



THE
KHANDANAKHANDAKHĀDYA
OF SHRI HARSHA



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KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀḌYA.

INTRODUCTION.

The fundamental tenet of the Vedānta of Shaṅkarāchārya is that the only Reality conceivable is that absolutely non-dual and non-differenced Entity whose nature consists of pure Consciousness; and the negative aspect of this same doctrine is that whatever presents itself as other than this Consciousness,—*i. e.*, the entire empirical world with its endless distinctions of individual thinking subjects and the manifold objects of their thought—is an essentially baseless appearance, no more real than the fleeting images which encompass the dreaming Soul and melt away into nothingness at the moment of waking; or than the unsubstantial pageant with which the magician as long as it pleases him deludes the senses of the bystanders. So far as our individual personalities are concerned, all our experiences constitute one long-continued dream, to be dispelled ultimately by that awakening which consists of the realisation of the true nature of inner objectless Consciousness, free from its limitations; the whole phantasmagoria is spread out by the magic of the Lord, who, puts it forth with a view to amuse himself, by deluding the senses of the imprisoned personalities, until these, by their supreme effort, regain their pristine intuition and see through the meshes of the magic.

To this view of things there are opposed in the first place, the ordinary consciousness of mankind which accepts as real all those manifold aspects and distinctions which characterise the world as perceived by the senses and dealt with by the operations of the understanding,—and in the second place, philosophical theories which essentially aim at nothing more than a certain systematisation of the world of common sense.

Kh. i.

The main Indian representative of theories of this latter kind is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy which undertakes to provide a complete explanation of the entire field of worldly experience—the objects to be known and the means of knowing them; and they tacitly pre-suppose the essential reality of all this world of thought and action. What is claimed for these philosophical systems is best described in the words of Vātsyāyana himself. Speaking of the ‘Instruments of Cognition’, whereby all our knowledge of things is obtained, he says—

“The Instruments of Right Cognition must be regarded as rightly effective, because it is only when a thing is known by means of an Instrument of Right Cognition that there is a possibility of its giving rise to fruitful and effective exertion. As a matter of fact, nothing can be known except through an Instrument of Cognition; nor can fruitful exertion be aroused except when things have been known; as it is only when the Agent has cognised a thing by means of an Instrument of Cognition that he desires either to acquire or get rid of it; and the effort of the agent stimulated by this desire to acquire or get rid of a thing is what is called ‘exertion’; and this exertion is called ‘fruitful’ when it becomes related to a result. The object or thing cognised by means of the Instruments of Cognition is of four kinds—pleasure, source of pleasure, pain and source of pain. . . . It is only when the Instrument of Cognition duly operates with regard to an object that due success can belong to the Cogniser (who can then only cognise the object)—or to the Cognised object (which then only can have its true character known)—or to the Right Cognition (which then only can lead to right activity). . . . It is on all these four factors—the Cognising Agent, the Cognised Object, the Instrument of Cognition and the Cognition—that the real nature of things is dependent for its being accepted, or rejected or treated with indifference. And this *real nature* of things is ‘being’ or ‘existence’ in the case of existing things, and ‘non-being’

“or ‘non-existence’ in the case of non-existent things
 “In fact the same Instrument of Cognition which makes
 “known the existent-thing, also makes known the non-exis-
 “tent thing.” (*Indian Thought*, IV, pp. 40-51.)

The things, or categories, whose correct knowledge leads to the attainment of the highest aim of human existence, are (according to the Nyāya), the following sixteen—The Instruments of Right Cognition, the Objects of Right Cognition, Doubt, Motive, Example, Doctrine, Factors of Inference, Hypothetical Reasoning, Demonstrated Truth, Discussion, Disputation, Wrangling, Fallacious Reason, Perversion, Casuistry and Clinchers. (Gauṭama’s Sūtra 1-1-1). The most important among these are the Instruments of Cognition and the Objects of Cognition; all the rest are of subordinate importance, being aids to the Instruments of Cognition. Says *Vātsyāyana*—

“Those enumerated in the Sūtra are the categories for
 “the true knowledge of which the treatise on Nyāya has been
 “propounded by Gauṭama; the Highest Good is attained only
 “when one has rightly understood the real nature of—(a) that
 “which is fit to be discarded, (*i. e.* pain along with its causes;
 “in the shape of Ignorance and its effects); (b) that which puts
 “an end to pain, *i. e.* Knowledge; (c) the means whereby the
 “destruction of pain is accomplished, *i. e.* the philosophical
 “treatises; and (d) the goal to be attained, *i. e.* the Highest
 “Good.”

(*Indian Thought*, IV, pp. 168-169).

Nyāya does not confine itself to an exposition of the Highest Good only. It makes it its business to explain in detail every one of those things that constitute the world, and every one of those factors that help in the obtaining of a correct knowledge of those things. An explanation of the true nature of the Supreme Brahman alone would not be sufficient; as before one undertakes the perilous task of seeking after that Inconceivable Reality, it is necessary that

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his attention should be weaned from all other things; and this weaning is possible only after one has understood their true character and found out for himself that there is nothing in worldly things that could be in the least conducive to any real or lasting pleasure; when one realises this, then alone is he in a position to enter upon that difficult path of duty and renunciation, conscious self-denial and rigid discipline, which has been aptly described as resembling the 'razor's edge'.

Thus then, as dealing with these all important topics, the Science of Reasoning, as expounded by Gauṭama in his Sūtras, is—says Vātsyāyana—

“The Lamp of all knowledge, the sheet-anchor of all things; the support of all sciences.”

Thus we see that what the Nyāya upholds is that all things of the world are real entities; and it provides us with precise definitions of every one of them; in fact the method adopted by the system is three-fold—(1) to enunciate the things to be known, (2) to provide exact definitions of these, and (3) to examine in detail everything in the light of the definition put forth. This Examination is by means of Discussion carried on among friends; which is the most agreeable way of getting at the truth of things. But before one can undertake a discussion with any profit, he has to admit the existence of, and comprehend the true nature of, every one of the Instruments of Right Cognition admitted by himself and his friends, and such other details as are required in the proper carrying on of a discussion.

It is at the very outset of this exposition of the Nyāya philosophy, that the *Khandana* joins issue. In order to start a discussion of any kind, it is not required, as the Logician would have us believe, that the essential reality of the sixteen categories should be acknowledged; for the starting of a discussion all that is required is that both parties should acknowledge certain rules of discussion as hind-

ing. Though the admission of such rules may imply the cognition of the categories, it by no means implies their essential *reality*. For the admission that the categories form the basis of all philosophical enquiry—as explained by Vātsyāyana—in no way obliges us to acknowledge their reality. The mere fact of the categories being the *cause* of the enquiry and discussion does not necessarily prove that they are *real*; the *unreal* can be a cause, just as much as the Real can. To maintain that a Cause must have real being involves the Logician in contradictions. For instance, according to the Nyāya, the Cause is *non-existent* at the precise moment that its effect comes into existence; and this should not be possible if the Cause is a real entity. In fact all that is essential in the Cause is that it should have an invariable previous existence to its effect; and this does not imply essential reality; as the said relation may hold good in the sphere of mere *apparent* existence. Such *apparent* existence, mere *empirical* (as opposed to *essential, absolute*) reality, is all that is necessary for the explanation of all empirical thought, speech and action; and this apparent reality is what the Vedāntin will readily admit. In fact such apparent reality is admitted even by the Nihilist, according to whom all worldly things have illusory existence, *samvṛiti saṁhā*. So far our author is in agreement with the view of the Bauddha Nihilist; but he parts company with him when the latter comes to deny the reality of *Vijñāna*, Cognition, also. In regard to this, our author accepts the view of the Bauddha-Idealist, according to whom nothing is real but *Idea*, Cognition. The reality of Cognition, says the Vedāntin, is guaranteed by itself; it is 'self-illuminated'; proved by itself. It is on this view only that the validity of Cognition can be established; while the theory of the Naiyāyika, according to which each direct cognition requires a secondary cognition to establish and guarantee it, finally invalidates all cognition; as it involves an unreasonable infinite regress of cognitions. The 'Cognition' however of the Vedāntin

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differs essentially from the 'Cognition' of the Bauddha Idealist ; for it is absolutely *one, non-differenced and eternal*, while that of the Bauddha is endless in number, undergoing changes every moment, and ephemeral. The theory that Cognition is self-illuminated or self-evidenced cannot be objected to on the ground that one and the same thing cannot be both 'subject' and 'object'. As in the first place, the Vedantin does not admit this alleged incompatibility of Subject and Object ; and in the second place, mere theoretical doubts on this point can have no force against undeniable facts of consciousness ; neither self-consciousness nor cognition of any object would be possible if 'subject' and 'object' were essentially distinct entities. While, therefore, our author is at one with the Bauddha-Idealist as to the 'undefinability' and consequent 'unreality' of all that is not-cognition, he holds,—differently from the Bauddha—that this Cognition or Consciousness is one and eternal and self-evidenced.

Cognition is *one, non-dual*—says our author ; and this fact is proved by Vedic texts which, in clear terms, declares such non-duality ; and the authority of Vedic texts is binding alike upon the Vedāntin and the Naiyāyika. Nor is there any force in the stock objection of the Naiyāyika that those Vedic texts that declare universal Non-duality are refuted by the ordinary means of knowledge, Perception and the rest, which reveal to us a world characterised by *diversity*. In the first place, no tenet with a claim to universality can be established by Perception, which never extends to more than a limited number of things, and the difference of these things from one another. It does not, on the other hand, establish either the difference of those things from the Cognitions of them, or the several Cognitions from each other. In this latter sphere therefore the Vedic declaration of Non-duality at once asserts itself, without being encountered by any valid counter-authority ; and if the general non-difference of the

object from the Cognition, and of Cognitions from each other, has once been admitted, we are driven to view the difference of things from each other as a mere false appearance; and as individual false appearances are always due to some defect in the individual mind and sensory apparatus, the said false appearance of difference among things is due to the great Cosmic Defect, *Māyā*, Nescience, which, in an inexplicable manner, attaches itself to the Universal Principle of Non-differenced Consciousness.

Every other argument that the Naiyāyika propounds against 'Non-duality' proceeds on the basis of 'diversity'; and as such is fallacious, as presupposing what it has got to prove.

Having thus shown that the Naiyāyika's arguments against 'Non-duality' are untenable, our Author next calls upon him to provide a valid definition of that 'difference' between things which, he says, is evidenced by Perception. A thorough examination of the several definitions proposed shows them all to be destructive of the very thing they are meant to define. For, if on the one hand, Difference is viewed as entering into the essential nature of the things that differ, the relation between the latter, if duly thought out, is found to be one, not of difference, but of identity. And if, on the other hand, difference is held to be something extraneous to the things that differ, the need of establishing a connection between Difference on the one hand and the things differing on the other, drives us into the assumption of an endless series of relations; which explains nothing.

Against the Vedānta conception of *Non-duality* deriving its authority from Vedic texts, it has been urged that these texts themselves are *diverse*. But *diversity* of the texts does not disprove the *non-duality* being real; for the Veda itself, as well as the process through which it gives rise to the knowledge of Reality, lies within the sphere of the *Unreal*, the *Illusory*. It is only *knowledge* in the true sense—i. e. knowledge in its pure

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essence of non-differenced Consciousness—that is *real*; that alone is eternal; it is never brought into existence; it always *is*.

So for we have been dealing with the constructive aspect of the Khandana. This, however, is only a subordinate aspect. As its very name implies, destructive criticism, of the most thoroughgoing kind, is its aim. The thesis upon which the entire work is based is that nothing can be explained,—neither any factor of worldly phenomena nor the ultra-phenomenal Consciousness or Brahman. All is *inexplicable anirvachanīya*; no adequate explanation can be provided of anything. In fact, so thoroughgoing is the ‘inexplicability’ propounded that our author, in denying the reality of the Logician’s ‘means of Cognition’, denies the reality of *Word* also as a means of cognition; and yet, we have seen, it is upon Vedic texts that he bases his notion of ‘non-duality.’ What our author would say would be that he does not deny the fact of *Word* giving rise to cognition; all that he insists upon is that it is unreal; and that it is *inexplicable*. In adopting this thesis, our author has given evidence of his having been the clever dialectician that tradition has given him the credit of being. When pressed to formulate his own explanation of things, he says—‘It is not my business to explain things; for me everything is *inexplicable*; and I shall make it my business to prove that this is so.’ In fact in certain places, when he finds the Logician’s argument getting the better of him, he wriggles out of the difficult position by turning round with the taunt—‘I have no proofs and reasonings in my system; when I put forward an argument it is only in accordance with your doctrines; so that if there is anything wrong in the argument the discredit is yours, not mine.’

In due accordance with this thesis, the plan that our author adopts is to submit the definitions which the Logician gives of the main categories and the main cognitional activities, to a critical investigation which leads to the result that all those definitions are found to suffer from inner contradic-

tions, and hence untenable. And since the Logician himself acknowledges the principle that the reality of things is proved through definitions and proofs, the inevitable conclusion is, since all definitions and proofs are untenable, all so-called reality, including all individual thought—every phenomenon in fact in the world of thought, speech and action—is a baseless illusion; nothing is real but the one Non-differenced Light of Universal Consciousness, Brahman.

The 'arguments of refutation' begin with the refutation of the Logician's explanation of 'Right Cognition.' Every one of the definitions proposed by several writers on Nyāya is taken up, examined and found defective. Similar refutations follow of—Apprehension, Recognition, Remembrance, the several kinds of Negation Instrument in general and Instrument of Cognition in particular, Operation in general, Perception, Inference and its factors, Analogy, Verbal Cognition, Word, Presumption, Non-apprehension as a means of cognition, and the different Fallacies of Inference. With this ends the first chapter. Chapter II contains similar refutations of some of the more important 'Clinchers' postulated by the Naiyāyika. Chapter III shows the absurdity involved in the putting of any such questions as—'what is the proof of the existence of God?' Chapter IV continues the refutations of the Nyāya categories—of Existence, Non-existence, Qualification, Substance, Quality, Community, Eternality, Individuality, Relations, Substratum, the conceptions of 'above' and 'below,' the relation of Subject and Object, Difference, the notion of Causality, Destruction and Prior Negation, Doubt, the notion of contradiction between 'existence' and 'non-existence' and Hypothetical Reasoning.

When we come to ponder over the place of this uncompromising 'Advaita' Vedānta, in the history of Indian thought, we cannot fail to notice that it bears upon its face the traces of most powerful influence exerted by Buddhistic religion and philosophy. Notwithstanding the opinions of Prof. Deussen and others, who would have us believe, that

'Vedānta'—in the form later developed by the great Śhaṅkarāchārya—is to be found adumbrated in the earlier Upaniṣads, we are forced to the conclusion that Śhaṅkara's Vedānta was a compromise between the thorough-going Idealism of the Buddhist and the orthodoxy of the 'Vedic' philosophers. Several acute Indian thinkers have noted this, and we find the Vedāntin often referred to as प्रच्छन्न बौद्ध, a 'hidden Buddhist.' Like the Bauddha Idealist, the Vedāntin denies the reality of things, on account of the impossibility of adequate explanations and definitions being provided of them; they are *anirvachanīya*, says the Khandana, they are *nirsonbhāva*, says the *Mādhyamikā-vṛitti* (p. 84, Calcutta Edition) and *undefinable* and *without character* says the *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra II. 173*. Both deny the reality of all phenomena; and both for the same reason that the exact nature of things figuring in that phenomenon cannot be ascertained. The position of the Bauddha *Mādhyamika* philosopher has been summed up by Vāchaspati Mishra in his *Nyāyavṛttikāṭṭaparyatikā* (Vizia. S. S. Benares, 1898, page, 249), and we cannot fail to perceive in this an echo of the thoughts and ideas permeating throughout the Khandana. Here is what the Buddhist philosopher says in regard to the Logician's view regarding the 'Instruments of Right Cognition':—

"It is our firm conviction that the entire world cannot bear scrutiny; and hence for us there need be no scrutiny or detailed study of what you call the 'Instruments of Right Cognition'; yet what we are going to show is that your view of these 'Instruments' is not tenable, in accordance with those proofs and reasonings that you yourself have postulated. And if in this process, your cherished proofs and means of Cognition melt away into nothingness, it is not our fault."

Is not this an exact echo of the following paragraph from the Khandana?

'How can he who holds, as we do, that all things cannot be defined either as real or as unreal, be found fault with on the ground of his inability to prove or define the

‘character of *undefinability*. Is not this very *undefinability* included in *all things*, which expression comprises the whole phenominal world? We in fact are prepared to prove the undefinability of things on the rules and methods of the logician himself—since all definitions whatever turn out to be futile, it follows that the thing is *undefinable*; for the logician himself teaches that, as between affirmation and negation, the rejection of either implies the acceptance of the other. It therefore is in accordance with the methods of the Logician that we say *the undefinableness of the Universe is proved*. Your method of argumentation against us cannot be right; for, as we have shown, it is refuted by arguments complying with all the rules devised by yourselves. For this reason there is no room for the criticism directed against the objections set forth by us; for our entire refutation of your rules and methods proceeds in strict accordance with these rules and methods as laid down by yourselves. If, finally, you were to reject as futile the arguments by which, in full agreement with your own rules and methods, we have shown your theories to be futile,—this would mean neither more nor less than that you reject as futile those very rules and methods of yours.’ (*Translation* Vol. I Para. 93, 94 and 97),

Our author was himself conscious of this apparent kinship to the Buddhist philosopher: and he has tried to point out wherein, on a cardinal point, lies his difference from that heterodox philosophy.

‘The difference between the Bauḍḍha and the Vedāntin comes to this:—the Bauḍḍha regards every thing without exception as *anirvachanīya*, i. e., undefinable; as Buḍḍha himself has declared in the *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra* (II. 173)—‘When we come rationally to examine things, we cannot ascertain the nature of anything; hence all things must be declared to be undefinable and devoid of any assignable nature or character’;—the Vedāntin, on the other hand, declares that this entire Universe, *with the exception of Cognition or Consciousness*, is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal.

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'It cannot be absolutely real, because this view is beset with difficulties ; nor can he regard it as absolutely unreal, since this would strike at the root of all empirical thought, speech and action.'

In view of this last assertion it is interesting to note that the Buddhist also admits of some sort of an *unreal* (illusory) 'reality' in the ordinary things of ordinary experience ; what the Vedāntin calls '*vyāvahārikī saṁṣā*', 'empirical existence', is nearly analogous to what the Buddhist has called '*samvṛiti saṁṣā*' ; both terms connote some sort of an *illusory existence* as distinguished from *absolute non-existence*. Like the Vedāntin again, the Bauddha regards every organised thing to consist of mere 'Name and Form', '*nāmarūpa*' ; the product of Illusion—called '*Māyā*' by the Vedāntin and '*Prajñā*' by the Bauddha.

As to the priority in time of the Buddhist Idealism as compared to the Idealism of the Vedānta, we have the authority of competent Buddhist scholars, who assert that Buddhism was from the very beginning essentially such as we find it in the *Tripitaka*—a philosophy of Idealistic Nihilism, an Idealism which holds (1) that the fruitful source of all error was the unfounded belief in the reality and existence of the external world, (2) that all known or knowable objects are relative to a conscious subject ; and (3) the whole phenomenal world is a mere illusion.

The 'arguments of refutation' are apparently irresistible ; the author feels this and declares at the very outset that his readers would obtain victory in disputations by merely repeating his arguments 'like a parrot.' These arguments have served this purpose on many a field of philosophical disputation ; but though they have secured victory to the victor, they have always failed to carry conviction to the vanquished ; he has been silenced, but not illumined.

Several attempts have been made by later Logicians to meet the arguments hurled against their system with such bewildering force. The earliest attempt we can trace was

made by Vāchaspati Mishra, the *second*, who, in addition to his thirty treatises on several branches of Law, wrote some books on *Nyāya* also; two of which are known to us, a commentary on the *Nyāya Sūtras*, called the '*Nyāyāṭa!ṭoāloka*' (available in manuscript) and the *Khaṇḍanoḍḍhāra* (published in the Paudit, New Series, Vols. 24 and 25).

The editor of the new edition of the *Khaṇḍana* with its *Vidyāsāgari* commentary (in the Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series) is not right in regarding *Gokulanāṭha Upādhyāya's* '*Khaṇḍana-kulhāra*' as a refutation of the *Khaṇḍana*; it is a commentary, not a refutation; the name '*Khaṇḍanakulhāra*' connoting 'the axe with which the cutting, *khaṇḍana*, is done.'

The *Khaṇḍanoḍḍhāra* is a detailed criticism of the arguments of *Khaṇḍana*; but never rises above the level of ordinary dialectics. The author who has made an attempt to meet the *Khaṇḍanakāra* on his own ground is Shaṅkara Mishra, the writer of the well-known commentary on the *Khaṇḍana*. He has written a small work called *Bhēḍarāṭna*, in which he at times does attain the high level of dialectic skill that we meet with on almost every page of the *Khaṇḍana*. Here is the task that the author sets before himself.—

'Logicians being the trusted guradians of the treasures of *Diversity*,—Shankara is now going to drive away the Vedantin-thieves, bent upon running away with those treasures.'—The writer shows that he has fully benefited by the writing of his commentary upon the *Khaṇḍana*. In several places he very cleverly turns the arguments of the Vedantin against himself, and ends with parodying the recapitulatory verses with which the *Khaṇḍana* often clinches its arguments. I should have liked to give long extracts from this interesting treatise; but the manuscript in my possession is a defective one; so I content myself with a single specimen.

'If there is *non-difference* between you and me, then you should know what is in my mind. If you say that you cannot know it because of the limitations imposed upon your cognitive faculty by your body, &c.,—then, as you do accept *difference*

‘as between our bodies, what objection have you to accepting
‘difference as between that which is limited by these bodies, *i. e.*
‘our selves? If you say that you do accept that difference also,
‘but all this difference is only *empirical*, not *real*,—then victory
‘lies with us; for if the difference as between our bodies
‘is not *real*, then why do you fail to know what is in my
‘mind? Then again, the Nescience that you postulate as the
‘basic cause of all phenomenal activity, must be something
‘different from your Brahman;—

‘Thus then for the steadfast warrior who takes up the
‘single mighty weapon of *Difference* and heeds nothing else,
‘there can be no discomfiture in the sport of battle.

This verse is a parody of verse 15 in the *Khaṇḍana*,
(Translation, Vol. I para 125).

Then again, we have seen that the constructive part of the
Khaṇḍana is based upon Vedic texts. As regards these
texts Shankara Mishbra offers the following remarks—

‘In the text *nityam vijñānam ānaṇḍam brahma*’ the
‘*vijñāna* means one whose knowledge is of an exceptional
‘character, this exceptional character consisting in its being
‘eternal, unlike our cognitions which are all ephemeral;
‘*ānaṇḍam* means one who has bliss. So that what is describ-
‘ed in this text is the personal God of the Logician, and
‘not the impersonal Brahman of the Vedantin. Then as
‘for those texts that speak of *two Brahman*s, higher and
‘lower, the Logician’s God is the *higher* Brahman, and the
‘self of the *Jīvanmukta*,—the man who has attained Release,
‘but continues in his body for sometime,—is the *lower*
‘Brahman. Similarly whenever the Veda uses the term
‘*Brahman*, it should be taken as standing for our *God*, and
‘not for the impersonal ‘Cognition’ of the Vedantin’.

The age of our author has been fixed with some sort of
certainty by the editor in his Introduction to the Chaakham-
bha Sanskrit Series. By means of several arguments
based upon external and internal evidence he has come to

the conclusion that Shri-Harṣa lived in the middle of the twelfth century of the Christian era, at the court of King Jayachandra of Kannauj. That our author was an honoured visitor at this court is clear from what he has said in the concluding verses of the Khaṇḍana.

In connection with Shri-Hārṣa our author there are several interesting stories, more or less reliable, current among Pandits.

He is believed to have been the nephew of Mammata, the author of the *Kāvya-prakāśha*. After having composed the *Naiṣaḍhachariṭa* in 100 cantos, Shri-Harṣa showed it to his uncle, who looked into it and remarked—‘What a pity you did not show this to me before I wrote the seventh chapter of my *Kāvya-prakāśha*, where I have dealt with the defects of Poetry! It would have saved me the trouble of hunting for examples of the several defects.’ Being dejected by this severe criticism, the young poet threw away his manuscript into the river, from where his pupils rescued a portion, which is all that has come down to us in the shape of the 22 cantos of the *Naiṣaḍhachariṭa*.

Another story makes Shri-Harṣa the pupil of Govinda Thakkura, the writer of the *Kāvya-praḍīpa*. That a promising young man of this name was actually with Govinda Thakkura is proved by the concluding verse of the *Kāvya-praḍīpa*.

ज्येष्ठे सर्वगुणैः कनीयसि वयोमात्रेण पात्रे धियां
गात्रेण स्मरगर्वखर्वणपरे निष्ठाप्रतिष्ठाश्रये ।
श्रीहर्षे त्रिदिवङ्गते मयि मनोहीने च कः शोधये—
दत्राशुद्धिमहो महत्सु विधिना भारोऽयमारोपितः ॥

—Where the author speaks of Shri-Harṣa as ‘one who is superior to me in all good qualities and inferior only in age.’ But of course it is doubtful whether or not he is the same as the author of the *Khaṇḍana*.

Some people have believed that Shri-Harṣa was one of the four Brahmanas brought over to Bengal by Aḍi Sūra.

But if our author had flourished at the court of this great king, he should have left some record of this fact, just as he has mentioned his connection with the 'Kānyakubja king.' It is however possible that the poem by him called *Gaudorvīsha-kulaprashastī* may be a description of the kings of Gaur, which was the ancient capital of the kingdom of Bengal. This question has to remain open until this poem has been found and examined.

We have to apologise to the reader for the discrepancy in the paragraph-numbering. I undertook the editing of the text and its commentary for the Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series at the same time that I began my translation. And so long as this arrangement continued, the paragraph-numbering in the translation was kept in conformity with that in the text. But subsequently the editorship had to go to other hands, whose notions of paragraph-numbering were different from mine; so that the numbering in the two soon ceased to tally. The head-note therefore at the beginning of the translation is apt to be misleading.

The earlier part of the translation has had the advantage of revision at the hands of Dr. Thibaut. But since his transfer to Calcutta his duties there left him no time to devote to this work. I am therefore afraid that the latter part has remained imperfect, in several respects.

The nature of the work is such that many passages must have been not understood or at best imperfectly understood by me. But thanks to my friend Babu Govindāḍāsa of Benares, I had the benefit of the manuscript of a very rare commentary on the text, by the famous Chiṣukhāchārya. This commentary has proved extremely useful, in elucidating several of the most difficult passages, where all the other commentaries proved unsatisfactory. I cannot therefore close this Preface better than by acknowledging my indebtedness to that indefatigable but unostentatious worker in the field of Sanskrit literary research.

GANGANATHA JHA.

Kh. xvi.

SHRI-HARṢA'S.

KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYA.

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

The Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādyā ('the Sweets of Refutation')—composed by Shri-Harṣa—who wrote probably before the eighth century—is the most famous and important of those Vedānta treatises which emphasize the negative or sceptical side of the system. As well known, the fundamental tenet of the Vedānta doctrine is that there is one absolutely non-dual or non-differenced Reality the nature of which is constituted by intelligence or knowledge (jñāna). Whatever presents itself as other than this one objectless intelligence, *i. e.* the entire empirical world with its distinctions of individual thinking subjects and the manifold objects of their thought, is an essentially baseless appearance, something at bottom no more real than the fleeting images which encompass the dreaming soul and melt away into nothingness at the moment of waking; or than the 'insubstantial pageant' with which the magician as long as it pleases him deludes the senses of the bystanders.

To this view of things there are opposed in the first place, the ordinary consciousness of mankind which unhesitatingly accepts as fully real all those manifold aspects and distinctions which characterize the world as perceived by the senses and dealt with by the operations of the understanding, and in the second place those philosophical theories which essentially aim at nothing more than a certain systematization of the world of common sense. The main Indian representative of theories

Kh. 1.

of the latter kind is the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy which undertakes to set forth in complete and methodic form the system of notions employed in ordinary thought, or—to put it differently—to give a theory of the various means by which truth is ascertained ; the tacit pre-supposition being that the system of knowledge which we build up through Perception, Inference and so on, is essentially valid in as much as being an exact ideal equivalent of a system of real things and their relations.

It is against this view of the world and of knowledge that the Vedāntin of the type of Shri-Harṣa directs his attacks. His plan is to submit the definitions which the Naiyāyika gives of the main categories of reality and the main cognitional activities, to a critical investigation—which leads to the result that all those definitions suffer from inner contradictions and hence are untenable. And, since the Naiyāyika himself acknowledges the principle that the reality of things is proved through definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) and the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the inevitable conclusion is that all so-called reality, including all individual thought, is a baseless illusion : nothing is real but the one non-differenced light of universal intelligence —Brahman.

THE KHAṆḌANAKHAṆḌAKHĀDYA.

[The paragraph numberings are in accordance with the edition published in the "Chaukhambhā Sanskrit Series," Benares. The page numbers refer to the edition published in the "Pandit."]

INTRODUCTORY VERSES.

(1). [Page 1.] To that universal soul, which is one, changeless, raised above all distinctive knowledge, declared in the Scriptures—to the Lord, not only embraced by Umā, but comprehended by me also, I offer my salutations. (1)

(2). [Page 3.] O Bhavānī, for the purpose of destroying the constantly accumulating evils of mundane existence, I reverently bow to the lotuses of your feet—those lotuses that rightly close when touched by the beams of the moon which Shiva wears as a diadem,—as he inclines his head towards you in the pleasing act of appeasing your anger. (2)

(3). O men of intelligence, may you attain to the joy of universal conquest, even by merely repeating parrot-like this work of mine—rendering 'speechless' all your proud opponents by utterly demolishing the possibility of either words or the things denoted by them 'being set forth in speech' (*i. e.* being satisfactorily defined.) (3)

CHAPTER I.

REFUTATION OF THE PRAMĀNAS.*

SECTION 1.

[In order to start a discussion of any kind it is not required (as the Logician would make us believe) that the essential reality of the categories distinguished by him (such as *pramāṇa i. e.*, means of valid knowledge; *prameya, i. e.*, object of valid knowledge, etc.) should be acknowledged. For the starting of a discussion the only thing required is that both sides should acknowledge certain rules of discussion as binding. The acknowledgment of such rules indeed implies a cognition of the categories, but by no means their *reality*.]

* The Logician (Naiyāyika) postulates sixteen categories of which the first two are: *Pramāṇa*, Means of knowledge and *Prameya*, object of knowledge.

(4). Our opponents, the Logicians, hold that in all discussion, it is absolutely necessary that the disputants on both sides should acknowledge the sixteen categories, *Pramāṇa* and the rest, as real entities fully established by all systems of philosophy.

(5). Others, however (the *Vedāntins*) do not admit this. For, they ask, what is the reason obliging the disputant to acknowledge the reality of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories?

[A] Is it because for disputants not acknowledging the categories it is not possible to start any discussion, all discussion necessarily depending on the acknowledgment of those categories? [B] Or, because such acknowledgment is the *cause* of the discussion to be begun by the disputants? [C] Or, because all these categories are well known and accepted by all men? [D] Or, because if they be not accepted the *ascertainment of truth* and *victory*—which are the respective results of the two principal kinds of discussion—would extend too far (*i.e.*, would be attained even by altogether unlearned and silly people).^{*}

(6). [A] The first of these reasons is not valid. For we actually find that there are lengthy discussions carried on by people such as the Chārvākas (Materialist-Atheists), the Mādhyamikas (Bauddha-Nihilists) and others who do not acknowledge the sixteen categories of the Logician. In fact, if these people were not capable of setting forth their views in literary works, there would be no reason for you to make any efforts towards their refutation. In putting forward the 'acceptance of the sixteen categories' as a necessary condition of all discussion, you thus pronounce a most wonderful incantation capable of binding all speech,—an incantation, so strangely powerful as to accomplish the result that the revered Preceptor of the Gods, Bṛihaspati, did *not* produce the *Lokāyatika-sūtras*, that the Tathāgata Buddha did *not* teach the *Mādhyamika* scriptures, and that our own revered Teacher, Śaṅkarāchārya did *not* compose his commentary on the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa.!!

* There are three kinds of discussion—(1) *Vāda*—Discussion for the purpose of ascertaining truth, (2) *Jalpa*—Discussion for the purpose of worsting the opponent, and (3) *Vitāṇḍā*—Sophistical reasonings put forward for the sole purpose of showing off one's cleverness.

(7). Here the Logician will perhaps re-state his argument in a more guarded form: I do not, he says, mean to deny that verbal disquisitions may be carried on by men who do not acknowledge the sixteen categories; but what I mean to deny is that such disquisitions can prove or disprove anything.

(8). In this also, we reply, you are mistaken. What renders verbal disquisitions incapable of proving or disproving anything is not their being put forward by persons who do not acknowledge the sixteen categories; what makes them thus incapable rather is,—as you will have to admit yourself—that they have the character of fallacious or erroneous assertions. We often find that assertions made by persons who, in accordance with their peculiar theoretical views, acknowledge the categories, are rejected as ‘incapable of proving or disproving anything’ by other persons, who also acknowledge the reality of the categories, but happen to hold a different philosophical theory.

(9). Consequently, so long as you are not able to show that our assertions are ‘fallacious’ or ‘erroneous’, we shall pay no regard to you, even if you go on repeating a hundred times—“you have put forward these assertions without acknowledging the sixteen categories.” Were such words to be taken seriously, we on our part might, with equal reasonableness, argue against you—‘you have put forward these assertions after having acknowledged the sixteen categories, and hence they must be rejected as fallacious’!

(10) But, the Logician objects, if there be no *Pramāṇa* and the other categories, how can the ‘verbal discussion’ itself—which is the topic of our present discussion—come about? * And how can there be any rules to determine *refutation* and the like, in connection with verbal assertions? For all assertions and denials depend upon *Pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge).

(11). [Page 10.] You misrepresent the case, we reply. We do not hold that all discussions should begin only after it has been acknowledged by the disputants that ‘*Pramāṇa* and the other categories have no real existence’. All that we mean is that

* As there could be no valid knowledge of it without some ‘means of knowledge’ (*Pramāṇa*).

discussions may be carried on by those who are indifferent as to the reality or non-reality of those categories, no less than by you who accept their reality. If this were not so,* it would not be possible for you to combat our theory in the way you have done, after having imputed to us the view that *Pramāṇa* and the other categories have no reality.

(12). For on what grounds could the discussion have been started so as to enable you, in the course of the discussion, to combat our view? Was it on the basis of both parties acknowledging the reality of the categories? or on the basis of both denying their reality? or on the basis of one of us acknowledging their reality and the other not acknowledging it? The first of these alternatives is inadmissible; since the objection you urge would not lie against one who acknowledges the reality of the categories. The second alternative would imply that you yourself are open to that objection. Nor again is the third alternative possible. For on it, just as the present discussion is started (even though one of the disputants does not acknowledge the categories), so, in the same manner all other discussions could be started (which would show that the acceptance of the reality of the categories is not necessary for the starting of discussions). And in reality it is absolutely necessary for the discussion to proceed on a common basis accepted by both parties (and so there can be no discussion when one party accepts the categories and the other does not). Were it not so, your opponent also would put forward, in accordance with his own view of things (not accepted by you), certain verbal objections against your assertions; and to which of you two, under these circumstances, would the victory have to be adjudged? In fact, it would be the disputant acknowledging the categories that would be galled by the weight of greater restrictions.

(13). For these reasons it will be right for you to declare that you raise your objections after the discussion has been started between us on the basis of certain rules agreed upon by both of us, irrespective of our views as to the reality or unreality of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories. And as thus you are

* i. e. If it were not possible for one not acknowledging the reality of the *Pramāṇas* to enter on a discussion.

unable to ascertain your own meaning, you truly cannot hope to ascertain the views of others.*

(14). [Page 12.] But, the Logician resumes, I do not mean to set forth my objections against an unreasonable disputant, accepting him as my opponent in a controversy; all I mean is to show to my own pupils that persons not acknowledging the categories cannot be admitted to any discussion. 'It is for this reason that the author of the *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* (Vātsyāyana, Page 4) says—'if on being asked his purpose, *he should say, &c., &c. (pratipadyatē, in the Third Person),*' and not 'if *you should say (pratipadyasē)*' [while this latter form would be required if the objection were addressed to the opponent.]

(15). But this also we cannot allow. For even if addressing your pupils only, you would have to express yourself as follows:—'These are the objections lying against the Chārvāka (materialist) and others'; and how would this be possible? For, would the objection against these people be put forward after they had been admitted to the discussion, or before that? In either case, the objection would not be effective against them.

(16). [B] Nor is the second alternative (noted in para. 5) tenable. For on that view the reality of the categories would have to be acknowledged only if the causal relation of the categories towards the discussion to be started were to come to an end on the non-acknowledgment of the categories. But the latter cannot be the case; for if it were so, those who do not acknowledge the categories could make no use of words at all, since the cause of such use would be absent. And we have already pointed out above that you cannot deny the existence of the use of words on the part of the Bauddha-Nihilists and others who do not acknowledge the reality of your categories.

* The Logician does not ascertain his own meaning in so far as he urges an objection against the Vedāntin, only after the discussion has been started without the Vedāntin admitting the reality of the categories, and yet declares that one who does not admit that cannot be admitted to a discussion. And he shows ignorance of the opponent's view inasmuch as he controverts the opinion that the categories are unreal; while all that the Vedāntin has so far asserted is that the acknowledgment of the categories is not needed for the starting of a discussion.

(17). Your meaning in setting forth the second alternative (B) may possibly be that *Pramāṇa* and the other categories are real because they are the cause of the verbal discussion carried on by the disputants; and since they are real they must be acknowledged by all, in agreement with the accepted principle that 'whatever is real is acknowledged as such.'

(18). But this also will not help you. For it is only after some discussion has been started that you can proceed to prove the necessity of accepting the categories, on the ground of their having reality as proved by the fact that they are the cause of the verbal discussions carried on by the disputants.

(19). In fact, we can regard that alone as the necessary antecedent of discussions without which it would be quite impossible for the disputants, aiming either at the ascertainment of truth or at victory over their opponent, to obtain what they desire. And since all that is absolutely necessary for this is that they should agree to lay down certain rules and conditions for the discussion, the disputants, before entering into any discussion, *do* lay down such rules and conditions.

(20). These rules and conditions are somewhat to the following effect:—(1) The party that starts the discussion should proceed by means of valid arguments in accordance with the recognised means of knowledge; (2) then the other party should point out, in the arguments thus propounded, some invalidating flaw in the shape of 'self-contradiction' and the like, which would show that the person propounding the argument is not possessed of that true knowledge which the discussion aims at; (3) if this second party succeeds in demonstrating some such flaw, the first party must be regarded as 'defeated'; (4) if, however, the second party fails to prove the flaw, it is he who must be taken as 'defeated'; (5) in each case, the party other than the 'defeated' must be held to be 'victorious'; (6) the position, that is ultimately found to be supported by valid proofs must be accepted as 'true';—and so forth.

(21). This leaves no room for an objection on the Logician's part, similar to that which we urged against him when asking him to point out his reasons for accepting the reality of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories,—*viz.*, "you are bound to point out your reasons for the necessity of laying down rules and conditions for

the conducting of discussions ; and this pointing out can be done only *after* a certain discussion has been started [and hence, like the categories, the rules also need not be accepted as necessary for the actual starting of discussions.]’ There is no room for this objection, we say, because the rules and conditions for discussions are spontaneously accepted by both disputants ; since on that basis only they can realise the two ends which prompt men to start discussions,—*viz* : the ascertainment of truth, and the defeat of the opponent.

(22). Here the following objection may perhaps be raised :—“ From what you say it would appear that the rules and conditions of discussion come to be accepted, not on the ground of valid reasons, but merely on the choice of the disputants ; and as thus the foundation is unsound, great confusion and uncertainty will beset the discussion, the subjects of discussion and the results of discussion.” But this objection also we refuse to admit. The rules and conditions above specified by us as the basis of discussion are perfectly sound, for they are self-evident,—as proved by the facts that it is impossible to imagine anything contrary to them, that they have come down to us through ^oimmemorial tradition, and that men have generally agreed to them on the basis of universal practical experience.

(23). Nor can it be asserted that the existence of the categories also must be accepted by the disputants on the same grounds as that of the rules and conditions. For, in order to render it possible for the discussion to be started, nothing further is recognised as necessary than the acceptance of the said rules and conditions. On the other hand, if we acknowledge the reality of the categories, it would be impossible for the disputants, if not accepting the rules and conditions, either to ascertain the truth, or to secure victory,—which are the two purposes for which discussions are started.

(24). [Page 17.] [C] Nor also can we accept the third alternative mentioned above (in para. 5): That is to say, the reality of the categories cannot be acknowledged on the ground of their being practically acknowledged by all men. For, we ask, do you mean that they are practically acknowledged by authoritative

^o The reading translated is that adopted by the Vidyāsāgarī commentary.

and trustworthy persons alone? or, by all men, high and low alike? It cannot be the former; since the fact of anything being supported by the usage of authoritative persons cannot be ascertained without due enquiry and discussion; and it is for the sake of just such enquiry and discussion that we are in search of the necessary basis. Nor the latter; as in that case you will have to admit the validity of the notion of the body being the Self, and so forth (which erroneous notions are generally entertained by common people).

(25). But, the Logician says, notions of this latter kind we do not accept, since we find them to be sublated by subsequent reflexion. If this is so, we reply, then the categories under discussion also cannot be accepted if they are found to be sublated by subsequent reflexion; otherwise they will certainly be acknowledged. But they cannot be accepted for the mere reason that they are practically acknowledged by people in general.

(26). [D] Nor can the fourth alternative (in para 5) be maintained: That is to say, the reality of the categories cannot be accepted for the reason that if it were not accepted, there would be an undue extension of the results of discussion. For, even though we are absolutely indifferent as to the reality or unreality of the categories in question, yet we also acknowledge the same rules and conditions for the conduct of discussions that you accept (and in accordance with which you judge of the results of discussions); and if these rules and conditions were to lead to undesirable judgments in regard to these results, in our case, they would do the same in your case also [and hence what is necessary for the discussion is only the acceptance of these rules and conditions, and not that of the categories].

(27). Here the Logician raises a new objection: If, he says, you start a discussion on the basis of certain rules and conditions to be observed in the carrying on of verbal intercourse, you must at any rate acknowledge the *reality* of the existence of such verbal intercourse; for unless you do so, you cannot speak of its being *carried on* or *effected*; since to *effect* a thing means to bring it from *non-existence* into *real existence*. Then again, the rule laid down by you (in para. 20), that discussions should be carried on by means of arguments founded on the recognised means of valid knowledge, could not be upheld unless you admitted that causal

power of the means of valid knowledge which consists in their having a necessary real existence previous to their effects; for such causal power is implied in that rule. Further, the rules relating to the ascertainment of 'defeat' pre-suppose the reality of the Fallacies; and similarly the reality of Invariable Concomitance (Vyāpti) and other elements of Reasoning is implied in the rules bearing on the ascertainment of what constitutes truth in the matter under dispute. It thus appears that in laying down your rules you distinctly admit the reality of those several factors; and hence it is a mere empty assertion of yours to say that 'discussions can be started without accepting the reality of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories.'

(28). Your objection is invalid, we reply. For what you seek to prove can be proved only *after* the discussion on the point has been started; and hence our objections to your position remain in force.

(29). Against this you may not urge that, "inasmuch as the laying down of the rules and conditions accepted by the Vedāntin would at once imply the acknowledgment of the reality of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories, the Logician is not open to the said objections." For what is implied in those rules is only the *knowledge* of *Pramāṇa* and the rest, and not their *reality*.

(30). And on this point we put the following question:—Do you mean that the reality of *Pramāṇa* and the rest should be admitted simply because there is a cognition of their reality? Or because there is such cognition of their reality as is not sublated (by some other more valid cognition)? Not the former truly; since from that view it would follow that we must acknowledge the presence of true water in the mirage (which, at the time, is cognized as water). Then, as regards the second alternative, should the reality of the categories be accepted because the cognition of them is not sublated or rejected by the two disputants and the umpire, at the time of the discussion,—or because it is not rejected by any person at any time? The former view would land us in absurdity, being much too wide in its scope; for it often happens that what is cognized by three persons and at one moment, is sublated by the cognition of a fourth person, and at another moment; and when such sublation actually takes place, the thing cognized as unreal truly is not held to

be *real*, simply on the strength of its having been cognised as such at a previous moment by two or three individuals. Hence the only tenable view is the latter,—*viz.*, that that alone should be regarded as *real* which is *never*, and *by no person*, found to be sublated.

(31). [Page 21.] Thus then, even if it be held that the cognition of the existence of the Fallacies, &c., *by the disputants and the umpire*, which is not sublated *at the time of the discussion*, is a necessary factor in the discussion,—in what way does this affect the view that the starting of a discussion does not depend upon the acceptance of the *reality* of the Fallacies, etc., as proved by such cognition of them as is not sublated *in any way (i.e., by any person, at any time)*? We have here to remember that ordinary empirical thought and activity are generally found to be based upon the acceptance of certain notions as true *by only a few persons and at only certain points of time*. And it is only such cognition of the existence of *Pramāna*, &c., that we regard as necessary in the starting of discussions. This is what is meant by the assertion that ‘discussions are started on the basis of the supposition that *Pramāna* and the other categories have a *practical* (and not *real*) existence.’

(32). We thus arrive at the conclusion that for the starting of a discussion certain rules must be accepted, such as the following—‘when the Umpire comes to the decision that a certain disputant has not transgressed the rules of discussion agreed upon, that disputant must be held to have gained the victory; that disputant on the other hand with regard to whose arguments the Umpire does not form that judgment must be regarded as having been defeated; that disputant again in whose arguments the Umpire acknowledges the presence of flaws pointed out by the opponent is to be regarded as vanquished; while a disputant not falling under that category cannot be regarded as vanquished, and so forth.

(33). [Page 23]. For when we say that the disputant must carry on the discussion in accordance with certain rules and conditions, we mean that the fact of the disputant having argued in due accord with all such rules and conditions must be the object of the Umpire’s cognition.

(34). Nor must it here be objected that, on the conclusion just arrived at, the real existence of the ‘cognition of the Umpire’

will have to be admitted (so that after all we again pre-suppose the reality of a thing other than Brahman). For if we enquire into the reality of that cognition, we again have nothing else to fall back upon than *another cognition* of the real existence of the same. (So that here again we have only *cognition* of real existence, not *real existence* itself.)

(35.) Nor does this necessitate the assumption of a regressus in infinitum (that other cognition again being dependent on another cognition, and so on). For, in accordance with the principle that 'there is no need of any further cognition, beyond the origination of three or four cognitions' (Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's Shloka-vārttika, Sūtra II, 61) there is no need to enter on any such regress.*

(36.) Perhaps our adversary will here argue as follows:—"If the last term of the series of cognitions has no real existence, this will imply that the whole series of preceding cognitions also has no real existence; you thus do not get out of your difficulty by accepting (as the basis of all discussion) the *cognition* (of the Umpire)." This may be so, we reply; but as a matter of fact, when the disputants have satisfied themselves by following the series of cognitions backwards up to three or four stages, they find that it would be undesirable to go any further; and thus by mutual agreement they take the reality of the Umpire's cognition

* In the place referred to Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa argues in favour of the natural inherent validity or authoritativeness (svataḥ-prāmānya) of all cognitions. Every cognition, due to one of the recognised means of true knowledge, is to be considered as valid, as long as there are no special reasons for doubt. Where such reasons exist, as when e. g. we are in doubt as to the true nature of a thing perceived from a distance or in faint light,—we resolve our doubt by a second cognition naturally springing from improved conditions; as when the exact nature of a thing first perceived from a distance reveals itself to us as soon as we approach it more closely. In certain cases this second cognition may again have to be corrected by a third cognition; and sometimes even a fourth one may be required; but in almost all cases it will not be necessary to go beyond this. Having carried our enquiry so far, we acquiesce in the result.—This principle is, in the text, appealed to by the Vedāntin. There, of course, remains the difference between his point of view and that of the Mīmāṃsaka that, according to the latter, a series of cognitions carried on for three or four stages, results in a cognition which is absolutely true, i. e., represents *reality* as it is; while according to the Vedāntin the final cognition is true in a relative, practical, sense only.

for granted, and proceed upon it as a basis of their discussion. If some such explanation be not accepted, then a similar infinite regress of cognitions would result even on your view, i. e., the view which acknowledges the reality of *Pramāṇa* and the other categories.

(37.) The Logician retorts—"We hold every cognition to have reality *by itself*; and thus all our proceedings can be carried on on the basis of such cognitions, without tracing any series of cognitions backwards. According to the view of the Vedāntin on the other hand, such tracing backward will be unavoidable; for otherwise, he also would have to admit that every cognition has reality." But, we reply, we are going to show, in the section on the 'Self-apprehension of Cognitions,' that the infinite regress cannot be avoided even by regarding every cognition as having a reality by itself. Then again, just as according to your theory, though the *cognition of the jar* and the *jar* both have reality by themselves, you yet hold that all practical proceedings are effected by the reality of the cognition, and not by that of the jar,—so analogously on our view, though the cognition and the jar are both equally unreal, yet all practical proceedings are effected by the unreal cognition, and by nothing else.

SECTION 2.

[The admission that the categories are the *cause* of philosophical discussions in no way obliges us to acknowledge their *reality*; for the Unreal no less than the Real may be a cause: to maintain that a cause has real being in fact involves us in contradictions. What is characteristic of a *cause* is merely that it has an invariable previous existence to its effect; but this relation may hold good in the sphere of mere apparent existence. Empirical thought, speech and action admit of being reconciled with the theory of the Buddha-Nihilist (Shūnya-vādin) according to which all things whatever are 'void' i. e. unreal appearances.]

A.—*The non-real can have causal efficiency.*

(38). "But" the Logician objects, "to assert that a thing is unreal and yet produces an effect involves a self-contradiction!" Why, we ret rt, should it not be a self-contradiction that a thing

is real and effects something? For it certainly has not been proved to the satisfaction of both of us that the *real* produces effects while the *unreal* does not!

(39). “But”, our antagonist rejoins, “(if the *unreal* or *non-being* were to produce effects, then) since the mere non-existence of the cause would be equally present at all times, its effect would arise also at times other than those when it actually appears.” We do not allow this objection. For according to your (the Logician’s) doctrine* the causal factors do not exist at the first moment of the existence of the effect; and this non-existence of the cause is exactly the same at all other times; why then should not, on your premises also, the effect arise at any time?

(40). “But”, the Naiyāyika resumes, “what, according to us, is necessary for the appearance of the effect at a certain time is not the *non-existence* of the causal factors at that very time, but the *existence* of those factors at the preceding moment; for this is what is actually observed.” Well then, we reply, (just as you hold that what brings about the effect is the existence of the causal factors at a time other than that of the effect’s coming into existence, so) we hold that what brings about the effect is the non-existence of the cause at some time other than the time of the actual appearance of the effect; for this is what is actually observed.

(41). “But”, the opponent resumes, “according to me what determines the effect at the particular time when it actually appears is the fact of its immediate sequence to the causal conditions (and this immediate sequence does not present itself at any other moment).” This also is of no avail, we reply. For as the fact of immediate sequence to the cause and the first appearance of the effect are simultaneous, and as moreover, that immediate sequence itself is something indeterminate (which for its determination would require antecedent determining conditions going back *ad infinitum*†), there is nothing to decide

* The Logician holds that at the moment when the effect comes into existence the causal factors have ceased to operate; as otherwise, he argues, there would be an endless number of effects proceeding from the same cause.

† The ‘*ūgantukatsvāt*’ of the text is explained by the commentators in many ways, none of which appears fully satisfactory. The translation follows the *Vidyāsāgarī*.

which of the two (the fact of sequence to the cause, and the appearance of the effect) is the *determining* and which the *determined* element. It therefore must be admitted that what determines the effect is the presence of the causal factors at some other point of time ; for this is what is actually observed. And we have shown above already that, in that case, there is an opening for our view no less than for yours, (for the causal factors present at another point of time may be the *non-existence*, no less than the *existence*, of the cause).

(42). "But, what then", the opponent asks, "is the distinguishing feature of the moment at which the effect originates"? Nothing more or less, we reply, than that very origination of the effect. If not satisfied therewith you demand some other distinguishing feature, then that feature also, in its turn, would belong to a point of time, which again would require a further distinguishing feature ; and so on and on ; there would be no end to the postulating of such features.

(43). "Still", the opponent urges, "you ought to point out some characteristic common to, and present in, all moments in which effects originate"! But this we meet by the counter-question—'and what would be the characteristic of that characteristic which is common to all those moments'? and this question would have to be repeated *ad infinitum*.*

B.—*Causal efficiency cannot belong to that which has real being.*

(44). I. 'If a cause be that into the nature of which real existence (*sattā*) enters as an essential element, then, for this very reason, the cause has no real being.' II. 'If, on the other hand, real being does not essentially enter into the nature of the cause, then, for this very reason, the cause has not real being.' (4)

(45). The meaning of this stanza is as follows:—

I. If the nature of the cause be such that it implies as an essential element *real existence*, then to say that the generic

* Unless we stopped somewhere at a characteristic not needing a further characteristic. But then it evidently is preferable to accept at once the characteristic mentioned—*vis* : that it is just the origination of the effect which distinguishes the moment of origination.

character 'real existence' (*sattā*) belongs to the cause would involve the absurdity of something (*real existence*) residing partially in itself (*i. e.* that *real existence* which goes to constitute the nature of the cause). Even if the thing qualified by *real existence* (*i. e.* the cause with such *existence* as an essential element of itself) were considered as something different from *real existence* (*sattā*) (so that the said absurdity would not arise)*, we could not accept the *sattā* (in the latter sense, *i. e.* the *sattā* which is predicated of the cause) to be the same with the *real being* that enters into the nature of the cause; for it is a recognised principle that no more than a thing can reside in itself, can it reside in that of which it already is an essential attribute. It would therefore be necessary to assume another *existence* as residing in the cause qualified by *existence*; and as this would mean that *existence* does not enter into the nature of the cause, the cause would have to be regarded as 'not really existing.' And if, in order to avoid this, we were to assume a series of existences, one after the other, there would be no end of such assumptions.

(46). Nor will you escape from this predicament by taking the long step of assuming an infinity of different kinds of *real existence*. For if you assume different kinds of *real existence*, you relinquish the very foundation on which the generic conception of 'existence' rests, and hence lose the idea of *even* the first *existence*. Seeking to establish the notion of *existence* you thus have lost the basis of it, and are worse off than before! †

(47). Nor again would the mere *individual existence* (*svarūpa-sattā*) of things suffice for the general conception of those things. For, if to these *individual existences*, which naturally are different from one another, you assign the exalted position of forming the

* It must be admitted that 'sattā' cannot reside in itself; but let us define the cause not simply as *sat*—that which *is*—, but as that something which has *being* for its essential attribute. On this view the cause is something different from mere *being*.

† 'Existence' as a generic entity is postulated only for the purpose of providing a basis for the generic conception of 'existence' as including under it all individual existences. Should it be considered necessary to admit an endless series of existences, there would be no need of either a generic conception, or of a basis for that conception.

basis of general conceptions, you politely relegate all generic entities (Universals: *sattā*, *gotva*, &c.) to the realm of the defunct.* And if you were to say—"well, let us then dispense with a generic conception of individual existence,"—in what manner we ask, will you arrive at the generic notion of *Cause*, which, according to you, implies the notion of *individual existence*?

(48). Moreover, so-called 'individual being' (*svarūpa-sattā*) really is nothing more or less than the thing (e. g. the jar) itself. And in the same way the individual being of that which is *not* also is nothing but the thing itself. The non-being jar does not cease to be a jar; if it did, we could have no such notion as 'the jar is not', for, according to the view criticised, that which is not would not be the jar.†

(49). II. Let us then consider the second alternative stated in para. 44, viz., that that which really *is* constitutes the cause, without 'real being' entering into it as an essential element.—On this view, we point out, that which has no real being also may be a cause, since real *being* and *non-being* equally do not enter into the nature of the cause.‡

(50). "*Being*," the Logician now argues, "may not enter as a factor into the nature of the cause; the very nature of the cause rather is constituted by *being*; for we regard that to be a cause which has a necessary *existence* prior to the appearance of the effect." Well, we reply, we also hold the cause to be that which possesses this necessary antecedent existence.

(51). "In that case", the opponent retorts, "you admit the cause to be something that has real being, and thus fare like the man who, in order to evade the payment of the toll at the river-

* Let us say that the individual existence (*svarūpasattā*) which belongs to each individual thing provides a sufficient basis for the general notion of *sattā* ('being'). But in that case, the theory of universals, such as *sattā*, inhering in the individuals (which is an essential part of the Nyāya view of things) would become meaningless.

† The individual being or character of a thing is not touched by our taking the thing to be *non-being* or non-real. If, therefore, it is this so-called 'individual being' which constitutes a thing's being a cause, the non-being or non-real also may possess causality.

‡ If real being is not an essential constituent of the causality of the cause (although the cause may be something really being), such things also as have no real being may be causes—it being understood that this 'non-being' also is not an essential factor of their causality.

crossing, sets out before daybreak, but only arrives at the crossing, when the dawn is just breaking"! Not by any means, we reply. You evidently have not grasped our meaning. In so far as admitting in the cause a *non-real* existence* (*asatī sattā*) I do admit *existence*; how otherwise could I say that 'that existence is unreal'? Do you, on your part, hold that 'causality' consists in *existence* (*viz.* necessary previous existence) which comprises within itself *being* (in the sense of *reality*)? This truly cannot be; for as shown above, you (if thus postulating *being* within *being*) will either have to relinquish *being* after a few stages (of the endless series of 'beings' to which the first admission of *being* within *being* commits you), or else to admit an endless series.

(52). "But", the opponent goes on to argue, "as mere non-existence would, on your conclusion, be common (to that which is the cause, as well as to all that is not the cause of a given effect), how could there be any certainty as to what is the cause"?† The same difficulty, we reply, would present itself on the view of *existence* or *being* equally belonging to both.

(53). "But", says the Logician, "in our case, we have as the determining factor positive as well as negative induction in regard to either the individual thing or to something of its kind ‡; while in your case, as all causes would be equally non-being, you would have negative induction only (in the form 'where the cause is not the effect is not'; while you could not say 'where the cause is the effect is.') And even this negative induction would not always be certain. For you cannot say that 'whenever the cause is not, the effect necessarily is not existing'; since on your view, the effect would, after all, be produced in certain cases (as we actually see it to be produced); and as for you the Cause is permanently non-being, this would mean that the effect

* The cause according to the Vedāntin, no doubt possesses *sattā*, 'existence' in the sense of *vyāvahārikī sattā*, *i.e.*, empirical existence, such as belongs to everything that appears to consciousness, but Brahman; but such *sattā* is *asatī*, *i.e.*, unreal; true reality belonging to Brahman only.

† If *e.g.* clay and threads are equal inasmuch as both of them are unreal, what should determine the clay, and not the threads, being the cause of a jar?

‡ The 'something of the kind' is meant to include cases where the cause is not a permanent continuous thing, but a series of closely consecutive momentary existences—such as the successive momentary flashes or flickers which constitute a flame.

is produced while the cause does *not* exist. And as to positive induction this you could never have". Not so, we reply. The conditions really are exactly similar in both cases.* Moreover, in asserting that 'there is no positive induction' you admit the existence of such induction (since otherwise there would be no occasion for denying it); and if you were to regard 'being' as a factor entering into the nature of positive induction, your view would at once be open to the objections stated above (in para. 44).

(54). "But", another objection is raised, "from your theory it would follow that those who enjoy mere imaginary sweets and those who eat real sweets, would have exactly the same experiences of flavour, strength, nutritive effects, and so on". He, we reply, who flatters himself with the hope of this objection invalidating our view, truly himself feeds upon imaginary sweets! For, *firstly*, we have already shown that causal efficiency cannot rightly be claimed for the *really existing* only, whether *real existence* be held to enter into the essential nature of the Cause or not (see para. 44); and *secondly*, it is a fact that mere imaginary sweets (as those tasted in a dream) actually do give rise to experiences of certain flavours and strength, and of nutritive effects.

(55). "But", the opponent further asks, "(if the Cause is unreal, the effect will be the same; and) how can the Unreal be an effect"? If, we reply, you hold *reality* to enter into the very nature of the effect, the same objection applies to the effect which we have above pointed out with regard to the Cause (para. 44). If, on the other hand, you do not regard *reality* as entering into the nature of the effect, the latter is unreal, and then there is no difference between your view and mine.

(56). Thus then we are both agreed that being a *cause* means nothing else than 'having necessary connection with a previous time'; and the dispute about the *reality* or *unreality* of the Cause—which both lie altogether outside the true nature of the Cause—is simply futile. (5)

(57). Here the Logician formulates a new attack: "Leave off for a while," he says, "putting forward mere counter-arguments, and directly answer the main question.—'How can the

* *i.e.* (to adopt one of the possible explanations of this clause) the positive induction can be equally well established if the 'existence' of the cause is considered an unreal, *i.e.* merely empirical, one.

causal efficiency of that which has no *being* be ascertained? You will not allow that the cause has the distinguishing feature of being that which necessarily *exists* prior to the effect; and mere *non-existence* would belong to all things alike (whether causes or non-causes)". Not so, we reply. The Cause has this distinguishing feature that with regard to it we have the idea that it necessarily exists previous to the effect (though this in no way establishes the *reality* of the Cause).

(58). "But", the Logician objects, "this principle is unduly wide, in so far as it would allow of our accepting as causes, such things also regarding which we may have a mistaken notion of 'necessary previous existence.'" No such thing, we reply. You accept the reality of a thing on the basis of a cognition which may be traced back three or four stages without meeting with sublation; and so we also allow the character of *being a Cause* to a thing which is the object of a cognition of just that kind. But as the cognition may be liable to sublation as it is traced back beyond those initial stages, and as this would prove the mistaken character of the earlier stages,—we do not, on the basis of those earlier stages, declare the Cause to have *real* existence; this is the difference between our view and yours. In fact the Logician himself rejects certain theories held by other schools (*e. g.* the theory, held by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, of the eternity of the 'word') on the ground that, although certain cognitions do not meet with sublation up to several stages of reasoning, they yet are sublated in the end. Were it not so, (*i. e.* were theories to be accepted as true when not found subject to sublation up to a few stages only), then there would be only one view with regard to all philosophical matters (as all philosophical theories would be found to be true to a few stages; and thus all being possessed of equal validity, there could be no different systems, based as these are upon varying opinions with regard to the comparative validity or invalidity of the several theories).*

* The sense of this rather obscure argument appears to be that the Logician regards the cause as absolutely real, while the Vedāntin, on further inquiry, allows it to be real for practical purposes only. The Logician himself proceeds in this way with regard to certain theories which though *primā facie* appearing reasonable, turn out, on further enquiry, to be wrong. If no such discrimination were made between what is wrong *primā facie* and what turns out to be wrong on protracted enquiry only, all theories would be equally true.

(59). The above arguments also set aside the doubt expressed in the following question:—"As all theories are equally unreal, how are we to ascertain which of them remains non-sublated up to three or four steps of enquiry, and which not?"*

(60). "But", a further objection is raised, "at the time when the Cause, as you conceive it, is not the object of that idea (*viz.*, of necessary previous existence), what difference is there (between what is the cause and what is not)?" The difference, we reply, lies therein that the Cause is the object of that idea at some time or other (while the non-causes never are the object of that idea). If this be not admitted, then tell me how such an idea presenting itself with reference to the Cause *at one time* could prove its *reality* at some other time? It might be argued that the *reality of the Cause at one time* may be the object of the notion at some other time (there being no need of the notion of a thing being something existing at the same time with itself). But then, we also may say with equal reasonableness that the fact of the said notion presenting itself with reference to a certain thing at one time indicates that it is the *Cause* at other times also (just as according to the Logician the notion appearing at one time proves its *reality* at other times). †It is exactly this kind of *reality* that has been called (by those who hold all things to be unreal) '*samvṛiti sattva*' or 'Illusory Reality.'

(61). The Logician now puts the question—"Is this idea of *samvṛiti* something real or unreal?"—his purpose being to

* The Logician himself admits that certain notions—*e.g.* that of 'silver in the shell'—meet with sublation as soon as we begin to enquire into them; while others—such as the notion of the eternity of words—are shown to be invalid by an investigation carried on through a certain number of stages. An analogous distinction may, without much difficulty, be established between different philosophical theories.

† This is added in anticipation of the objection that to hold the cause to be *unreal* would be opposed to the Vedāntic conception that it has *samvṛitisattva* (which is some sort of *reality*.) The sense of the author is that the *reality* that the Vedāntin and all other Idealists admit in regard to things is not *absolute* reality but a qualified *reality*, merely *empirical*. This is what has been designated by the Bauddhas '*samvṛiti-sattā*' in the *kārikā*—"the instructions imparted by the Buddhas proceed on the basis of two kinds of *reality*, the ordinary *empirical*, and the *absolute* reality." It corresponds to what the Vedāntin calls '*vyāvahārikī sattā*.'

propose the following dilemma—"if the idea is unreal it cannot differentiate the Cause from non-causes ; if it is real, it cannot be accepted by you Vedāntins." But we meet him with the following reply :—We both are agreed as to its being cognitions, or ideas, on which all empirical thought, speech and action rest.*

Now when we proceed to enquire into an idea and, on advancing in our enquiry three or four stages, find it to be real or true, then the particular thought, speech, &c., concerned must be regarded as based upon real or true ideas ; while it must be regarded as based upon unreal or false ideas, when the ideas, on enquiry, are found to be unreal. And as for differentiation, unreal ideas can effect this, in the same way as in misconception (*bhrama*) the (unreal) object of misconception differentiates the idea.†

(62). Thus then, as a matter of fact, the discussion should be begun without taking into any account the *reality or unreality* of cognitions. Otherwise, if we were to confuse our understanding at the outset (over this side-issue), there would be no chance for the real discussion ever being taken up. In the case of ideas having for their object future things and the like, you also admit that a *non-existing* object is the basis of individually distinguished thought, speech and action. And what distinguishes the special causal power (of any given cause from that of others) is the effect which is *not (yet) in existence*.‡

(63). Nor can it be argued against the proving force of this last instance that, "in the case of this thing (*i.e.*, the effect) there is *existence* at some (future) time, while in the case of cognition and its object, there is, on your view, no existence at any time ; and that hence the two cases are altogether different." For, since at the time of actual thought, speech or action related to those things, both are equally non-existent, the existence of your effect at some other time, when such existence

* All are agreed on the point that our actions are controlled by the ideas that we have of things ; for if a person did not cognise or know a thing, it could not in any way affect his action, speech or thought.

† In error or misconception, as when we see silver in the shell, the imagined silver suffices to differentiate the cognition of the moment from other cognitions.

‡ What does really distinguish the causal power possessed by sesame-grains (*tila*) from the causal power of other things ? Nothing else than the not-yet-existing effect, *i. e.*, the sesame oil which can be made out of the grains.

cannot serve any useful purpose, is exactly like the waking up of the watchmen after the house has been cleared out by thieves.*

(64). But, the Logician objects, such things as jars and the like (which are to come into existence at some future time) actually do exist at some time, and therefore possess a certain individual form and attributes (such as class-characteristics); and hence the ideas of them, by their very nature (*i. e.* as representing those things) appropriate to themselves that form and those attributes as their own differentiating characteristics. The same cannot be asserted with regard to absolutely non-existing or unreal things; for, since an absolute non-entity cannot be held to be differentiated by any individual form and attributes, the correlative idea also cannot be defined as related to something definite—as, after all, it should be, owing to its very nature (being an idea of something).

(65). Not so, we reply. Above already (para. 48) we have explained that the non-real has the same form and character as the real: every particular non-existent (unreal) thing is characterized by the non-existence of specific form and attributes. Were it not so, many absurdities would result (we, *e. g.* should not be able to distinguish between a *sky-flower* and a *hare's horn*, which we actually do distinguish as non-entities of different form and character). And we, moreover have already met this objection by what we said as to the object of misconception (or *error*, *bhrānti*)—(where, as the Logician himself admits, something non-existing, shell-silver *e. g.*, is the object of cognition). Further discussion of this point therefore is needless.

*When the non-existence of the thing and its notion, at the time of thought, speech or action, will have been fully established on the basis of the non-existence of the effect, its existence at some other time will not save the situation.

SECTION 3.

[The view finally to be accepted is one which partially agrees with the theory of the Vijnāna-vādin, according to whom nothing is real but Thought or Idea. The reality of Thought is guaranteed by itself; Thought is 'self-illuminated,' proved by itself. It is on this view only that the validity of Thought can be established; while the theory of the Naiyāyikas, according to which each direct cognition requires a secondary cognition (*anuuyavasāya*) to establish and guarantee it, finally invalidates all thought. The 'thought' (*vijnāna*) the reality of which the Vedāntin acknowledges differs essentially, however, from the *vijnāna* of the Vijnāna-vādin; for it is absolutely non-differenced and eternal.]

(66). Others again, finding no satisfaction of mind in the view of Cognitions (Ideas) also being mere nonentities, and not being bold enough to make at once the sweeping assertion that the whole Universe (things and ideas alike) has no real existence, take up the following position:—Cognition (Thought, *vijnāna*) is self-illuminated (*svayamprakāsha*) and self-proved. For as a matter of fact, whenever Cognition takes place, there never arises, even in the mind of the attentive self-observer, either the doubt 'Do I cognise or do I not cognise,' or the wrong cognition 'I do not cognise,' (when there *is* cognition), or the right cognition to the contrary 'I do not cognise' (when really there is no cognition).* Hence, if with regard to

*The distinction between the three cases is explained in the *Vidyāsāgarī* as follows:—A 'wrong cognition' is the cognition of a thing as something which it is not; in the case in question, the cognition 'I do not know,' while, actually there is knowledge. A 'doubt' is in the form 'Do I know or do I not know.' A 'right cognition to the contrary' is the cognition in the form 'I do not know the thing' which appears when actually the thing is not present, and hence is not cognised. The idea underlying this threefold division is that these are the only possible alternatives with regard to a thing which though sought to be known, is not *rightly* cognized.

It may however be pointed out that when the thing is *actually known* (which is what is meant by *cognition taking place*), the cognition 'I do not know' cannot be 'right'; and hence the third item in the above is not quite properly introduced. And it appears that the author, wishing to exhaust all cases of *non-right cognition*, lost sight of this apparent anomaly: the absence of *right cognition* applies to the first two only; it is the *absence of cognition* that applies to all three.

anything sought to be known there is an absence of untrue cognition (in the form of either doubt or wrong conception) and of contrary cognition, this absence implies that the thing is rightly cognised,—the absence of wrong cognition being invariably concomitant, in such cases, with right cognition. Were this not so, even that man whose desire to know is not hampered in any way would only have a cognition pertaining to the negation of that thing (*i. e.*, only doubtful or wrong cognition),—a cognition which would have for its invariable concomitant the *absence* of the cognisability of that thing,—*i. e.*, which would imply that the thing is not known*. For these reasons, the Cognition must be held to be proved by the consciousness of it that all men have (*i. e.*, it is illumined or proved by itself).

(67). To this, the Naiyāyika raises the following objection :—“The fact that Cognitions are free from doubt and error is due (not to their being *self-illumined* and self-proved, but) to their being regularly followed by a ‘representative (or secondary) cognition’ (*anuvyavasāya*)†.” This is not so, we reply. For where the existence and cognisability of that ‘secondary cognition’ are not admitted (and they are actually not admitted by some philosophers, *e. g.* the Bauddhas), there, in case of enquiry, it would be difficult to prevent doubt from attaching itself to the whole cognitional process,—such doubt beginning with the ‘secondary cognition’ itself which refers to the thinking Self (*‘I am that which possesses the knowledge of the jar’*) and extending down to the object of the simple cognition (the jar, for instance) (which cognition itself is the object of the *anuvyavasāya* or secondary cognition). For where there is a doubt regarding that for which the object is (*i. e.* the cognition, simple or secondary), there is a doubt with regard to the object also. And if, on the *anuvyavasāya*-theory, it were assumed that each cognition is invariably followed

* If the absence of Doubt and Contrary Cognition with regard to a thing did not imply that the thing is *rightly known*, then, even in cases where there are no obstacles to the right knowledge of a thing, we should have only doubts or contrary cognitions, and this would mean that the thing is not rightly known.

† According to the Naiyāyika the cognition ‘this is a jar’ is regularly followed by a secondary cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) in the form ‘I know the jar’; and . . . is this latter cognition which proves or establishes the former one.

by corroborative 'secondary' cognitions up to three or four stages, the chances of doubt remain all the same (for doubt would attach itself to that corroborative cognition at which we should stop, and that doubt would vitiate the whole series). On the other hand, on the view of Cognition being self-illuminated (and self-evidenced), there is no distinction of *instrument* and *object* of knowledge (since there is no *object* apart from the *Cognition*); and hence there is no opening for any objections based on such distinction (*e.g.* that one and the same thing cannot be the action and the object of the action at the same time). On any other hypothesis, the very form and character of Cognition could not be established; for if Cognition had to be established through something else, we should have to assume an endless series of corroborative cognitions.

(68). But, the Opponent resumes, we do not hold that the Cognition itself must necessarily be the object of another cognition, but that it is by its mere existence that it accomplishes all practical purposes in connection *with itself**,—and thus where could there be any necessity of making an endless assumption (of cognitions)†"? But this also we disallow. For (in accordance with the Nyāya principle that 'whatever is is to be known through a valid means of knowledge') unless some valid means of knowledge were set forth, what would guarantee the real existence of the Cognition on which all those operations are to rest? What is there to indicate that the Cognition is real? Why should it not be unreal?

(69). To this the Logician makes the following reply :—The general character of the cognition as such having been established (by the *anuvyavasāya* cognition), while there is no valid means of knowledge to establish the cognition in its specific character, there indeed is nothing to establish the reality (truth) of the cognition in this latter aspect; but, when (as natural) the cognizer desires some such proof, it will subsequently be

* If we read '*svārthe vyavahārah*,' the meaning would be *all practical purposes with regard to its object.*

† The opponent might here be understood to admit the self-luminousness of cognitions; but as a matter of fact it is not so; he only regards the mere existence of the cognition enough for all practical purposes, and he does not touch the matter of the *pramāṇa* of the cognition.

supplied either by the reality of the activities (to which the cognition gives rise), or by some other means (e. g. remembrance)*. But this also we cannot allow. For there would still remain the unsettled question 'what then guarantees the reality of those activities?'--and this would again lead to an endless series. And if, to avoid this, we were to stop at some link of the series, the reality of that link would remain unestablished, and this would vitiate the reality of the whole series: a general downbreak, extending so far as to disestablish the reality of the very thing which is the object of the simple cognition, thus could not be avoided. This is what is meant by the assertion (made by the Bauddha writer Dharmakīrti) that, 'for him who does not accept the Cognition as directly cognised by itself, the cognition of the thing cannot be established.'

(70). A person who acknowledges the need of valid means of knowledge is bound, when basing practical thought and action upon the real existence of the jar, to tell us the means of proof of such existence. If he were simply to accept such reality without reference to any proof, why should not the contrary (*i.e.* the unreality of the jar) be the true fact? It therefore is incumbent on him to show the existence of proofs for the real existence of the jar. But then again, a thorough person cannot accept the reality of these proofs without further proofs for their reality; in agreement with the axiom that the absence of the existence of proofs implies the absence of the existence of the thing (the existence of which would be proved by the existence of the proofs). Otherwise we should have to admit the reality of such things as the 'seventh flavour' (in addition to the six†

* The Logician pleads that the *anuvyavasāya* cognition ('I am cognizing') may not guarantee the truth of the specific cognition 'I cognize the jar,'—it being possible that what is cognised as the *jar* may not be a *jar* but something else,—but it at any rate guarantees the reality of this latter cognition as cognition; the object may be right or wrong, but there is no doubt that the Cognition is there. And subsequently the evident reality of the practical activities to which the specific cognition gives rise guarantees the reality of the cognition *qua* specific cognition. Or else, it may be the remembrance of the thing (the jar e. g.), which supplies the required conviction.

† The six flavours are—*Kaṭu* (pungent), *Amla* (acid), *Lavaṇa* (saltish), *Tikta* (bitter), *Kaṣaya* (astringent), and *Madhura* (sweet).

which alone are known from experience). It thus is evident that he who refuses to accept Cognitions as *self-evidenced* is in an evil plight indeed. For if he were to accept the reality of proofs, without troubling about the real existence of proofs for the reality of the proofs, we might justly call on him to accept at once the reality of the jar itself; it would in that case be needless to trouble about proofs for such reality.

(71). The Logician now may attempt to present his case in a different way. "We do not," he says, "maintain that in the case of every cognition there is an infinite continuous chain of cognitions and cognitions of cognitions; our theory rather is that somewhere in that chain there is a cognition which is established by a valid means of knowledge; and that through this cognition the entire series of cognitions is validated, (whence there is no need of an endless *retrogressus* of cognitions)." But this explanation also could be accepted only if, in addition to the cognitions 'this is a jar' and 'I cognise the jar', we ordinary men were conscious of the rise of another cognition, weighted with the burden of numerous objects constituted by the whole series consisting of the jar and its series of cognitions (while as a matter of fact we do not find within ourselves any cognition thus burdened).

(72). And even if some such all-comprehensive cognition should be possible for beings with capacities transcending ours (e. g. men possessing the gift of so-called 'Yoga-perception'), that cognition, which would have for its object the cognition weighted by all those objects, would again have to be viewed as cognised by a further cognition. But for such further cognition there is, in the first place, no proof; and in the second place, no final Release would be possible in that case*. For no cognition (even of the Yogin) could apprehend the entire series of cognitions, including itself; since this would mean that the cognition is self-evidenced (which is just what our opponent denies). This reasoning also disposes of the view that, "the last and last but one of the series (of the cognitions of the Yogin) mutually apprehend

*The cycle of-birth and rebirth of the Soul, according to the Logician, continues so long as the soul remains endowed with any of its specific qualities; and as Cognition is one of such qualities, so long as there would be any cognition, the soul would remain bound within the cycle.

hend each other"; for if the last cognition apprehended its predecessor (of which it itself is, *ex hypothesi*, an object), it would, in apprehending that, at the same time apprehend itself (in other words, it would be *self-evidenced*).

(73). Nor also have you any proof for the statement that the last cognition will be apprehended (not by the cogniser of the series himself, but) by another person who will not apprehend the absence of that cognition. For on this hypothesis also you will have to assume an endless series of proofs upon proofs.*

(74). Nor may you justify the assumption of an endless series of cognitions (each of which has for its object the preceding member of the series) by pointing to the infinite series which presents itself as soon as we enquire into the causal factors of a thing such as a jar, and into the factors of those factors, and so on. For the two cases are not parallel. If there were any break in the series constituted by the jar and its causes, it would follow that the jar is eternal.† And it is on the basis of this presumptive reasoning (*arthāpatti*) that we conclude that in the chain of the jar's causal factors there is no break (*i. e.*, that that chain extends backwards into infinity). If the same was the case with Cognition also, (*i. e.*, if there were some presumptive evidence in the character of the Cognition, as that, if the 'series of cognitions' were to break at any point, then from that point backwards, up to the very beginning of the series, there would be no establishing of any cognition at all, and hence the cognition must be accepted as having *all cognitions* of the series for its object), then, inasmuch as the particular cognition itself would be included in the 'series' apprehended by it, there would be an apprehension of

* The cognition of that other man also would ultimately have for its proof the cognition of some other man, and so on and on *ad infinitum*.

† If there were a break or stop in the endless retrogressive series of causal factors of any thing, *e. g.*, a jar, *i. e.*, if we refused to assume further causal factors for any particular set of such factors, then this latter set would have to be viewed as uncaused, *i. e.*, eternal. As such however it would have exercised its causal power (the power to produce its definite effect) from all eternity, and from this it would follow that the effect itself, the jar *e. g.*, would be eternal.

the cognition *by itself*; and if (in order to avoid this) the cognition were not included in the 'series,' then for the apprehension of that cognition itself it would be necessary to postulate another cognition, and so on and on *ad infinitum*; and, if lastly (in order to avoid both these contingencies) it be held that that cognition itself is not apprehended, then the non-apprehension of that one cognition would gradually mean the non-apprehension of every one of the cognitions in the series;* and from this tangle of difficulties there would be no escape for you. And further you would be open to all the objections that we are going to point out later on (in *kārikā* 35, para 359) in connection with the relationship (according to the Logician) among the means of knowledge and their objects.

(75). Nor can it be maintained, on account of the difficulties stated, that cognition does not exist at all; for that which proves itself to every one cannot be denied. And, as we shall show later on, (*kārikā* 26, para, 164) it is just the view of Cognition being *self-evidenced* which frees it from all objections. And as that only can be self-established or self-proved which is of the nature of *prakāsha* (light, illumination, intelligence, consciousness), no attributes whatever that are of the nature of *non-intelligence* (*jaḍatva*), (the essence of which is that it depends upon something other than itself) can adhere to self-accomplished Cognition.

(76). † It is for this reason (*viz.*, of cognition not having any attributes) that Cognition does not form the object of verbal assertions which depend for their functioning on the acknowledgment of attributes. (There, however, are certain attributes which

* The final cognition not being 'known,' the 'cognition' preceding it in the 'series'—*i. e.* the cognition of which that final cognition would be the object,—would not be possible; as if this cognition existed, the final cognition could not be said to be not known. And similarly tracing the series backwards step by step, we would find each one of the cognitions in the series to be *non est*.

† This is in answer to the question—"If the Cognition has no attributes, how can we speak of it as 'self-evidenced'?—as such an assertion pre-supposes the presence of some attribute?" The sense of the reply is that such assertions are figurative, being based upon an indirect imposition of attributes upon Cognition which, by its nature, is without any.

are predicated of Cognition in an indirect way—as follows): Eternality is predicated of it on the ground of its not being limited by time ; it is designated as ‘all-present’ because it is not limited in space ; and is spoken of as the ‘all-self,’ ‘non-duality’ and so forth, on account of its being absolutely free from the limitation of any specific characteristics. The acceptance of these attributes does not conflict with Cognition being absolutely *non-dual* ; for they imply nothing but *absence* of certain limitations. Our view on this point is similar to that of the Bauddha and the Prābhākara who hold that ‘absence or negation is nothing different from the place where it resides,’ and also to that of the Logician himself who holds that mutual negation is nothing different from the things between which that relation holds good.* Nor can any objection be taken to the negation implied in ‘non-duality,’ on the ground that the counter-entity of this negation (*i. e.* the entity denied, *i. e.* *duality*) has absolutely no existence. For the negation here is as legitimate as that of the object of an erroneous conception (as when we negate the presence of *shell-silver*, ‘there is no shell-silver in this place,’ although that silver has no existence).

(77). This ‘Cognition’ (or *Consciousness* or *Brahman*) is set forth by Scripture which stands to it in the relation of a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Scripture does not indeed directly denote or express it (for, as stated above, self-proved Cognition or Consciousness lies outside the sphere of what can be declared by words) ; but it indirectly intimates that it is what is meant to be expressed. Hence, although in reality to Consciousness the relation of thing denoted and words denoting does not apply, it yet is indirectly intimated by the texts of the Veda ; and from the point of view of Nescience we therefore may, as others (among them the Naiyāyikas) do, designate the Veda as a valid means of cognizing ‘Cognition’ (*Brahman*). We however must keep in mind that in reality Cognition is established or proved by nothing else but itself.

* “According to the Logician, mutual negation is co-extensive with the things between which it subsists—and the perception of this negation consists in the perception of the things”—*Upaskāra on Vaiśeṣikasūtras IX—i-4 & 8.*

SECTION 4.

[To the doctrine that Cognition apprehends itself, it must not be objected that a thing cannot at the same time be subject and object of action (*karman*). For of 'object of action' no valid definition can be given.]

(78). Another objection is raised against the self-apprehension of Cognitions. "It is altogether absurd", our opponent says, "to hold that Cognition is self-apprehended; since the relation between an action and its object is not possible, unless the two are different things. For the action, being something to be accomplished, proceeds from the object; and in this sense the object is the cause of the action. A thing truly cannot be accomplished by itself; for what constitutes the relation of cause and effect is the peculiar fact of one thing being the antecedent of the other; and a thing cannot possibly be its own antecedent or consequent; since antecedence, as well as consequence, to a certain thing refers to a point of time that is not determined by that thing. Hence, if we were to assume the existence of the thing at that time, we should lapse into the self-contradiction of one and the same point of time being connected as well as non-connected with the same thing."

(79). This is not so, we reply. We do not acknowledge it as an absolute rule that actions are produced by their objects; for clearly, no such relation is possible in the case of the cognitions of things that are yet to come into existence. That the object is, in grammatical terminology, called a *kāraka* (*i.e.* literally, the *producer* of the action), is due to the fact that in some cases the object of the action is found to be productive of it.* Again, we find the Object of an action defined (1) as that which is the sphere of the operation of the instrument, or (2) as that which receives the result of the action,—the action itself inhering (by *samavāya*) in something else; and on the basis of either of these definitions we may use the word 'object' without any idea of the object being that which produces the action.

(80). Let us however more closely consider these definitions of the Object, the nature of which you say is incompatible with our

* As e. g. in the case of what is expressed by the sentence 'I know (myself)'

view (of the self-evidencing character of Cognition). The second of the definitions given above,—viz : that the Object is that which receives the result of the action which itself inheres in something else,—is unacceptable, since it applies to the Ablative also (which never is *Karman*).^{*} Should you rejoin that that which stands in the Ablative case is also an 'object'; we demur; since in that case, instead of '*vṛikṣāt paṇam patati* (the leaf falls from the tree, ablative) we might also say '*vṛikṣam paṇam patati*' ('*vṛikṣam*' being in the objective case) (while as a matter of fact we do not say so). If to this you rejoin that it depends on the wish of the speaker whether one or the other case be used, and that in the sentence quoted the objective case is not used simply because the speaker does not wish to use it,—we reply that if an objective character really belonged to the Ablative, any speaker choosing to use the Accusative (objective) case-ending in place of the Ablative one, would be free to do so. The opponent may rejoin that it is a traditional convention of Grammarians that the Ablative is never to be spoken of as the Objective. But then it comes to this that, even though the Ablative is never to be used or spoken of as the Objective case, yet, in agreement with your definition of the object, you really hold it to be an 'objective;' and this would afford an opening for defining the Object as *anything*. And whence, we ask, have you acquired that more than human insight that enables you to ascribe to the Ablative the objective character as defined by you, while yet it never can be used or spoken of as 'objective'? The opponent may here restate his definition in the following somewhat qualified form:—"the object is that which, while not being expressed by an Ablative, receives the result of an action inhering in something else." But this also we cannot accept, for on this definition, we should have to regard as *transitive* (having an object) the verb 'rises' in the sentence 'the river rises', in as much as the *rising* would have an object (as defined by you) in the shape of those parts of the river bank which receive the result of the action of *rising*,

^{*} In the case of what is expressed by the sentence '*vṛikṣāt paṇam patati*' 'the leaf falls from the tree' (abl. case) the result of the action of falling—which inheres in the falling leaf—is received by the tree which is deprived of the leaf. Hence, if the definition of 'object' given in the text is valid, the tree also is an object.

in the sense of their being *reached* by the high water. * If instead of the qualifying clause you should insert the clause 'which is destructive of the action',—i. e. if you define the object as that which receives such a result of the action inhering in something else as puts a stop to the action,—we point out—(1) that the objection we have urged on the ground of the sentence 'the river rises' remains as valid as before; [for the connection of the water with the higher parts of the bank, which is the result of the rising of the river, may be said to put a stop to the rising];—(2) that no transitive character could in that case belong to the root *vṛidh* 'to cut' †;—(3) that in that case the verb *tyaj* (as occurring in sentences like '*vṛikshan tyajati parṇam*', 'the leaf leaves the tree') could not be regarded as transitive [in as much as the result of the action of *leaving*, i. e. the separation of the leaf from the tree, does not put a stop to the action of *leaving*];—and (4) that in the sentence '*ātmanañ-jānāmi*', 'I know myself', the *ātmanam* could not be considered as an Object, since there is in this case no 'something else' (in which the action inheres; the *ātman* being the *object* and at the same time *that in which the action inheres*). It might be said that, "in the case of the Self, 'otherness' or 'diversity' is introduced by the difference of limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*); so that the Self, in so far as conditioned by those adjuncts,—viz: the qualities of being a *doing* and *enjoying* agent, and so on—would be the object of cognition (while the *pure* Self is the cognising subject)." But although this may be so in a certain sense‡, yet he who knows the real Self certainly would cognise it as free from limitations; and *ex hypothesi* the Self free from limitations cannot be the object of cognition. How, further, would you make out the character of the 'object' in sentences such as '*pachyate phalam svayameva*', 'the fruit ripens by itself', where the same *fruit* is both nominative and object, [and the action thus does not inhere in something other than the object]. Then again, the Logician regards God as omniscient (and eternal); and as His cognitions are eternal, they can

* This emendation will serve to exclude the objective character from the tree from which leaves fall.

† This root is found in such sentences as '*vṛikṣam vardhate vardhakih*', 'the wood-utter cuts the tree.'

‡ In reality, in this case, the limitations would be the real object.

never be put a stop to by their results ; and thus your definition of the object is not applicable to things known by God. For all these reasons we conclude that the term 'object' is merely a technical term—similar to terms such as '*nadī*,' '*vriddhi*'* and the like,—which the Grammarians have devised to account, in their conventional way, for the formation of words ; and we hence need not pursue the search for a comprehensive definition of *Object*.† We shall deal with further aspects of this question in the chapter on 'Self-apprehension' forming part of our other work '*Ishvarābhisandhi*.'

SECTION 5.

[Nor can the theory that Cognition is self-illuminated or self-evidenced be objected to on the ground that one and the same thing cannot be 'subject' and 'object' of cognition (*viśayin* and *viśaya*). We in the first place do not admit this alleged incompatibility of subject and object ; and in the second place theoretical doubts on this point have no force against undeniable facts of consciousness ; neither self-consciousness (the '*I*-cognition') nor cognition of any object would be possible if *viśaya* and *viśayin* were necessarily distinct entities. We therefore, while being at one with the Baudhdha as to the undefinability and consequent unreality of all that is *not* cognition and consciousness, hold that Cognition or Consciousness is completely proved by itself.]

* Pāṇini uses the term '*nadī*' (which properly means *river*) to denote all feminine bases ending in ' *ī* ' ; and just as there can be no definition of '*nadī*' (river) that could apply to all these bases, so in the same there can be no definition of 'objective' that would apply to all cases.

† According to the *Vidyāsāgari* the text here has the following additional sentence—"Nor can the *objective* be defined as that which is the sphere of the action of the instrument ; because this definition would apply also to cases such as *hastena Rāmeṇa shareṇa*, where the action of the 'hand' falls on the 'arrow'. And further even without a comprehensive definition of the object, we could speak of it as that which, while bringing about an action, is the aim of its operation."

This passage however appears too disjointed to be accepted as part of the original text ; and, moreover, it does not appear likely that the author, after having once said that he considers it useless further to pursue the question of definition, should discuss another definition. The passage probably is a marginal gloss which has crept into the text.

(81). The Opponent now takes up other ground :—“ If ”, he says, “ self-illuminated Cognition is absolutely non-dual, then, the relation between ‘ object ’ *viṣaya* and ‘ subject ’ *viṣayin* (i. e., the Cognition) will not be possible. For to be *viṣayin*—literally, ‘ that which has an object ’—means *to be related to an object*; and no relation (or connection) can subsist without some kind of difference ; for where there is no cognition of difference between the things related, the cognition of relation is something contrary to reason.”*

(82). This is not so, we reply. That relation which is constituted by ‘ subject ’ and ‘ object ’ is not something different from the things related ; and even if it were such, we—in order to avoid an objectionable infinite regress—would have to admit the fact of that relation ultimately resting in itself.† And as thus it must be admitted that this last cognition of relation is accomplished without assuming any difference between the relation and the things related—and this for the reason that so-called *svarūpa* (or *svabhāva*) relation is not bound by the same rules as other kinds of relation‡,—so in the same manner the relation of ‘ subject ’ and ‘ object ’ may be viewed as accomplishing itself without any

* It is generally held that all cognition implies that relation the two terms of which are called the ‘ *viṣaya* ’ (object) and the ‘ *viṣayin* ’ which may be translated as ‘ subject,’ although this is somewhat misleading ; for the *viṣayin* is not what we understand by the ‘ knowing subject,’ but merely the cognition (*jñāna*). The objection raised by the *Naiyāyika* against the *Vedāntin* is that if ‘ cognition ’ is absolutely non-dual, the distinction between *viṣaya* and *viṣayin* vanishes, and with it Cognition itself, for which such distinction is essential.

† If the relation were something really different from the terms of the relation, we should have to postulate a further relation connecting the first relation with those terms, and so on, in infinitum ; to avoid which infinite regress (—and that such regresses *must* be avoided is a general principle of Indian philosophical argumentation—) we should have to stop at some place and assume that the last relation at which we have arrived is *not* something different from the terms it connects.

‡ The meaning is that the case of the *viṣaya-viṣayin* relation is analogous to that of the *svarūpa* (*natural*) relation as conceived by the Logicians themselves. In the case of other relations, as e.g. *Samyoga* (conjunction of two things in space), the relation is viewed by the Logicians as something additional to, other than, the things conjoined. In the case of the *svarūpa*-relation, on the other hand,—which exists e.g. between the ground and the absence of the jar, as expressed in the judgment ‘ there is no jar in this place ’—the relation is not held to be anything different from its terms i.e. the jar and the ground.

difference between the things related ; and thus the apprehension also of the relation is possible without any apprehension of difference (between subject and object). There surely is nothing incongruous in all this.

(83). Nor must it be argued that if the subject-object-relation in the case of self-apprehending cognition were to differ even in the least from the subject-object-relation in the case of the jar and the cognition of the jar, one of these relations would have to be rejected as false.* For the fact is that in the case of the jar and the cognition of it, that relation *has* to be rejected as false because they both have a merely illusory existence (are figments of Nescience); while in the case of self-evidenced Cognition, which is absolutely real, that relation also is absolutely real. Hence no fault can be found with the view of the two relations not being of the same kind.

(84). It however is not really necessary to assume that the self-apprehension of Cognition demands that cognition should be related to itself either by the relation of action-and-object-of-action, or by that of subject-(viṣayin)-and-object-(viṣaya.) According to you Logicians things are *being* (sat), through their being connected with the 'Universal' *Being* (sattā) (which inheres in all that *is* through the so-called samavāya relation); that 'Universal' *Being* itself however is *being* through itself; and this resting in itself of *Being* is not held to constitute an absurdity. In the same way we may regard cognitions as self-accomplished (without either of the aforesaid relations being appealed to).

(85). Or, we may view the matter in the light of another analogous case. Bahuvrīhi-compounds of the class called 'tad-guṇa-samvijñāna,'† primarily denote something not directly denoted by any of the component words, while at the same time

* The objection here anticipated is that if the Vedāntin does not admit both relations to be of the same kind, one of the two must be rejected; and as that subsisting between the jar and the cognition of the jar is found to be real by universal experience, it is the self-apprehension of the cognition that must be rejected. The Vedāntin, on his part, argues that one of the two must no doubt be rejected; but the one so to be rejected is the relation between the jar and the cognition of it.

† An example of this class of compounds is *lamba-karna* (long-ear) which primarily denotes the *ass*, while at the same time it suggests what the component words directly denote, *vis. long ears*.

they secondarily denote what is directly denoted by those words. Analogously Cognition may be conceived as primarily apprehending its object (*e. g.* a jar), and therein also apprehending itself, which in reality is not its object. This theory however, declaring as it does that self-apprehension belongs to cognitions having objects (*e. g.* a jar)—properly belongs to the Guru (Prabhākara), and is not the Vedāntic theory of the self-apprehension of Brahman; since in the latter there is no object whatever. We however may reason on the same lines by making use of a different analogy: just as in the case of 'Kuṭādi' (a technical term denoting a number of words among which 'Kuṭa' is the first), the compound (Kuṭādi) applies to what is not its object (*i. e.* is not directly denoted by the term), so Cognition also, in the state of Nescience* apprehends itself—although this 'Self' is not really its object.

(86). Although therefore our theory of the Self-apprehension of Cognition is on several points in disagreement with ordinary experience (where the relations of action and object of action, and subject and object always imply difference), yet 'Presumption' (anyathānupapattiḥ), being shown fully to prove such apprehension, obliges us to accept the theory together with those discrepancies. This is as follows: We have to give up the notion, suggested by ordinary experience, that the Cogniser is something different from the thing cognised, since otherwise the cognition of the *I*, (where the subject and the object of cognition are one) could not be accounted for. Similarly we have to abandon the view of the thing cognised being different from the cognition; because otherwise the consciousness 'I know' (where the cognition is also the object cognised) would not be possible. The means of proof relied on in the above instances which is technically called 'presumption', being stronger than any other means of proof, would refute even a hundred arguments based on facts of ordinary experience. We have on this point the following authoritative enunciation (by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Tantra-Vārttika II. 1. 5): 'Ever so many things not directly experienced have to be *assumed* when there is a valid means of proof for them.'

* This qualifying clause is added to guard against the objection that even such Self-apprehension of the Cognition as here is set forth, involves duality which is not acceptable to the Vedāntin.

(87). Thus then, when we have Presumption to prove a certain thing, it crushes under 'oot all discrepancies' with ordinary experience; for it is the strongest of all means of proof. (6)

You then must either provide some other explanation of the fact on which the said 'Presumption' relies, or give up your obstinate clinging to mere facts of experience; for the two can no more abide together than light and shade. (7)

(88). We thus have shown that the *self-evidencedness* of Cognition is something that you yourselves may easily comprehend and accept,—and we have done so by means of lines of argumentation fulfilling all the rules of correct reasoning as acknowledged by yourselves. As for ourselves, we accept Cognition as self-proved and self-accomplished on the sole strength of our consciousness.

(89). The difference between the Bauddha and the Vedāntin then comes to this:—The Bauddha regards everything, without exception, as *anirvachanīya*, i. e. undefinable; as Buddha himself has declared in the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* (II. 173)—“when we come rationally to examine things, we cannot ascertain the nature of anything; hence all things must be declared to be undefinable and devoid of any assignable nature or character.”—The Vedāntins on the other hand declare that this entire Universe, *with the exception of Cognition or Consciousness*, is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. It cannot be absolutely real, because this view is beset by difficulties which we shall point out later on; nor can we regard it as absolutely unreal since this would strike at the root of all empirical thought, speech and action of intelligent men of the world.

(90). Our adversary may here taunt us as follows:—“If you are incapable of defining things, you should at once betake yourself to proper teachers who will teach you definitions.” But this taunt would be justified only if we maintained that this *undefinability* of things depends not on the very nature of things, but on the incapacity of the speaker.

(91). Let our opponent who imagines that he can define things come forward with his definitions. He will fail; for we shall at once point out objections to each definition he attempts. The Logician will perhaps reply that the very objections of

the Vedāntin imply certain definitions; and in this way demolishing themselves are (no valid objections but) mere 'negatory reasons.'⁴⁸ But this is not so; for the objections by means of which we impugn the definability of things are themselves undefinable: we in fact make use of undefinable objections only; how then can you tax us with self-contradiction? Moreover you, on your side, are unable to give a valid definition of the 'negatory character of a Reason,' and to apply that definition to our objections (and reasonings).

(92). The Logician here starts a fresh discussion: "You assert," he says, "that the Universe is undefinable, because difficulties face you whether you regard it as real or as unreal. Now, what do you mean by this? Do you mean that there is a doubt as to the reality or unreality of the Universe? Or that you regard the Universe as something different from both, the Real and the Unreal? In the former case, since of the two mutually contradictory characters, (of Reality and Unreality), one *must* belong to the Universe, the objections raised against one of the two views must be merely apparent (not valid). And it is the objections raised against the reality of the world that must be regarded as invalid, as necessarily results from the following considerations:—If we accept the theory of Reality, how can the objections to the Reality be valid at the same time? [For truly, Reality is that which precludes all objections or shortcomings]. If, on the other hand, we accepted the theory of Unreality, everything would have to be regarded as unreal; and how then could the objections to, or defects of, that view be real (or valid)?' The second alternative again is altogether impossible owing to sheer contradiction. For, we have the authoritative declaration—'In the case of two mutually contradictory terms, or conditions—there is no room for a third term or condition' (cf. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Bibliotheca Indica, page 424).

(93). All this, we Vedāntins reply, is the argumentation of a ōñan who has failed to grasp the position of his opponent. How can he who holds, as we do, that all things cannot be defined either as real or as unreal, be found fault with on the

* A 'Jātyuttara' or 'Jāti' is a kind of fallacy. If a reason is put forward in such a form as to demolish itself, it is said to be a 'Jāti'. 'Jāti' is of twenty-four kinds—See *Nyāyamañjali*, pp. 619 et. seq., and *Gautama-sūtravṛtti* I, 58.

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the Vedāntin imply certain definitions; and in this way demolishing themselves are (no valid objections but) mere 'nugatory reasons.'⁶ But this is not so; for the objections by means of which we impugn the definability of things are themselves undefinable: we in fact make use of undefinable objections only; how then can you tax us with self-contradiction? Moreover you, on your side, are unable to give a valid definition of the 'nugatory character of a Reason,' and to apply that definition to our objections (and reasonings).

(92). The Logician here starts a fresh discussion: "You assert," he says, "that the Universe is undefinable, because difficulties face you whether you regard it as real or as unreal. Now, what do you mean by this? Do you mean that there is a doubt as to the reality or unreality of the Universe? Or that you regard the Universe as something different from both, the Real and the Unreal? In the former case, since of the two mutually contradictory characters, (of Reality and Unreality), one *must* belong to the Universe, the objections raised against one of the two views must be merely apparent (not valid). And it is the objections raised against the reality of the world that must be regarded as invalid, as necessarily results from the following considerations:—If we accept the theory of Reality, how can the objections to the Reality be valid at the same time? [For truly, Reality is that which precludes all objections or shortcomings]. If, on the other hand, we accepted the theory of Unreality, everything would have to be regarded as unreal; and how then could the objections to, or defects of, that view be real (or valid)? The second alternative again is altogether impossible owing to sheer contradiction. For, we have the authoritative declaration—'In the case of two mutually contradictory terms, or conditions—there is no room for a third term or condition' (c.f. *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Bibliotheca Indica, page 424).

(93). All this, we Vedāntins reply, is the argumentation of a man who has failed to grasp the position of his opponent. How can he who holds, as we do, that all things cannot be defined either as real or as unreal, be found fault with on the

⁶ A 'Jātyuttara' or 'Jāti' is a kind of fallacy. If a reason is put forward in such a form as to demolish itself, it is said to be a 'Jāti'. Jāti is of twenty-four kinds—See *Nyāyamañjali*, pp. 619 et. seq., and *Gautama-sūtravṛtti* I, 58.

ground of his inability to prove or define the character or nature of 'undefinability'? [Literally, how can he be urged to establish the reality of 'undefinability'?] Is not this very *undefinability* included in 'all things',—which expression comprises the whole phenomenal world? We in fact are prepared to prove the undefinability of things, on the rules and methods of the logician himself—'since all definitions whatever turn out to be futile, it follows that the thing is *undefinable*;' for the Logician himself teaches that, as between affirmation and negation, the rejection of either implies the acceptance of the other. It, therefore, is in accordance with the methods of the Logician that we say, 'the undefinableness of the Universe is proved'! In reality, however, we Vedāntins turn our backs on all efforts to *prove* the reality or unreality of the phenomenal world, and take our stand upon the one absolute essence *Brahman*, whose nature is nothing but pure Consciousness or Cognition,—and in this, which accomplishes all our purposes, we find full satisfaction and peace of mind.

(94). Those on the other hand, who (like the Logicians) undertake to ascertain the Truth by means of argumentations proceeding in strict accordance with the rules of proof and disproof devised by themselves, we address as follows:—This your method of argumentation cannot be right; for as we have shown, it is refuted by arguments complying with all the rules devised by yourselves. For this reason there is no room whatever for criticism directed against the objections set forth by us; for our entire refutation of your rules and methods proceeds in strict accordance with these rules and methods as laid down by yourselves. Nor may you use the very fact of our setting forth those objections as a cause of action against us. For we have told you distinctly that arguments can be set forth only after it has been acknowledged that the argumentation is to be carried on by those who are indifferent as to the *reality* or *unreality* of the argumentation [so that our mere entering on the argumentation does not presuppose our acceptance of its *reality*.]

(95). If against this you maintain that no discussion is possible unless the reality of the argumentation be acknowledged, —we reply that the said reality cannot be acknowledged without

know is the particulars of such proof." For as the proof known in a general way is enough to establish Nonduality, any further enquiry as to particulars would be as futile as an enquiry about the teeth of a crow. *In fact the knowledge of the proof in general will at the same time imply and bring before your mind the particulars required; what need then of a further question? For among the number of the well-understood means of right knowledge that one in which, in the given case, you have no good reason to discern any defect, is the particular means of knowledge in which proof in general will find rest and be completed. If, on the other hand, you on valid grounds trace defects in all the kinds of proof already known to you, the general proof will have to find its resting place and completion in some other means of proof which it may be found to imply. And if, finally, the purport of your question is to enquire as to the individual proof (that might convince you), we reply that it is not possible for us in every case to put our finger upon all the individual proofs (that would convince each and every enquirer); and hence even though we fail to point out such an individual proof, there is no harm done to our position.†

(101). If, on the other hand, you declare the cognition you have of Non-duality not to be true, then your question amounts to this—"what is the proof for that which is the object of wrong cognition?"—and does not this question clearly imply a self-contradiction ‡? You perhaps will rejoin, that the cognition of Non-duality is false according to you, while it is true according to us (the Vedāntins); and that hence it is to us that the question as to the proof of the cognition is addressed (and as the means of this can be called 'pramāṇa,' there will be no self-contradiction). But here we demur; we certainly do not consider it our business to point out the right means of proof for the cognition

* The meaning is that there can be no 'general' without the 'particulars' constituting it; hence there can be no idea of the former without the latter.

† The *Vidyāsāgarī* says:—"When the Logician is asked—what is your proof for the existence of atoms?—all that he can say is that *it is Inference*; and he cannot, unless he be omniscient, put forward any particular inferential reasoning that would convince all individual enquirers."

‡ The 'self-contradiction' lying in this that the means of wrong cognition cannot be called 'pramāṇa' (means of right cognition).

that you may have of Non-duality (and yet this is what is intended by your question, when it presupposes the *wrong* character of the cognition of Non-duality). We no doubt hold Non-duality to be ever true; but does this imply that the means of proof, on which *your* cognition of Non-duality rests, are valid? Let us imagine the case of a man who infers the existence of fire on a mountain, on which a fire is actually burning, from the perception of a fog which he mistakes for smoke,—would this (erroneous) cognition of smoke, which has fog for its real object, have to be regarded as a valid means of knowledge? *

(102). Let your question, however, be allowed to stand in some way or other; we have a reply to it:—*viz*: that the proof of Non-duality is nothing else but the Veda, in which we meet with texts such as 'one only without a second', 'there is no diversity whate—' (*Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV—iv—19.) We shall in the *Ishvarābhisandhi* show that the Veda is a valid means of true knowledge, and specially that it is such a means with regard to (not only things *to be accomplished*, such as sacrifices, but also) *accomplished* entities (such as Brahman and its Non-duality). For even if the passages making statements as to accomplished entities really had another impōrt (*viz.*, that of enjoining the *meditating* upon Brahman as one, non-dual)†, yet that impōrt would rest upon the validity of what the connected words of the text directly express (*i. e.* the validity of the injunction of cognising or meditating on Brahman as *one* rests on the validity of the fact, directly stated by those texts, of Brahman *being* one); and thus only those texts would be capable to refute other means of proof (which the Logician might employ against the doctrine of Non-duality). We here must remember that cognitions remain authoritative in themselves until they come to be sublated or invalidated by opposed cognitions (and

* Just as in this case, even though the cognition of fire is right, yet the means by which it is got at is not valid,—so it may be that even though your cognition of a certain thing may be right, yet you might have got at it by some invalid means.

† The position of the opponents to the Vedānta is that the authority of the Vedic passage consists only in laying down something *to be done*, and not in describing the real state of things; and that hence what the Vedāntic texts mean is, not that Brahman is really one, but that a person desiring final Release should meditate upon Brahman as such.

our setting in motion one of the valid means of proof; for otherwise anything might be accepted as real. It, therefore, would be necessary to call in the aid of *Pramāṇyas* for the due apprehension of the subject-matter of the argumentation, and so on; we thus should be driven into a vicious infinite regress, and it would become, simply impossible to start any discussion.

(96). Nor may you say that "since argumentations are actually accomplished previously (to the apprehension of the subject-matter), there is no need to look out for another argumentation (and hence an endless regress does not arise)." For if the argumentation is already previously accomplished, then,—since every argumentation is determined by its object (*viṣaya*), which is no other than the matter to be argued,—that object also will have been previously argued or considered; and thus (both the argumentation and its object being already accomplished) there would be no need of beginning any argumentation at all. "But, might it not be the case that some special point or aspect of the matter to be discussed has not been established previously, and that a further argumentation is begun on account of that?" This, we rejoin, implies that the special argumentation (or consideration) of which that special point or aspect is the object has not been accomplished previously. Your efforts by this means to escape from an infinite regress thus are as profitless as the chewing of a dry bone.

(97). If, finally, you were to reject as futile the arguments by which, in full agreement with your own rules and methods, we have shown your theories to be futile,—this would mean neither more nor less than that you reject as futile those very rules and methods of yours. And if you should attempt to refute our objections (formulated in agreement with your rules) by means of the Vedāntic arguments which we employ to refute your theories, the victory in the controversy would clearly rest with us. For you would in this way yourself prove our position, *viz.*, that the arguments put forward by us are really effective in demolishing the position of opponents. Thus then the whole discussion that would be carried on between you and ourselves would be in the form that it will be your business to establish your position and ours to demolish them; and in the course of such a discussion, victory could belong to you only in case you succeeded in

establishing your position [and hence you have no ground for the view that no discussion can be started, by one who holds all things to be neither real nor unreal.*] †

(98). For all these reasons, it remains an established conclusion that the whole phenomenon of diversity is totally inexplicable or undefinable; while Brahman alone constitutes absolute reality, free from all diversity.

SECTION 6.

[Non-duality is in a certain sense proved by the very doubt regarding it which our Adversary sets forth. And it is fully proved by the, inherently authoritative, Vedic texts that declare it.]

(99). [Page 82]. Here the Logician interposes the question—“But what is your proof for Non-duality?” This very question, the Vedāntin replies, cannot be asked by one who does not admit Non-duality. Unless one has an idea or conception of Non-duality how could the question as to its proof be asked at all? For what you ask for is not proof in general, but proof which has for its object a particular thing; and such a question is possible only if the questioner has an idea of that thing. For every question is a kind of energy of speech, and all energy of speech is determined by the object of the idea (or cognition) which gives rise to the energy. If there were no cognitions determining the objects of verbal energies, general confusion with regard to those objects would prevail.

(100.) If then you admit that you have a cognition of that Non-duality regarding which you ask a question, we further ask you—Is this cognition of yours a true or a false one? If you hold it to be a true cognition, then the very same means of proof (or true cognition) on which that cognition is based is, at the same time, the means of proof for Non-duality; and as thus the means of proof is already known to you, the question is idle. Nor can we allow you to argue that, “though the proof for Non-duality be already known in a general way, yet what I want to

* This is the explanation given by the *Vidyāsāgarī*. The *Śāṅkarī* explains the last sentence to mean the “in this manner there would be no end to these refutations and counter-refutations.”

from each other'; not in the form 'I am different from the jar and the cloth,' or 'the jar and the cloth are different from me,'

(106). As to the self-illuminedness (self-apprehension) of Cognition (which we Vedāntins maintain), this means that the cognition bears witness to itself only, not also to the difference of itself from all those several things from which it may differ.* If it were not so, (i.e. if all that from which cognition is different were the object of self-illumined cognition), then self-apprehension would take within itself all those things and their differences; and would not this again lead at once to absolute Non-duality?†

(107). [Page 91.] 'But if Cognition manifests its own form (itself) as well as the form of its object, it must also manifest the difference (bheda) of the two; for difference is nothing but the individual character of the two things which differ!' If this were so, we reply, then, in the case of the erroneous cognition 'the thing before me is silver' in which the individual character of the *this* and the individual character of the *silver* are both manifested, the difference of the two would be apprehended at the same time (and this would mean that there is no error; while such error is a matter of fact). † 'Let it then be said that what constitutes the difference of two things is (not their mere individual characters but) their individual existence as comprising certain specific attributes (and that in the case of error these specific attributes are not cognized).' But then we may say the same with regard to (not erroneous) cognition also: i. e.

* This is in reply to the objection raised by the Prābhākara that in apprehending itself the cognition at the same time apprehends its difference from other things.

† If, owing to the light of the cognition itself, everything would appear to it, then everything would be the cognition's 'own'; in this way everything (apparently) different from it would at once become self-illumined cognition, and thus we should be led back to the view of universal Non-duality (Śhankarā).

‡ The opponent had maintained that Cognition cannot cognize itself and an object, without cognizing the two as different. This the Vedāntin meets by pointing to erroneous cognition where there is cognition of two things (as e. g. the thing before me and silver) without cognition of their difference. The opponent replies that in erroneous cognition there is absent, not cognition of difference of the things themselves, but of the things as distinguished by certain attributes (if all the attributes of the thing before the onlooker were cognized, the thing would be recognised as a mere shell).

Cognition while manifesting itself may not manifest its difference from its object. For on the view of the apprehension of this difference presupposing certain contacts (of the internal organ with the sense-organ, the sense-organ with the object, etc.) (such contacts would have to exist prior to the cognition of which they are the cause, but) such prior existence is not possible (since the contact which is an attribute of the cognition cannot exist prior to that of which it is an attribute.) Should it be argued on the other hand that, just as the Cognition does not depend on contact, etc., for its own apprehension, it is not in need of them for the apprehension of attributes also (such as the attribute of its difference from other things)—we demur on the ground that in that case (all kinds of cognition being alike independent of contact etc.), there would be no distinction between direct apprehension and remembrance, and between valid and erroneous cognition.*

(108). [Page 92.] As thus the perceptual cognition (of the jar and the cloth) is proved by the Vedic texts (declaring universal non-duality) to be identical with the jar and the cloth, how should that same cognition be capable of acting as a valid means to cognize any difference of itself (in the form of the jar) from itself (in the form of the cloth)? And as perceptual cognition which you put forward as refuting the cognition of universal non-difference suggested by the Veda thus is found incapable of proving the difference of the jar and the cloth, the Vedic texts—having no contrary authority to meet, and enjoying unimpaired inherent authority, and being further rendered altogether invincible by the aid of 'Presumption'—fully prove the non-difference of those two things, without any possibility of their authority being obstructed.† The conclusion is that, as the scope of the application of the scriptural texts thus is not limited in any direction, they constitute a valid means of proof for the conception of general and absolute Non-duality.

* While it is an acknowledged principle that valid Perception is distinguished from erroneous one thereby that in the former there is an actual contact of the sense-organ with the object *cognised*, which is not present in the latter.

† Perception intimates no more than that the several objects of perception—jars, pieces of cloth, etc.,—are different from each other, not that they are different from the cognitions of them. Here then the Vedic teaching of general

so unless the conception of Non-duality based on Vedic texts be invalidated by other means of proofs, it remains valid).

SECTION 7.

[There is no force in the objection raised by the Naiyāyika, that the Vedic texts which declare universal Non-duality are refuted by the ordinary means of knowledge, Perception in the first place, which reveal to us a world characterized by diversity. No tenet with a claim to universality can be established by Perception, which never extends to more than a limited number of objects and the difference of these objects from one another. It does not, on the other hand, establish either the difference of those objects from the cognitions of them, or of the several cognitions from each other. In this latter sphere therefore the Vedic declaration of Non-duality at once asserts itself, without being encountered by any valid counter-authority; and if the general non-difference of the object from the cognition, and of cognitions from each other, has once been admitted, we are driven to view the difference of objects of thought from each other as a mere false appearance, which, just as individual false appearances are due to some defect of the individual mind or sensory apparatus, is due to the great cosmic defect (Avidyā or Māyā), which somehow is attached to what alone is real--the principle of universal non-dual intelligence. All arguments which the Logician brings forward in order to prove that cognitions differ from each other, and that hence their objects also must be allowed to be different, can be shown to be fallacious.]

(103). The Logician now proceeds to impugn the position that Non-duality is to be known through the Veda. The Vedic texts, he says, cannot be taken as valid sources of knowledge with regard to those matters which they appear directly to express; since such knowledge is obtained by sense-perception and the other valid means of knowledge. Hence we must assume them to have another, altogether different import.

(104). You are mistaken, we reply. You hold sense-perception to subvert the Vedic texts declaring Non-duality; but as a matter of fact, perceptions, differences, and so on arise with reference to their own limited objects only, such as a particular jar, or

piece of cloth and the like. But there is no sensuous perception or inference etc., acknowledged by both of us, which would apprehend *all* individual things, past, present and future. Such perception, if it existed, would make of you an omniscient person; but I should believe in this your omniscience only if you gave proof of knowing what is going on in the mind of myself. If then, sense-perception and other kinds of cognition have for their objects *a few* things only, they have no power to sublimate the Vedic texts declaring Non-duality, which refer to other things also; for the rule is that a valid cognition sublimes a contrary cognition only with regard to its own particular object. Were it not so, great confusion would arise: for instance, in that case, the Vedic text which enjoins the killing of a goat to be offered to Agni and Soma might set aside the general injunction of not killing any animals, so that the latter injunction would become meaningless.*

(105). [Page 90.] And if this is so, then the Vedic texts (which assert the oneness of *all* things) are not subject to any sublation (and hence are fully valid) in so far as intimating the non-difference of the so-termed sublating cognition (*i.e.* the perception of individual difference) and the sublated cognition (*i.e.* the cognition of general oneness), and hence *do* intimate the oneness of those cognitions; and do you then mean to say that the perceptual cognition sublimes itself? (as it would do if, as you claim, it were to sublimate the Vedic cognition with which it is one). On what ground, indeed, could one assert that the Vedic texts which declare the non-duality of *all existence*, possess no validity with regard to the non-difference of the sublating (perceptual) cognition from its own object, *i.e.* the jar, the cloth, and the difference of the two? For certainly the cognition of the oneness of *all* things cannot be sublated (by the cognition of the difference of two particular things—the jar and the cloth); since that latter cognition has for its object neither itself nor its own difference from the jar and the cloth. For the cognition actually presents itself in the form ‘the jar and the cloth are different

* One Vedic injunction lays down that an animal should be sacrificed to Agniṣomau; another that no animal should be killed. The text argues that the former injunction, as referring to a particular animal only, does not set aside the authority of the latter.

certain point have to admit a cessation of the series of sublating cognitions; since otherwise in the first place there would be no room for the appearance in consciousness of any other object, and in the second place there would be an endless regress; and to that very cognition at which you stop, the non-duality text will at once attach itself, and, thus having obtained a footing, reduce the entire series of objects and cognitions to Non-duality. And in this it cannot be arrested anywhere by any means of knowledge. Hence—

As soon as the series of sublating cognitions, tired out as it were by running a long way, comes to a stop, it is overtaken and vanquished by the Non-duality texts catching it up from behind! (8.)

(114). [Page 98.] Nor can we allow an argument which the Logician might possibly here propose, *viz.*, that at the point where the series of cognitions (establishing duality) comes to an end, there would be the cognition of another person which would supply the proof for difference. For in that case you will have to point out some proof for the fact of that other person cognising the last cognition of the preceding series as different from its object. It will not do to say that the proof lies in the cognition of again another person (for this would lead us into an infinite regress). Nor may you say that such a proof may be supposed to exist (even though you be unable actually to point it out). For, firstly, a merely supposed proof would at once be set aside by the well-ascertained cognition afforded by the Vedic texts; and secondly, even if such supposed proof were effective, you would have the same infinite regress.

(115). The Logician may at this point attempt to find a new basis for his view—as follows:—As a matter of fact, he says, the Vedic declaration of Non-duality having been found to be sublated by ordinary cognitions (perceptual and the like), when the series of those cognitions is followed up to a few stages (as the Vedāntin also admits in his last reasoning), we may infer, on the strength of that actual sublation, that in further following up the series that cognition also, which itself is not the object of a further 'representative' cognition (*anuvyavasāya*), possesses sublative force with regard to the Vedic

declaration. This is to say—having found the declaration to be sublated in some instances we, therefrom, infer its sublation in the case of the last cognition also, on the ground of the latter belonging to the same category ('cognition') as the former. To this also we demur. For, we ask, in which of the two following ways do you mean to prove that the Vedic declaration is sublated by that last cognition—is it by means of a cognition constituted by nothing else than the apprehension of the invariable connexion (*vyāpti*) (between cognitions and the fact of their being different from their objects)—such *vyāpti*-cognition resting on any cases, among the whole number of cognitions, where the two terms are observed to be connected as more and less extensive terms?—or is it by means of an (inferential) cognition which, having that last cognition for its object, manifests that the *probans* (the 'reason' or middle term on which the inference rests) is present in that last cognition,—that inference being supported by the knowledge of an invariable cognition observed in the case of other cognitions?*

(116). [Page 100.] Neither of these lines of argumentation we can accept. To the former we object that if the cognition of general concomitance were to be accepted as independently (*i. e.* without a further explicit inferential process) exercising its sublative power with regard to particular cases also,—then the particular cognition also (which is the outcome of the inferential process based on the notion of concomitance) would already be contained in that general cognition; and how then could it be said that there is any inference? † Then as regards the second

* On the former alternative the case of the last cognition is considered proved by immediate reference to the general proposition 'All cognitions are different from their objects.' On the latter alternative the following formal inference is made—'That last cognition is different from its object, because it is a cognition, like the cognition of a jar and the like.'

† The ordinary process of deductive reasoning consists in inferring a particular fact from a general fact. If this general fact were enough to accomplish by itself the particular fact, what would be the use of the process of inference? For instance, if the universal premiss 'men are mortal' were to imply, as it stands, the mortality of Socrates, there would be no need for the expl. inferential process comprising another premiss 'Socrates is a man' and a conclusion 'Socrates is mortal'.

(109). The argument that the cognition of difference (as immediately given by perception) cannot be explained otherwise (than on the basis of the reality of such difference) would by no means justify a conclusion contrary to the above. For in the first place perceptual cognition, because rendered doubtful by the Vedic texts which declare non-difference, cannot be proved to be a *valid* means of knowledge. And in the second place the cognition of difference (plurality) admits, like the cognition of a double moon, of being accounted for otherwise.*

(110). [Page 95.] We further must notice that Scripture emphasizes the word 'one' ('one only this was in the beginning, without a second') by adding the word *eva* (*i. e. only, exclusively*), and thus declares *absolute* Unity. The validity of sense-perception and the other sources of knowledge which intimate plurality cannot, therefore, be justified by the assumption of there being both Diversity and Unity (which theory—the so-called 'bheda-bheda' theory—might otherwise be held to satisfy the Vedic teaching as well as Perception &c.)

(111). The Logician raises another objection. How, he asks, can the process of Non-duality being established by the Vedic texts—as assumed by you—be the true one, considering the fact that cognitions do not operate by gradual stages?† There

non-duality steps in directly and asserts itself with regard to the non-difference of objects from their cognitions, and of cognitions from one another. But if the several cognitions are really not different from one another, we must assume (by Arthāpatti) that their objects also are not different. And this last step establishes absolute universal Non-duality.

* The appearance of a double moon is due to some defect of the eye of the spectator. The appearance of Plurality in general is due to Nescience; the great cosmic defect.

† The Vedāntin had, in what precedes, asserted that the establishment of absolute Non-duality proceeds by steps or stages: the Vedic texts at first determine their own non-difference from their objects, and after that the non-difference of the objects from one another. To this the Logician objects that 'words' after having produced a certain cognition, stop in their operation and do not, by themselves, give rise to further cognitions; just as a certain action or effort which gives rise, let us say, to the separation in space of two material objects does not give rise to a further separation. The Vedic text thus, after having at once given rise to a certain cognition, cannot be assumed to continue operating so as finally to establish the non-difference of objects from one another.

is, we reply, no force in this objection also. As a matter of fact, the cognition of the Non-difference of things originates from the Vedic text at once, and from this there follow, developing themselves by a succession of steps of thought as described above, our cognitions regarding the several individual things—all of them, however, being based on the validity of the initial cognition of non-difference (which results immediately from the Vedic text.)*

(112). But, the Logician resumes with regard to a previous argument of the Vedāntin, even if the perceptual cognition of the difference between the jar and the cloth does not have for its object the difference between the cognition itself and those two things, how can, on this ground merely, the Vedic text be held authoritatively to establish the non-difference of that cognition and its object? For another cognition, presenting to consciousness the difference of that Cognition on the one and jar and cloth on the other side†, will refute the Vedic text declaring non-duality!

(113). The matter, we reply, is not as you present it. In the case stated, the Vedic text, immediately abandoning its former object, will assert its authoritative force with regard to the non-difference from its object of that other cognition (brought forward by you) which apprehends the difference—from the jar and the cloth,—of the cognition of the difference between the two: and thus establishing the non-difference between that other cognition on the one hand, and the jar and the cloth and their difference on the other hand, it will not rest before having finally established the non-difference of all the things concerned. However far you may go (in constantly bringing forward other cognitions to sublimate the Non-duality texts), you will at a

* The stages may be thus explained:—(1) The Vedic passages afford the cognition of the Unity of all things; (2) then comes the ordinary sensuous cognition of the Jar as different from the Cloth; (3) this sensuous cognition is found to be inconsistent with the previous valid cognition; (4) this cognition of difference, therefore, is rejected as invalid; (5) thus the doubt raised as to the non-difference between the Jar and the Cloth is set aside; (6) the two are regarded as one. And so on with each set of objects. Thus it is not necessary for the verbal cognition itself to come into play with regard to each of these.

† I. e. the cognition 'the perception which apprehends the difference of jar and piece of the cloth is not the jar and the cloth.'

sublate the Vedic declaration of Non-duality; as that 'Presumption' itself will eventually stand in need of being apprehended. (10).^{*}

SECTION 8.

[Further arguments against the position of the Naiyāyika. The latter frequently invalidates his reasoning by making an initial assumption of the reality of difference, which premiss the Vedāntin refuses to accept.]

(121). But, the Logician resumes, we find that everything in this world may be associated, in a positive as well as a negative judgment, with that 'difference' the conviction of the existence of which is implanted in our minds by repeated impressions; and this prevents the Vedic declaration of universal non-difference from giving rise to a corresponding cognition.† But in this objection also there is no force. 'For words (verbal declarations) are capable of giving rise to ideas relating even to absolutely non-existing things (as when the verbal statement 'on the tip of my finger a hundred elephants are disporting themselves' gives rise to the corresponding idea),—and also, as long as there is nothing to sublimate it, to a true cognition, firmly based on the intrinsic validity, (svataḥ-prāmānya) that belongs to all cognitions' (Shloka-vārttika II. 6). (11)

Again, he also (*viz.*, the Prābhākara) who holds the view that in all cases of verbal cognition there must be absence of the apprehension of non-connection (of the things spoken of), declares that, in the case of a cognition which is not sublated (by another, stronger, cognition) the non-apprehension of a

*As this Presumption can not establish any difference between itself and its own apprehension, this will supply the necessary basis for the declaration of Non-duality, which having thus got a footing will eventually establish Universal Non-difference.

†We, on the ground of invariable experience, unhesitatingly affirm as well that 'the jar is different from the cloth' as that 'the jar is not the cloth;' and so of all things. Against the rooted conviction thus expressing itself the Vedic declaration of universal non-difference is unavailing.

non-connexion which is absolutely 'non-existent, is invariably accompanied by the apprehension of a connexion.* (12)

(122). Nor can the Vedic declaration of non-duality be sublated by any reasoning as to the impropriety (of accepting the validity of such a declaration in the face of perceptual experience to the contrary); for on account of its substratum being absolutely real the Vedic declaration is stronger than Reasoning, which is not of such nature. (13)

Moreover, reasoning based on impropriety can claim superior force with regard to that only which, when once in operation, does not cut off the very root of such reasoning; in the case in question it has no such force, since the contrary takes place.† (14)

(123). The Logician (taking up the thread of the discussion from para. 118) now reasons as follows:—You, Vedāntin, argue—'Such and such a thing (*e. g.* the last but one cognition of the series) is not apprehended as different from such and such another thing (*e. g.* the last cognition); and this non-difference having once been established by the non-duality texts, by this means universal non-duality is established in the end.' But the fact is that that primary difference (the apprehension of which you deny) is apprehended by me at the very time of discussion (so that the Vedic declaration of Non-duality is unable to obtain a foothold). And hence your attempt to disprove difference is futile, whether you bring forward an alleged instance of non-difference, or not. (For in the former case we meet you by affirming our consciousness of difference, and in latter, you, of course, can prove nothing).

* The Mīmāṃsaka maintains that in cases of valid cognition due to a verbal statement (as when somebody says 'bring the cow') there is absence of any cognition of non-congruity (*ayogyatā*) between the things spoken of, and that together with this non-cognition there goes the cognition of congruity or connexion. The Vedāntin, accepting this, declares that, for the same reasons, there is cognition of congruity in the case of the verbal statement 'all this is one'—a cognition which, as shown before, is not sublated by any other valid means of knowledge.

† The basis of the reasoning from impropriety is, in the given case, the generally held notion of the practical or relative reality of individual existence; and this the Veda—which insists on the oneness of all existence from the metaphysical or absolute point of view—does not deny. The reasoning from impropriety thus is deprived of its basis.

argumentation. If you regard the inferential cognition as what sublates the Vedic declaration, then, in as much as that inference (which would prove the difference between cognitions and their objects) cannot include itself within its scope (*i. e.* as the inference while proving that all other cognitions are different from their objects may not prove this with regard to itself), the Vedic declaration of non-difference will at once get a foothold on that inferential cognition, and, as we have shown above, from there extend over the whole series of cognitions and objects.

(117). The Logician then puts forward the following inference:—All the cognitions in question are different from their objects; because they are cognitions; like the cognitions of the jar and the cloth. This, he says, is an inference in a strictly general form, including the cognition itself also, and hence you prove also the difference of itself from its object. You are again mistaken, we reply. For (although the inference may prove the difference of the cognitions from their objects, it does not prove the difference of the objects from the cognitions, and hence) the Vedic declaration of Non-duality which intimates the non-difference of the object from the cognition will allow no room for the above inference. And if, to controvert this, the Logician should maintain that what the inference proves is (not the difference of the cognition from the object but) the mutual difference between cognition and object, we should have to point out the difficulties connected with the *probans* of that inference.*

(118). And even granting that your inference proves the mutual difference between a cognition and its own object, it proves nothing with regard to the difference of that cognition from other cognitions and their objects; and hence Scripture, encountering no opposition as to this latter point, will at once rush in, declaring the non-difference of one cognition from the object of a second, and of a third cognition from the object of the second and so on, and thus in the end triumphantly establish

* If the proposition to be proved is 'cognitions and objects are mutually different from each other', what should be the *probans*? 'Because they are cognitions'?—this would prove nothing as to the objects. 'Because they are objects'?—this would prove nothing regarding the cognitions.

the Non-difference of all. Nor can you give to your conclusion the following form—‘all cognitions are different from the objects of all cognitions’; for this would imply that a cognition which itself is the object of another cognition is different (in its character of ‘object’) from itself (in its character of ‘cognition’)—which is an absurdity. Nor may you escape from your difficulties by stating the conclusion in the form—‘all cognitions are different from all cognised objects except themselves’; for the Non-dualist who maintains the non-difference of all things refuses to accept the qualification ‘excepting themselves’ (which implies difference); and as your *probandum* thus is one not acknowledged by your opponent, your whole inference is invalidated.

(119). The reasons set forth also leave no room for the objection that the Vedic declaration of Non-duality is effectively counteracted by the declaration ‘all things are different’, which, in the absence of sublation, must be regarded as self-evident. For if this declaration be taken as asserting the difference of all things from *some* thing, the argument would be needless, since we Vedāntins also admit the difference of all *unreal* things from the one Reality—Brahman. If, on the other hand, it be understood as asserting the difference of all things from *all* things, this would imply the absurdity of things being different from themselves. And if you should wish to qualify the ‘from all things’ by the added clause ‘but itself’, the Non-dualist would refuse to admit that qualification.

(120). Thus then—If you make ‘all things’ the subject (minor term) of your inference, you lay yourself open to a double criticism—there is nothing left to constitute the ‘probans’ and the ‘instances’ of your inference (for the minor term has swallowed up every thing), and you arrogate to yourself omniscience (for none but an omniscient person can make an assertion regarding *all things*). If, on the other hand, you leave something outside the sphere of your minor term, that something constitutes the doorway through which the scriptural Non-duality texts march in (and disestablish all difference or duality). (9). And for the same reason, even the ‘Presumption’ based upon the ‘difference’ cognised by the first (sensuous) apprehension (of the difference between the Jar and Cloth, for instance) cannot

(124). Not so, we reply. You maintain that, when I say,— ‘You have no valid cognition of the difference between the final cognition of the series and the cognition produced by the Vedic declaration of non-duality as well as other cognitions’,—you at that very time *have* a valid cognition of that difference. But that cognition cannot, at that time be obtained through perception, because at that time the final cognition (of difference) is not actually present (and there is perception only of what is actually present). Nor could you arrive at the desired cognition either by means of a *reason* (*i. e.* the *proving* middle term in an Inference), or by *presumptive reasoning* (*arthāpatti*);* for in neither case would the reasoning have any force against the upholder of Non-duality; since in the alleged inference the *Probans* would not differ from the *Probandum*; and similarly in the ‘presumptive’ reasoning the alleged ‘impossibility’ would not differ from that without which that impossibility cannot be avoided. And how then could any valid cognition arise from such mere semblances of Reasoning? Nor may you (the Logician) plead that the difference is known to you full well, and that hence the *Probans* is well established for *yourself* at any rate. For in that case all speech on your part will be altogether purportless; since speech is meant to inform and convince others. And if, on the other hand, you keep silent, you will not escape the charge of being a dullard. Nor will it help you to say that you yourself have a fully valid cognition of the difference, and that you express it in words merely to make it known to others; for the fact is that others have no confidence in your words. When two opponents, each of whom is eager for victory, meet in a discussion, the words addressed by one of them to the other serve a purpose

* The inference might be in the following form,—‘The last cognition differs from the cognition produced by the Vedic declaration, because the two are produced by *several* agencies.’ But this inference the Vedāntin holds to be fallacious, because the difference of agencies on which it rests is not acknowledged by him.—The ‘presumptive’ reasoning would be in the following form,—‘If there were no difference between the two cognitions, the fact that persons having no knowledge of the Veda have no cognition of non-duality could not be explained.’ But here the alleged ‘impossibility’ is explained by means of difference, and the difference again is postulated on account of the impossibility which constitutes a vicious circle.

only if they initially arouse in the latter the desire to hear what the former has to say and eventually produce in his mind a valid cognition. But this the words of the Logician, when addressed to the Vedāntin, fail to accomplish ; for as we have already explained, in neither case (*i. e.* neither by way of inference nor by way of 'presumptive' reasoning) is the point on which the reasoning hinges proved for the Vedāntin. Nor will it avail you to say 'even if my words do no more than produce a doubt in the mind of the Vedāntin, the Vedic declaration will be sublated in so far as regarded as doubtful, and hence you will be unable to prove by it the doctrine of Non-duality.' For as to him who holds the view of general Non-duality all difference is something non-established, the defects of the opponent's reasoning--such as the non-difference of the *probans* from the *probandum* and the like--will ever be present to him, and hence there will be no chance of doubt ever arising in his mind.

(125). Thus then for the steadfast warrior who takes up the single mighty 'weapon of Brahman'* and heeds nothing else, there can be no discomfiture in the sport of battle. (15)

(126). Then again, with regard to the object of the cognitions or thoughts of another person (from which you would seek to differentiate your own cognition), we can indeed form a vague general idea of them as 'something that he is thinking of', or 'something that he wishes to say'; but without some special determining circumstance we are unable to apprehend the particular object of which he thinks, or which he wishes to express. You, therefore, never can obtain a valid cognition of the difference of such an object from the last cognition (of the series of cognitions in that person's mind); since for this it would be absolutely required for you (the person other than he to whom the cognition belongs) to have an idea of the particular object thought of by the person (the difference wherefrom, of the cognition, is meant to be cognised by you). For without the idea of that particular thing, the difference from which is meant to be cognised, there can be no cognition of difference ; since if

* The 'Brahmāstra' was the most powerful of all the missiles used by ancient archers ; there is also a play upon the other meaning of the compound -- 'the all-powerful weapon in the shape of *Brahman*' (the one Reality accepted by the Vedāntin.)

this were possible, it would be possible for a thing to be cognised as different from itself.* And as the declaration of Non-duality thus at once gains a footing, how can you stop it from ultimately establishing the oneness of all that is? Thus then, we ask—

Having but a vague general notion, and never a definite particular one, of things, how can you prevent the texts declaring Non-duality from gaining a foothold? (16).

(127). 'But', the Logician asks, 'does not your refusal to acknowledge any difference or diversity involve you in flat contradiction with empirical thought, speech and action, which are based upon diversity of words and things?' There is no contradiction, we reply, as we shall fully explain later on. Moreover, that contradiction with which you charge us requires to be proved in some way; but since, according to the Non-dualist, there is no difference between that against which the charge is levelled and that which is used to establish the charge, there is no real charge at all. Hence—

'Even though the champion of Non-dualism carry on the discussion on the basis of Diversity (understood to be something non-real), how can the charge of Self-contradiction be established against him by means of arguments which are not proved to be *really* different from what they are meant to impugn?' (17).

* The translation follows the interpretation of the commentators. It however appears to be much simpler to take the passage in the following manner:— "You cannot have any valid cognition of the difference of the other man's cognition from the object he may be thinking of, without knowing the particular object that he is thinking of; for it is just possible that that very same cognition may be the object of his thought; and certainly this cognition cannot be rightly cognised as differing from itself." This interpretation is not altogether unwarranted; as Raghunātha Shīromāṇi refers to it as the interpretation of 'Shrīpāda'.

SECTION (9).

[We, moreover, the Vedāntin continues, call upon the Logician to give a valid definition of the difference between things which he says is evidenced by Perception. A thorough examination of the several definitions proposed shows them all to be destructive of the very thing they are meant to define. For if, on the one hand, difference is viewed as entering into the essential nature of the things that differ, the relation between the latter, if duly thought out, is found to be one, not of difference, but of identity. And if, on the other hand, difference is held to be something extraneous to the things that differ, the need of establishing a connection between difference on the one and the things differing on the other hand drives us into the assumption of an endless series of relations—which explains nothing.]

(128). Another aspect of the question here demands consideration. What, we must ask, are we committed to by the view that Perception and the other means of knowledge refute the scriptural declaration of Non-duality, in as much as through them we apprehend the difference from each other of things such as jars and pieces of cloth?

(129). What, we ask, have we to understand by the *difference* of things which you say is known through Perception? Is this difference constituted by the nature of the very individual things which differ *? or is it to be defined as the mutual negation of those things? or as the difference of attributes? or as something else?—The first alternative is inadmissible. For, if what constitutes the difference from each other of the jar and piece of cloth is their very nature, it follows that the two have no individual existence without either implying the other. For where there is a difference, it must be a difference from something; were it not so, to say 'difference constitutes the nature of a thing' would be no more than a statement of two synonymous technical terms. And if what Perception apprehends as the individual nature of the cloth were nothing else than the difference of the cloth from the jar, the jar would enter into the very individual being of the

* On this view, to say that the, 'jar differs from the cloth' is to say that the 'jar is *itself* and the cloth is *itself*'; and thus the 'difference' of a thing is only *its own self or nature*.

cloth, and this would mean that Perception which was put forward as revealing difference would operate in an exactly opposite way and establish *non-difference*!

(130). You, our opponent replies, interpret the Perception of difference as presenting to consciousness *non-difference*; but please just pay attention to that aspect of it also which presents difference. If the two things were identical, the cognition would be either that of a jar or of a piece of cloth; not that of the difference of the cloth from the jar!

(131). The counter-argument, we reply, would be valid if we, while holding *non-difference* to be absolutely real, at the same time denied the illusory existence of difference. Hence—

The cognition, which does not present to consciousness *non-difference* can never present difference; but it is valid with regard to the former only, not to the latter—for this would imply the contradiction (by the apprehension of difference) of that (*i. e.* the apprehension of *non-difference*) upon which it is itself dependent. (18)*

(132). Our opponent, changing his ground, now says that what constitutes the individual nature of the cloth, is *mere difference* (not so far implying difference from any definite thing such as a jar); this abstract difference is, when we add 'from the jar'; further defined by the jar which is the 'counterentity of the difference', and as such distinct from it.† But this also, we reply, is inadmissible. For of a difference, apart from a definite counter-entity, no valid conception can be formed; as a matter of fact, knowledge of difference always refers to difference

* The difference of jar and cloth can not be present to consciousness without the apprehension of the jar *by itself* and the cloth *by itself*; while the jar and cloth may be present to consciousness without their difference being apprehended; hence the apprehension of difference is dependent on that of *non-difference*, and hence *non-difference* alone is real' (Shāṅkarī). That is to say, without the apprehension of *non-difference* there can be no apprehension of *difference*; hence the latter can never be true; as that would mean the denial of the former upon which it itself depends.

† 'A thing which differs' is the counter-entity (correlative term; *pratiyogin*) to 'difference'.—On the above, second, form of the theory according to which 'bheda' is 'svarūpa-bheda', the jar does not enter into the self of the cloth as an essential attribute or determination (*viśeṣaṇa*)—as it did on the first form—, but only as an accidental attribute (*upalakṣaṇa*).

determined by a definite thing from which something else differs. Moreover, what an extraordinary piece of reasoning is it to argue that the essential individual character of a piece of cloth (which by your view is difference and) which, as such, should be independent of everything else, becomes 'difference' from something actually only when coming to be defined by that counter-entity (the thing from which it differs)*! Truly, what is *blue* by its own nature, does not become blue when defined by *yellow* as a counter-entity!

(133). Also consider what follows. You maintain that 'difference' is constituted by the individual nature of the cloth in so far as determined by a counter-entity, e. g. a jar. Is it then, we ask, the essential nature of the jar which constitutes the jar the counter-entity of the cloth, or some attribute of the jar? On the former alternative, the individual nature of the jar is nothing else than its being the counter-entity of the cloth: the jar thus absorbs the cloth within itself; and the unavoidable result is the identity of the two. Nor can we allow you to assert (in a manner analogous to what you had above asserted with regard to difference) that the nature of the jar consists (not in its being the counter-entity of the same definite thing but) in the mere abstract character of being 'counter-entity', and that its relation to the cloth—'the jar is a counter-entity with regard to the cloth,'—is something further, different. For there can be no valid cognition of something having the character of counter-entity, without relation to some definite other thing of which it is the counter-entity. And further, the idea or form of expression 'with regard to the cloth', also will give rise to difficulties, whether this relation be viewed as the essential character or a mere attribute of the jar. †

*The *Svarūpa* of a thing belongs to itself independently of all things; and it is not dependent upon its specification by any counter-entity. Hence if the difference be the *Svarūpa* of the cloth, it must be independent of the jar. But this is not possible.

†Does this 'being defined by its relation to the cloth,' constitute the essential character or an attribute of the jar? In the former case, the cloth enters into the essential nature of the jar; in the latter case, it becomes an attribute of the jar; and then the principle applies that an attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are non-different. Both alternatives thus imply identity of jar and cloth.

(134). Nor is the second of the above alternatives (in para. 133) tenable. For if 'being a counter-entity with regard to the cloth' is an attribute of the jar, then the cloth will enter into the very nature of that attribute; and this establishes non-difference of the cloth with that attribute (and hence on your view the cloth would be the attribute of the jar)! And if the cloth thus is shown to be an attribute of the jar, the jar will, by an analogous argumentation, be shown to be an attribute of the cloth; for the character of being a counter-entity, which belongs to the cloth, being definable only in relation to the jar, no other position could possibly belong to the jar (but that of being an attribute of the cloth). And the result thus would be that each of the two things would abide, or be contained, in the other, and at the same time be that in which the other abides or is contained. But as a matter of fact there is no means of knowledge that gives us a valid cognition of the cloth abiding in the jar and at the same time the jar abiding in the cloth. (Moreover, what view shall we, in this case, take of the attribute and that to which the attribute belongs?) Are the two connected by a definite form of connexion or relation, or are they not so connected? In the latter case, anything might be the attribute of anything. If the former, an endless series of connexions or relations would have to be assumed (for it would be necessary to account for the connexion of that definite relation with its two terms, by the assumption of a further connexion, and so on). And if, in order to avoid this endless regress, the relation, either at the very beginning or at some later stage, were assumed to be dependent on the very nature of the things related (i. e. to be a so-called *svabhāva* or *svarūpa* relation, which makes it needless to assume a further relation), then this would lead to absolute Non-duality; inasmuch as just as the attribute in question, being *related* to one thing, constitutes the very *svarūpa* or nature of that thing (the relations between the two being of that kind),—so in the same manner, when that same attribute would be related (by that same relation, which is the only one possible according to the view set forth) to another thing, it would constitute the very *svarūpa* or nature of this latter thing also [and thus the nature of both these things consisting of the *attribute* in question, there

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would be non-difference between the things themselves]. This same reasoning can be applied to all *attributes* of things (as with regard to these also we can put forward the same alternatives as above). The result is that Perception which according to you is a valid means to cognise difference as constituting the essential nature of things, really proves universal Non-duality.

(135). The Logician here comes forward with another argument. Whenever, he says, we view the jar by itself, without reference to other things, then we cognise it as a jar only ; while when we view it with reference to other things, as *e. g.* a piece of cloth, then we cognise it in the form of ' difference from such objects' (this being only two different ways of viewing one and the same object). This also we cannot admit. For the cognition of difference (of the jar from other objects) is of a totally different nature from the cognition of the jar by itself. And this difference of character would not be imparted to the cognition if the jar only were (in both cases) the object of cognition. Nor may it be argued that the difference of the two cognitions is due to the fact that in the cognition of ' difference' (of the jar as different from the cloth &c.) the cloth, etc., enters as an additional element (so that the cognition in one case would be of the jar, in the other case of the jar *plus* the cloth). For the cognition of difference is something quite different from the cognition of the jar *and* the cloth. 'The jar and the cloth,' 'the jar is different from the cloth'—these are two cognitions of which nobody truly ever is conscious as equivalent. Nor is the reason far to seek ; for any dispute as to what in each case constitutes the object of cognition is cut short by the fact that in one case the nominative case ('and *the cloth*') is used, and in the other the ablative case ('*from the cloth*'); and that with regard to this use there is no possible option. As a matter of fact, we observe that when the notion to be formed is that of the jar *and* the cloth, nobody ever thinks of the cloth as different from the jar. For all these reasons we conclude that for forming a definite idea of the jar there is no need of the consciousness of the cloth.

(136). Nor is it a fact that where a certain cognition is the cause of another the thing which is the object of the causal cognition always presents itself to the mind in the ablative

case ('from that'), * while the thing which is the object of the caused cognition presents itself in the nominative case ('this'). For if this were so, then in all perceptual cognition the object of the definite or *concrete* cognition (savikalpaka, which is the second stage in the process of perception) would appear in consciousness in the nominative case, together with the object of the non-definite (or abstract, nirvikalpaka) cognition (which is the first stage in perception) in the ablative case.† And similarly, in all cognition from Analogy, the thing that is remembered (through Analogy) would appear to consciousness in the nominative case, together with the similarity (which is the cause of the cognition) in the ablative case; (i. e. our cognition would be 'on account of its similarity to a cow, this is a gavaya, *bos gavaeus*); while the cognition only is 'this is a gavaya.' We hence arrive at the conclusion that even though the consciousness of every one testifies to the fact that what presents itself to the mind in the form 'the jar is different from the cloth' is nothing else than the difference of the jar in relation to the other thing *cloth*;—and this would imply that the *form* of the jar consists in its *difference from the cloth*;—yet this view cannot be upheld, merely on the ground that the cognition of the jar is dependent upon that of something else (the *cloth*, or *difference from cloth*); for if we admitted this we should be committed to the absurdities mentioned above (of there arising cognitions such as *ghaṭatvāt ghaṭaḥ* etc).

© This is meant to meet the argument that the fifth case (Ablative) does not necessarily, in the case under discussion, denote *difference*; when we say 'dhūmāt vahnih' ('from the smoke, fire') we mean that fire is inferred from the smoke; analogously the collocation of words 'paṭāt ghaṭaḥ' might indicate that the cognition of the cloth is the cause of the cognition of the jar.—The reply is that causal cognitions, even when actually existing do not appear in consciousness in the form of a term in the ablative case.

† I. e. the complete perception of some individual jar would express itself in thought and speech in the form 'ghaṭatvād ghaṭaḥ' i. e. "from the class-character (or *Universal*) 'jar-ness', the (individual) jar." In perception there first arises an indefinite cognition of a certain group of generic characteristics ('This is a thing belonging to the class 'jars'); and from this there springs the cognition of the individual jar, with its definite shape, colour, etc. But as a matter of fact the finished cognition presents itself to consciousness, only in the form ' (this is) a jar. '

(137). The above reasoning also disposes of the view that the Vedic doctrine of Non-duality is refuted by Perception in as much as revealing to us that difference among things which consists in their *mutual negation*, *ānyonyābhāva*, (the second alternative noted in para 128). For the arguments already set forth prove, in the case of mutual negation also, that that very thing, difference from which is maintained, enters into the nature of difference itself.

(138). [Page 112] Moreover, the mutual negation between jar and cloth, as indeed between any two things, must be held to have for its counter-entity the identity (*tādātmya*) of the two. Now if this identity were not admitted in any way (to exist) it would not be possible to form a valid cognition of the negation that is qualified or defined* by that identity; for there can be no valid cognition of a negation qualified or defined by something that, as *e. g.* a hare's horn, is an absolute non-entity.† The reason of this is that whenever a means of right knowledge operates with regard to something that is qualified or defined by something else (*e. g.* a counter-entity, as in the given case), it cannot act without presenting to consciousness the latter thing also; and when this latter is an absolute non-entity, no valid cognition can establish itself with regard to the qualified or defined thing itself.‡ Nor can it be asserted that the negation in question, having for its abode the jar, must be allowed to have for its counter-entity the cloth (not the identity of jar and cloth), and thus is not open to the damaging objection that it has for its counter-entity an absolute non-entity. For if this were so, what difference would there be between the *mutual negation* under discussion, and that other kind of negation or non-existence which the Logician terms *samsargābhāva* (negation or non-existence of connection)§? It

* An inseparable or permanent attribute is called the '*viśeṣaṇa*,' and an accidental one '*upalakṣaṇa*.'

† The negation of an absolute non-entity would itself be devoid of existence or meaning.

‡ And this means that there can be no valid cognition of the *mutual negation* in question.

§ The Logician postulates three kinds of Negation (1) *Ānyonyābhāva* or Absolute Negation, (2) *Ānyatābhāva* or Mutual Negation,—i. e. the negation

will not be right for you to explain the difference between the two negations on the ground that 'the negation of connection between jar and cloth means that 'the negation of the jar' is in contact with the cloth,—while the *mutual negation* or *negation of Identity* of the cloth (in the jar) means that the negation of the jar constitutes the very nature of the cloth; [as you do not hold this view which is held by the Prābhākara only]. For these reasons the difference between *mutual negation* and *negation of connection* must be held to lie therein that while the counter-entity of the latter includes mere 'connection,' the counter-entity of the former includes 'identity' between the things concerned. And in this way you cannot escape from the aforesaid absurdity of admitting a negation that has for its counter-entity an absolute non-entity.

(139). Nor may the Logician argue that all that 'mutual negation' between the two things—jar and cloth—means is that the generic character of the cloth does not reside in the jar, nor the generic character of the jar in the cloth. * For, according to the Logician, the generic character of the jar and that of the cloth possess no attributes on account of which the two characters could be negated with regard to each other (or distinguished); and as from this it follows that the two characters are identical, any means of knowledge, negating the generic character of the cloth with regard to the jar and that of the jar with regard to the cloth, would thereby intimate that both the cloth and the jar are devoid of the generic character of cloth as well as of that of the jar. And as thus there could be no possibility of difference (between the jar and the cloth), either in point of attributes or of essential nature, there would be nothing to determine what should be the counter-entity and what the

of one thing in the other and *vice versa*, and (3) *Samsargābhāva* or Negation of Connection. The difference between the last two is that in the latter we only deny the connection of one thing with another, while in the former, what we deny is the identity between the two. In the one case the counter-entity of the negation is identity, while in the other it is only the thing of which we deny the connection.

* By this explanation the Logician avoids the contingency of having the 'identity' between the two things as the counter-entity of 'mutual negation.'

entity in the so-called 'mutual negation,' and hence the latter could never be the object of a valid cognition.*

(140). For the same reasons the Vedic view of Non-duality cannot be refuted by Perception, viewed as manifesting that difference of things which consists in their (alleged) difference of attributes (dharma). For in the case of difference of attributes also, these attributes are nothing else than generic characters—such as *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva*. Now you must maintain either that there is a further difference of attributes in those attributes, and then you involve yourself in either of the following difficulties,—the difference of attributes rests in itself (thus involving the absurdity termed *ātmanāshraya*, a thing resting in itself) or (if you base the difference on another difference and so on) there arises an infinite regress; and, in addition to either of the difficulties, we actually are not conscious (of any other differentia of things but their generic characters); and none of these difficulties you can remove;—or, in the second place you hold that there is no difference of those differences (*i. e.* that the *ghaṭatva* and the *paṭatva* are one), then the differences of attributes become one; and how then can they establish difference between their substrates (*i. e.* the jar and the cloth)?

(141). Then again we ask—Does that difference of attributes which constitutes the difference of the jar (from the cloth, etc.) subsist in a substrate other than the jar, or in a substrate non-different from the jar? The alternatives proposed being contradictory ones, no third alternative is possible.

(142). On the former alternative, the same question would again arise with regard to that difference which differentiates the two substrates of the 'difference of attributes' (*i. e.* we should again have to ask 'does that difference reside in a substrate different or non-different from the jar' etc.); and as the reply

* If the mutual negation of jar and cloth is constituted by the mutual negation of the generic characters of the two (the *ghaṭatva*, jar-ness, residing in the *ghaṭa*, and the *paṭatva*, cloth-ness, residing in the *paṭa*), then those class-characters themselves cannot be distinguished from each other; since no similar further Universal resides in them (for of *ghaṭatva* and *paṭatva* no *ghaṭatva-tva* and *paṭatva-tva* can be predicated). And the two class-characters becoming indistinguishable *i. e.* identical, they can no longer serve to distinguish the cloth and the jar; and it thus becomes impossible to maintain a relation of mutual negation between the two latter.

(given in favour of the former alternative) would again give rise to a similar question, an infinite regress would result. Well, the opponent says, let there be an infinity of differences! This cannot be, we reply. For if an infinite number of differences were to connect themselves with their substrate *in succession*, they could not enter into relation with a thing having an existence limited in time (such as a jar). * Let us then assume that all these differences attach themselves *at once* to the thing as soon as it enters into existence! But what then, we ask, is there to determine *what* particular difference subsists in the substrate qualified *by what* other difference? † Who indeed, in the absence of all distinction, will be able to settle the contest between them all? Moreover, since in each case, the succeeding difference (in the series of differences) would render the full service required by the immediately preceding one (*viz.* by accounting for, or establishing, it), the series of differences while advancing in front would melt away from behind—like the learning of a student who has a weak memory; and what solid basis (of difference) would then be left for the series? ‡

(143). And thus it is in all other cases also where an 'endless series' is admitted.

The reasoning of him who commits himself to an endless series has three irremediable defects—(1) as each succeeding difference is accepted, each preceding difference lapses as needless; (2) there is nothing to determine what difference subsists in what substrate possessing a certain difference; and (3) there is no evidence for holding that many differences inhere in the single object (the jar). (19).

(144). [Page 124]. If, on the other hand, in order to escape from an infinite regress, we should stop after a few stages and (instead of explaining the difference at which we halt by a further difference) agree to find the difference of the two things in the mutually exclusive characters of the things themselves,—

* The jar exists for a short time only; hence it will not be in existence till eternity, so as to become related to the endless differences coming up in *succession*.

† The meaning is that if the infinite number of differences were to come down upon the object all at once, there would be no means to ascertain their orderly successive dependence on one another.

then in that case it would follow that the two things whose individual characters would be held to consist in being mutually excluded only, are really devoid of all individual character (for the exclusion of the entire character of the jar means nothing positive, and that which has this character will thus have no character at all). Let it then be said that it is not the entire characters of the things which are mutually excluded, but only a particular aspect of those characters. But in that case, as it would be only a particular individual aspect of the character of the jar that is excluded by the cloth, the entire character of the former would remain unexcluded by it; and thus there would be no difference between the jar (in its entire character) and the cloth, the two becoming one and the same!

(145). In reality, however, you are bound to explain what you understand by that particular aspect or character of a thing which, you say, is different from its character as a whole (or its general character). You will perhaps say that you do not acknowledge a general character which extends over all individuals (as e. g. all jars); but that the term 'character' (*svarūpa*) has many meanings and is applied to individuals which all have their particular characters. But if this reasoning were admissible, we should at once have to abandon all hope of establishing any generic entities, such as 'gotva' (the class-characteristics, or the *Universal*, 'cow').* Nor, in the second place, can there be an apprehension of the connexion with regard to the application of the term 'character' (form; *svarūpa*) to each separate individual (which are endless in number).†

(146). If, then, the character of things consisted of the individual things themselves (and not in any generic character comprehending all individuals) then, as soon as the thing is perceived, its character would be perceived; and (since this character is ex hypothesi, the particular character which distinguishes it from all other things) there never would be a doubt as to what the thing is (while as a matter of fact on seeing an

* For Universals such as *gotva* (cow) rest on the assumption of a generic character which is present in all individuals of a certain class.

† For the apprehension of the denotative power of words also pre-supposes general notions comprising many individuals.

object from a distance, etc., we often are in doubt as to what particular thing it is).

(147). There remains the other alternative (proposed in para. 141)—*viz.*, that difference resides in that which is non-different from it. But this would imply that even the individual jar which is apprehended as one, would, owing to that difference (which ex hypothesi is non-different from it) appear as *diveræ*, manifold! We thus could never get at anything that would be one only; and there being no one (no unity), how could we have *diversity* (which is only the negation of unity; remembering also that there can be no negation of an absolute non-entity)?

(148). The above reasoning also sets aside the view that the difference (of the thing) resides neither in the thing as determined by difference nor in the thing as not so determined, but simply in the thing viewed as neutral with regard to the stated alternative. *

(149). Reasoning of the above kind also enables us to reject the theory that *difference* is—neither the nature of a thing, nor mutual negation, nor difference of attributes—but an attribute or quality which has an existence by itself, and is also called 'separateness' (*prīthaktva*). For this theory also 'halts', and hence is incapable to escape from the objections set forth above,—*viz.*, on the ground that difference cannot reside either in what is different or what is non-different from it, etc.

(150). If finally, in order to avoid the contingency of difference being identical with that in which it abides (a contingency arising under the theories of mutual negation and of difference of attributes discussed in previous paragraphs), it be held that the Difference (of the Difference from its substrate) abides in itself, then there is '*ātmāshraya*'—the absurdity of a thing abiding in itself. If to avoid this, the Difference should abide in another difference, and so on, then there would be an infinite regress. And if, in order to preclude this infinite regress, you were, at any stage, to deny the difference between the difference and that in which it abides, then, availing itself of the opening afforded by the non-difference thus arising,

* On this view also a thing would have to be regarded as different from itself; for it would be neutral as to itself being determined or not determined by the difference.

oneness will slip in, and in a moment spread over the whole line of differences (reducing them all to nothing).

(151). We thus have fully shown that the vedic declaration of Non-duality is not to be refuted by Perception. As for Inference and the rest, they cannot, even according to your view*, sublate Vedic teaching. (20).

And as for 'Presumptions,' they do splendid service to the Vedic teaching, marching in front of it like valiant soldiers and destroying all enemies and obstacles in its way. (21).

* According to the Logician also, Scriptural Authority is more authoritative than Inference. Otherwise, he would have to accept the human skull as 'pure,' on the ground of the inference—'the skull is pure because it is a part of an animal, like the tail of a cow,'—even in face of scriptural authorities declaring the skull to be something unclean.

SECTION 10.

[That the scriptural texts which convey the idea of Non-duality, themselves bear the characteristics of Plurality, does not disprove Non-duality being the absolutely Real. Scripture itself, as well as the process through which it gives rise to the knowledge of Non-duality, lies within the sphere of the Unreal, Illusory. 'Knowledge' in the true sense *i. e.*, universal Consciousness or Brahman, is never produced, it eternally is.]

(152). [Page 128.] The Logician starts a new argument :— The Vedic declarations of non-duality, he says, convey their meaning only in dependence on the differences between letters, words, case-terminations, meanings of words, and so forth; how then can it be maintained that they are *not* sublated by these manifold notions of difference on which they depend? For it is a recognised principle that what depends upon another thing is weaker than that thing.

(153). But this argument also is without force. For we do not maintain that Difference or Diversity has absolutely no existence. We indeed hold that it has no *real* being, but we allow to it an illusory existence, and this is enough to account for the causal relationship (between ideas of difference and the Vedic declarations) upon which the Logician bases his argument.

(154). But, our adversary says, in the fundamental non-dualistic texts themselves, there occur certain words and phrases which are not explicable without the admission of Diversity. In the text 'ekam evādvitīyam'³² the word *eva* is meant to exclude things *other* than the *one*, and the word *advitīyam* ('without a second') presupposes the existence of a *second*. Similarly in the text 'neha nānāsti kiñchana'[†] the phrase 'na nānā' ('no diversity') presupposes *diversity*, and the word *kiñchana* (*anything*; *whatsoever*) implies the existence of many things.

This apparent contradiction also, we reply, is removed by the explanation just given. What the non-dualistic texts teach is the absolute reality of non-dualism; and the absolutely real cannot be sublated by the conception of what is *not* absolutely real: the conception of the real shell can truly not be refuted by the conception of the silver (erroneously imagined) in the

* Chhāndogya VI. 2. 1.

† Brj. Ār. VI. 4. 19.

shell. In cases where one cognition admittedly refutes another as when the (mistaken) inferential cognition 'the fire is not hot' is refuted by the sensuous cognition of the heat of the fire—since the former cognition depends on the latter (the cognition of that which is not-hot presupposing the cognition of its counter-entity *i.e.*, that which is hot), the two cognitions both belong to the sphere of Nescience (*i.e.*, the Unreal or Illusory), and hence there is no objection to one (*viz.*, the dependent one) being sublated by the other (on which it depends).

(155). But, our opponent rejoins, (just as you maintain that the Vedic declaration is irrefutable because it has for its object the absolutely Real), it may be argued that the 'non-heat' of fire also is absolutely real and hence not to be refuted by sensuous cognition! Not so, we reply. For if the so-called 'non-heat' of fire is of the same kind as what is perceived in water and other substances, and hence is not different from *coolness*, our reasoning cannot but lead to the result that this 'non-heat' also belongs to the sphere of illusion. If, on the other hand, you do not maintain this (but hold 'non-heat' to be something quite different from what is known through ordinary experience, so that the arguments by which the illusory character of the apparent world is proved, would not apply to it), then it would be neither more nor less than another term for Non-duality, (for this alone is altogether different from the empirical world). As a matter of fact, however, we find that the conception of 'non-heat' presupposes diversity in the form of the differentiation of cognitions, objects of cognition and the like; and hence cannot escape from the devouring grasp of the Reasoning which proves the whole Universe to be illusory. The case of Non-duality is different; for any refutation of it could only be based on Diversity and hence could not be real (Diversity itself being illusory only), there is no possibility whatever of Non-duality ever being shown to be unreal.

(156). But, our adversary resumes, in what sense do you mean that our original objection, (urged in para 152) is disposed of by your setting forth the reality of Non-duality? Our contention was that the Vedic declaration cannot afford a valid cognition of Non-duality, for the simple reason that it is in conflict with, and sublated by, that upon which it depends for its very

origination (*viz.*, sensuous and other cognitions of diversity)!

(157). This argument also, we reply, does not touch us. Non-duality, which is absolutely real, could be sublated only by real Diversity, not by an illusory one; hence the conception of real Non-duality cannot be sublated by that upon which it depends, when this latter is no more than diversity, possessing an illusory existence, and the idea of such Diversity. Even if the conception of Non-duality to which the Vedic texts give rise were in itself merely illusory, the object of that conception—*i.e.*, Non-duality itself—would remain real; (and then again the conception is not capable of sublation) for a conception is sublated only by the demolition of its object, and in the present instance the object (*i.e.*, real Nonduality) is not demolished.

(158). [Page 132.] Hence

‘The Vedic declaration taking shelter under the wing of absolutely real non-duality need not fear in the least that it will be sublated by what it depends on’. (23).

Scripture itself, indeed, declares this when saying ‘it is from a second only that there is fear.’*

(159). This ‘non-duality’ when considered along, and identified with, the teaching of the text ‘All this is Brahman only’† is seen to be nothing else but *Brahman*; and on the basis of the text ‘Brahman is knowledge (*vijñāna*) and bliss,‡ this Brahman is ascertained to be of the essence of knowledge (consciousness). And by this we are led to the conclusion that the knowledge of Non-duality to which the Vedic texts give rise, resolves itself into the ‘non-duality of knowledge or consciousness.’

(160). But, the Logician objects, if knowledge is one with Brahman, how can it be held to be *produced* by Vedic texts? Your objection would be well founded, we reply, if the fact of the *production* of knowledge were something truly real; it, however, is not such, for it lies within the sphere of illusion, and hence is in no conflict with what is the absolutely real fact, *viz.*, that knowledge is essentially ‘non-producible,’ *i.e.*, eternal.

(161). It is in accordance with this that the Veda declares ‘Knowledge’ (Brahman) to be *one*. An adversary might here argue that *oneness* must either mean (1) absence of diversity,

* Brj. Ar. I. 4. 2. † Nṛsiṃhottaratāpanī 7. ‡ Brj. Ar. III. 9. 28.

or (2) the number one (numerical oneness), or (3) the very self (or essential nature) of knowledge, or (4) some other attribute termed *oneness* and really meaning the same as *absence of difference*; and that *oneness* in any of these senses cannot be proved to belong to 'Non-duality'; for the presence of an attribute of any kind would be in contradiction with 'Non-duality.' All we wish to reply to this is that if the conception of an *attribute* of Non-duality cannot stand—as we admit it cannot—the attack made upon it, it must be dismissed (as illusory), just as we dismissed the idea of Knowledge being something *produced* by the Veda. That on the other hand which is validly cognised as the substrate of that attribute of Non-duality (*i.e.*, non-dual Knowledge or Consciousness itself) remains unsublated and hence has to be recognised as absolutely real. We illustrate this by the instance of 'shell-silver': when the real shell is for a time (erroneously) cognized as silver, and subsequently, owing to sublation, the attribute of *being of the nature of silver* is discarded, the fault of the attribute (*i.e.*, its sublation) does not imply the cessation of the substrate to which the attribute belongs (*i.e.*, the real shell).

(162). This notion of Non-duality then cannot be refuted even by hundreds of arguments that might be set forth by clever men; as Scripture says 'this notion cannot be set aside by reasoning'*. Therefore,

'O men of understanding! Apply your intellect to the refutation of this notion only if you really desire to fling into the sea the magical all-bestowing gem that has come to your hand!' (24).

(163). Then again, this notion of Non-duality brings about results of a perceptible nature also (not only Release which transcends all perception); as is said † 'Even a little of this virtue saves from great dangers.'

'It is by the grace of the Lord only that in the minds of a few men there arises that desire to know Non-duality which affords a shelter from all danger'. (25).

(164). And thus—

'Lo! That Non-duality which has been ascertained, in a

* Kāṣha Up. II. 9.

† Bhag. Gītā II. 40.

way,* to be the purport of the texts declaring Non-duality, triumphantly emerges from the discussion, as self-luminous and absolutely real Consciousness!' (26).

(165). [Page 136.] I, therefore, can only call upon you, however much you may hanker after the enticing glamour of illusion, to accept with due faith this Non-duality as it is set before you fully supported by arguments agreeing with your own principles of correct reasoning; and when, thereupon, guided by such faithful acceptance of the purport of the Upaniṣads you seek for knowledge of the Self, you will, after having in due course withdrawn your mind from all its outgoing functions, attain by and within yourself to the direct intuition of that Highest Reality which is witnessed to by its own light and excels honey in sweetness! How the mind, freeing itself from all distractions, merges itself in the Highest Reality constituted by the Self, as in a lake of nectar, and thus attains the highest bliss—this I have already described in my *Naiṣadha-charita*, in the canto devoted to the praise of the Supreme Person.

SECTION 11.

[The 'arguments of refutation' which it is our task to set forth are of universal applicability; they may be used by any philosophical disputant to disestablish the position of his antagonist.]

(166). In what precedes we have by no means disproved the capability of the 'arguments of refutation' to establish any desired result—they thus being comparable to a king's word of command (which has the effect of routing the hostile army at the same time that it preserves the king's own army); why then should you (the Vedāntin) not employ those arguments, in any way you like, against the different philosophic systems? (27). †

* 'In a way,' because to that end we have to accept as valid the relation of texts or words and their meanings, which lies within the sphere of illusion.

† The present section is meant to meet the objection that the 'arguments of refutation' can be used only to establish the Vedāntic position; while yet, in the introductory stanzas, the assertion had been made that they would lead the disputant to victory over all opponents, and in all kinds of discussion.

(167). [Page 138]. The fact is that our arguments of refutation freely and fully operate with regard to philosophical tenets of any kind. We introduce the statements of certain particular philosophic doctrines simply with a view to putting forward only such 'arguments of refutation' as cannot be impugned by any counter-argument except by such arbitrary assumptions as that 'the arrangements of the Universe depend on the will of a personal God (and hence their reality cannot be gainsaid)'. (We give some details as to this universal applicability of the 'arguments of refutation') :—If, for instance, the disputant holds the doctrine of (Bauddha) Nihilism or that of (Vedāntic) 'Inexplicability', the general applicability of those arguments against all other doctrines, of course, is beyond all doubt. If, on the other hand, the two disputants be upholders of the view of the reality of *pramāṇa* and the rest of the categories, the arguments refuting definitions will have their use in disestablishing the special definitions (set forth by the Opponent), and the arguments disproving the things to be defined will have their use in disestablishing those special means of proof, etc., which refer to the things.

(168). [Page 139]. Nor must it be objected to this, that the Logician who, in the course of a disputation with another Logician, should reject the definitions given in the Sūtras (which should be authoritative for all Logicians) abandons the fundamental principles of his own doctrine. For what he would aim at disproving, would only be some special interpretation of the definitions in the Sūtras, given by his Opponent. But, it may be objected, if a disputant aims at disestablishing particular definitions, particular means of knowledge whereby the reality of something is proved, and particular interpretations of the Sūtras, he will to that end have to set forth other definitions, other means of proof and other interpretations (all of which, on the view of the universal force of the 'arguments of refutation' would be equally invalid !). Not so, we reply. In the case referred to by you the arguments in question would be put forward as useful for that special kind of disputation which is called '*vitandā*' (which aims, not at establishing one's own view, but merely at refuting the view of the adversary), and hence the disputant would not be himself open to any criticism

bearing on the establishment of his own views.

(169). [Page 140.] Thus then there, also, is no objection to the 'arguments of refutation' being employed by a disputant who accepts the fundamental tenets of his opponent; for he may object to the details of the doctrine, in the manner of an 'Ekadeshin' (who while accepting the fundamental views of a system holds special views of his own on special points). Just as Grammarians (although agreed as to the correctness of a certain word) may raise and discuss the question as to how the word is formed, in order to ascertain the extent of each other's knowledge; so in the case of philosophical systems also, disputants although holding the same fundamental views, may engage in a critical discussion in order to test each other.

(170). And then, that enquirer also who (beyond aiming at the discomfiture of an antagonist) is concerned to establish a definite view of Reality, will necessarily have to refute the arguments that may be brought forward against him (and this can only be effected by the 'arguments of refutation'); for otherwise his own positive view of Reality could not be established. And it thus appears that even in *vāda* (i.e., *bonā fide* discussion which aims at the ascertainment of truth), there is room for the employment of the 'arguments of refutation'.

(171). As to *Jalpa* finally (the third kind of discussion distinguished by the Logicians), this we declare to be a mere *conventional* kind of discussion; for in reality so-called *jalpa* consists of two *vitandās*. For otherwise (i.e., if we admitted, as an independent class, a discussion which in reality consists of two *vitandās* only), why should we not also acknowledge, as a further independent class, a discussion consisting of two *jalpas*? With this matter we have dealt at length, on the occasion of discussing the nature of *jalpa* (in the work called 'Ishvarābhisandhi').

(172). But let us, for the occasion, acknowledge *jalpa* as a distinct class of discussion. A person engaging in this kind of discussion, would in the first place put forward as *right* certain views which may be open to objections, after having shown that those objections do not apply, and then would refute him who insists on those objections, by applying some 'argument of refutation.' And it thus appears that in *jalpa* also those arguments are not altogether out of place.

SECTION 12.

[The first 'argument of refutation' is that none of the definitions, given by our opponents, of the categories of Reality are valid.]

(173). Now then, of what kind are those 'arguments of refutation'? They are as follows:—In the first place we enunciate the following principle—'All determination (proof) of (the reality of) what is to be defined, (*i. e.*, things) depends on definitions; but no satisfactory definitions are possible, because all attempts to define lead us into reasoning of an objectionable or vicious kind, such as 'reasoning in a circle' (*chakraka*); as when the 'knower' (the knowing subject) is defined as the 'substrate of knowledge.'^{*}

SECTION 13.

[In the first place the definition given by the Logician of *pramā*—right knowledge—is untenable. *Pramā* cannot be defined as *tattva-anubhūti* *i. e.*, direct knowledge of a thing's *tattva* (lit. *this-ness* or *that-ness*), because on none of the explanations which may be given of the meaning of *tattva* it can be shown how such *tattva* can be rightly cognized.]

(174). [Page 143.] We will first examine the definition given by the Logicians of '*Pramā*' (*i. e.* right or valid cognition; cognition that results from the unimpeded functioning of one of the recognised means of valid cognition, the so-called *pramānas*). The definition given of this,—*viz.*, that it is "the immediate apprehension (or consciousness—*anubhūti*) of the true nature (*tattva*, literally '*this-ness*' or '*that-ness*') of a thing,"—is unacceptable; since the Logician is unable to give a satisfactory explanation of what is meant by '*tattva*.' The term *tattva* (*that-ness*) literally means 'being *that*', the *that* being something that suggests itself as being under consideration. Now on the occasion of defining 'right cognition,' no particular thing suggests itself as being under consideration—and to which, therefore, the *that* could refer. It might be

* While 'knowledge' in its turn is defined as an attribute of the knowing subject.

said that every state of direct consciousness presents to the mind, in the way of suggestion, the object to which it is related, and that it is this object to which the *that* refers ; for what is meant by a thing being 'that which is under consideration' or 'that which suggests itself' is the thing's being present to the mind of the speaker or hearer ; and we, therefore, designate as 'this-ness' that which is the being (or *character* or *nature*) of that thing. But this explanation we cannot admit.

For in certain cases (as when a shell is mistaken for silver) that which is not silver becomes the object of a man's cognition as silver (so that, according to you, the *tattva* of silver is the object of cognition) ; and thus the definition of 'right cognition' proposed, fails to exclude *wrong* cognition. Moreover (if only the *character* of the thing is *tattva*) the thing itself (to which the character belongs) cannot be called '*tattva*,' and thus the cognition of the thing itself, or of the thing as qualified by the character, will have to be regarded as *wrong* cognition (for it will not be 'cognition of *tattva*').

(175). But, our opponent may say, leave off levelling against our definition objections merely founded on considerations of the literal meaning of the word '*tattva*' ! It is well-known that the word '*tattva*' denotes nothing else than the individual character (*svarūpa*) of a thing (and this comprises the thing itself as well as attributes, and so on). This also, we reply, will not help you ; for whether you view *svarūpatva* 'the having the character of *svarūpa*' as a *jāti* (class-characteristic ; Universal), or as a mere *upādhi*, you cannot make out a satisfactory case for such *svarūpatva* either residing in itself or not so residing. *

* The argument comes to this :—You say that in right cognition we cognise the *svarūpa* of a thing. Now *svarūpa* is, to argue as the Logician does, that in which '*svarūpa-tva*' (the 'class-characteristics of *svarūpa*') resides (just as a jar is that in which *ghaṭatva* 'the being a jar' resides. This *svarūpatva* may be viewed either as a *jāti* (in which case the translation 'class-characteristics' holds good) ; or as a mere *upādhi*—an external limiting or determining condition ; this does not change the case. Now shall we say that in that *svarūpatva* which resides in *svarūpa*, *svarūpatva* is again residing, or not ? The former assumption would imply the fault of '*ātmaśhraya*' (the dependence of a thing upon itself, which explains nothing). On the second assumption *svarūpatva* cannot be said to have a *svarūpa* of its own, and hence (according to the view of the Logician) there can be no right cognition of it.

Moreover, what is denoted by the word '*svarūpa*' cannot be one thing ; it rather denotes something different in the case of each individual object, and hence a definition of 'right cognition' which implies *svarūpa* can never take in the right cognitions of all things. How, further, can the word '*tattva*' exclude wrong cognition ? When a shell is (wrongly) cognised as possessing the character of silver (silver-ness), there is in that case also a cognition of a *svarūpa* ; for it certainly cannot be denied that either the shell or 'the character of silver' is a *svarūpa* ; nor again can it be maintained that the connexion of the two which, in the cognition, presents itself to consciousness, is not a *svarūpa*. For the connexion that presents itself to consciousness is, according to the system of the Logician himself, so called 'inherence' (*samavāya* ; that connexion which, not to mention other cases, holds good between a 'class-character,' *jāti*, and that which has that character) ; and surely *samavāya* is a *svarūpa* ! The Logician may retort—'True, *samavāya* is a *svarūpa* ; but this inherence of the class-character of silver does not really subsist in that particular shell.' This makes no difference, we reply ; for though the *inherence* may not subsist in that shell, this does not deprive it of the character of *svarūpa* ; Devadatta *not being in the house* does not on that account cease to be a *svarūpa*.*

(176). [Page 146.] 'Mere *svarūpa*,' the Logician rejoins, is not called *tattva* ! By *tattva* we understand that *svarūpa* of a thing which is cognised as actually connected with that particular point of time and space at which the thing is cognised.† Not so, we reply. That view of the matter would imply that every right cognition is a wrong cognition, in so far as referring to the place and time of the thing cognised.‡ Let us then say, the Logician rejoins, that in the case of time and place their *mere svarūpa* (without further connexion with time and place) constitutes their *tattva* ! This also is inadmissible,

* The point is that so long as *svarūpa* is before consciousness (and this is the case of 'silverness' appearing to inhere in the shell) the cognition is, according to the definition, *pramā*.

† And hence the cog- ition of silver-ness which is not actually present in the shell, does not come under the definition of 'right cognition.'

‡ For that place and time themselves do not possess that relation to place and time on which, you say, right cognition depends.

we reply. For if the word *tattva* has several meanings, the definition of right cognition will cease to apply to all cases.

(177). The Logician now offers another definition of *tattva* :—
 ‘By the *tattva* of a thing we understand its really existing such as it is apprehended.’ But this also is unsatisfactory. For, on this definition, you will have to acknowledge as the *tattva* of a thing a certain character of it which is cognised, even if that character really belongs to it not at the time of cognition, but at some other time; you would *e.g.*, have to allow that that redness of a jar which *will* be produced by subsequent baking, constitutes the *tattva* of the jar even at the time when the jar, as yet unbaked and black, *appears* red to a man who suffers from the disease called ‘Rakta-pitta’ (which makes one see all things as red); and will hence have to allow that man’s cognition as *right* cognition. To avoid this objection, the Logician may qualify his definition by bringing in a reference to time :—
 ‘by the *tattva* of a thing we understand its really existing, at the time of cognition, such as it is then cognised.’ But this would again imply that the cognition, in so far as particularized by time, would not be true cognition, for this ‘being particularized by time’ cannot again be connected with another time.* But why, the Logician resumes, should not time, determined by one determining factor (*upādhi*), be related to time as determined by another determining factor; (for we observe that *e.g.*, time as determined by the period called a year may be further determined by the period called a month, and so on; so that there appears to be no reason why time determined in one way should not at the same time be further determined in another way). The extension of your reasoning, we reply, (which endeavours to establish that a difference is introduced into time—which is one—by its connexion with different determining conditions) would lead to the conclusion that Devadatta in so far as carrying a

* According to the Logician right cognition implies a definite relation to time: there is right cognition of that which is such as it is cognised, at the moment when it is cognised. But this would imply that there can be no right cognition of that very time-element which enters into right cognition; for while the jar *e.g.*, may be conceived as connected with a definite moment of time, that moment of time itself cannot be viewed as again connected with another moment of time.

stick (which is one determining condition), is different from and, therefore, can mount on the shoulders of, himself in so far as wearing earrings! * And if to this *reductio ad absurdum* you object that, although Devadatta may have several determining attributes, he—as substrate of those attributes—does not cease to be *one*; we reply that the case of *time* is exactly the same (*i. e.*, time also remains one although connecting itself with different determining conditions).

(178). These arguments also serve to discard the definition according to which 'the *tattva*—the reality—of a thing is its being a cause.' This latter definition is further open to the three following objections:—(1) If everything is such, *i. e.*, if all things are real in so far only as they are causes, there can be no right cognition of such things as are not actually cognised as causes. † (2) There would be an objectionable 'self-dependence' (*ātmāshraya*; vicious circle.) ‡ And (3) on this view each momentary phenomenon (*kṣāna*) of the Universe being regarded as a 'cause' (of that which succeeds it), we would be reduced to the vexatious and ridiculous position of having to take shelter under the wings of the Jainas who hold the *being* of a thing to consist in its irrefutable capacity to *bring about effective action* (*i. e.* to be a cause).

* *I. e.*, absurd consequences are at once seen to flow from the assertion that what is one becomes different by its connexion with several determining or specifying conditions.

† Or (as one commentary explains) If you say that right cognition is of causes only, we point out that a cause is that which is determined by the class-character of a cause (we might say 'causality'); but in 'causality' there does not inhere a further causality (according to the principle that a *jāti* has no further *jāti*); hence there can be no right cognition of causality.

‡ If, in order rightly to cognise a cause, it were required to cognise also the cause of that cause, a regressus ad infinitum would arise; if on the other hand this were not required, the right cognition of the cause would depend upon itself—which would be an objectionable *ātmāshraya*.

SECTION 14.

(A)[And next, it is not possible to accept the so-called *anubhūti* (or *anubhava*) of the Logician, which, according to him, is a generic term denoting all primary cognition *i.e.*, cognition not of the nature of remembrance or representation (*smṛiti*). The tenet that all knowledge is either *anubhūti* or *smṛiti* cannot be upheld; it in fact is at once seen to be upset by those cognitions which we comprise under the term 'Recognition' (*pratya-bhijñā*), in which there evidently is an inseparable fusion of a direct presentative, and an indirect representative, element.]

(179). [Page 149.] We next ask what definition you are prepared to give of '*anubhūti*'* (which term was used by the Logician in defining *pramā* as *tattva-anubhūti*). Do you define it as a species or sub-class of 'knowledge' (*jñāna*); or as knowledge other than remembrance (*smṛiti*); or as knowledge which is destitute of the character of remembrance; or as knowledge which has a specific cause coming into existence just before the knowledge?

* We have so far translated *anubhūti* (or *anubhava*) by terms such as 'direct knowledge' 'immediate consciousness,' etc. None of these translations are fully adequate; and there is in fact no English, or western, philosophical term that connotes exactly what *anubhūti* does. The great division of all knowledge (cognition; state of consciousness-- *jñāna*, *buddhi*, *pratyaaya*) is, according to the general Indian view (as best represented by the Nyāya) into *Anubhava* and *Smṛiti*. The former term comprises all cognitions (including what we would prefer to call states of feeling, experiences of pleasure and pain) which, when presenting themselves to the mind are strictly *original*, *i.e.*, not reproductions of former cognitions. In this sense—the cognition which we have through sight and touch of a fire burning before us; the idea we have of a fire on a distant hill, owing to an inference based on the perception of smoke rising from the hill; and the knowledge of a fire burning somewhere which we acquire through the statement of a trustworthy person or an authoritative book; are all of them *Anubhava*. Such *Anubhava* is not necessarily true knowledge; it is *Anubhava* also when, in twilight, we see a man where there is only a post, or a snake where there is only a rope. *Smṛiti* on the other hand comprises all cases of 'representative' cognition, where the cognition before the mind is not at the time originated by one of the 'means of knowledge' (*pramāṇa*; *i.e.*, Perception, Inference, etc.), but is the mere re-entering into consciousness of a previous cognition.

It of course is evident that neither 'direct apprehension' nor 'immediate cognition' nor 'presentative knowledge,' etc., etc., exactly correspond to *Anubhava*.

(180). The first of these definitions is not tenable. For on what ground, we ask, do you mean to establish that special kind of knowledge which you call *anubhūti*? If you reply, that your reason is the universal presence, in all instances of so called *anubhūti*, of that state of consciousness or cognition which expresses itself in the form 'I am immediately or directly conscious of,'²⁸—we argue against you as follows:—When a man, towards the close of a January night, bathes at the confluence of the white and the dark rivers (*i. e.* the *Gangā* and the *Yamunā*), he, on the strength of certain scriptural assertions, may have before his mind the idea of future heavenly bliss (promised as the reward for the meritorious action of bathing at that place and time); but all the same, there arises in him no state of consciousness which would express itself as 'I directly apprehend or feel (*anubhavāmi*) pleasure'; on the contrary what he is directly conscious of is pain or discomfort due to the coldness of the air and water. Similarly, when a generally religious man is engaged in enjoying the love of another man's wife, he may, owing to his knowledge of what scripture says on this point, have before his mind the idea of future punishment to be experienced in hell, but all the same his actual thought and feeling is not 'I am experiencing pain,' but rather 'I am at the present moment experiencing intense delight.' If the inferential cognition (of bliss in the one, and torment in the other case) which is based upon general principles indicated by scripture (*viz.*, that 'he who bathes, etc., will go to heaven', and so forth) were of the nature of *Anubhava*, the former man would apprehend pleasure, and the latter, pain.

(181). If you say that what those two men actually think and say, is due to their taking *anubhava* in the popular sense of direct or immediate (sensuous and perceptual) apprehension (*sākṣātkāra*), while the cognitions and forms of expression that depend on inference founded on scriptural statement are present in the minds of the learned and thoughtful,—we reply that in that case, the fact of such direct apprehension being regarded and spoken of as *anubhava* would be due to its directness and immediacy; and hence there would be neither any valid proof for, nor any purpose of assuming, a special

* Compare the preceding note as to the inadequacy of these renderings.

sub-class of cognition called *anubhava*. *Anubhava* then would mean one thing in the case of the ordinary man, and another thing in the case of the learned and intelligent; and hence no definition could be given that would apply to all cases of *anubhava*.

(182). The Logician (making another stand for his *anubhava*) replies—"the fact is that we have the notion of an *anubhava* (a certain kind of consciousness or apprehension) which is common to sensuous cognition, inference and so forth, in so far as all these differ from representative cognition (*smṛiti*). Now this notion cannot be explained as due to the immediacy (*sākṣātkāritva*) of those cognitions (since inferential cognitions, etc., avowedly are *not* immediate); we, therefore, must assume some other class-character '*anubhūtitvam*' which is to be met with in all those cognitions, whether immediate or not."

(183). This reasoning also we reply, is unsound. That we think and speak of certain things as having that in common that they differ in certain characteristics from other things,—of this the reason is just that particular character of those things: but we do not on that account postulate a special *class* of things. If classes were to be postulated wherever several things agree in differing from other things, we should have to postulate a special class *akṣa*—comprising all those several things which are denoted by the word '*akṣa*', *viz.*, dice, the *vibhūṭaka*-fruit, the sense-organs, etc.—, for no other reason than that those things have in common that they differ from other things such as jars and the like.

(184). For the following reason also we cannot admit a special class of cognitions other than remembrance termed '*anubhūti*:' There is the (mental process of) *Recognition* (*pratyabhijñā*), as when we think 'this is the same jar (that we saw on former occasions)'; with regard to this Recognition the question arises whether it comprises two cognitions—*viz.*, one of the nature of *anubhūti* (of the jar seen), and one of the nature of *remembrance* (of the jar with which the jar seen is identified);—or one cognition only, which is in part *anubhūti* and in part *remembrance* (the view of the *Prābhākara*);—or pure remembrance only;—or pure *anubhūti* only (the *Nyāya* view)? Should you accept the first of these alternatives, we point out that in all

Recognition there is present to consciousness the non-difference of this thing as seen now and here, from the thing as observed in its previous condition. Now this non-difference cannot be included in *remembrance*; for the simple reason that the said non-difference not having been cognised before cannot be suggested to the mind by any impression (for as it was not known before, it cannot have left any impression on the mind). And we remark at once that for the same reason the third alternative is untenable. Nor can the idea of non-difference be considered as *anubhūti*; because at the time of recognition the previous condition of the thing is not cognised in the way of *anubhava*. Were this the case, the alternative now under discussion would be identical with the last alternative, which we shall refute later on. For similar reasons the second alternative also is not tenable. For if that factor of Recognition which consists in the non-difference of the present thing from the thing as qualified by its previous condition were regarded as cognised by *anubhava*, the qualification by the previous condition also would have to be included under *anubhava*. And this would bring us back to the alternative first considered.

(B) [None of the other theories given of the nature of Recognition can be upheld. It cannot be regarded (a) as comprising distinct cognitions, one of the nature of *anubhūti* and the other of the nature of *smṛiti*; for the idea of the *non-difference* of the *this, i. e.*, the thing actually perceived, and the *that, i. e.*, the thing *as* which the *this* is recognised, is neither directly apprehended (by *anubhūti*) nor remembered.—Nor (b) can it be viewed as one cognition which is in part *anubhūti* and in part *Remembrance*; for any attempt to distinguish and characterize in separation those two elements proves futile.—Nor (c) can it be viewed as pure *Remembrance*, for reasons analogous to those which tell against (a).—Nor (d) can it be conceived as pure *anubhūti*; for the cognition of non-difference of the past from the present can be based neither on sense-contact which is the direct cause of all *anubhava*; nor on an impression; since of that non-difference—of which we are conscious not earlier than in the act of recognition itself—there can be no

previous impression. Nor could we, on this theory, account for cases of doubtful recognition. And finally if Recognition, although due to impression, were to be classed as *anubhūti*, other kinds of remembrance also would have to be similarly classed, and the distinction of *anubhūti* and *smṛiti* thus would be lost altogether. As thus it appears that *anubhūti* does not denote a truly distinctive kind of cognition, its employment as a factor in the definition of *pramā* renders that definition nugatory.]

(185). Against this last argumentation the opponent might offer the following explanation:—In Recognition that factor which presents itself in the form, 'this present thing is non-different from itself as qualified by its previous conditions,' itself contains more than one, *i.e.*, two factors; the first of these, *viz.*, the idea of the thing in its previous condition, is pure Remembrance; the second, *viz.*, the cognition of the said non-difference, is *anubhava*. (And hence the objection raised falls to the ground). But, we reply, were this so, the Recognition would present itself as follows—(a) *That* thing under its previous conditions, *plus* (b) '*this* thing is non-different'—the former being *remembrance* and the latter *anubhava*; and thus there would be nothing to reveal that the non-difference has for its substrate the thing as under its previous conditions. This means that, Recognition would *not* present itself in the form 'this is the same thing as that which formerly appeared under different conditions' (while yet everyone knows that this latter form is the characteristic form of all Recognition).

(186). The Logician may here attempt the following explanation:—That non-difference which is intimated by *anubhava* contained in Recognition), as having for its substrate the thing which is apprehended through *anubhava*, cannot accomplish itself without depending on a 'second term'; for non-difference must be of something *from* something. Now what immediately suggests itself as the nearest second term is the thing as distinguished by its previous conditions, which is suggested by that remembrance which forms part of recognition. It is this which non-difference takes up as its second term, and thus establishes itself as having that previous thing also for its substrate.

(187). But this explanation is even more futile than the previous ones. What, we ask, is the meaning of non-difference leaning upon or taking up the second term? Does this mean that it has the second term for its substrate; or that it is cognised as having it for its substrate? The former alternative is impossible, for it would imply that non-difference originates only now, (*i. e.*, at the time of recognition) as abiding in the thing related to its previous conditions; and this again would imply that, before recognition, there was difference between the thing as it is now and the (same) thing as it was previously (and this clearly is nonsensical). And on the second alternative, there would arise a difficulty that we have already pointed out, for the cognition of the non-difference of the present thing as having for its substrate the 'second term,' (*i. e.*, the past thing) can be included neither under *remembrance*, nor under *anubhava* (since it essentially is a cognition in which both these cognitive factors are combined).

(188). Further, if you regard Recognition as a simple cognition which has the character or aspect of *remembrance* as regards the *that*, and the aspect of *anubhava* as regards the *this* ('*this is that jar which*' etc.), there will be an unavoidable confusion with regard to the thing itself. For, we ask, what is it that in this case is brought before the mind by the impression (which here, as in all cases, gives rise to remembrance)?—is it a mere *that*, or is it the thing (*e. g.*, the jar) qualified by the character of *that-ness*? On the former alternative we could not have the recognition in the form '*this is that thing*'; for what the impression would bring before the mind would be mere *that-ness* (not a thing qualified by *that-ness*). Nor is the latter alternative tenable. For, on it, it would be necessary to maintain that also in the *anubhava*-element of recognition—which is expressed as *this*—there reveals itself the *thing*; for if it revealed the character of *this-ness* only and not the thing, it could not have the form '*this thing, etc.*' And as thus the impression and the Perception both present themselves as causing the idea of the *thing*, the question arises whether the idea of the thing is to be viewed as originated by different cognitions; or by a single cognition of non-difference, brought about by the two causes conjointly. The former view is in conflict with the view,

accepted by the Logician himself, that Recognition is a single act of cognition; and moreover is open to the objections urged above (para 184, etc.) against the differentiation (of the objects of remembrance and *anubhava*, in Recognition). On the latter view, every recognition, as far as the thing is concerned, will have the character of Remembrance as well as that of *anubhava*; and this would mean a confusion of the two—leading to the undesirable contingency that the two would not be differentiated even on the basis of the difference of their respective objects.

(189). The Logician now argues as follows:—Even though the required differentiation (between *remembrance* and *anubhava*) may not be possible on the ground of the difference of their objects, it will be possible on other grounds. The mental act will be distinguished as 'Remembrance' by reference to its being originated by an impression, and as '*Anubhava*' by reference to its being originated by the contact of the sense-organ concerned (with the object, the internal organ, etc.); in this way the objectionable confusion will be avoided. But this also, we reply, may not be. As we do not admit that 'the character of being true knowledge' (*pramāṭva*) is an invariable class-character (*jāti*), it must be considered as determined by the object; and hence it will not avail to bring in other conditions such as (origination from an impression, etc.) in order to differentiate between *anubhava* and *remembrance*; for since both refer to one and the same thing (as you maintain), right cognition (*anubhava*) and what is *not* right cognition (*i. e.* *remembrance*) will have one and the same object (which is absurd).* And further since all the various aspects of a cognition are at once cognised in the Self as either present or not present, both *anubhava* and *remembrance* present themselves to consciousness as soon as recognition takes place; and if then we were not to admit that each of the two is determined and distinguished by its object, we should be driven to the absurd conclusion that through *remembrance* we may be conscious of the *this* (*i. e.* the present thing) also, and through *anubhava* of the *that* (*i. e.* past thing)!

* Recognition is *pramā* in so far as it is *anubhava*, and *apramā* in so far as it is *remembrance*; if, then, the two have one and the same object, the latter is at the same time the object of *pramā* and of *apramā*.

(190). If again, you should define *Remembrance* as that which is brought about by impressions (and plead that this cannot connect itself with the *this* of which we are conscious in Recognition); we reply that what we are now concerned with is the difficulties we experience in ascertaining what factor of Recognition is actually brought about by impressions. If you, in order to remove those difficulties, do no more than put forward the same character (*viz.*, of being produced by impression), this will fail to convince other people (for it simply is reasoning in a circle).^{*} Nor may you say that what determines the 'being due to impressions' is the general character of Remembrance conceived in some way other than being due to impressions. For consider—'being due to Impressions' really means nothing else than 'necessarily, (or regularly) coming into existence after impressions.' Now this necessary or regular sequence cannot be realized without pre-supposing a certain uniform character belonging to many individual cognitions which makes us apprehend that regular sequence; and it thus comes to this that it is the character of Remembrance which determines whether or not a cognition is brought about by impressions. This means—having the character of Remembrance is the condition for determining that a cognition is due to impressions; and 'being due to impressions' is the condition for determining that a cognition is of the nature of Remembrance—a flagrant case of reasoning in a circle! Hence, on this hypothesis, confusion of Remembrance and *Anubhava* is unavoidable.

(191). Moreover, we ask,—do you, or do you not, hold that in the case of Recognition the two sets of causal factors (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*) which bring about *remembrance* and *anubhava* are present? If not, how then can Recognition be in part of the nature of *anubhava* and in part of the nature of *remembrance*? And if such is the case (*i.e.*, if, even without the special causal conditions of *remembrance* and *anubhava*—such as remem-

* What is it that in the act of Recognition determines what element of the Recognition is due to impressions, and what element to the action of the senses? It will be no answer to this question to say 'being due to impressions' is determined by 'being due to impressions.'

brance originating from impression, etc.—the two enter into Recognition), the result will again be a confusion of the two. On the former alternative, on the other hand, (*viz.*, of the two sets of causal factors being present), it will follow that each of the two independently brings about its own effect, since each by itself has the power of bringing about its effect; it in fact is a well-ascertained principle that several causal factors bring about several effects.

(192). Against this the opponent may argue as follows:—In cases where two sets of causal factors originate independently of each other, their effects no doubt are distinct. But in the case of Recognition the two originate simultaneously and operate conjointly, and hence naturally give rise to one common effect of a mixed character. Although this is not observed to be the case with such sets of causal factors as produce, let us say, a jar and a piece of cloth respectively, yet the state of things may be such in the case of the two causal sets in question (which in Recognition give rise to *remembrance* and *anubhava* respectively); for these sets are quite different in nature from ordinary sets of causal factors. Truly, it cannot be asserted that such as the character of one thing is, such also must be the character of all other things; for were this so all the variety of this world would come to an end!

(193). Not so, we reply. For if the two sets of causal factors act together, are we to assume that they aid each other or not? If not, the peculiar feature which consists therein that they are joined will be useless towards the production of the separate effects; for in the absence of mutual aid it cannot possibly serve any purpose; and hence, the conjunction of the two making no difference, the two effects would be brought about quite separately. If, on the other hand, the two sets of causal factors are held to help each other, the impression would be operative towards the production of the *anubhava*-element (in Recognition) also, and the sense-organ towards the production of the *remembrance*-element also; and as thus the two features (*viz.*, being produced by impressions, and being produced by the sense-organ), which were meant to distinguish the one from the other, turn out to be common to both, *anubhava* will enter into *remembrance*, and *remembrance*

into *anubhava*; and thus Recognition will be most indelibly marked with irremediable confusion of *Anubhava* and *Remembrance*.

(194). Nor, in the next place, can we accept the view (held by the Naiyāyika) that a Recognition is nothing but *anubhava*.* For with regard to the aspect that the thing recognised is the substrate of non-difference from that which is cognised (remembered) as *that*, neither impressions nor sense-contact have any causal power (*i. e.* that aspect cannot be due either to impression or to sense-contact), and hence that aspect ceases to be an object (of any sort of cognition, while yet it is just that aspect which is characteristic of all Recognition). †

(195). Nor may the Naiyāyika plead that the element in question is apprehended, through the agency of the impression, by that (indirect) contact which consists in that element (*i. e.*, non-difference of the *that* from the *this*) being a qualifying attribute of what is connected with the object.‡ For if this were so, there could be no *doubtful* recognition—as there actually is when we think ‘Is *this* thing *that* thing, (which we knew before), or is it not?’§ But, the Logician replies,

* The fourth alternative noted in para 184. See also para. 206.

† According to the Naiyāyika recognition is a special form of *anubhava* which is produced by impression and sense-action together. But the Vedāntin objects,—let us admit that the impression is the cause of that element of recognition which consists in its being qualified by *that-ness*, and the sense-organ of that element which consists in its being qualified by *this-ness*. Neither of these two causes, however, has the power of giving rise to that element which consists in non-difference characterised by that to which *that-ness* belongs (*i. e.*, the non-difference of the *this* from the *that*); for that does not lie within the sphere of the impression, and the sense-organ is not in contact with it.

‡ The Naiyāyika is supposed to argue as follows :—The non-difference of the *this* from the *that* is a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the jar, the jar is a qualifying attribute of the impression, the impression inheres (by *samavāya*-connexion) in the cognizing Self; the Self is in conjunction (*samyoga*) with the internal organ, and the internal organ with the sense-organ. In this mediato way the sense-organ apprehends the ‘non-difference.’

§ For contact of the indirect kind described above is present in doubtful recognition also; and the latter, therefore, would not be of the nature of doubt, but true knowledge.

doubt arises in such cases, owing to the presence of certain imperfections of the cognizer, and not to the fact of its qualifying something in contact with the sense-organ. But if such were the case it would be possible for us to have 'doubtful recognitions' due to imperfections, even in the absence of impressions (which is absurd); and moreover that which manifests (renders cognizable) a certain real thing cannot be called an 'imperfection.' But, (although the imperfection in question manifests a real thing), yet it also may manifest something (the doubtful factor) which is not real, and hence it may be termed an 'imperfection'! If this were so, we reply, then even the sense-organs and other means of cognition (which in cases of wrong cognition manifest things that are not real) might be spoken of as 'imperfections'! And if it should be argued that it is only when the sense-organs are *qualified* (*i. e.*, affected by imperfections) that they manifest (unreal) things, and that hence it is the qualification only which can be called an 'imperfection,'—we reply that this may be said with regard to the imperfection under discussion also; for it is never without the aid of some qualification that the imperfection manifests unreal things. And if it be argued that doubt arises, when, owing to an imperfection, something unreal only appears to consciousness, although there is a real thing;—in that case no intelligent person would ever be moved to activity by doubtful cognition.

(196). You will perhaps say that although the doubtful cognition has for its object a real thing, the condition of mental uncertainty is due to the imperfection (so that the 'imperfection' may be defined as that which brings about the uncertainty). But, we remark, as the real thing always is of a non-confused (unambiguous, definite) character—whenever it manifests itself to consciousness (whether in a doubtful or a certain cognition), it will manifest itself in that very character in either of the two alternatives in a doubtful cognition; and how then should it have the character of uncertainty? And if that certain thing which thus constitutes one of the two alternatives in a doubtful cognition is not sublated subsequently, then, although the doubtful cognition makes us apprehend something in addition to the certain thing—*viz.*, the non-existence of that thing—yet its character of certainty remains unchallenged; and what forms the

additional element is only the certainty of negation (of the thing) which constitutes the other alternative.⁹

(197). [Page 165.] The Logician starts another explanation. The character of 'Doubt' which belongs to certain cognitions is a class-character (*jāti*), and we define an imperfection to be that which brings about that class-character. But, we reply, this also cannot be. Doubt expresses itself in the form—'this is that or not that ;' now on your view we could neither have the cognition of, nor use the word 'or' as co-ordinate with the words expressive of the two doubtful alternatives.† And further, if the alternative force of *or* connected itself with the cognition (and not the objects), we could not make use of forms of alternative expression such as 'bring the post or the man' ; for just as the character of certainty (which belongs to the cognition) cannot be connected with the words denoting the objects of cognition, so the alternative sense of *or*, if it belonged to the cognition, could not be connected with the objects of cognition ; (while it is actually so connected in cases such as the one last quoted). If what the word *or* denotes belonged to the cognition, it could not connect itself with the objects, not any more than the character of 'immediacy' or 'directness' (which belongs to certain cognitions) can belong to their objects.

(198). Nor can it be said that what takes place in the case of Doubt is that, although there is contact of the object with the mind, yet this contact is suppressed by certain imperfections (of the cognizing agency) and that hence the mind does not apprehend the object. For, we ask the Logician, although there be imperfections, how can there be suppression of the contact, when all that you hold to be necessary for the apprehension of the object is that the object should be in contact

⁹ In all Doubt we have two alternatives, e. g., 'this is silver or not-silver.' If the silver is real, the cognition 'this is silver' will remain unsublated and hence show itself a certain cognition. And the alternative cognition also 'this is not-silver' is *nishchaya* (definite knowledge), although in the form of error. Thus there is nothing 'uncertain' in doubtful cognition.

† While this actually is the meaning we attach to the word *or*. What the doubt refers to is the objects of cognition : the cognition itself is not affected by it. If what the word *or* expresses connected itself with the cognitions (not their objects) Doubt would express itself in the following form—'I cognise or I do not cognise.'

with the impression, the impression with the cognizing Self, the Self with the internal-organ, and the internal organ with the outward sense-organ (all which contacts are present in the case of Doubt)? If it were possible to have a Doubt (independently of the 'contact of impression') it would also be possible to have doubts with regard to things without having ever perceived them, or without remembering them! [And thus we have shown that on your views also it is necessary to admit the agency of Impression-contact; and hence you cannot free yourself from the objections urged under paras. 195-7, where we pointed out that even if the agency of Impressions be considered sufficient to account for the factor of *that-ness*, this does not account for Doubt in the form 'is this *that* jar?']

(199). In reality,* however, (your position is not tenable). For† there can be no apprehension through the aforesaid contact, since the internal organ does not apprehend the impression; nor do the sense-organs apprehend the Self; as it is an admitted fact that the contact (which is the really effective agent in bringing about an apprehension) is that which has the character of a qualification related to something that is apprehensible by the organ concerned‡; except in cases where what is apprehended is the negation or absence of some such quality or thing that has for its substratum something that is not apprehensible by that sense-organ.§ If this were not so (*i. e.*,

* So far the author has argued that, even if it were admitted that in the doubt 'is this that?' the notion of *that-ness* is obtained through the impression, yet the doubt could not arise. He now proceeds to argue that the notion cannot be attained in that way.

† The commentators differ as to the construction of this difficult passage. According to the Shāṅkarī the first clause extends up to नियमेन; while according to the Chitsukhī and the Vidyāsāgarī and a second interpretation of the Shāṅkarī also (which the translation follows), that word has to be taken with the next clause. In any case, the conclusion which the two clauses are meant to support has to be supplied.

‡ There can be effective contact of the organ with a thing only where the latter is a qualification of something apprehensible by the organ; in the case in question, however, the impression not being apprehensible by any sense-organ, no effective contact can take place.

§ This clause is added in order to meet cases such as that of the organ of hearing apprehending sound in Ether which itself is not apprehensible by that organ; in such cases the aforesaid contact is not present. The case of Impression does not come within this exception; here, therefore, the aforesaid contact is necessary.

if mere *sambaddha-viśeṣaṇatā* constituted the necessary contact), the eye would apprehend the negation (absence) in the water-atom, of *earth*, the non-perceptibility of which is disproved by the fact that it (*i. e.*, earth) is apprehended in other things (such as jars).² Nor can it be held (in conformity with the Nyāya tenets) that the atoms do not exist in that portion of space which lies within the sphere of the action of the sense-organs. As a matter of fact, again, it is not even necessary to add the above qualification to our general rule regarding the character of effective contact; (we have added it only in order to meet the case of the apprehension of the absence of sound; and) according to those who hold that the absence, of sound is apprehensible by the senses, the contact that is effective is that in the shape of *being related to the organ of hearing*,—a contact which is of an altogether different kind, and is regarded as the *seventh* kind of contact (distinct from the six ordinary contacts); and thus in this case also the apprehension is not due to contact in the form of mere *sambaddha-viśeṣaṇatā*—the mere fact of being a qualification of something that is related.

(200). Nor may you meet the above argument by asserting that—“the Impression itself constitutes the contacts of the previously apprehended object and of the Self with the internal organ as connected with the Self; and hence it does not matter that the notion of *that-ness* should be beyond the reach of the sense-organ; specially as we hold that the ‘contact’ which consists in the connexion of the object and the apprehending sense-organ is not itself perceptible by the sense.” For, as in that case there would be no contact of the eye, or any other sense-organ, with the *that-factor* in Recognition, the Recognition could not be regarded as *visual* (depending on the eye; sensuous). The *this-factor* may be perceived by the eye, and the

* The water-atom is in contact with the eye; the absence of earth is a *viśeṣaṇa* of the water atom; earth is perceptible elsewhere; the absence of earth thus is *sambaddha-viśeṣaṇa*, and hence is perceived by the eye. We escape from this absurd conclusion by adding the qualification that the *viśeṣaṇa* must be related to something which is perceptible by the organ concerned. The water-atom itself is not perceived by the eye; hence its *viśeṣaṇa* also cannot be perceived by that organ.

that-factor by the internal organ ; but whereby would the non-difference between the *this* and the *that* be apprehended? You thus are confronted by the difficulty pointed out on a previous occasion (para. 194).

(201). The same reasoning also serves to refute the following view :—“ In all Recognition the impression (of the previously cognised *that*) is a mere auxiliary factor, serving the purpose of preventing an unduly extensive operation of the sense-organ ; and hence the *that*-factor which appears in Recognition is not in contact with the sense-organ ; just as in the case of erroneous cognition (where the erroneously apprehended object, e. g., silver, is not in contact with the sense-organ, and yet *appears*, owing to the impression left by previously perceived silver). All that is meant by *the sense-organ apprehending only such things as are in contact with it*, is that the presence of the aid of some contact is necessary ; in the case in question this condition is satisfied by the contact of the *this*-factor : there is no need of the aid of contact of the sense-organ with all the factors of the object recognised (and hence there is no objection to the Recognition being regarded as *visual* or *sensuous*).” This view, we say, is unacceptable. For on it, it would firstly be impossible to have any doubt such as (‘is *this* thing *that*, or not.’)* And, secondly, it would imply that the cognition ‘ I saw that thing ’ would be of the nature of Direct Cognition (*Anubhava*), not of the nature of Remembrance ; for that cognition, proceeding as it does from the impression which is nothing else than the contact of the thing previously apprehended with the Self—such contact being mediated by the contact of the internal organ (on which the impression really is made) with the Self—would, on your view, proceed from the contact of the thing with the sense-organ (and hence would be, not Remembrance, but Direct Cognition, *Anubhava*). For the thing remembered would, on that view, not in any way differ from those cognitions etc., which are directly presented to consciousness by the contact, inhering in the Self, of the Self and the internal organ.

(202). The above reasoning also enables us to dispose of the following two views regarding the nature of Recognition :—‘ What

* For the full cause of recognition being present in the shape of the impression and the sense-contact, there could be no doubt.

is conceived in Recognition is the *this* as containing within itself the absence of that mutual negation which has for its counter-entirety the *that* ; and ' what is conceived in Recognition is the non-difference of the *this* and the *that*.' For the absence of the mutual negation of the *this* and the *that* would be nothing else but the *this* and the *that* taken together ; and this compound idea could not be apprehended by a single agency (*viz.*, either impression, or the sense-organ). And ' non-difference of character between the two ' could mean nothing else but *identity* of the two, and hence could not be apprehended by any agency but that which apprehends that identity (and we have proved above that neither the impression by itself, nor the sense-organ by itself, can apprehend the identity of the *this* and the *that*).

(203). Then again, if the cognition of a thing presented to consciousness by an impression were to be regarded as Direct Apprehension, why then should not *Remembrance* also be regarded as Direct Apprehension ? In answer to this our adversary might urge that what makes a cognition Remembrance, is not the mere fact of its being brought about by impressions, but the fact of its being brought about by such impressions as are not in touch with (not aided by) any cause or source of Direct Apprehension ; and that hence Recognition which requires the contact of the sense-organ with the thing recognised, must be regarded as Direct Apprehension ; while Remembrance (which does not presuppose that contact) is not to be thus regarded.

But this argument we easily meet by the following counter-argument :—Inasmuch as a cognition is a Direct Apprehension only, if brought about by a cause of direct apprehension which is not aided by impression, Recognition, which is brought about by such causes of direct cognition as are aided by impressions, must be classed as *Remembrance*, and not as Direct Apprehension.

But, our opponent may continue to argue, in no other case (but what we know as Recognition) do we find Remembrance brought about by such causes of direct apprehension as are aided by impressions (and hence Recognition cannot be classed as Remembrance).

This also we at once meet by the counter-argument :—In no case (but Recognition) do we find Direct Apprehension brought about by sense-contact aided by

impressions (and hence Recognition cannot be regarded as Direct Apprehension).

(204). The conclusion then is as follows:—Since there are no means of decisively proving the truth of either view (*viz.*, 'that Recognition is of the character of *Remembrance* because it is due to impressions'; or 'that it is of the nature of *Anubhava* because it is due to sense-contact'); and since whichever of the two views you would accept (as this would be without sufficient reason), it would be always possible to put forward the other view (in contradiction to it),—Recognition, as being brought about by both sets of causal factors (*i. e.*, those required for Direct Apprehension as well as those required for Remembrance) must be held to be Remembrance and Direct Apprehension.

This takes away all ground for the hypothesis, that Direct Apprehension (*Anubhava*) constitutes a particular species of cognition altogether distinct from Remembrance. Nor can a distinction between these two alleged *species* of knowledge be established on the basis of their objects; for this attempt we have already shown to be futile (para 188). In these circumstances, if no idea of contradiction presents itself to you, although it has turned out that the same cognition is both 'remembrance' and 'direct apprehension' with regard to the same object, there similarly is no reason for you to object to the conclusion that the cognition is, with regard to the object depending on it, both authoritative and non-authoritative cognition (*pramā* and *apramā*).

(205). [Page 175.] The above argumentation serves to show that the acceptance of '*Anubhava*' as a specific class or species of cognition, leads into contradictions (in so far as implying that 'Recognition' is both '*Anubhava*' and Remembrance, and both *pramā* and *apramā*), and hence refutes that view; and it also serves to set aside the argument that (if such a special class of cognition were not admitted) we should be in conflict with a universally acknowledged fact—*viz.*, that on the ground of immediate consciousness we must admit that there is such a class-character as *Direct Apprehension* which excludes Remembrance, but is present in all other cognition whether immediate (sensuous) or mediate (*i. e.* inferential and the like.)

(206). [The opponent reiterates the position stated in the preceding paragraph.] Our only refuge, he says, lies in viewing

Recognition as *Anubhava* or Direct Apprehension, pure and simple.* As a matter of fact we are conscious in all Recognition, of the character of Direct Apprehension only, not of that of Remembrance also; it is our actual conscious experience also that justifies us in deciding that although Recognition is due to impressions, yet, inasmuch as it stands in further need of sense-contact, it is nothing else but Direct Apprehension. If this were not so, we should not be conscious of Direct Apprehension in the act of Recognition. We thus oppose you on the ground that you are in conflict with an undoubted fact of conscious experience.

(207). This, we again point out, is just what we deny. As a matter of fact we have, in Recognition, the presentations to consciousness of a *this* and of a *that*, the former of which falls within the sphere of Direct Apprehension, and the latter within that of Remembrance; and you hence are unable to prove that the entire mental process is to be relegated in a one-sided way to the sphere of Direct Apprehension alone.

(208). [Page 177.] We thus arrive at the conclusion that, since in Recognition, Remembrance and Direct Apprehension are mixed up, it must be admitted that the word '*Anubhūti*' (in the definition of *pramā*) does not really exclude anything.†

* See above, para. 194.

† The Logician had defined *pramā* as *tattva-anubhūti*; the term *anubhūti* being meant to exclude all that is not Direct Apprehension. But our author has now shown that the word does not exclude Recognition which, with Remembrance, is not regarded by the Logician as *pramā* i. e., authoritative knowledge; the conclusion from this being that the said definition is faulty.

It may be noted here—as pointed out by the *Shāṅkarī*—that the orthodox Logician does not mean to exclude Recognition from '*pramā*'; but the author has discussed the nature of Recognition (which is only one form of Remembrance) simply as leading up to his main contention that the definition cannot exclude any kind of Remembrance.

(C) [Nor may the Logician plead that the term *anubhūti*, though not perhaps excluding Recognition, yet does serve to exclude other kinds of Remembrance. The case of 'shell-silver,' *e. g.*, which is supposed to be due to remembered silver, cannot be explained without reference to some sense-element ; here also, therefore, there is a mixture of Remembrance and *anubhūti*.]

(209). Nor may the Logician maintain that the word *Anubhūti*, though failing to exclude Recognition, at any rate, excludes other kinds of Remembrance. For, as we are going to show, he will have to admit that those other kinds also have the character of *Anubhūti*. Let us analyse a case of ordinary Remembrance, such as 'the jar formerly was in this place.' Here there appears in consciousness the jar as qualified by past time. Now it will be readily admitted that this its character of being connected with the past was not previously (to the act of remembrance) apprehended directly, and cannot, therefore, be reproduced before the mind through an impression. What on the former occasion was directly apprehended rather was the jar's connexion with the (then) present time. Hence, since we find that in Remembrance the causal agency for apprehending the character of the past is combined (with the impression which gives rise to Remembrance), we must conclude that Remembrance, like Recognition, is of a mixed character, partaking of the nature of Remembrance and of Direct Apprehension as well.*

(210). The objection stated is also applicable to the view we have already combated (para 203 ff.)—*viz.*, that Impression aided by the agencies of Direct Apprehension tends to bring about Direct Apprehension (in the shape of Recognition). For if such were the case there would be no Remembrance at all ; for there is no Remembrance where the idea of the past (in the form of *that*) is not present to consciousness. We thus find that there is nothing (either in the shape of Recognition or that

* What, in remembrance, is reproduced before the mind, is only the jar itself which we saw formerly, and which left an impression on the mind ; but not the jar as connected with the past (for when we saw it, it was present and hence could not leave on the mind the impression of past time). That element in Remembrance which presents the jar as connected with the past, therefore, cannot be Remembrance, but must be *Anubhūti*—direct, primary cognition.

of Remembrance) that can be excluded by the term ' *anubhūti* ' in the definition under discussion.

(211). [Page 178.] Some (*i.e.* the followers of Prabhākara) indeed maintain that there are cases of remembrance in which, owing to some defect of the cognizing agency, the *that*-element of Remembrance is obscured.* But this view is inadmissible; since there is nothing to prove that the cognition in question is of the nature of Remembrance. Against this it cannot be urged that since the causal conditions of Direct Apprehension are absent, nothing remains but to regard the cognition as Remembrance (all cognition being either *Anubhava* or *Smṛiti*). For if we were to argue in this way it might be said that nothing remains but to class inferential cognition also and other kinds of cognition as Remembrance, for the reason that owing to the absence of contact between the sense-organ and the object the causal factors of *Anubhava* are not present. † It will perhaps be argued that it is on account of there being a total absence of the causes of *all* kinds of Direct Apprehension (that we are driven to regard the cognition in question as a Remembrance). But in reply to this we ask—' How, my friend, have you ascertained that the cause which gives rise to the idea of silver not comprising the notion of *that* (*i.e.*, the idea of silver presenting itself *not* as connected with past time, *not* as a remembered thing) is nothing else but the cause of Direct Apprehension? Should you reply that you have ascertained this on the ground that the causes of all the five kinds of right knowledge (which alone, according to the Philosophers, give rise to right cognition) are absent;—we further ask—why then do you not also conclude that nothing remains but to regard the

* So that in such cases there would be remembrance without conscious reference to past time. The Prabhākaras in this way account for erroneous cognition or misconception; we mistake the shell for silver because at the time when we perceive the shell, previously perceived silver presents itself to our mind without our being at the time conscious of the previous experience.

† It must be noted that the Opponent would hardly admit this argument. Inferential cognition does not, according to the Naiyāyika, cease to be *anubhava* for the reason that it is not brought about by the causes of sensuous perception (contact of the sense-organ with the object etc.). It evidently is on this account that the commentator (Shāṅkara) calls the argumentation of the text ' *gūḍhābhisaṅghi* ' *i.e.* unintelligible.

fifth kind of right knowledge (*viz.* *Arthāpatti*, knowledge founded on presumption) as *Remembrance*, for the reason that it is not brought about by the causes of the *four* kinds of right cognition (which alone according to your views, constitute right cognition)? And where, we further ask, have you met with a case in which cognition arising in the absence of the causes of the five kinds of right cognition is regarded by all parties as 'Remembrance'? Keep in mind that above already we have thrown out the suggestion that the cognition 'there was a jar in this place' is of the nature of Direct Apprehension. [So that you have no corroborating instances to prove your general proposition].

(212). The Opponent here will perhaps argue as follows :— 'In the case under discussion (*viz.* of the shell being regarded as silver) we regard the impression of silver as the only cause of the cognition and do not assume any other causal agency, for the reason that there is no possibility of the operation of those causal agencies which bring about sensuous and other kinds of cognition,* and that as silver had been previously perceived, there is every possibility of the impression of silver being present. The case of inferential cognition and the rest is different. Here also we have cognition arising in the absence of the causes of sensuous perception, but as the object of those cognitions is something not directly experienced before, they cannot be held to originate from impressions, and we hence postulate for them special causal agencies, such as the so-called *linga* (prohans, middle term) on which Inference rests. We then may very well define Remembrance, *viz.*, as either being that which is produced by impressions unaided by any other means of knowledge, or as being a special class of cognition which is characterized by the mentioned feature. This is not so, we reply. For, we ask—what is your reason for not regarding the sense-organ itself as the cause of the cognition in question and, instead, trying to establish the origination of the cognition in question, from an impression? You may reply that you do this for the reason that the cognition cannot be

* When the shell is mistaken for silver, the cause of sensuous perception of silver (*viz.* contact of the organ of sight with real silver) is absent; similarly there is absence of the causes that would move us to *inf.* * the presence of silver, and so on.

produced by the sense-organ because at the time there is no contact between the sense-organ and the object (falsely cognized), and because the assumption of the organ bringing about the cognition even in the absence of such contact would involve an undue extension of the organ's operation. But this we meet by the counter-argument that your assumption of Impression by itself bringing about the cognition would imply an undue extension of the operation of Impressions.* To avoid this undue extension you perhaps will say that the cognition is brought about by the Impression as aided by the preception of similar properties (common to the Shell perceived and the Silver remembered). But against this we might maintain with equal force that there would be no undue extension of the operation of the sense-organ if we held that the cognition is brought about by the *sense-organ* as aided by the same perception. Against this you might argue that 'on this view there might be remembrance of things never cognised before'! But, we point out, a similar objection would lie to your view also. For according to that it would be possible for a man who has the impression of silver to remember it when he merely perceives the object (the shell) which possesses the property common (to silver and the shell *viz.* glitter), even though he does not cognise it as possessing that property; and the answer by which you would meet this objection would be equally available for us also. † It might be argued that—'in that case (*i.e.*, if the Remembrance of the silver were sensuous) it would be possible for the man to have the sensuous cognition of the silver possessing the common property, even though there were no impression left on his mind of the previous perception

* If mere impressions could produce cognitions, anything previously experienced might suggest itself to the mind at any moment, irrespective of certain associative conditions such as similarity and the like.

† The Logician meets this contingency by pointing out that when the man sees the *shell*, even though the *impression of silver* may be present in his mind, he cannot have the notion of *silver* in the *shell*, because this notion is not possible without the man perceiving the presence in the shell of the *glitter* common to shell and silver. . . The author says that a similar answer is available for the Vedāntin also: The *non-remembrance* of the silver is due, *not to the absence of the impression of silver*, but to the absence of the perception of the property of *glitter*.

of it as possessing that property (and this is not possible).[†] But on your view it would also be possible for the same man (who has no impression of the silver as possessing that common property) to have the remembrance of silver, if he happens to have the impression of the silver itself (apart from that property). [And this would be equally absurd.]

(213). Thus then, as regards your view also, the undue extension (of the character of 'Remembrance') can be avoided only by admitting as a necessary factor for Remembrance, the absence of certain obstacles to the action of impression, such as length of time and the like. And that same recognition of the thing (the shell) as similar to the previously perceived thing (the silver) which according to you is the auxiliary factor finally awakening the impression, will also serve the purpose (on our view) of avoiding the 'undue extension' of the sense-organ. And as for the argument that 'the recognition of a *similar* thing is always preceded by the remembrance of the thing that has to be remembered' (*i. e.*, the silver),—we reply that this condition holds equally good on both views.*

(214). 'But', the Logician retorts, 'in spite of all this, the fact remains that nowhere else do we meet with a cognition that is brought about by a sense-organ without the contact of the organ with the object (and such contact is not present in the case of Remembrance). But this objection is invalid; since we assume such unaided operation of the sense-organ in special cases only, such as that of Misconception.† Or else, we may regard the influence of that defect to which the misconception is due, as constituting the 'contact' (required for sensuous cognition). And further, as regards Impressions also, we nowhere else (*i. e.*, in no case other than Remembrance) find any cognition that is brought about by impressions without the aid of some other means of knowledge; and on what basis then do you

* According to you the impression aided by such a recognition constitutes the cause of Remembrance; according to us the cause is the sense-organ aided by such recognition; and thus Remembrance being sense-produced shows itself to be the same as Direct Apprehension.

† We hold that the sense-organ, without actual contact with the object, brings about the Remembrance of erroneously imagined silver; *not* that all sensuous cognition is brought about in that way.

assume such unaided efficiency of them (in the case of Remembrance)? If against this the Opponent should urge that, 'in the case of Recognition it is the impression, and not the sense-organ, that is aided by the perception of similarity and the like (and that hence in other cases—Remembrance *e.g.*—we may assume Impressions to be aided)';—we point out that both impression and the sense-organ are the cause of Recognition, and hence the aid of the perception of similarity etc. may belong to both equally.

(215). 'But,' our opponent retorts, 'if in the case of the false surmised silver you regard the sense-organ as aided by the perception of similarity etc., you will have to regard it as aided by the impression also; just as in the case of Recognition (where the sense-organ is aided by the impression; and so the Misconception being brought about by the aid of impressions may be regarded as 'Remembrance').' By no means, we reply. If Misconception were of the nature of Remembrance, the notion of 'that' would enter into it just as it enters into Remembrance (while as a matter of fact this is not the case). And if you should attempt to prove the presence of the *that*-idea in Misconception on the ground of its being aided by the perception of similarity etc.,—this inferential reasoning would be vitiated by a qualifying condition (*upādhi*),—viz. the character of being brought about by impressions.* Nor may you argue as follows:—'It is due to the fact of Recognition being aided by the perception of similarity that the *that*-idea enters into it, and hence as regards Misconception we can reject the operation of the perception of similarity, but not that of Impression.†' For as a matter of fact, whenever there is no perception of similarity

The reasoning would be as follows:—'Misconception implies the *that*-idea because it is aided by the Perception of Similarity'. But the character of being brought about by impressions, while being present everywhere where there is the *that*-idea, is not necessarily present in all cases where there is perception of similarity. The reasoning, therefore, involves the *Fallacy of Accident*.

† The sense of the argument is—it is true that the *that*-idea, is not present in Misconception. But what is always concomitant with that idea, is the operation of the perception of similarity etc. We, therefore, in the case of Misconception, can deny the presence of this operation; but we have no grounds for denying the operation of Impression.

etc., even though the Impression is there, there is no cognition of the nature of Remembrance.

(216). 'All the same,' the opponent resumes, 'we cannot dismiss the fact that sense-organs are operative only with regard to objects they actually get at (are characterized by what is technically called *Prāpya-kāritvam*); for this is what we learn from our experience of really existing things (and hence as the falsely surmised *non-existent* silver cannot be got at by the sense-organ, so that sensuous cognition is impossible, the cognition must be regarded as Remembrance).' Not so, we reply. We have already explained that just as the sense-organs bring about cognitions only when aided by the actual proximity of the object (which thus is *got at*), Impression (to which alone Remembrance can be due) can bring about cognitions only when it is aided by other means of knowledge: this is a fact (ascertained in the case of Recognition) which also refuses to be dismissed. (And hence the misconception of silver cannot be regarded as due to *Impression*). And in case Impression itself is regarded as constituting a 'contact' (with the sense-organ of *Mind*), it becomes all the more patent that 'sense-contact' is not absent (in the case of the idea of silver).

(217). Then again, the view that the false surmised silver is due to impression alone independently of any other means of knowledge, necessitates the assumption that the *that*-idea (which is an essential factor in all ordinary remembrance) is somehow obscured or eliminated, and this naturally gives rise to the further question 'whence this elimination'; all the more, since the silver having been cognised on previous occasions as qualified by present time and certain other characteristics, we should naturally expect that, in the case of subsequent cognitions brought about by the impression left by the previous cognition, the silver should again present itself to the mind with those very same characteristics;—for this is the result actually observed in the case of recognition. [And yet this is not found to be the case in the cognition under discussion, which, therefore, cannot be due to impression alone.] It cannot be maintained that the *that*-element is eliminated from the cognition owing to certain defects; for the relation to the object (the *that*) constitutes the very nature of the impression, and therefore never can

be absent from it. But, the reply may be, what we ascribe to defects, is the elimination of the *that*-element (not from the impression but) from the act of remembrance! What then, we ask, constitutes that defect? The answer will be that 'it is that to which misconception (*bhrānti*) is due, according to the Logician.' But in that case (*i. e.*, if the absence of the notion of *that* in all forms of misconception were due to a defect), the notion of *that* would be absent even from such forms of misconception as 'this silver is not different from *that* silver'; or, 'this is *that* same silver'; or '*that* same silver has again come before me';—in all of which the silver that comes in is the silver in general referred to by *that*. If this were not so, the absence of the notion of *that* would also not be possible in the case of the misconception 'this is silver.' We here close this digression from our main theme.

(218). Nor lastly can it be held that Recognition is a form of cognition totally other than 'Remembrance' and 'Direct Apprehension.' For if not partaking of the character of direct apprehension, it would pass into the category of wrong cognition (since right cognition has been defined as the 'direct apprehension of the real nature of things'). Nor may you reply to this—'Let it be so, we do not mind'; for the Logician when denying the momentary character of things brings forward the fact of the 'recognition' of things as a proof of their permanent character. Moreover if you were to establish your definition by abandoning something (*viz.*, 'recognition') which is universally known to fall under the category to be defined (*viz.*, right cognition) this would imply the absence of all rule regarding the framing of definitions.*

(219). The conclusion, therefore, is that you have no good reason to maintain that in the definition of right cognition (*pramā*), the word '*anubhava*' (direct apprehension)—which denotes a *kind* of cognition—is included for the purpose of differentiating it from *Remembrance*.

* One means to test the validity of a definition is the enquiry whether it is applicable to all things to be defined. This canon of definition would have to be given up if, for the sake of upholding our definition, we were to exclude from it things that it admittedly should include.

(D) [Direct Apprehension cannot be defined as 'what is other than Remembrance'; for the characteristic features of *anubhūti* as well as *smṛiti* are found to co-exist in Recognition; and moreover this *difference from Remembrance* cannot be shown to be either from *all* Remembrance or from any individual act of remembrance.]

[Page 187.] (220). Nor* may Direct Apprehension be defined either as 'what is other than Remembrance,' or as 'what is destitute of the character of Remembrance.' For we have already shown that the characteristic features of 'Remembrance' and 'Direct Apprehension' are actually mixed up (*viz.*, in Recognition); and hence the term *anubhūti* would fail to differentiate (right cognition from all other kinds of cognition).

(221). The former of the above definitions cannot be accepted for the following reason also. What, we ask, do you mean by saying that Direct Apprehension is *other than Remembrance*? That it is other than *some* particular remembrance? or other than *all* remembrance? or that it is destitute of the character of Remembrance?

(222). The first of these alternatives would imply that any particular remembrance also is direct Apprehension, for the reason that it is *other* than some other particular remembrance; for this latter particular remembrance from which the former differs does not cease to be *Remembrance*; and hence being other than it, will be equivalent to being *other than Remembrance*.

(223). Nor can the second alternative be maintained. For in what way can you ascertain that a certain right cognition is other than certain particular remembrances that may be, let us say, in *my* mind or in the mind of some other person? Of these you evidently can have no idea. For in the first place, ordinary people like ourselves (who do not possess the insight due to Yoga) cannot perceive the thoughts of other people by the senses. Nor, in the next place, can we manage to do so by inferences or by presumption (*arthāpatti*); since men of limited powers of perception, as we are, cannot in all cases perceive either the

* Here begins the refutation of the second and third alternative definitions of *anubhūti*, set forth in para 179.

probans (on which an inference depends), or the eventual impossibility on which presumptive reasoning depends. Nor can we form, in all cases, ideas of the remembrances in other people's minds on the basis of *words* (*śabda*, verbal information); for we cannot count, in all cases, on suitable words (to express those remembrances) being available. That, lastly, analogical reasoning (*upamāna*) and the rest cannot help us, is evident. How then should it be ascertained that a certain right cognition is other than *all* particular remembrances? And as this cannot be known, the definition under discussion clearly is invalid. You will perhaps meet this conclusion by arguing as follows:—'A man who has a perceptive (intuitive) cognition of a remembrance in his own mind knows it as possessing the generic character of Remembrance; and as all remembrances, arising at any time in the mind of any person, have this same generic character, he knows them also in the same intuitive way (his inner organ which mediates the intuition being, through that generic character, in indirect contact with all individual remembrances wherever taking place). The case is analogous to what takes place in inferential cognition, where at the time when we apprehend the invariable concomitance of two things, we also intuitively apprehend all the individual things belonging to the two classes, through an indirect intuition mediated by the contact of the inner organ with the generic characteristics of the two classes.' But this reasoning is not right. For your conclusion, as well as the instance whereby you endeavour to establish it, are both open to serious objections. Were your arguments valid, it would follow that the man who intuits one thing as knowable, would—through the above mentioned contact with the generic character 'knowability'—have an intuitive knowledge of all that is knowable *i. e.*, the whole universe! If you accept this conclusion also you clearly regard yourself as omniscient; but I shall believe in this your omniscience only if you can tell me what is going on in my mind!

(E) [Direct Apprehension cannot be defined as 'what is destitute of the generic character of Remembrance'; for negation of *smṛititva* may also be *mutual negation*, and the latter is present in *smṛiti* also. Nor can *absolute negation* be intended, since this also would make the definition too wide. Nor lastly, can it be argued that between two acts of Remembrance there holds good not pure negation, or difference, but difference combined with some kind of non-difference, and that hence the negation of Remembrance cannot subsist in any Remembrance. For there is nothing to show that in *anubhūti* also there may be difference, as well as some kind of non-difference, from Remembrance.]

(224). Nor, lastly, can we accept the third alternative definition. For what, we ask, do you mean by 'direct Apprehension being destitute of the character of Remembrance'? Do you mean that it implies the negation of the character of Remembrance? or that its essential character (*svarūpa*) consists therein that it has *Smṛititva* (the class-character of all remembrance) for its counter-entity? or that it is the cognition of that character of the substratum?

(225). The first of these alternatives is unacceptable. For the *mutual negation* (*anyonyābhāva*) also of the character of remembrance is 'negation of the character of remembrance'; and as such mutual negation is present in remembrances also (for each individual remembrance implies the negation of other individual remembrances), they also would be included in Direct Apprehension! And the definition thus failing to exclude remembrances, the qualification (*i. e.*, the 'being other than Remembrance,' which in this definition of *anubhava* qualifies the general term '*jñāna*,' 'cognition') becomes futile. And if, in order to avoid this, the term qualified (*i. e.*, *jñāna*, cognition) were to be left out, (so that the definition of *anubhava* would be not 'cognition other than remembrance,' but merely 'what is other than remembrance'), the definition would include other mental states also as—*e. g.*, desire.

(226). It might be urged that what is meant by 'negation of the character of remembrance' is (not *mutual negation*) but complete negation of all relationship to the character of remembrance' (which complete negation, of course, can never reside

in any remembrance). But this also we cannot allow. For what, we ask, do you mean by 'complete negation of relationship to the character of remembrance'? Is it 'negation of relationship qualified by the character of Remembrance'? or is it 'negation of the character of remembrance qualified by relationship'? or is it something else that you mean by this peculiar expression of yours? As to the first alternative we point out

that as the *mutual* negation of the character of remembrance is present in each individual remembrance (for in one remembrance there is absent that individual relation to *Smṛititva* which is present in others), you lapse into the same absurdity as before (see the preceding paragraph); for remembrance is not 'relationship to the character of remembrance' (and hence there may be, in remembrance, absence of the latter). For the same reason

the second alternative also cannot be accepted; for any particular remembrance is not the same as 'character of Remembrance qualified by relationship'; and hence we may maintain that there is mutual negation between any particular remembrance and the character of Remembrance qualified by relationship; and thus the aforesaid objection remains in force. And this objection will remain valid even though you go on adding the qualification of 'relationship' to every 'negation'*; and moreover your procedure would lead to the reprehensible assumption of an endless series of such qualifications.

(227). Nor may you urge, against this, that there is no need to assume an endless series of relationships, for the reason that the 'relationship to the character of remembrance' is not connected by means of another relationship, but that such relationship constitutes its very nature. For in that case it will be all the more impossible for you to keep clear of the objection brought forward on the ground of the *natural* negation of the relationship of remembrance; since according to your latest assertion the introduction of a further qualification in the shape of another relationship means nothing more than what is already expressed by the 'relationship to the character of remembrance.'

*If you assert that though there may be *mutual negation* between the particular remembrance and the 'character of remembrance qualified by relationship', yet there is no *Saṃsargūbhāva* between the two;—we shall again ask 'what do you mean by this', and so on.

(228). Moreover, how can there be an absence of relationship (to the character of Remembrance) in Direct Apprehension—considering that you hold that the relationship between two things is *not* something apart from them, and that therefore the relationship to the generic character of Remembrance and the individual Remembrance possessing that character are both of the nature of,—*i.e.*, non-different from,—the Relationship? Is it the form or character (*svarūpa*) of 'Direct Apprehension,' or the form of 'Relation to the generic character of Remembrance' that is not present (in Direct Apprehension)? [And since both these forms are present] what then is it that could be negated (by the negation of 'relation to the generic character of Remembrance' which is held to be identical with the two forms mentioned)? And if that which is negated is a relation quite different (from the 'relation to the generic character of Remembrance'), this negation would apply to an individual remembrance (no less than to Direct Apprehension); for you also hold that in Remembrance there is no such relation as is something different from it,—your theory being that the relation between the individual remembrance and the generic character of Remembrance is nothing else but the very nature (*svarūpa*) of the two.

(229). * The Logician resumes as follows :—“ Even though it is possible that the Direct Apprehension and the 'relationship to the class character of Remembrance' may be present in their

*The disestablishment of the definition of *anubhava* as 'that which implies the negation of the character of *Smṛiti*' has so far proceeded on the view that the *Saṃsargābhāva* of *Smṛititva* resides in Direct Apprehension. It now is proposed to show that this latter assumption itself is not tenable. According to the Logician, the relation to (or connexion with) a certain general character is nothing apart from that relation or connexion and the individual thing in which the general character resides. Applying this general principle to the case in question we must admit that the *Saṃsarga* of *Smṛititva* and the individual *Smṛiti* must both be regarded as non-different from the *Saṃsarga*. Therefore, to say that in *anubhūti* we have the absence of *Saṃsarga*, would mean that there is absent in *anubhūti* either *Smṛiti* or *Smṛititva-Saṃsarga*. But *Smṛiti* is the same as *anubhūti*, inasmuch as both are *dharma* *i.e.*, objects qualified by certain characteristics; to say therefore that *Smṛiti* is absent in *anubhūti*, would be equivalent to denying the *Svarūpa* of *anubhūti*. Nor can *Smṛititva-Saṃsarga* be absent from *anubhūti*; for *Smṛiti* certainly bears some relation to *anubhūti*. If, on the other hand, what is denied of *anubhūti* were a *Saṃsarga* distinct from the two things which the Logicians hold to be identical with the *Saṃsarga*,—that new *Saṃsarga* would be absent from *Smṛiti* also (for the *Saṃsarga* of *Smṛiti* has been declared by the Logician to be nothing different from those two things). And then there would be an difference between *Smṛiti* and *anubhūti*.

respective individual forms, yet the two have not the capability of giving rise to mutually connected ideas; it is only where such capability exists that the two individual forms are said to constitute a 'relationship' (so in the case of *Smṛiti* and *Smṛititva-Saṃsarga*)." But this also we cannot admit. For that capability of which you speak is not possible unless there is shown to be present some generic character which comprises and determines all special cases of such capability.* And if for that purpose you were to put forward some such other generic character, the same difficulties would meet you with regard to the connexion of that also; with the result that you would have to go on searching for one generic character after another, ad infinitum.

(230). [Page 196.] †But even if we were to admit your explanation, what is it, we ask, you mean to deny with regard to Direct Apprehension? What we deny with regard to Direct Apprehension, the Logician replies, is its capability of giving rise to the idea that the 'relationship to the character of remembrance' and Direct Apprehension are connected (related). This also will not do, we reply; for you can not deny the capability, on the part of *Anubhūti*, of giving rise to the said idea in its erroneous form.‡ What we deny, the Logician replies, is the capability of *Anubhūti* to give rise to a true idea of that kind! If, we reply, you admit the existence of a true idea of that kind, it follows that Direct Apprehension may have the character of Remembrance!§ If, on the other hand, you do not admit this,

* That is to say, it will be necessary to point out a general character or feature present in all cases where two things have the power of suggesting each other, as is the case, e. g., with any *Smṛiti* and *Smṛititva-saṃsarga*.

† It has so far been shown that there is nothing to determine that 'remembrance' and 'the relationship to the character of Remembrance' have the capability of producing the idea that they are related to each other. It now is proposed to show that even if this were the case, the definition of Direct Apprehension is not established.

‡ There will be nothing to prevent a man from forming the erroneous conception 'Direct Apprehension and the relationship etc., are related'; hence we cannot deny the capability of *Anubhūti* to produce that idea.

§ If the idea 'Direct Apprehension and relationship to Remembrance are connected' ever is a true one, the character of Remembrance cannot, at least in that case, be denied of *Anubhūti*.

CHAPTER I.—SECTION (14).

with regard to what then would you assert the absence of the capability of production? If you mean to assert that Direct Apprehension is devoid of the capability of producing that idea which has absolutely no existence, the assertion will have to be extended to Remembrance also; for although there may be some such true ideas produced by Remembrance, there will be non-capability of production on the part of Remembrance also, with regard to that absolutely non-existing (untrue) idea which is other than those true ideas. Nor may you represent the matter as follows:—‘the difference which we statute between Direct Apprehension and Recollection is that the former, and not the latter, is incapable of producing all (any) ideas of that kind (no stress being laid on the distinction of true and untrue ideas).’ For in the first place we have no means to form a right notion of all individual ideas of that kind; and, further, we ask, what do you understand by all in this connexion? Do you mean that *Anubhūti* is incapable of producing all ideas of the kind that exist? for all that do not exist? or all that exist as well as all that doubt exist? If you hold the first or second alternative, such capability belongs to Remembrance also; for no particular remembrance is capable of producing all the ideas—of the for ‘Remembrance and relationship to the character of remembrance are related’—which present themselves with regard to all remembrances (the fact being that each individual remembrance produces such an idea with regard to itself only). And as regard the incapability of producing some such idea, we have already refuted it. If, on the other hand, you were to accept the third alternative, then the said incapability would not be present in *Anubhūti* either; for as to the idea that has true existence, we, just because it does exist, cannot deny to *Anubhūti* the capability of producing it; and as to the idea that has no true existence, nothing can, for that very reason, be denied of it.

(234) At this stage the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas come forward with the following argument:—“You have argued that the definition of *Anubhūti* (as that which is marked by the absence of Remembrance) is too wide, on the basis of there being present, in particular remembrances also, the mutual negation of the character of Remembrance which belongs to other individual remembrances. This, however, cannot be

admitted ; for according to the *bhedā-bheda*-view (i. e., the view of difference together with non-difference), there is, in any particular remembrance; difference as well as non-difference, with regard to the generic character of Remembrance ; and where there is this 'difference with non-difference,' there can be no mutual negation (and hence mutual negation of *Smṛititra* cannot reside in any particular *Smṛiti*)."

This argumentation also is unsound we reply. For how do you ascertain that Remembrance, and not *Anubhūti*, is different as well as non-different from the generic character of Remembrance ? We refuse to accept the reply that 'this is ascertained thereby that, as a matter of fact we have no valid cognition of *Anubhūti* as qualified by that difference-with-non-difference.' For, we ask, do you base your assertion on the absence of a cognition that has true existence, or of one that has no true existence ? In either case your reasoning fails, as shown above, (i. e., if the right cognition has true existence it cannot be denied ; if it has no true existence, no assertion, including denial, can be made regarding it). Nor can it be said that the right cognition denied is that which is the counter-entity of *prior non-existence* (i. e., that which has had no previous existence). For if you admit that such right cognition exists with regard to Direct Apprehension, the latter comes to be what you seek to deny (i. e., qualified by the character of Remembrance)*. And then as regards the absence of mutual negation between the individual Remembrance and the general character of Remembrance—which really is nothing but the two things themselves,—this would belong to Direct Apprehension as well ; since it would be open to the argument put forward by us above, viz.,—that Direct Apprehension is not 'the mutual negation of the Character of Remembrance' ?

* To say that in Direct Apprehension there is a 'prior non-existence' of right cognition, is to admit that though the cognition did not exist before, it exists now ; the right cognition of Direct Apprehension thus is qualified by the character of Remembrance.

(F) [The Logician now argues that while it may be admitted that the *mutual negation* of Remembrance is present in individual Remembrances, the presence of *absolute negation* of Remembrance is quite inadmissible. But this we meet at once by denying that there is any real difference between those two kinds of negation. Every attempt of the Logician to prove such difference upon a difference of the counterentities of the two kinds of negation lands him in difficulties from which he is unable to extricate himself. He cannot, *e. g.*, argue that while mutual negation has for its counter-entity *Identity*, absolute negation has for its counter-entity mere connexion or co-existence. For were it so, the destruction of the jar would not be a case of negation of the latter kind.]

(232.) [Page 200.] 'The Opponent now takes up a different ground. 'We grant,' he says, 'that the objection (based upon the possibility of mutual negation between the 'character of Remembrance' and 'an individual remembrance') cannot be met by postulating that between these two there is *difference-with-non-difference* (as attempted in para. 231); but you cannot deny the distinction between 'mutual negation' and 'negation of *Samsarga*' (on which our answer is primarily based); since this distinction is based upon the fact of our having, in ordinary experience, two distinct conceptions, —*viz.*, on the one hand, 'this thing is not that thing' (where there is *Anyonyābhāva*, 'mutual negation'); and 'that thing is not here' (where there is absolute negation of relation, *Samsargābhāva*). [And thus, even though there is mutual negation between *Smṛitva* and *Smṛiti*, there can be no absolute negation of relation between them].'

But this also we deny. For, as a matter of fact, there is no difference in the character of the counter-entities of the two kinds of negation; nor is there any difference between the two due to any other characteristics; nor, lastly, is there any difference in *kind* between the two. As for these reasons, the said conception of difference, although present, does not prove itself to be valid, it must be disregarded, being no more than a 'false witness.'

(233). Against this the Logician may state the difference between the two in the following way:—'Mutual negation is that negation which exists at the same time and place as its

counter-entities (i.e., the things each of which implies the negation of the other); while absolute negation of relation is such negation as is something quite apart from the counter-entities. (That is, the mutual negation of the jar¹ and the cloth exists in those things; while the absolute negation of the connexion of the jar with a certain place—'here there is no jar'—cannot co-exist with the jar.)

But we cannot accept this distinction; because it is open, in turn, to the following unanswerable objections:—(1) *ātmaśhraya* (vicious circle); (2) *ananubhava* (being contrary to ordinary experience); (3) *svabhedānanugama* (the impossibility of a comprehensive conception of such negation); and (4) *tattadavagamānabhyupagama* (the impossibility of the idea of any individual negation).²

(234). [Page 203.] The opponent states the distinction in a different form:—'Absolute negation of relation is that negation which has relation (*Samśarga*) for its counter-entity; while mutual negation is that negation which has for its counter-entity "identity" (of two things). In this way the two do not become mixed up; for the negation of the identity of relation is not the negation of relation, since it has identity for its counter-entity.'

But this also is unsound; for on this definition, the destructions which substances, qualities and actions undergo on being reduced to their inherent (*Samavāyī*) causes (as when e.g. the jar on being smashed is reduced to clay) would not be cases of absolute negation of relation; and if this destruction has for its counter-entity 'relation' (as demanded by the definition), then—inasmuch as in the present case the relation is that of Inherence (*Samavāya*, which includes the relation of cause and effect),

* These objections are thus explained by the *Shuṅkarī*:—(1) *Abhāva* (negation) is defined as that which is *other than bhāva*; and the character of being *other than bhāva* is defined as consisting in the mutual negation of *bhāva*; thus Negation is defined in terms of negation:—this constituting *Ātmāśhraya*, 'dependence on self' or 'defining in a circle.' (2) In order to avoid this 'circle,' it will be necessary to assume *mutual negations ad infinitum*; but no such endless negation is ever cognised in ordinary experience. (3) And as in this case it will not be possible to speak of the 'mutual negation,' no comprehensive notion of the negation or difference of anything will be possible. (4) And lastly, as any such endless series of negations will not be cognisable by any person who is not omniscient, the theory will strike at the root of all conception of individual negations.

it will follow that *Samavāya* is non-eternal (while yet according to the Logician all *Samavāya* is eternal). Moreover, if we accepted the above definitions, neither of the two *abhāvas* would ever have for its counterentity things such as jars (since, according to the definitions, the counter-entity is either *saṃsarga* or *tādātmya*); and this would mean that jars and the like would be unlimited (either in time or space) as time and space are. And lastly, on this supposition (*viz.*, of individual things such as the jar and the like, not being factors of the counter-entity), you would have for counter-entities of your negations all 'relation' and 'identity,' without any special qualification; and this would amount to the total denial of Relations and Identity; and if (in order to avoid this: you were to include in the counter-entity special things (jars and the like), the negation would be a total negation of those things also (*i.e.*, it would imply that those things have no existence whatever). And if again, in order to avoid this, you were to run after the *relation of the relation* (*i.e.*, if you were to say that what is denied is only the relation of the relation), this would imply that the relation itself is not touched (by the negation, and therefore has unlimited existence; as was above asserted of the things). And if, in order to avoid this, you were to say that we must assume a series of *saṃsargas* in which the negation of each link implies the negation of the preceding link, we reply, that this involves the objectionable assumption of an infinite retrogress. And again, if to avoid this, you were to say that you stop at a certain link of the series, negating, not the further *Samṣarga* of that *Samṣarga*, but that *Samṣarga* itself;—there would be total denial of that *Samṣarga*; and this would imply the total denial of the preceding link, and so on and on, the retrogressive action resulting in the total destruction of the whole series.

(235). [Page 205.] The Logician may set forth a different view of *abhāva*. The opposition, he may say, between the counter-entity and its correlative (*i. e.*, between the thing negated and the negation) is not implied in their very nature (so that the existence of the one would imply the absolute non-existence of the other); it means no more than that the two cannot exist together; what is implied in the

existence of one, therefore, only is that the other does not co-exist with it,—not that it has absolutely no existence at all.

But this also we cannot admit. For (if the opposition between the two means no more than that) then at times the thing negated might become identical with the negation. 'But',

the Logician replies, 'how can that be, considering that a valid cognition to that effect (*viz.*, of the identity of the two) has no existence!' Consider, we rejoin, what this reasoning

implies. You admit that the opposition between a thing and its *abhāva*—which you define as incapability of co-existence—rests on the non-existence of a valid cognition, and hence it is

evident that incapability of co-existence cannot on its part, determine that latter non-existence. Nothing, therefore, remains but to conceive the opposition between right cognition and its

non-existence as one of essential contradiction.* 'But why,' the Logician rejoins, 'should not that opposition also be viewed as consisting therein that there is no valid cognition of the

co-existence of the two?' Because, we reply, this principle might be unduly extended.†

Let us then, the Logician rejoins, give the following form to our last definition, that there *never* is a valid cognition etc. This also, we reply, will

not do; for a universal assertion of this kind could be made only with reference to generic character; and hence between any two things taken as individuals the opposition would not hold good.‡

(236). [Page 207.] Well, the Logician says, let us then conceive the opposition between a negation and its counter-entirety to consist in the fact of their having an inherent

* What opposition is there between the right cognition and the absence (*abhāva*) of the right cognition? Clearly it cannot be mere 'absence of co-existence'; for you have above attempted to base 'absence of co-existence' upon 'absence of valid cognition.' We, therefore, are compelled to allow an opposition of essential nature between *pramā* and its absence.

† When thinking of air, *e. g.*, we do not cognize the co-existence of colour and touch; and this 'absence of valid cognition' might be imagined to establish a general opposition between colour and touch; while yet the two clearly co-exist in earth or water.

‡ When we say that two things can *never* co-exist, the statement can only refer to their *jūti*s *i. e.*, generic characters which exist at all times; not to individual things which are transitory, and regarding which a negation referring to *all* time would have no sense.

incapability of being validly cognised as co-existent. But, we ask in return, what should this incapability, said to belong to the things, be, apart from the characters of being just the counter-entity and its correlative? You may not say that it is just the individual character of the two; for he also who holds that there is a relation between the two (as *e. g.*, the relation of counter-entity and its correlation—which relation implies the co-existence of the two) admits the two to have distinctive individual characters (so that the latter cannot constitute opposition in the Logician's sense). Nor may you attempt to improve your definition by explaining 'individual characters' to be those characters which are *such—i. e.*, between which there is *no* relation. For this imposes on you the task of distinctly explaining what constitutes individual character of that kind (and this you are unable to do).

(237). And further, (if the opposition meant by you were nothing more than incapability of co-existence), what difference would there be between the opposition of the generic character of the cow and the generic character of the horse on one hand, and the opposition between negation and its counterentity, on the other hand? And moreover, how could opposition thus understood meet cases where there actually *is* a valid cognition of the co-existence of Negation and its counter-entity (as in the case of a swiftly moving chariot which, at any moment, we cognize as *being* and as *not being* in contact with some point of space); and when there is such a valid cognition, why should the Logician seek to establish the opposition by other methods (by the explanation *e. g.*, that the contact is with one point of space, and the non-contact with another),—considering that the actual existence of the valid cognition (*viz.*, in the given instance, of contact and non-contact existing together) proves that the contrary notion (of the two not being capable of co-existing) is *not* valid (and hence need not be established at all).

(238.) [The Logician now takes up the thread of the argument set forth by the Vedāntin in para. 234, *viz.*, that if the counter-entities of absolute Negation and mutual Negation were Relation (*samsarga*) and Identity (*tādātmya*) respectively, no negation at all would be possible of jars and the like things]. The two negations, he says, are the negations not of *mere*

Relation and Identity, but of those two as qualified by (or along with) the jar and the like ; and an affirmation or negation which is thus qualified can never be without taking in the qualification also (as e. g., the jar). This explanation also, we reply, is not open to you. For if the negation of something that has a certain qualification is the negation of that qualification also, the negation of the identity of relation will also be the negation of relation ; and thus the objection we urged against you (para. 225) sticks to you all the more tenaciously.* But, the Logician will perhaps say, the negation of relation (to the generic character of Remembrance) which I referred to (as characteristic of *anubhūti*) is such as does not have identity for its counter-entity (and hence even though the negation of the identity of the relation to the generic character of Remembrance might belong to Remembrance, it would not matter), and similarly the negation of identity may be conceived as that which does not have relation for its counter-entity. But this also cannot be admitted ; for in that case, in the first place, the negation of the relation of identity, as well as the negation of the identity of relation, would be totally different kinds of negation ; and, secondly, your assertion would mean that ' what is to be regarded as the negation of Relation is that negation of Relation which is not the negation of Identity' ; and in this the second qualifying *samsarga*† would be quite superfluous (as this would be the same as saying that the negation of relation is that *negation* which etc.) ; and thus while aiming at adding to your definition of Direct Apprehension something further, in the shape of ' negation of Relation', you finally come to lose even the expression ' negation of relation.' Then again, in this explanation of yours, the denial of the negation of identity would apply to the negation of identity also. For [you define the ' negation of Relation' simply

* It had been argued above (para. 225) by the Vedāntin that if direct apprehension (*anubhūti*) were defined as that which implies the negation of relation to the generic character of Remembrance, then, inasmuch as Negation of the identity of the relation to the generic character of Remembrance is present in Remembrance also, the above definition would apply to Remembrance also. And now the Logician himself asserts that the negation of the identity of relation is the same as the negation of relation.

† I. e. the qualification which is inserted by the Logician to the end of excluding the definition from Remembrance.

as that which is not the negation of identity ; but this cannot serve to exclude the negation of Identity, because] we never can have a valid cognition of the form ' the negation of Identity is the negation of Identity ' [and unless we have this cognition, the definition of ' Negation of Relation ' will apply to the negation of Identity also]. The cognition is impossible because the co-ordination of subject and predicate in a judgment has a meaning only when there is some difference of character between the two, as *e.g.*, in the judgment ' the lotus is blue.' But in the case of the judgment in which ' Negation of Identity ' is subject as well as Predicate, no co-ordination is possible ; and hence your definition of ' Negation of Relation ' will unduly extend to the ' Negation of Identity ' also. What, moreover, would be that other thing residing in all negations of Identity of which the ' negation of Identity ' could be predicated (in the assertion ' Negation of Identity is negation of Identity)? If that thing were mere Negation, the assertion would assume the form ' Negation of Identity is Negation ' ; and this would be far too wide (as including all kinds of negation) ; and if any particular ' negation of Identity ' were that with regard to which the ' negation of Identity ' were meant to be predicated, then all other particular ' negations of Identity ' would have to be regarded as ' Negations of Relation.'

(239). The above reasoning applies to all definitions where other things are sought to be excluded by the addition of the clause ' other than the thing to be defined.' For

' Just as you do not predicate of any thing the negation of that thing, so you cannot predicate the thing of itself ; for valid co-ordination stands in need of some difference of character.' (29).

' And if the thing were predicated of itself in some other form (either of greater or lesser extension), then, on the supposition of that form also, you will be met by the same difficulties as pointed out above ' (30).

[If this ' form ' is of greater extension than the thing defined, the definition becomes too wide ; if it is of less extension, it does not take in all the individual things sought to be defined.]

(240). Again (if the ' negation of relation ' is defined as that negation which does not have Identity for its counter-entité), the negation of relation of the ' negation of Identity ' would also

be excluded (*i. e.*, it would not be regarded as a 'negation of relation,') as it would have identity as a factor of its counter-identity). Should the opponent reply that, inasmuch as he does not admit any such further negation as the 'negation of relation' of the 'negation of Identity' (such negation of a negation leading to an infinite regress), the stated objection cannot be brought forward on the basis of any such negation;—we meet this by pointing out that according to this view he could not accept the *negation of Identity* of the *negation of Identity* (*i. e.*, he could not speak of anything as not identical with the negation of Identity); and how then could any distinction be made between the 'negation of relation' and the 'negation of Identity,' on the ground of the former not having 'Identity' for its counter-identity; since all *distinction* implies negation of Identity?

The opponent will perhaps reply—'the negation of Identity' of 'the negation of Identity' really is nothing more than the latter itself; and on this we may, in an altogether unexceptionable way, base our conceptions of distinction between the different kinds of negation (without any infinite regress being had recourse to). Well, we reply, if such is the case, we may, with equal validity, make the same assertion with regard to 'the negation of relation' of 'the negation of Identity.'

(241). [*Page 214.*] Then again, when you say that the negation of relation is that negation which does not have 'Identity' for its counter-identity, you thereby deny all negation that has Identity for its counter-identity; and this would come to mean that the 'negation of relation' is of the nature of 'Identity' itself; for as the two negations destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda (who slew each other), the result will be the firm establishment of Identity. And in this unqualified 'Identity' the whole world will be included; and as that which you understand by 'negation of relation' is also a part of the world, this your 'negation of relation' will identify itself with the 'negation of Identity'; and thus all your efforts towards the specification of Negations turn out to be entirely futile and ridiculous. It is an astonishing result indeed that the objection urged against your unspecified definition applies with equal force to the definition when specified or qualified.

(242). Let me then, the opponent resumes, propound the following question: When we say 'the pillar is not the negation of the jar,' does this mean that the pillar is identical with the jar? The answer can be a decided negative only, for the following obvious reason. If the whole world were nothing else but either 'jar' or 'not-jar,' then no doubt the denial of the pillar's being the negation of the jar would necessarily mean that the pillar is the jar; but since as a matter of fact there are other things also, *e. g.*, pillars, no such thing follows.

(243). This is not so, we reply. Though besides the *jar* and the *non-jar* there are other things, such as pieces of cloth, pillars, etc., yet no things whatever lie outside the sphere of what is covered by 'Identity' and 'the negation of Identity'; for *Identity* (*anyonya*) without any qualification includes the whole world; and when this Identity (which includes the whole world) is negated (by 'negation of Identity'), the *negation of this negation*—which according to you constitutes the character of the 'Negation of Relation' would come to include the entire world. Specially consider that when it is affirmed that the jar is identical with (is the very *Self* of) the cloth, the Identity here asserted is not something apart from the very nature of the jar itself. If Identity were held to be a certain *property*, otherwise termed 'non-difference' (*abheda*), which (in the judgment 'the jar is not the cloth') would be denied with reference to the two things *jar* and *cloth* (so that the 'negation of Identity' would be only a *property* of the world, and not the world itself)—in that case the negation would be one of 'relation' and not of 'Identity.' We, therefore, conclude that the entire world is included in 'unqualified Identity,' and that there is no room for any other alternative.

(244). [*Page 217.*] It, further, would, on your view, not be true that, when the jar is denied, its negation is affirmed, and when the negation of the jar is denied, the jar is affirmed; since according to you there exists something further (than *jar* and *non-jar*). Or, even if the above were allowed, the assertion 'the pillar is not the non-jar,' would mean nothing else but 'the jar is identical with the pillar,' and thus the difficulty which you put forward against us (para. 242) falls upon your own head. For that difficulty can be overcome only on the basis of a

distinction between the 'negation of relation' and the 'negation of Identity'; and so far this distinction is not established.

(245). For the above reasons it also cannot be maintained that the difference between the two kinds of negation should be admitted on the ground of experience (or 'consciousness'; *prātīti*). [For our proof that the *things* are not distinct at once disposes of the attempt to establish their distinctness on the ground of difference of *ideas*]. And then again, as the 'negation' and the 'thing negated' (*i. e.*, the jar and the negation of the jar) are mutually contradictory, and as you are incapable to establish a differentiating specification regarding this law of mutual contradiction (which would make it applicable to one kind of negation and not to another), it remains an unshaken law that the negation of the one correlate implies the affirmation of the other; and thus the negation of the 'negation of Identity' beyond dispute implies the affirmation of 'Identity.'

(246). As to myself the principle of 'non-explicability' ('non-definability') serves as an adamantine armour, easily warding off the 'arrows' of objections based on ideas and the practical requirements of life [consciousness and practical life alike being alleged to demand the recognition of a real difference between absolute and mutual negation]. My theory is that the world, being established by immediate experience, is something other than an absolute non-entity (of which there is no experience at all); but that although on this account *being* (*sattva*) must be allowed to it, it yet is sublated (by reflexion), and hence must be held to be (not either real or absolutely non-existent but) 'indefinable' (*unirvachanīya*).

(247). The distinction between the two kinds of negation, which is so constantly asserted on the ground of being a fact of consciousness, thus falls to the ground altogether; for the impossibility of giving a rational account of the distinction of the counter-entities of these negations (*i. e.*, the things negated) implies that the distinction as met with in consciousness has to be rejected. And—

'As the distinction of these counter-entities can be established only on the basis of the distinction between the two kinds of negation—mutual negation and absolute negation—, who can remedy the 'vicious circle' here presenting itself? (31).

(G) [Nor can Direct Apprehension be defined as 'that in which there is *absolutely* the absence of the character of Remembrance.' For the mere addition of the word 'absolutely' does not free the definition from the objections put forward in paras. 222 *et. seq.*]

(248). The Opponent now states his definition of Direct Apprehension (*anubhava*) in a somewhat changed form:—'Direct Apprehension is that in which there is absolutely (*eva*) the absence of the character of Remembrance.' But this does not improve matters. For what is the further point expressed by '*eva*'? It cannot be said to preclude the presence of the character of Remembrance, for this is already effected by the word 'absence'; *negation of presence* and *absence* meaning exactly the same thing. Should it be said that the word *eva* serves to preclude the co-abidance (in *anubhava*) of the presence of *smṛitīva*,—we rejoin that this also is sufficiently expressed by the simple definition (without the addition of *eva*). Moreover the negation of Identity (of the co-abidance of the presence of *smṛitīva*) would reside in Remembrance also; for surely Remembrance is not 'the co-abidance of the said presence' (and thus the definition would not exclude Remembrance.) Consider also that as you admit, in Remembrance, the presence (of the character of Remembrance) as well as the absence (*i.e.*, the negation of Identity of the character of Remembrance), you thereby also admit the negation of the said co-abidance [and hence your definition fails to exclude Remembrance]. And further also consider that two negations are mutually destructive [and that hence the expression 'the negation of the co-abidance, etc.' means in simple language that where there is the character of Remembrance, there the negation of that character is not; and this is tantamount to the, manifestly futile, assertion 'where the character of Remembrance exists, there it exists']. From the circumstance that in one substratum, *e.g.*, fire, colour and taste do not co-exist, it does not follow that they cannot co-exist anywhere [and in the same manner, the fact that the character of Remembrance and the negation of that character do not co-exist in Direct Apprehension furnishes no reason why they should not co-exist in another substratum, *e.g.*, Remembrance; and hence there would be

**Indian Thought*, Vol. II, Khaṇḍana continued from Vol. I, p. 354.

nothing incongruous in applying the definition to Remembrance also.]

(249). [Page 220.]. But, our Opponent rejoins, when we actually find that the negation and non-negation (*i. e.* the 'negation of Identity' and its counter-entity) can co-abide in the same substrate, it cannot be proved that they are mutually destructive [and hence the said 'negation of co-abidance' cannot reside in Remembrance]. But in that case your own wish will be the only authority for giving the names 'negation' and 'non-negation' to such co-existent things, and not to Colour and Taste, which also are co-existent in some cases.* But, the Opponent explains, in the case of Colour and Taste we observe that they are not mutually destructive, and hence—in as much as in certain substrates, *e. g.*, Fire, one of them does not exist, we can regard them as *non-co-existent*; such however is not the case with the Negation and its counter-entity, (*i. e.*, 'the character of Remembrance' and the 'negation of Identity of that character' which being mutually destructive are yet found to co-exist in Remembrance and so cannot be regarded as *not-co-existent*). In that case then, we rejoin, all that would be necessary for the *non-co-existence* of two things would be their not being mutually destructive; and this would mean that the absence of this fact, (*viz.*, of the two things being mutually destructive) is the condition necessary for their being regarded as co-existent; and this would lead to the conclusion that Colour and Taste (which are not mutually sublatory) can never co-exist (in any substrate)! and that negation and its counter-entity can never be co-existent!

(250). [Page 222]. 'What I mean,' the Opponent here may possibly say, 'is that Direct Apprehension is that wherein there is *always and necessarily* the non-co-existence of the character of Remembrance [and this does not apply to Remembrance which is not always such].' But this also, we reply, will not serve your purpose; because in this case also it will be as

* According to you 'negation of Identity' and its 'counter-entity' are found to co-exist in some cases, not in all. Similarly Colour and Taste co-exist in some substrates, not in all. Why then should the terms 'Negation' and 'Non-negation,' which you apply to the former, not be applied to the latter also?

difficult for you to give a satisfactory explanation of *eva* (*always and necessarily*) as on the previous occasion (para. 248). In the same manner we have also to reject the view that—"the negation meant is a peculiar kind of negation, (*viz.*, absolute negation) which can never abide in the same substrate as its counter-entity (and the *absolute negation* of the character of Remembrance can never co-exist with Remembrance; although the 'negation of the Identity' of that character can)." This position is untenable, because the peculiar character of this Negation also is to be inferred only from the fact that it does not co-exist with its counter-entity—even though it be similar to other kinds of negation in being the denial of something capable of existence; and we have already shown that the *absence of co-existence* is equally present in the other kind of negation also [and thus no distinction has yet been established between the two kinds of negation—absolute Negation and Negation of Identity.]

The Opponent may here put forward the explanation that the peculiar character of absolute Negation is established by the fact that it is only with regard to this Negation that we have the actual *cognition* of the impossibility of co-existence. But even admitting this, the *fact of being co-existent*—to which the cognition relates—is found to reside in *Remembrance* also (which has been shown to be non-co-existent with the *character of Remembrance*). Should the Opponent explain that 'Direct Apprehension is that wherein we have that Negation of the character of Remembrance which is other than the *Negation of Identity*'—he lays himself open to all the objections which we have already brought forward against the definition of Direct Apprehension being 'that which is different from Remembrance.' Further discussion of this topic is needless.

(251). The first of the alternatives set forth (in para. 223) having thus been disposed of, we shall now show that the second and third alternatives also cannot be accepted, *viz.*, (b) that 'being devoid of the character of Remembrance' means 'having the character of a substrate which has the character of Remembrance for its counter-entity'; or (c) that means 'the Cognition of the character of this substrate.*' The fact is that the objections which we have put forward against the first alternative

* Both these views are held by the Prābhākaras.

apply to these views also, with equal force; in as much as according to you the conditions of the 'Negation of Identity' would be exactly the same as those of the ordinary (absolute) Negation. [And hence, as according to you Absolute Negation is nothing more than the particular substrate in which the counter-entity is not present; so the 'Negation of Identity' also would be nothing more than one of the counter-entities, or else the Cognition of it; and hence as the 'Negation of Identity' of the character of Remembrance would reside in 'Remembrance' also, the definition given in accordance with those alternatives also would apply to 'Remembrance.']

(252). The Opponent now proceeds to give a different interpretation of *samsargābhāva* (absolute negation). We have "the absolute Negation of the character of Remembrance in a thing to which that character is denied as having any relation. Where, on the other hand, that character is only denied to be identical with the thing, we have not absolute Negation, but Negation of Identity. And it is not this latter negation which we mean by the negation appearing in our definition of Direct Apprehension; it is the former, *i. e.*, Negation absolute, which is meant. But this explanation also will not stand scrutiny. For what, we ask, do you mean by the instrumental termination in the word *samsargīṭayā* ('as having relationship')? (1) Does that termination express a *characteristic feature* (*lakṣaṇa*)? (2) Or does it mean *accompaniment* only? Or is it used as one of the *kāraṅkas* only, *e. g.*, the instrument? * The first of these alternatives is not possible; for the definition then might mean the 'Negation of Identity' of the *character of Remembrance* qualified by the *character of being related*; and (as this would apply to Remembrance also) the main objection thus would remain in force. Nor can the second alternative be accepted: You cannot deny that in Remembrance there is the *negation of*

* According to (1) the definition would mean 'there is negation of that character of Remembrance which is qualified by the character of being related;' according to (2) 'there is negation of the character of Remembrance together with the character of being related;' according to (3) 'there is negation which is brought about by the instrumentality of the character of being related.'

identity of the character of Remembrance along with the character of being related [and thus the objection remains]. Nor lastly, can the third alternative be maintained; for absolute Negation is not something that can be produced,* and it is absolute Negation that you are concerned with. [And hence the character of being related cannot be spoken of as instrumental towards bringing about that negation.]

(253). Should the Opponent rejoin that the instrumental ending (in *samsargiṭayā*) denotes manner or method (*prakāra*), we call on him to explain what he means by method. He may reply that method is just method; but this will not do; for unless, to a person who does not understand a thing, you give a real definition, (not merely an explanation of the thing by itself), you cannot prove to him that it excludes anything (which you maintain the instrumental ending to do). Were your proceeding allowed, the consequence would be that no enquirer would ever receive a real definition; if somebody asked you 'what is a jar'?—you might simply reply 'a jar is neither more nor less than a jar'! And if then an Opponent of yours should assert that your view of the Instrumental termination denoting method is not right and you should ask him 'what is the objection'?—he would do all that could be expected of him by replying 'the objection is neither more nor less than an objection.'

(II) [It has been shown that Direct Apprehension cannot be defined in a general way as that which has not the character of Remembrance. In the same manner it can be shown that we cannot define it as being without this or that particular characteristic of Remembrance; for the simple reason that it is not possible to mention any characteristic feature of Remembrance; that is, it is not possible to define Remembrance.]

(254). The same arguments set forth so far to prove that Direct Apprehension cannot be defined as that which is devoid of the character of Remembrance, prove also that it cannot be defined as that which is devoid of any other characteristic

* It is only *dhvamsa* that can be produced.

feature of Remembrance. One may define Remembrance as 'the cognition of that which has been previously cognized'; but this definition will extend to all so-called 'stream-cognitions,' (*i.e.*, series of closely successive cognitions in which each member is exactly like the preceding one). Or again, Remembrance may be defined as that recognition which is *dependent or relative*—the dependence or relation consisting therein that for the specification of its object (the thing remembered), it depends on, or refers to, a previous cognition of that object. But this definition also does not stand the test; for on it the character of Remembrance will have to be allowed to the idea of the *that* which enters into all *recognition* ('*this* thing is *that* thing which I cognized on a previous occasion'). You will say that there is no harm if it be so. But then we meet you by pointing out that in that case all Recognition would consist of two independent factors—one of Direct Apprehension referring to *this*, and one of Remembrance, referring to *that*; and as thus the two objects would be apprehended by two distinct acts of cognition, by what cognition would the identity of the two objects be apprehended? (and it is just this identity of the *this* and the *that* which constitutes the object of Recognition). And thus you would lay yourself open to the objection set forth by us before. A third definition of Remembrance may be given:—'Remembrance is cognition produced by impressions alone.' But this we reject on the ground that the characteristic mentioned is a quite impossible one, in as much as all kinds of cognition (including Remembrance) are due to certain aggregates of causes (the Self, the internal organ, the contact of the two, etc.) [And thus there can be no cognition due to impressions *only*]. A fourth definition may be given:—'Remembrance is that cognition in the bringing about of which impressions are the special distinctive cause.' But this definition would apply also to the recognition of one's self (the judgment of personal identity) which expresses itself in the form 'I am that (person I was before)' (which has no other peculiar cause but an impression); and as regards the contact of the Self and the internal organ this is common to all cognitions. [Hence impressions alone might be regarded as the peculiar cause, but this is found in the case of Recognition of

Remembrance, (*viz.*, impressions) only if we could form the comprehensive conception of one generic entity 'Remembrance' which would be the effect of that cause; but so far you have not been able to establish the existence of such a generic entity and hence you cannot ascertain its cause. And further, if you were to succeed in explaining the character of that generic entity, that explanation itself would at once supply the definition of Remembrance, and there would be no further occasion for that definition of yours which we are at present criticizing. The Bhāttas finally make the following distinction:—'Direct Apprehension (*anubhāva*) is that cognition through which the *object* is rendered *cognized*; Remembrance is that cognition through which *that which was cognized* before is rendered *cognized*.' But on these definitions the character of Remembrance will have to be allowed to such inferential cognitions as 'the thing is already known,' or 'the thing will be known, etc.,' (where that which is *cognized* already is cognized through the Inference.)

(255.) [Page 228.] Thus then we conclude that it is not possible to distinguish Remembrance (from Direct Apprehension) —(1) either on the ground of the different character of its object; for the same object would belong also to the Direct Apprehension arising from the verbal assertion of that definition of Remembrance;—* (2) or on the ground of their respective causes and effects; since of such causes and effects no previous comprehensive conception can be formed;—(3) or on the ground of the idea that the two constitute distinct generic entities or classes; since we have shown that the two classes would overlap.

(256). Nor can we accept the fourth alternative definition of 'Direct Apprehension' given in para 179, *viz.*, that it is 'that kind of cognition the specific cause of which is such as to come into existence just before the cognition.' For unless we know the distinctive character of the effect (Remembrance), how can we ascertain the cause? and wherein are we to cognize the specific character (of the effect)?

* On the distinction referred to Remembrance will be defined as 'that which apprehends an object already apprehended.' But this verbal assertion also causes the apprehension of such an object, and hence would also have to be considered as 'Remembrance.'

I [Having proved the inadequacy of the definition 'tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā' by showing that neither *tattva* nor *anubhūti* can be satisfactorily defined, the author now proceeds to consider the said definition of *pramā* as a whole.]

(257.) [Page 229.] And, further, the Logician is not only incapable to give an account of the meaning and the distinctive function of each of the terms of the definition ('tattvānubhūtiḥ pramā'); we shall show, in addition, that there are objections to the definition as a whole. The definition 'Right cognition is the direct apprehension of the real nature of things' would include, under the category of valid knowledge, those cognitions also which happen to be right by mere chance, as the cognition referring to the 'crow and the palm tree.'* Such cognitions take place not unfrequently. A man may, e. g., close his hand over five shells and ask 'how many shells are in my hand?'—the person asked, by the merest fluke, gives the right reply 'there are five'; this being due to mere fortuitous coincidence as in 'the case of the goat and the sword.† But as the (true) cognition of *five* is in the mind of the questioner and the person questioned, this also might be classed as a case of *pramā*. It would not be excluded by the term 'true nature' or 'true condition' of things (*tattva*) in the definition; for as the number is *really* five the cognition cannot be called (*unreal* or *false*.) Nor would it be excluded by the word *anubhūti* (*direct apprehension*); for it is a cognition, a something not previously cognized, and hence destitute of the characteristic feature of *Remembrance*. Nor can it be argued that there being nothing to corroborate the cognition in question, it must be held to be a mere 'doubt' in the speaker's mind; the statement of one

* A crow alights on a palm tree just at the moment when one of the fruits of the tree, being thoroughly ripe, is about to detach itself from the tree and fall. A spectator concludes that the falling of the fruit is caused by the contact of tree and bird. This happens to be true in the given particular case, and the cognition though not generally valid thus might be classed as *pramā* as defined above.

† A goat rubs itself against a pillar from which a sword is loosely suspended; the sword falls and cuts the goat's throat. That the rubbing of its body against the pillar causes the death of the goat is a mere chance coincidence.

alternative only being like the case of the cultivator.* For the two cases are not parallel; in as much as the thought in the cultivator's mind must be viewed as a case of undoubting certainty as to one alternative; when all the requisite conditions are present he really feels certain with regard to the goodness of the harvest. Otherwise (*i. e.*, if we allowed that certainty as to one of several possible alternatives has to be classed as *doubt*; in other words if *certainty* were classed as *doubt*), real *doubts* might, on their part, be viewed as the combination of *certainties* with regard to several alternatives! Nor finally can the cognitions under discussion (*i. e.*, those cognitions which happen to be right by mere chance) be declared to be truly valid cognition (*pramā*), since they cannot be included in perception or any other kind of valid cognition.

(258.) [Page 231] The Opponent now may suggest that the definition should be amplified by the specification that cognitions to be valid (*pramā*) must be produced by instruments of cognition which never go astray (are unfailingly correct). But then, we point out, the word *tat̥tra* (reality) becomes quite useless. Moreover, you are not able to contend that those cognitions discussed above, which turn out to be right by chance, are produced by faulty instrumentality (and hence the definition now proposed does not exclude them from *pramā*). If you were to maintain this, you would thereby admit the possibility of correct cognitions being brought about by faulty instruments; for the correctness of the cognition would not come about without some instrumentality; since, if this were so, the absence of a determining agency would give rise to a most confusing extension of the principle (for, if no specific cause were required for such chance cognition, they might arise at any time and any place). And as these cognitions are as a matter of fact correct, you are bound by an instrumentality which is definitely and

* The cultivator at bottom doubts whether the harvest will be good or not; but all the same he confidently asserts that it will be good. So in the case under discussion it might be said that although a person may say, with apparent confidence, that the questioner's hand holds five shells, he in reality doubts whether there be five or some other number, so that his cognition would have to be classed not as *pramā* but as *saṃshaya*.

exclusively connected with correct cognition. 'What is that instrumentality?'—the Opponent asks. It is your business, we reply, to give the answer to this question! And the answer must be such that the cognitions under discussion may be included in the well-known group of valid cognitions. Or else, you should try to exclude it from that group by a general definition of right cognition. [And this is not possible, in the case of those chance cognitions which happen to turn out right].

(259). [Page 232.] Similar cases of cognitions being right by chance are to be met with in the sphere of Inference. The cognition of a certain subject of a conclusion (as *e. g.*, 'fire on a mountain) which is founded on a false reason (*e. g.*, fog which is mistaken for smoke), may be correct, in as much as, by chance, the mountain may have fire as well as smoke (in addition to the fog) or fire alone. This cognition would indeed not be right in so far as relating to the *probans* (*i. e.*, the fog which is mistaken for smoke); nor would it be right with regard to the 'subject' of the conclusion as possessing that 'mark'; yet as far as the *fire-factor* of the subject is concerned—viewed either by itself or as possessing a 'mark' other than the one perceived—the cognition relating to the fire must, under the aforesaid conditions, be held to be right or valid. Hence on the basis of this cognition also (which will have to be included in the category of *right cognition*), there is no escape for you from the aforesaid objection.

It might possibly be argued that as the inferential cognition in question is brought about by a wrong instrumentality, the object of the cognition must be something other than the real fire on the mountain (and that hence the cognition is not one of the *reality* of things). But, we rejoin, although the individual object of cognition may be other (in as much as it is *really* not fire inferred from smoke), there is true cognition as far as the *generic character* of the object is concerned^{*}; and consequently the objection remains in force. The Opponent may reply that since the special case, *i. e.*, the subject and the reason of the special case of inference, (which is under discussion) falls under the category of the connexion of two generic entities, and since in the given instance the special

* The cognition of *fire* in general is true; for *fire* actually is present on the hill.

connexion which presents itself to consciousness is unfounded (false), the generic fire also (which you hold to be truly cognized) must be false; and that hence the objection urged does not hold good. But this also we cannot concede. For it must be admitted that even in cases where there is no cognition of individual character the individual is cognized in so far as it possesses generic character; in a case, *e.g.*, where we are in doubt whether something belongs to Devadaṭṭa or to Yajñadaṭṭa, we yet cognize definitely that, it belongs, to a man. In fact, if in all cases of cognition of relations any individual case were to come in its purely individual character, it would be quite impossible to have any comprehensive notions of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) and the like.* Then again, (although we might admit that you are right with regard to the cognition of individual things), in cases of wrong inferential cognition of generic entities (which although produced by a wrong instrumentality, may happen to be right by chance),† there clearly is no room for assuming the cognition of any other individual (since a generic entity is *one* only, and cannot be looked upon as being itself an individual included in a higher genus: there is no *gotraṭva* of *gotra*). Should our Opponent maintain that in this case also what is cognized is a generic character and its inherence in an individual; both of which, (*i. e.*, character and inherence) are other than what really exists (so that the cognition is not, as we maintain, substantially right, but false);—then he, abandoning the *anyaṭhākhyaṅgi*-view, lapses into *asaṭhkhyaṅgi*.‡ It might possibly be argued that what takes place in the case of the inferential cognition in question is that some special attribute of the generic entity is, erroneously identified with the generic character itself, (*gotra*,

* We could never arrive at the *vyāpti* 'wherever there is smoke there is fire,' unless we dropped all individual characteristics of particular fires and smokes and formed pure general notions of the two.

† As when a man mistaking some cloth tied round the neck of a cow for a dewlap, would infer therefrom the 'gotra' of the animal; the cognition of *gotra* would be right although brought about by a wrong instrumentality.

‡ Compare, on these two philosophical views, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 176 et. seq.

The *anyaṭhākhyaṅgi* theory is the one held by the Logician; but, as the text remarks, his argumentation in the present case, as to the nature of inferences which are true by accident only, lands him in the *asaṭhkhyaṅgi*-theory.

e. g., being erroneously inferred, while all that really should be inferred is the form and colour of a cow.) But this also does not establish your case ; for even thus (the conception would be wrong only in so far as that *identity* is concerned and) as far as the generic entity possessing that attribute is concerned, the cognition would remain as right and valid as before. Moreover, it has to be considered that in the case under discussion the causal conditions are such only as to produce the notion of connexion (between the generic entity and the attribute), and hence cannot give rise to the (erroneous) notion of identity of the two : specially would this be so in the case of an inference that is put forth for convincing another person,—where the conditions present are such as only to bring about the notion of relation (not identity) of the things to which the inferential reasoning refers. And if, in the face of all this, we were to assume the notion of identity, there would be left no ground for any definite rule regarding the different causes giving rise to the different kinds of misconception, (for then, any misconception might arise from any cause.)

(260). [Page 235.] Then again, (even though we admit your contention in the above case) what would be your view with regard to the case where a person has the misconception in the form—‘I have inferred the *relation* of the generic character (*gotva*) in this individual—this is verily a cow’ [where the inference is of the *relation*, while the ultimate Cognition is of *identity*] ? What, further, would be your view regarding that kind of ‘fallacious inference’ which is called ‘*śiddha-sādhana*’ (‘proving what is already proved or known’) ? [In which case the final cognition resulting from the inferential process, is of *tattva*, and hence valid ; although the instrumentality through which it is brought about may be found fault with]. Should you maintain that here also the thing cognised is *other* than the real thing, you contradict what the very name of the fallacy expresses, *viz.*, that the thing inferred is *proved* (admitted to be real) already . If, on the other hand, the thing proved were held to be true (real), this would imply the admission that a fallacious inference brings about the cognition of what is real ; and as this would break through the

general principle ('that no fallacious argument can produce right cognition'), we should not be justified in assuming, even in the case of other fallacious inferences, that the thing cognised by their means is other than the real thing. In any case (even though you succeed in finding some explanation for the other fallacious reasonings) you will have no basis for distinguishing the 'siddhasādhana inference' (from a valid inference).

SECTION (15.)

[In the second place, *Pramā*, Right Cognition, cannot be defined as that 'anubhava,' direct apprehension, which is 'yathārtha,' i.e. in keeping with the thing as it is; because no adequate explanation of what constitutes 'yathārtha' can be given.]

(261.) [Page 236.] The definition of Right Cognition as the direct apprehension of the thing as it really is is also not tenable. Because, what is the meaning of the apprehension being 'in consonance with the thing as it is?' Does it mean that it has the *tattva* of the thing as its object? Or, that it is similar to the thing? It cannot be the former; as that has already been refuted (by our showing that it is impossible to define '*tattva*' or *this-ness*.) Nor is the second explanation possible; because the wrong cognition also having this similarity to the thing that both are 'knowable' (a term that includes all conceivable cognitions and things), that also would have to be regarded as '*pramā*,' 'Right Cognition.' The logician will perhaps urge as follows:—"The similarity that is meant (to subsist between the right cognition and its object) is in that form of the thing which is objectified by the cognition (and in wrong cognition, the thing objectified by the cognition is entirely dissimilar to the thing as it exists); nor is this position vitiated by the argument that—'even in wrong cognition the knowability of the thing cognised may be manifested [when, e.g., the shell is cognised as silver, this wrong cognition appears in the form *this silver is knowable*, in which case the cognition is quite similar to that form of the thing—viz., *knowability*—

which is objectified by that cognition]; and in such cases the wrong cognition would become included in the said definition of Right Cognition;—this argument cannot vitiate the logician's view; because, so far as the factor of 'knowability' is concerned, when this factor does become manifest in the cognition, the cognition is certainly to be regarded as *right*, even though it may be quite wrong as regards the other factors objectified by (entering into) the cognition." This, we reply, cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, the logician accepts as Right Cognition the cognition of things (the jar, for instance) as having colour and such other qualities inhering in them [as when we have the cognition—'the jar has colour inherent in it']; and yet in this case the cognition is not held to be similar to the object in that form of it which is manifested; as what is manifested in, or objectified by, the cognition, is *the character of having colour and inhering in it*, while the form of the object (the jar, for instance) is something totally different; [and thus with the qualifying explanation given by the Logician, the definition becomes too narrow, failing to include a cognition that he recognises as *right*.]

(262.) [Page 237.] The Logician explains—"What we meant by the apprehension being similar to the object is that it has for its qualification—it is qualified by—that form which is manifested in that apprehension; consequently in the case cited—that of the jar being cognised as having colour inhering in it—the colour is manifested in this cognition only as a qualification inhering in the object; and as such, it becomes a qualification of the cognition also (which thus comes to be similar to the object, in that both have the same qualification)."

This is not right, we reply; because in that case when the shell is cognised as *silver* 'before me,' the cognition will have to be accepted as *right*, because what is manifested is the character of *being before the cogniser*, as the qualification of the thing cognised, and this same would, *ex hypothesi*, be the qualification of the cognition also (which would, thus 'be similar to the cognised thing, in the form that is manifested in the cognition.' The Logician retorts—"In so far, the cognition in question is certainly accepted as right, and as such

it is not reasonable to urge this as an incongruity." This answer will not serve your purpose, we reply; because in that case, the epithet 'in keeping with the thing' in the definition, would be quite superfluous; because there would be no incongruity, according to you, even if Right Cognition were defined simply as 'apprehension'; because all the so-called wrong cognitions, would ultimately have some object for themselves, according to the *Anyathākhyāti* view (by which in wrong cognition, though one thing is cognised as another thing, what is cognised is a *thing* all the same); whereby, in so far as the *character of being a thing* would be manifested in the cognitions,—which character is certainly present in the thing cognised,—it would become possible for all wrong cognitions, to be accepted as 'right'; and thereby 'Right Cognition' would become synonymous with 'cognition' or 'apprehension.' If then, you seek to introduce the epithet 'in keeping with the thing' for the purpose of excluding all cognitions that might differ from the actual thing even in the slightest detail,—then in that case, the definition remains open to the objection urged against it at the very outset.

(263.) The •Logician supplies another explanation of 'similarity':—"We regard that cognition as *right* which is similar to the thing cognised, in having for its qualification the entire form (of the thing) manifested in the cognition; nor is this explanation open to the objection that the thing, (in its entire form, though a qualification of the cognition) cannot be the qualification of itself (and therefore there would be no similarity between the thing and the cognition);—because the thing could be regarded as its own qualification in so far as it serves to exclude things other than itself." This explanation also, we reply, cannot be accepted; because in that case, the wrong cognition would not be *right*, even so far as being the cognition of a *thing*; because in this case the cognition is not similar to the cognised thing in its entire form.* Then again, if you are prepared to take the bold step of casting the correct portion of the cognition into the realms of 'wrong

* When the shell is cognised as *silver*, so far as the cognition is of a *thing*, it is *right*; it is only when it comes to the detailed character of the thing that the incompatibility and wrongness come in.

cognition,' not paying any regard to its inherent correctness,—then why do you not take the similar step of regarding the wrong portion of the misconception as right, in consideration of the correctness of the right portion of it? And in this manner you are quite free to define 'Right Cognition' as 'Direct Apprehension' (*Anubhūtiṅva*), or 'Apprehension' (*Jñānaṅva*), and so forth.

(264). Then again, if a certain cognition which is wrong in one part, be regarded as wrong even in that part of it which is right,—[this rightness or wrongness being determined by its being sublated or not sublated],—then we would have to regard as wrong that perception which we have of the jar on the house-top in a dark night; as in this case the thing being, at a great distance from us, the light of the moon or the flash of lightning which allows us to have a vision of it, does not enable us to see that part of it which is on the other side (of the light); and hence on this account the perception that we have is not that of the complete actual size of the thing, but only of a smaller size (and this perception *as regards the size* being wrong, the whole perception will have to be regarded as wrong).

And further, whether a cognition is sublatale or not can be ascertained only on finding that, when we actually go to act up in accordance with the cognition, we find the real state of things conforming to it; and if the criterion of correctness be as you say, then where could we find the corroborative instance of an activity that would pertain to all the details (of qualification, etc.) of the thing cognised,—such for instance, as the particular place, time, supply of light,* water and so forth,—by which corroboration alone the *correctness* of the cognition could be ascertained?

(265). Then again, if because one part of the cognition is found to be sublated, we were to regard as wrong that portion of it which is not sublatale, then, to the Idealist who would argue that—"because a certain thing has been found to be sublated (and hence unreal) in one case, it must be regarded as unreal even in cases where it is not so sublatale (and hence all things are unreal under all circumstances)"—what answer

* This would imply that the author had in view the cognition of real water and that of the *mirage*.

could you give, except the renouncing or throwing away of all the well-known instances of right cognition ?

(266). The Opponent says:—"A cognition is *right* only with reference to that particular manifested qualification of the thing on which is based its similarity to that thing; and thus the *rightness* depends upon the particular phase of the thing; * and it is with a view to this that we have added to the definition the qualification '*yathārtha*.'" This also cannot be, we reply; because in this manner all the *rightness* of cognitions would pertain to qualifications, and no cognition would be *right* as regards any *qualified* thing. In answer to this it might be urged that—"what is meant by a *qualification* in this connection is only a *differentiating factor*; and as things also do differentiate, by their connection, the properties belonging to them, these also may be spoken of as *qualifications*; and hence the reply loses its force." But this is not right; because even thus the undesirable contingency remains that the cognition cannot be *right* as regards the *qualified* factor (though it may be so as regards the qualification).

And further in the case of the cognition of *shell-silver*, the *character of silver* does differentiate and qualify the shell, the cognition being in the form—"this is that particular shell which appeared *as silver*." † In answer to this it might be added that—"the qualification meant is the *direct* one, while the *character of silver* can qualify the *shell* only indirectly through the cognition; and so the definition of *rightness* cannot apply to this." This also is not right, we reply. As in that case when we have the cognition 'this man carries a long stick,' where the man is cognised as *man*, the qualified factor is cognised as distinguished from men carrying *short* sticks, the cognition would not be *right*, in as much as the qualification 'long-ness' (which is the only basis of distinction) qualifies the man, not *directly*, but *indirectly*, through the stick.

* The *character of silver* is not a qualification of the *shell*; hence with reference to that, the cognition cannot be called '*right*.'

† This would be the form of the sublatiug judgment, and in this cognition also the shell would be qualified by the *character of silver*; and to that extent the previous cognition would be *right*.

Nor can it be asserted that, "the qualification meant must be such as is independent of the form of the cognition." *

As in that case, we would have to regard as *wrong* the cognition that 'such and such a thing has been *directly cognised*,' (where the qualification depends upon the cognition). Then, as for the answer that, "the qualification is in the form that is manifested in that same cognition," †—this is extremely puerile; because the *colour* and such other qualities that we cognise do not qualify the cognition (in the form 'I perceive the colour of the flower') through the relation of *inherence* (by which it resides in the flower). It might be said that—"the restriction that we mean by saying 'in the form that is manifested in that cognition' is with regard to the qualifications of *objects*, and not to those of *Cognitions*." But this cannot be; because in that case your definition would contain the restrictive clause 'in the form manifested in that particular cognition;' and as the one particular cognition could not be present in any other cognition, the definition would apply specially to one cognition only; and as such could not include *all right cognitions*.

SECTION 16.

[The author proceeds to refute the definition of Right Cognition proposed by Uḍayanāchārya, as *samyak-parichchitti*, *right discernment*,—the objection against this being that the words of the definition are not amenable to any reasonable explanation.]

(267.) Nor will it be right to define Right Cognition as "*samyak-parichchitti*." ‡ Because on account of objections already pointed out above, the qualification '*samyak*' cannot be explained either as *that which has the tattva* (*the real form of the thing*) for its object, or as *that which is in accord with the object*.

* This while excluding the qualification of shell by '*silver-ness*' will include the cognition of the long-sticked man.

† The character of silver is cognised as residing in the shell by the relation of inherence, while it resides in it only in the idea formed by the misconception.

‡ The sense of the objection is that the expression '*samyak-parichchitti*' cannot be taken either as a non-compound, or a *karmadhāya* compound; i.e., the word '*samyak*' cannot be taken as qualifying '*parichchitti*'.

CHAPTER I.—SECTION (16).

(268)* “What we mean by ‘*samyak*’ is ‘entire’ or ‘whole’; in ordinary parlance we find it asserted—‘I perceived the thing only in a general way, and did not see it *entirely* (or well); hence the expression ‘*samyak-parichchhitti*’ is to be explained as the ‘*parichchheḍa*’ (discernment) of the ‘*samyak*’ (entire) thing.’ (A *Ṭaṭpuruṣa* compound);—or we may even take the word ‘*samyak*’ as coordinate (qualifying adjunct) to the *parichchheḍa*, taking the word ‘*samyak*’ to mean *that which has the ‘samyak’ thing for its object*. [A *Karmadhāraya* compound].”

(269.) [Page 243]. This cannot be, we reply. For, what do you mean by the ‘*sāmastya*,’ ‘entirety,’ of the thing? (1) Do you mean that the thing is present along with all its constituent parts? (2) Or that it is present, endowed with all its properties? It cannot mean the former; because in that case, the ‘*parichchheḍa*,’ or ‘discernment,’ of a thing devoid of constituent parts, as also the knowledge of those things with constituent parts which does not pertain (or take in) the intermediate parts (but views the thing as a whole),—will have to be regarded as *wrong*. Nor is the second meaning possible; as in that case all the cognitions of persons *not omniscient* will have to be regarded as *wrong*.

(270.) You will perhaps offer the following explanation:—“What is meant by the word ‘*samyak*’ is that the thing is cognised along with its distinguishing features; in ordinary parlance also, when they say ‘*na mayā samyak dṛiṣṭam*,’ what is meant is that ‘I have not seen the thing along with its distinguishing features (in detail, I have had only a cursory view of it).’ Hence what our definition means is that *Right Cognition is the discernment of the dharmin (thing with properties) along with its distinguishing features*. As regards wrong cognitions, &c., all these appear in a man who fails to notice the distinguishing features of the thing; and hence it is for the purpose of differentiating Right Cognition from all such cognitions that we have the qualification ‘*samyak*.’ As for the cognition of those ultimate specific qualities, which, by their very nature, cannot have any

* The questioner takes the compound as *ṭaṭpuruṣa*.

further distinguishing features,—even though these have no properties or distinguishing features, according to us, yet for these their own specific form would be regarded as the ‘distinguishing feature’ (for purposes of our definition).”

(271.) But this is not right; because what you say is that the thing is cognised along with its distinguishing features (and you do not say anything as to whether these features are the right ones); and hence in the case of the mistaken cognition of shell-silver also, as we have the cognition of the shell before us with the distinguishing feature of *being silver* or ‘silveriness,’—the cognition should have to be regarded as *right*. If again, you were to introduce into your definition the mention of the specific distinguishing features of each and everything cognised (whose cognition alone would be defined by such a definition), then, in that case, it would be impossible to get at an all-comprehensive definition of *Right Cognition*; while on the other hand, if you mention only the ‘distinguishing features’ in general terms, then, as shown above, the definition becomes too wide (including wrong cognitions also). And thus in either case, the definition remains faulty. Then again, as regards the ultimate Specific Qualities spoken of above, it may be that their very *form* constitutes the necessary ‘distinguishing feature’; but in this case the distinguishing feature would be identical with the thing cognised; and hence this latter could not be spoken of as ‘*accompanied by* its distinguishing features;’ and thus there would be no answer to the charge that the definition fails to include the cognition of these qualities.

(272.) Some people offer the following explanation:—“By the word ‘*viśeṣa*,’ or ‘distinguishing features,’ are meant those characteristics without the perception whereof we are liable to doubts and misconceptions, and the perception whereof enables us to ascertain whether the cognition is to be rejected or not; and until we are able to ascertain this, it is not possible to make any distinction between *truth* and *untruth*; and such distinction is absolutely necessary; as without this

there would be a self-contradiction." *

(273). But this is not right; as you cannot mention any '*vishēṣa*' with regard to the cognition of which there may be a positive certainty that it is not wrong; specially as a dreamer cognises all sorts of *vishēṣas* (which proves that all *vishēṣas* are liable to misconception). Nor would it be right to accept such a '*vishēṣa*',—even though its existence cannot be proved,—simply for fear of the pain of 'self-contradiction' (that you have urged). Because, simply because you cannot prove the existence of the '*vishēṣa*', why cannot you accept the fact that there must be some other means of avoiding the 'self-contradiction,'—† even though it be not possible to point out such means? ‡ As a matter of fact, there is not a single cognition, pertaining to things perceived in ordinary experience, which cannot be dreamt of, or be the subject of a false assertion (and be known by that means); consequently, you assume the existence of the *vishēṣa*, as something present in your consciousness,—even though you have no (necessarily true) cognition of it; and certainly, rather than court this apparent self-contradiction, it would be far better to assume the existence of some unperceived means § of avoiding the 'self-contradiction' (for avoiding which you are led to make the assumption of the *vishēṣa*). Then again, as for this threat of 'self-contradiction,' we shall have many occasions, off and on, to refute it entirely.

° If everything be untrue, then the cognition of this untruth would also be untrue,—this would be one 'self-contradiction.' (2) If we have no notion of the truth of a certain cognition, we cannot make any denial of such truth,—this would be another. (3) There would be a contradiction involved in regarding as *true* the sentence denying the truth of all things, etc., etc.

† Some means other than the postulating of the *vishēṣa*.

‡ If the *vishēṣa* is something apart from the things of ordinary experience, then it is what we call *Brahman*. If not, then it is liable to misconception; as all ordinary things are so liable.

§ The theory of '*anirvachanīyāṭū*'—the thing cannot be explained—is the means suggested.

(274). The opponent explains—"What we mean by the expression "*viśeṣasahītopalambha*" is, not that the *upalambha* or Cognition is to be accompanied by the *viśeṣa*,—but that the object that is cognised is cognised as along with its *viśeṣas* or distinguishing features; and hence as the character of *being silver* is not the *distinguishing feature* of the shell, how can our definition be made to include the misconception of shell-silver? (as urged by the *Siddhāntin* in para 271)."

(275). But the reasoning is already refuted by the objections shown above: That is to say, if you mention only '*viśeṣa*' in general (without specifying any particular distinguishing feature) then, inasmuch as some such *viśeṣas* as *being before the eyes* and the like are really present in the *shell*, the misconception would become included in the definition; and if, in order to avoid this, you were to mention particular *viśeṣas*, then there being no end to this, no one comprehensive definition of Right Cognition would be possible.

(276). Then there remains the argument that the *viśeṣa* serves the purpose of enabling us to ascertain whether or not a certain cognition is to be rejected. To the extremely foolish person who sticks to this position, we say:—when one and the same thing is spoken of by the sentence "there are fruits on the river bank"—as uttered by the trustworthy and the untrustworthy person,—what *viśeṣa* or *special feature* is there which you perceive in the thing in one case and not in the other? [and yet in one case it is true, not to be rejected, and in the other, untrue, to be rejected]—[and hence the mere postulating of the *viśeṣa* cannot serve your purpose].

If there be a still greater fool (who does not understand our meaning) he should be made to understand it in the following manner:—Being afraid of having to postulate an endless number of *viśeṣas*,—necessitated by your having to assume one *viśeṣa* after the other,—you have admitted

that some *visheṣas* are *visheṣas* by themselves (and not by reason of having other *visheṣas*); but then, as all these self-specificatory entities would be distinct from one another, there would be no one form pervading over them all; and thus the definition could not be made to include all. Nor can it be argued that we have an all-comprehensive characteristic—in the shape of *being the means of ascertaining which cognition is to be rejected and which not*,—which would include all *visheṣas*. Because even in the case of the misconception of shell-silver, there is the *visheṣa* of *being silver*; and this *visheṣa* is the true means of ascertaining whether the cognition is to be rejected or not, *in some cases* (*i.e.*, of real silver) [even though not in the particular case in question]. Nor would it be right to add the words ‘of that’ and ‘in such and such a case’ [*i.e.*, it will not be right to say that a *visheṣa* is to be regarded as the true *visheṣa* only when it is found *in the particular cognition concerned* to be the true means of ascertaining whether or not *that particular cognition* is to be rejected]. Because this again would make the *visheṣas* mutually exclusive (and thus make a comprehensive definition impossible); secondly as for the *bāḍha*,—*rejection, sublation*,—of a certain cognition, this always appears in the shape of the right cognition of that form of the thing which is contrary to that apprehended by the rejected cognition; [*i.e.*, the misconception of shell-silver is rejected by the cognition ‘this is not silver’]; and hence such a rejection cannot provide us with any comprehensive notion of the latter thing (*i.e.*, the one apprehended by the wrong cognition); [and hence the *bāḍha* also will have to be qualified by each thing concerned; which will make it impossible to have any comprehensive notion of all *bāḍha*; and thus the character of *being the true means of bāḍha* also will fail to provide the necessary comprehensive notion of all *Visheṣas*]. And lastly you have still got to

establish the character of Right Cognition [and this enters into your conception of the *Viśeṣa*, which again is necessary for your conception of Right Cognition].*

(277) This definition of Right Cognition is also open to some other objections that we have shown above (sec. 15) against the definition ‘*yaṭhārthānubhavaḥ pramā,*’ with reference to the qualification ‘*yaṭhārtha*’; and these objections we do not mention again, for fear of repetition.

(278) Then again, [there is yet another objection against the definition of Right Cognition as the *parichchhitti* of the qualified thing along with its distinguishing features]:† There are certain cognitions—for instance, the ratiocinative cognition, and certain imaginary doubtful and wrong cognitions—which appear only when certain distinguishing features are present (and cognised); and all these will become included in the said definition. Nor will it be right for you to assert that you do not admit of any merely imaginary doubtful and wrong cognitions. Because in your own system, you do actually admit of merely imaginary doubts and wrong cognitions as emanating from the avowed deceivers, the very basis of whose assertion consists of such cognitions,—or from the truth-knowing teacher who starts imaginary discussions for illuminating the understanding of his pupil.

* Right cognition you define as *सविशेषज्ञान*, and *विशेष* again you define as *वाच्यवस्यद्हेतु*; and *वाच* is only *विपरीतप्रमा* or *ज्ञान* of the contrary form.

† When we see the smoke issuing from the hill, and remember the necessary premises, we conclude that there is fire on the hill; and this conclusion we strengthen by the reasoning—‘under such circumstances if there were no fire, the smoke would be without a cause.’ This last cognition, ‘smoke will be without a cause’ is what is meant by ‘ratiocinative cognition.’ It is a cognition following on the cognition of certain distinguishing features; and yet it is not *right cognition*. Then again, even though in the stock example of the *bhrama* of shell-silver, there may be no cognition of proper *viśeṣas*, yet we can imagine some instances of doubtful and wrong cognitions which follow on the cognition of due *viśeṣas*, and all these would become included in the definition in question.

(279) Lastly, the word *parichchheda* being synonymous with 'anubhava,' its introduction is open to all the objections that we have urged above against this latter word.

B.

[For similar reasons,—impossibility of affording adequate explanation of the words of the definition—we reject a *fourth* definition of *Right Cognition* as *an apprehension which is not defective.*]

(280) Nor is it right to define 'Right Cognition' as *n* 'anubhava' or *apprehension that is 'avyabhichārī,' i.e., not incorrect or defective.* Because if the expression 'avyabhichārī' as used in this definition be synonymous with the expressions 'tatṭvaviśhaya,' 'yathārtha', &c., then the very same objections that we have urged above against these expressions present themselves again. If however it be asserted that the word 'avyabhichārī' means that the cognition is *not without, or unconcomitant with, the object cognised,*—then, we ask, what do you mean by this? (1) Do you mean that the Right Cognition exists only at the time when the object exists? (2) or that it exists only at the place where the object exists? (3) or, that it is of the same character as, similar to, the object?

(281) The first of these meanings is not possible: the word 'avyabhichārī' cannot mean that the Right Cognition exists only at the time when the object exists; because in that case the definition would exclude all *inferential* cognitions of past and present things. Nor can the word mean that Right Cognition exists only at the place where the object exists, because in the first place, the definition, in that case, would not include those admittedly Right Cognitions which are not co-existent *in space* with their objects; and secondly we would have to regard as *right* those Cognitions which impose wrongly the character of an object co-existent in space with the Cognition upon something

else. *Nor can the word mean that the Right Cognition is similar to the object; because in accordance with the view (which is the Logician's also) that the Cognition is something distinct from the object cognised, it would never be possible for the object to be similar *in all respects* to the Cognition (and hence no Cognition would be *right*); while according to the view that the Cognition is non-different from its object, this non-difference will have to be accepted in the case of *wrong* Cognitions also; and hence there would be no useful purpose served by the qualification 'avyabhichārī' (which is added only with a view to preclude *wrong* Cognitions); and if with a view to escape from these predicaments you specify certain features in regard to which the *similarity* (between the Cognition and its object) is intended, then you become open to all the objections that we have urged above in connection with the definition containing the expression 'yatārtha.'

C.

[On similar grounds, the Author rejects the fifth definition of *Right Cognition* proposed by the *Bauddha*—that it is that apprehension which is not incompatible with the object cognised.]

(282) Nor is it right to define 'Right Cognition' as *that 'anubhava' or apprehension which does not disagree with—is not incompatible with—the object cognised*. Because what do you mean by this 'non-incompatibility'? (1) Do you mean that the cognition is *cognised by means of another cognition*, as being in agreement, or compatible, with the object? (2) or that it is *not cognised*, by means of another cognition, as being incompatible with the object? (3) or that the cognition has for its object something that is invariably concomitant

^o e.g. Ātman is co-existent in space with Cognition; and when this character of Ātman would be imposed upon the body as 'īdam śharīraṁ Ātmā,' we would still have the Cognition co-existent with its object Ātman; and yet this Cognition would be wrong.

with that Cognition? (4) or do you mean something entirely different from all this?

(283) The *first* of these is not possible: it cannot be that the cognition is cognised as compatible with the object; as according to this view, we should have to regard as 'right cognition' that misconception which proceeds in a continuous series (where the second member of the series will have the preceding Misconception for its object, and in perfect agreement with it, and so on and on each subsequent member of the series). Nor would it avail to urge that what is meant is that that other cognition also must be a *right* one; as what you are seeking to define is 'right cognition' itself, (and hence you cannot introduce the same term in the definition).

(284) Nor is the second meaning possible: it cannot be your meaning that the Cognition is not cognised as being incompatible with the object; as in this case the definition would include those wrong cognitions which may not have their sublating cognitions appearing for some time (and during this interval, the former cognitions would have to be regarded as *right*). And further, when the eye is in a healthy condition, we rightly see the conch-shell as white; if after this the organ happens to be affected with bile, we see the same shell as yellow; and in this case the former cognition (as *white*) would be *cognised* by means of the latter cognition as 'incompatible with its object' (*yellowness*), and would, as such, have to be regarded by you as *wrong*. If in order to avoid this you were to urge that the latter cognition spoken of in the definition should be a *right* one, then there is the objection that we have already pointed out—*viz.*, that 'right cognition' being the term to be defined, it will not be right to introduce it in the definition. If you say that, what is meant is that the cognition should not be sublated or rejected by a cognition *proceeding*

from a faultless source (thus avoiding the use of the term, 'right cognition'),—then in that case, this last might well be the definition of 'right cognition' (and there would be no need for the definition in support of which you have to put forward this explanation). And further, until you have defined what is *faulty*, it cannot be ascertained what is *not-faulty* or *faultless*. It might be urged—"What of this? We can easily define the *faulty character* as some peculiarity in the source of the cognition which makes this latter *wrong* (contrary to the real nature of the thing)." But even this will not serve your purpose; * as what is meant to be excluded by the word 'wrong' is the cognition of that which is *not actually cognised*; and] as no account can be taken of that which is not cognised or known at all], the introduction of the word would be absolutely useless. And if the word were dropped, then the faultiness of a source of cognition would come to consist in its character of *producing a cognition!* and under the circumstances there would be no cognition proceeding from a *faultless* source! Nor can it be asserted that what the word 'wrong' serves to exclude is the 'right cognition.' Because this latter is what you have got to define; and so long as you have not got at its true definition, you can have no idea of it as distinguished from other kinds of cognition; and then under such circumstances how can you form any notion of its exclusion (by the word 'wrong')? And thus it comes to this that, without the cognition of 'right cognition' as differentiated from other cognitions, you can have no idea of the 'right cognition' as thus differentiated! And this would land you in all the three predicaments of *Ātmāshraya* (Vicious Circle), *Anyonyāshraya* (Mutual Interdependence) and *Anavasthā* (*Regressus ad Infinitum*).

'As a matter of fact, in the case of the definition of all such things as are possessed of more than one distinguishing

feature, when one of these features is singled out (for the purpose of defining the thing), then we have all the three predicaments just mentioned; because that feature itself is something other than the other features belonging to the same thing. [And if these are not already *known*, they cannot be *excluded*, etc., etc., as argued above.]' (32)

(285) Nor is the third of the alternatives (mentioned in para. 282) tenable; that is, the definition cannot mean that the Cognition has for its object something that is invariably concomitant with that Cognition. Because by the phrase 'invariably concomitant' do you mean anything and everything that may be concomitant? or only some particular thing? In the former case, we could not regard as *wrong* the cognition that we have *in a dream* of fire with smoke, or that which we may obtain from the assertions of an untrustworthy person (with regard to the existence of fire with smoke on a hill where, in reality, there may be no fire at all). In the latter case, is this particular 'concomitant' to be in the form of *effective action*—*e. g.*, the *burning* of fire? or in that of its accessories,—*e. g.*, *fuel* of fire? In either case there will be no escape from the aforesaid objections. [As during dreams many objects are cognised along with their effective actions]. And further, as all the cognitions (of the thing, its effective action, accessories, &c., necessitated by your view) could not be recognised as valid all at once, it will be necessary to accept some order of sequence in them; and under the circumstances, if it be considered necessary (for the validity of the cognitions of an object) to have in a continuous series, valid cognitions of its effective action and accessories, then the entire life of a person would become taken up by the cognition of a single object; while if a break in this series be admitted, then there will be nothing to establish the validity of the last item (at which the series stops); and thus the

invalidity of that one item would, in due backward course, vitiate the validity of every one of the items of the series, to the very first cognition. Then as regards the presence of *actual* effective action, it will be hard to ascertain whether or not a certain effective action is actually present; and hence in our ordinary usage, we cannot stop at each step to consider the actuality or otherwise of the effective action; and as for the fact of the mere idea (of the *effective action*), we have this in the case of wrong cognitions also (and so this cannot serve as a criterion).

(286) “ Well, under the circumstances, we can accept the *fourth* alternative * (noted in *para* 282). That is to say, the *non-incompatibility* of the cognition may be regarded as consisting in the fact of its having for its object something which is capable of effective action; as has been declared in the following verse—‘ The non-incompatible cognition is valid, and *non-incompatibility* consists in the presence of effective action. But this also is not right; because if you mean the presence of effective action, merely *in a general way*, then in the case of misconception (of shell-silver also) we will have such *non-incompatibility* (inasmuch as the *shell* is capable of the effective action of the *shell*, even though not of *silver*). In answer to this it might be urged that the thing cognised must be capable, *in the form cognised*, of effective action. But this will be extremely difficult to ascertain in every case. Nor will it be easy to ascertain this by actually perceiving the effective action; because it is possible for us to have the *perception* of effective cognition even when no such action is possible (*i.e.*, it is possible for us to have a misconception of effective action; and so such perception itself cannot serve as the right criterion). This may be met by the explanation that what is meant to be the criterion is the *right cognition* of the effective action; but this we have already

* Adopted by the 3aṅgīya writer, Dharmakīrti.

refuted above ; as we have yet to define what 'right cognition' is. It might be urged that—"every cognition is regarded as valid when it is found to be in keeping with (compatible with) the intention of the cogniser."* But this is not right ; for if by this be meant that the cognition should be in keeping with the intention *at the time of the cognition*, then this will be found to apply to dream-cognitions also ; while as regards other times, it will not be possible to ascertain whether or not a certain cognition is in keeping with the person's intention *at other times*.

(287) [Page 254]. The above arguments serve also to reject the explanation that—"what is meant by the '*samvāda*' (compatibility) of the cognition is that the thing cognised is capable of being actually got at (in the form cognised)." [As it cannot be ascertained *at the time of the cognition* whether or not the thing can be got at, etc., etc.]

Truly difficult of refutation is this theory of *Dharma-kīrti's*, and one has to be very careful with regard to it.

D

[We cannot accept the sixth definition that 'Right Cognition is that cognition which is not sublated' ; because it is not possible to fix the meaning of the phrase 'not sublated.']

(288) By what we have said above is also refuted the definition that *Right Cognition is that apprehension which is not sublated or rejected* (by any subsequent cognition). Because if you mean that the Cognition is 'not sublated' *at the time of the Cognition*,—then the definition becomes too wide (including all Cognitions, as no cognition is sublated at the time that it appears) ; and if you mean that it is 'not sublated' *at a different time*, then we have only got to point out that we can not be sure with regard to any cognition,

* When the person sees a thing before him and makes up his mind to use it in a certain way ; if the thing really turns out to be fit for such use, then the cognition is right.

that it can *never* be sublated at any time. Then again, if you mean that the cognition is to be 'not sublated' by the Cogniser himself,—then too the definition becomes too wide (as no cognition is sublated or rejected by the cogniser at the time of the cognition); and if in order to avoid this you mean that the *sublation* denied is by some other person,—then, we can never be sure as to any cognition being 'not sublated' by any person.

E

[The seventh definition—that Right Cognition is cognition other than the ratiocinative, the doubtful, the wrong and the remembered—cannot be accepted; because of the arguments already explained.]

(289) Nor again is it right to define Right Cognition as an *apprehension or knowledge other than the ratiocinative, the doubtful, the wrong, and the remembered*. As this definition is to be refuted in the same manner as the one dealt with before where Right Cognition was defined as a cognition *other than remembrance*. (Para 220).

F

[The eighth definition—that Right Cognition is that cognition which belongs to the class of '*pramā*'—has to be rejected, because in the first place, this would involve a 'Cross Division'; and secondly, no real explanation of '*pramāṭva*' itself is available.]

(290) As for the definition that Right Cognition is that which is related to (belongs to) the class '*Pramā*' (*i. e.*, which is possessed of the general character of '*pramāṭva*')—this cannot be right, specially for one who (like the Logician) regards 'Cross-division' as wrong.* Then again, if this general character of '*pramāṭva*' were to give rise to the notion of *Pramā*, without being itself duly recognised, then

* The sense of this is that the Logician cannot accept any such *Jāti* or class as '*Pramāṭva*'; as this would overlap with another *Jāti* '*Sākṣāt-kāraṭva*.' Both of these reside in the ordinary *right sense-perception*, and yet '*Sākṣāt-kāraṭva*' is not present in *right inferential Cognition*, and '*Pramāṭva*' is not present in the *wrong sense-perception* of shell-silver.

there could be no Misconception or Doubt with regard to any Right Cognition being wrong. [That is to say, with regard to certain Right Cognitions, we have sometimes the misconception that it is wrong, or the Doubt that it may be right or wrong; and these are due to our failing to *perceive* the presence or absence in the Cognition concerned, of the character 'Pramāṭva'; so if we were to have the notion of 'Pramā', or 'Right Cognition', without any idea of the character of 'Pramāṭva', then all Right Cognitions would be always known as right, and there would be no room for the aforesaid misconception or doubt]. In order to avoid this predicament, if it be held that the notion of *Pramā* is due to the presence of the general character of 'Pramāṭva' as accompanied by the absence of discrepancies (which are the source of misconception and doubt),—then, in that case, we should have to regard as 'right' that Cognition which is known as mere 'Cognition' in general, and with regard to which we do not have the notion of 'misconception', or 'doubt' or any such particular character. [As in this case also there are no discrepancies of the kind mentioned, as evinced by the absence of Misconception and Doubt; and as for the character of *Pramāṭva*, it may be there for aught we know; and according to your view it is not necessary for us to have any cognition of this general character.]

(291) [PAGE 256.] If in order to escape from all this it be held that it is when the character of 'Pramāṭva' is duly recognised that we have the notion of Right Cognition,—then, you have to explain how this *Pramāṭva* itself is to be recognised. It cannot be recognised by means of sensuous perception through the mind; as in that case with regard to any 'right cognition' that might appear, there could be no misconception or mistake to the effect that it is a *wrong cognition*; nor could there be any doubt as to its being right or wrong; because like the *thing* itself (*i.e.*, the cognition), its

character (*rightness*) also would have been ascertained through the mind.* It may be argued that the recognition of 'Pramāṭva' is through the mind directly, while in the other case the mind stands in need of the help of other characteristics (as for instance, the character of being the apprehension of the real nature of the thing, and so forth); or it may be that the said recognition is only *inferential*, being brought about by the said characteristics which would be indicative of *Pramāṭva* (as distinguished from all other things). But this also affords only a false glimmer of hope to you; because in that case, all purposes of ordinary usage (*i.e.*, of forming a comprehensive notion of *all* right notions), being served on the basis of those characteristics, there would be no need for the assumption of any such generic entity as *Pramāṭva*' (which is assumed solely for the sake of the said comprehensive notion). If, in order to escape from this predicament you have recourse to the argument that the *characteristics* are *many* (and not one, which would suffice for the comprehensive notion),—then you have to point what these *many characteristics* are. Each and every one of the characteristics of right notion that you have been putting forward one after the other we have been showing to be faulty, and we shall show this again later on, in the course of our refutation of the view that Cognition derives its validity from extraneous sources.

G.

[Lastly, Right Cognition cannot be defined, as possessed of *Pramāṭva*, which is a particular kind of power or efficiency;—because it is not possible to ascertain what this efficiency is, and every definition that may be advanced is bound to be too wide.]

* Ordinarily the cognition is mentally perceived; and as to whether it is right or wrong it is ascertained by such other means as the absence of subsequent sublation, and so forth. If both were *mental*, both would be *coeval*; and all so-called right cognitions would always be regarded as *right*; and there could be no doubt or mistake with regard to them.

(292) The reasonings advanced above also dispose of the definition that the 'Rightness,' *Pramāṭva*, of a Cognition being a peculiar power or efficiency, the Right Cognition is that which is possessed of this efficiency. Specially as it can not be ascertained what this 'efficiency' is.

(293) Then again, whatever the definition of Right Cognition may be, if it were the basis of our conception of such *rightness*, either when it itself would be merely recognised, or even when it is not itself recognised,—in either case, there would be an *undue extension* (i.e., even Mistaken Cognitions would come to be regarded as *right*).^{*} And if it be only when the *rightness* is *rightly* cognised (that it can serve as the basis of our notion of Right Cognition), then there could be no right cognition of the *rightness*, until we have ascertained what 'right cognition' is. [Thus there is a vicious circle]. It may be urged that it does not matter if this is not duly ascertained, the fact remains (that it is there). But this will not be right; as might not your opponent say (with equal force) that 'the fact remains, that it is *not* so'? And then you will have no answer to that. And further, according to what you say, there would be no need for seeking to ascertain what the character of *Right Cognition* is. Specially as in that case (i.e., according to your view of the *rightness* remaining a fact even though not recognised) the cognition of the *jar* also might be regarded as *right* simply because the *rightness* is there [and it will not be necessary for us to recognise this *rightness*, for which purpose you have been putting forward the above definition and thus there is a total annihilation of all definitions.] We need not pursue this discussion any further.

^{*}The sense is that even in Mistaken Cognitions, we have the notion, for the time being, that these are right. Whether this notion itself is wrong or right, that is another question. This aspect is met in the next sentence.

SECTION 17.

[It having been shown that no adequate definition of *Pramā*, *Right Cognition*, is possible, the Author next proceeds to demonstrate the untenability of all the definitions that have been proposed of *Pramāṇa*, Means of Right Cognition.]

A. [Pramāṇa cannot be defined as 'the instrument of right cognition'; because no adequate definition of 'instrument' is available.]

(294) It having been found impossible to define *Right Cognition*, the definition of *Pramāṇa* also as 'the means or instrument of right cognition' cannot be maintained; specially as the meaning of the word '*Karāṇa*,' 'Means,' 'Instrument,' cannot be defined.

(295) The opponent proceeds to supply a definition of the 'means' or 'instrument':—

"The name 'means' or 'instrument' is given to that *cause which is not taken up in the making up (or fulfilment) of any other of the various agencies tending to the accomplishment of the action* (but which aids *directly* and entirely in that accomplishment). * The Nominative or the Active Agent tends directly to the accomplishment (or bringing together) of the *Means* or instrument to the action, and is as such 'taken up in the making up of another agency' (and so it cannot come within the above definition of the *Instrument*). Even though the *Instrument* has an independent existence by itself, and cannot, as such, be said to be 'accomplished' by the Agent,—yet, inasmuch it is by the Agent that it is set in operation, it may be said to be *accomplished* by him (at least in regard to the action concerned); specially as it is a real 'means' only when thus set in operation. In the same manner the *Objective* also is taken up in the accomplishment of the *Instrument*; as it is on the *Objective* that the *Instrument* operates; and in the absence of the *Objective*, there is nothing upon which the operation of the *Instrument* could take

* He proceeds to show that the definition cannot apply to any other *karaka* (agent) save the *karāṇa* (Instrument).

effect; and hence as being a necessary factor in the accomplishment of the character of the *Instrument* it can be said to be taken up in its accomplishment. Similarly the Locative also aids in the fulfilment of the operation of the *Instrument*. Lastly as regards the Dative and the Ablative, these are not necessary agencies in all actions, as the *Instrument* is. Consequently we can rightly define the *Instrument* as *that cause which is necessary in the case of all actions, and which is not taken up in the accomplishment of any other agency.*"

(296) The above definition cannot be maintained. The explanation that you have provided may look all very well until we have examined it closely; but when we proceed to look into it more carefully we find that, if the word '*anṭara*' that you have introduced in your definition (in the compound '*kāraṅkāṅṭara*,' 'another agency') means only 'difference,'* then it cannot serve the purpose of *exclusion* (as it is meant to do); † because the word could serve the purpose of *excluding* certain *kāraṅkas* and including the one intended, only if it were possible for a mere '*kāraṅka*' or 'Agent' in general, without any specification, to be produced; but as this is not possible, the word '*anṭara*' cannot serve to *exclude* what it is intended to exclude. Nor can the word '*anṭara*' mean 'another'; as if it did, then it would be necessary to point out with reference to what the thing spoken of is 'another'; if this *other thing* is not pointed out, then it would refer to the word '*kaṅṭara*' itself, on account of the close proximity of that word; just as we have in the assertion '*anyoḥ ātmā, śarīram anyat*,' 'the self is another thing, and the body another'; then the word *kāraṅkāṅṭara* would come to denote the *Agency other than the Instrument*; and this

* As in the assertion '*anyoḥ mahaṭ anṭaram*.'

† It is only when the general *ghata* is spoken of that we can make use of words that would exclude some and include others. In the case in question it is not possible for any *kāraṅka* in general to be produced; and hence no exclusion is possible or necessary. As it is only the *kāraṅka* of a particular kind that is produced,

would be objectionable, as it is still being ascertained what the 'Instrument' is (and so we cannot introduce this word into the definition); and further, in this case the definition would become too wide (as the Nominative and the Objective also are taken up in the accomplishment of the *Instrument* only, and not in that of any Agency *other than the Instrument*). Nor can the word 'anṭara' refer to the forms of the Nominative and the Objective; because in this case also the definition would become 'too wide', inasmuch as it would include these two also (because neither the Nominative nor the Objective is taken up in the accomplishment of its own form, both of these tending to the accomplishment of the Instrument, as you have yourself stated). Nor again can the word 'anṭara' be explained as expressing *contradistinction to the Nominative and the Objective* (the definition meaning that which is not taken up in the accomplishment of any agency other than the Nominative and the Objective). Because in that case the introduction of the word would be absolutely useless; as it would suffice to say only 'that which is not taken up in the accomplishment of an agency.' [As the Locative and the rest would be included in the word 'Agency', 'Kāraka', itself; and the *Instrument* is never taken up in the accomplishment of the Nominative and the Objective.] In order to escape from these difficulties, you will perhaps urge that the word 'karakānṭara' does not mean anything more than the word 'Kāraka', and as such it may not be used. This will not avail you; because in that case the Hand and such other instruments, which do bring about many agencies (in the shape of *fire*, for instance, in the act of Cooking) will not be regarded as 'instruments' at all;—while as a matter of fact, a *Kāraka* or 'Agency' is any cause that is operative (towards the bringing about of some effect); and we find the *Fire operating* (towards the action of *Cooking*) through its contact with the vessel; and th's fire in its turn is produced

by the *hand* (which thus is 'taken up in the accomplishment of an agency).’ Nor will it be right for you to assert that the Hand is not an ‘instrument.’ Because inasmuch as it is found to be a *cause operating towards a certain end*, you cannot but regard it as that particular kind of ‘agency’; and as it cannot very well be regarded as the Nominative or any other *Kāraka*, you would have to postulate a seventh *Kāraka* (if you do not regard it as the ‘Instrument’)! You cannot argue that —“inasmuch as the operation of the Hand towards the burning of fire is not direct but interposed (by the action of the fuel, etc.) we cannot regard it as the *cause* of the burning, but only the *cause of its cause*.” Because the same might be said with regard to the Nominative agency also (which also would thus according to you, cease to be a *Kāraka*); because between the operation of the agent (wood-cutter) and the broken splinters of the wood, there intervene many other operations, such as the operation of the axe, the cutting, and so forth. It might be said in answer to this, that in this latter case all the intervening operations belong to the Agent, and as such they do not deprive this latter of the causal character. But then, the same may be said with regard to the Hand also. Thus then your definition is wrong; simply because it does not apply to things like the Hand, whose *instrumental* character is unquestioned. The above reasoning also serves to refute the view that the expression ‘*Kārahantāra*’ (in the definition of *karāṇa*) means ‘those other than the Nominative and the Objective.’ [As the acknowledged Instrument, Hand, is ‘taken up in the accomplishment’ of another *instrument*, which is neither the *Nominative* nor the *Objective*].

(1298) Nor can the Instrument be defined as the *object* or *substratum* (*viṣaya*) of the agent’s operation. Because when a man makes an effort to set his body in motion, what becomes the object of his operation of *effort* is, either the

action of bodily motion, or the body as qualified by that action; and hence these will have to be regarded as the 'instrument' in the said action (of '*chālana*', *setting into motion*); but this cannot be accepted; because a thing cannot be the *instrument* towards itself in the future state [*i. e.*, while the *setting into motion* of the body is not accomplished, the *motion* of the body is still in the future; and as such this latter cannot be the *instrument* towards the former; and similarly the *body qualified by the motion*, does not exist until the body has been *set in motion*, and as such this could not be the *instrument* towards this latter.] Nor could this objection be escaped by adding the qualification of 'Direct' (*sōkṣāt*),—the Instrument being defined as the *direct object of the operation of the agent*.* Because (even though this addition may save you as regards the action of the Self in the shape of the Effort to set the body in motion, where the body is the *direct* object) the objection would remain in force, as regards the action of the Self towards the setting of the Mind and such other things into activity, (which are the *direct* objects of the operation of the Self); and secondly because this definition would not apply to all Instruments (for instance the *axe* in cutting is not the direct object of the cutter's operation, who operates through his hand).

(299) You will perhaps argue that the *hētu* or cause of a certain action is certainly the object or substrate of the operation of the agent or doer of that action, and this *cause* will be the 'Instrument' for that action. This also cannot be maintained, we reply; as by this definition there could be no *instrumentality* in the action of the sprouting of seeds, according to Atheists [as according to them there is no *doer* or *agent* in this case];—and further by this definition it will be necessary to exclude, from the category of 'Right

* Thus, the Pūrvaśākin, would say, as the *effort* is the action of the Self, the Body cannot be said to be its *direct* object.

Cognition', the cognition that we have after deep sleep (that 'I have been sleeping *happily*'), as during deep sleep there is no actual *cogniser* (the Self having reverted at that time to its state of pure consciousness, without the *upādhi* in the shape of the cognitive faculty which is necessary for its being a *cogniser* or *agent*), and hence (by your definition) there can be no *Instrument* either; while for every *right cognition*, there have been enumerated (by you) distinct *Upādhis* in the shape of *Instruments*. And, if in order to avoid this, you were to assert that the presence of the *Cognitive faculty* is not necessary for the *Agent* (in the case of *Cognition*), then this admission of yours could be made to extend too far (for your acceptance). [That is to say, in that case it would not be necessary for the Creator of the world to be endowed with the *Cognitive Faculty*; and the creation would have to be attributed to non-cognitive Matter.] Then again, according to the Theistic doctrine, as *all* causes would be *the object of the operation of God (the Agent)*, there would be no cause which (by your definition) would not be an *Instrument*. If you say 'Amen' to this, then all that remains for you to differentiate the *Instrument* from is *what is not a cause*; and for this it would suffice for you to define the *Instrument* simply as the 'cause'; and it is needless effort on your part to add qualifications.

(300) [PAGE 263.] To the above you may reply:—
 "Qualifications have been added not for the purpose of excluding other things, but for the purpose of showing that a single thing can, in the said distinctive form, be spoken of by the word '*Karāṇa*.'" But in that case the '*Karāṇa*' being that which has the distinctive form mentioned in your definition, the definition would come to contain a mere mention of the *Karāṇa*, which is *the thing to be defined*; and it would not be the statement of the definition, that you profess to provide. Nor would it be right to argue that, "the

only purpose of definition consists in showing the grounds for the use or application of the word denoting the thing to be defined [i. e., the definition is nothing more than the pointing out of the signification of this word].” This, we say, is not right; because in that case, *that which is possessed of odour* would not be a ‘definition’ of the Earth [as the word ‘Earth’ does not *mean* or signify *that which is possessed of odour*]. Then again, if such be your standpoint, then why did you not point out the denotation of the word ‘*karāṇa*’ by the statement ‘everything is *karāṇa*’? You might retort by saying—“I should have done this only if *everything* were actually spoken of as ‘*karāṇa*.’” But to this our rejoinder would be that the definition put forward by you would be all right only if *all kārāṇas* or *agencies* were spoken of as ‘*karāṇa*’; as a matter of fact however, neither the Nominative nor the Objective is spoken of as ‘*karāṇa*’ [and hence your definition is not sound].

(301) “But,” the opponent argues, “we do find the Nominative spoken of as the *karāṇa*; as for instance, (1) in ordinary parlance, in such sentences as ‘Devadaṭṭa is the *pramāṇa* or authority in this matter’ (where Devadaṭṭa, the Nominative agent, is spoken of as ‘*pramāṇa*’ which is a *Karāṇa*), and (2) in scientific works, as in Nyāyasūtra II—i-67, where the authoritative character of the whole Veda is sought to be established on the basis of the fact that the *trustworthy person is an authority or pramāṇa*,—as is found in the case of those portions of the Veda that deal with incantations and medicines; [where also *the trustworthy person, the Nominative agent, is spoken of as pramāṇa, which is karāṇa*].” This is not right, we reply; for we ask—is this use of the word ‘*karāṇa*’ as applied to the Nominative, only figurative (indirect), like the application of the word ‘fire’ to the (bright) Boy? or is it literal, (direct)? And if on the basis of your assumption the use be literal or direct, then we find that this view is negated

or made untenable by the argument that in that case, the word 'karana' would, on the same grounds, be applied to the Objective also; and hence there is no other alternative save that of regarding the said use of the word as only *figurative*.

(302) [PAGE 265] It may be urged that the word 'karana' is actually applied to the Objective also, when this latter is spoken of in the form of the Instrument. But it is absolutely impossible to point out any instance of such usage, either in ordinary parlance or in scientific works; for where do you find the sentence 'ghatēna pashyati' used in the sense of 'ghatam pashyati'? If there be any such usage only in your mind, we cannot make up our mind to pay any regard to it. Because (if we were to pay any regard to such individual freaks) we may have to accept the fact of the name 'karana' being applied to all cognisable things,—a fact which would be present in the mind of that person of perverted intelligence who holds that 'every cognisable object is an Instrument.' The Opponent may urge,—“we do not meet with such a sentence as 'ghatēna pashyati,' because no such sentence is ever used by people (and not because the Instrumental character does not belong to the Objective); as certainly it is not necessary that people should actually speak of each and everything that may have a certain character, as having that character.” That might be so; but it is incumbent on you to point out instances where the name 'karana' is actually applied to the *objective*; but, as a matter of fact, any concrete instance of such application it is absolutely impossible to find.

(303) [PAGE 266] Nor can the Instrument be defined as *that which is inseparably related to the action*.* Because 'ayogavyavachchēdā'. (inseparability—non non-companionship) ultimately means only 'yoga' (companionship or

* The other agencies though related to the action are not inseparably connected with it; it is only the Instrument which is thus inseparably connected.

connection); and thus the definition would only mean that the Instrument is *that which is related or connected to the action by connection*; and this would be tautological. It may be explained that the word 'sambandhi' or 'related' denotes relationship at some particular point of time, and hence it is with a view to indicate relationship *at all times* that we have the qualification 'ayogavyavachchhēḍēna' or 'inseparably.' This also is not right; because as a matter of fact, the word 'related' does not denote relationship at any particular time; and hence there would be no need for the adding of other words for the purpose of denoting *relationship at other times*, not already expressed. In answer to this it may be urged that—"the word 'related' signifying mere relationship in a general way, if we had that word alone in the definition, then it would be made applicable to the Nominative and such other agencies of the action also, by taking the general word 'related' as serving the purpose of denoting *relationship at a particular time* (which would apply to the Nominative also), even though these other agencies may not be related to the action at other points of time; and hence with a view to preclude this we add another word to signify *relationship at other points of time also.*" This again cannot be accepted; because just as you have argued with regard to the general relationship signified by the word 'related,' so it might be said with regard to this other word also that you add: That is to say, this other word also signifying in general the relationship at other points of time, it might be taken as referring only to some one point out of the many 'other points of time'; and so for the purpose precluding the non-relationship at the other points of time, it would be necessary for you to add another qualifying word.

(304) It may be that you intend to preclude (by the qualification) the *non-relationship at any time* (i.e., the Non-relationship at all times). But this may be got at by

means of the word 'related' itself; and there is no need for seeking to get at it by means of another word. If it is argued that "the *Universality* of the Non-relationship is got at by the preclusion of the negation (*i. e.*, by the double negation)",— then we reply that the *preclusion of negation* is nothing more than simple *affirmation*.

(305) It may be asserted that what is meant by the word '*ayogavyavachchhēḍēna*', 'inseparably', is that the Instrument to which the 'relationship' belongs is such that it never becomes the substratum of *Non-relationship* (*i. e.*, it does not permit of the co-existence in itself of the *relationship* and its negation). This again is not right; as in the other Agencies (of the Nominative, &c.) also, *at the time that they are related to the action*, there is no non-relationship (and hence the definition would include these also). Nor would it be right to add the word 'always' (or 'at all times'); because in that case we would ask—would the *relationship of the action* with the Instrument exist also at the time that the Instrument itself is non-existent? (for certainly it should do so if it is to exist 'at all times'). If you add the qualification 'while the Instrument exists', then in that case the word '*sambandhi*' in your definition would be superfluous; as it would be enough to define the Instrument as *that which while it exists* is qualified or characterised by *ayogavyavachchhēḍa* (inseparable relationship)*. Or you might define it merely as '*Sambandhi Kriyayā*',—this word itself being meant to convey *relationship at all times* (which grammatically the possessive termination in '*Sambandhi*' is quite capable of expressing); as we have already pointed out above.

* The definition would be in the form *yāvaṣaṣṭram kriyayā ayogavyavachchhēḍēna*; the third case termination in the last word denoting *qualification* or *specification*.

(206) If you are ready to accept this signification of the word 'sambandhi', after having, by some perverted course of reasoning, shown the necessity of that word in your definition,—then we put forward the following objections:—By your definition, the proximity of the asterism of 'Rohini' would be the 'Instrument' in the action of the rising of the asterism of 'Kṛittikā' that precedes it; and further the setting of the *fourteenth* asterism counted from the beginning would be the 'Instrument' in the rising of the *fourteenth* asterism after that.* Nor can this be regarded as right; as the two events (rising and setting) occurring simultaneously (and not one after the other), the one can never be regarded as the *cause* of the other (as *sequence* is a necessary factor in all causal relation); and not being a *cause*, it cannot be regarded as an *agency* (*kāraṇa*) towards the other [because the *Agent* is only a particular kind of *Cause*]; and so lastly, there is no possibility of its being the 'instrument' (which is only a particular kind of *Agency*).

(307) Nor will it be right for you to argue that in the case cited there is no sort of 'relationship' present. As you cannot deny the fact that there is an *invariable concomitance* between the two events; and such concomitance has the character of a natural *relationship*. You might urge that the 'relationship' intended is that of cause and effect. But this also is not possible; as in that case the *sāmāgrī* or 'continent accessories tending to bring about a certain effect, would have to be regarded as 'instrument.' "Amen! be it so"—you might exclaim. But can you be happy by merely repeating this sacred syllable? It would seem as if you were going to pronounce a certain scriptural incantation

* There are 28 asterisms distributed among the twelve zodiacal signs located in the ecliptic circle. This circle in its continuous revolution makes the zodiacal signs and the asterisms with their rise and set in regular order, so that at the time that the sixth sign with the fourteenth asterism would be setting in the West, the twelfth sign with the 23rd Asterism would be rising in the East.]

prefaced by this sacred syllable, seeking to force us to believe in the 'dogma that the 'contingent accessory also is an instrument', in which we have no trust.

(308) * The opponent argues: "[The definition of 'Instrument' that we have put forward involves the relationship of cause and effect; and this cannot apply to the Contingent Accessory or Auxilliary, because] As a matter of fact the Contingent Accessory does not constitute the 'cause', which is only one part out of its many parts, each of which severally forms the 'cause' of various kinds (*samavāyī*, *asamavāyī* &c); and the 'Contingent Accessory' is only that in the wake of which (in close sequence to which) the effect invariably follows." This is hardly satisfactory; as this definition of the 'Contingent Accessory' is found applicable to the Instrument also, which would thus itself become a 'Contingent Accessory;' and in this manner a *Kriyā* or Action would have to be regarded as the *instrument* of Disjunction and such other effects (due to that action); and this Disjunction again would have to be regarded as the *instrument* of the consequent destruction of Conjunction or contact!

(309) Then again, the character of the *causa* consisting in being the necessary and invariable antecedent,—which according to you resides severally in each of the parts of the *contingent accessory* (as a whole) also (as this is also the necessary and invariable antecedent of the effect),—how can you say that this latter is not the 'cause'? [And if it is the 'cause', it becomes included in the definition of the 'Instrument']. In reply to this it may be urged that, "the *contingent accessory* of a certain effect includes also that *point of time* which precedes the appearance of the effect; and certainly this could have no existence at that same point of time (as this would involve the absurdity of the point of time existing in itself) [consequently the 'contingent

* Here we have the *Khāṇḍana* of the *lakṣhana* of 'Sāmagri.'

accessory' not always being the *antecedent* of the effect, it cannot be regarded as the 'cause'." But this is not right. Because for the very reason that you propound, the point of time preceding the appearance of the effect is not regarded as the 'cause'; and for this reason it does not enter as a factor in the 'Contingent Accessory' of the cause. [Consequently, if the definition of the *Instrument* applies to the Contingent Accessory qualified by time, it becomes defective, in that it is too wide.]

(310) * Then again, the 'Instrument' cannot be as it has been defined. Because, in some cases, even though the instrument may be fully active, may it not bring about the action (of which it is the *instrument*), *all along the time that it itself exists?* [e.g., the axe is an 'instrument' in the cutting, and yet it does not produce the cutting during all the time that it is in operation; for instance, it is in operation from the time that it is raised by the hand up to the time that it actually falls upon the wood to be cut; but the cutting is produced only at this last point of time]. † And further, it is impossible for you to adduce evidence to prove that the instrument (axe) does not continue to operate even for a moment, at the time that the action (cutting) actually appears; and hence it becomes doubtful (in the absence of such evidence) [whether the operation of the instrument is really the

* The author having shown that the definition of Instrument is too *wide* now proceeds to show that it is too *narrow*, in that it does not apply to such well-known instruments as the axe and the like.

† The translation follows the interpretation of the *Viḍyāsāgarī* and the *Chīṭsukhī*. Śhaṅkara Mishra reads and explains the passage differently. He reads '*Kriyā—akālā*' which he explains as 'at the time that the action does not come into existence,—i. e., at the point of time preceding the appearance of the action'; the passage thus means that 'there is no evidence available for proving that at this previous point of time also the action of *cutting* does not actually inhere in the axe which is being raised and let fall.' This tortuous interpretation also points to the same argument as has been deduced from the passage by the simpler interpretation of the *Chīṭsukhī*.

antecedent to the cutting, or it is simultaneous with it]; and thus the definition becomes inapplicable to this Instrument [as according to the definition it is necessary that the operation of the Instrument be the necessary *antecedent* of the action]. [In the case just mentioned it is doubtful whether or not the instrument is operating at the moment of the appearance of the action; but there are cases where it is certain that the instrument is operating at the time; for instance] in the case where a tangible substance remains touched by the hand for a long time, it must be admitted that there continues (even at the time of the appearance of the action of *touching*) the *contact of the organ of touch* which is the 'instrument' of the true sensation of touch [and this *contact* being the operation of the organ towards the action of *touching*, the two are found to be *simultaneous*].

(311) Then again, if you add to your definition of the 'instrument' the qualifying clause 'as long as it exists', it would mean that the thing is an 'instrument' during all the time that it exists (and not only at the time that it is operative towards the bringing about of a certain action). You cannot argue that the *causal nature* (of the thing) exists only at certain points of time (and not at all times of its existence); as the *causal nature* consists only in the necessary and invariable relationship with the point of time immediately preceding the appearance of the effect; and as the factor of *time* already enters into this, it cannot be further referred to any other factor of time (as one *time* cannot be said to exist at another time).

(312) You may urge that—"what is meant by the Instrument *being related inseparably to the action*, is that the action (surely) invariably follows on its existence." But what do you mean by this? (1) Does it mean that the action invariably appears *after the instrument*? (2) or that the action invariably appears *during the existence* of the

instrument? (3) or that the action invariably *persists* after the instrument? The first of these alternatives cannot be accepted; as in that case the contingent accessory will have to be regarded as 'instrument', while the character of 'instrument' will have to be denied to the Hand and such other well-known instruments;—[because the action does not appear *after* the hand has ceased to exist]; and lastly, we will have to regard Pleasure, Pain and such other cognisable things to be true *means or instruments of cognitions*. Nor can you urge that the cognisable thing is certainly an instrument of the Cognition. Because no one ever regards them as such. Nor is the second of the above alternatives acceptable; because in that case the definition of 'instrument' will not apply to the organ of Touch, which remains in contact with the tangible object for a long time,—as if in such a case the mind happens to be pre-occupied, the sensation of touch (with regard to which the organ would be the Instrument) does not appear. Nor again can the third alternative be accepted; as in that case such other things as the contingent accessory and the like will have to be regarded as 'instruments'; and in the view that things have a permanent (and not mere momentary) existence, the *production or appearance* of the jar will have to be regarded as the 'instrument' of the jar (which exists invariably after its production, and which may be called a '*kriyā*' in the sense of *that which is done or brought about, i. e., an Effect*). Nor lastly is the fourth alternative possible; as according to this all things that happen to coexist at one time will have to be regarded as 'instruments' to one another. (Not finding any of these meanings of your definition possible) you may explain your definition of the 'Instrument'—as that which is inseparably related to the action—to mean that the 'instrument' is that which, *when operative*, does not fail to produce the desired result. But this definition will not

apply to such well-known Instruments as the Hand and the like [as in the above quoted case where the hand is in long, continuous contact with an object, if the mind happens to be pre-occupied, the result, in the shape of the sensation of touch, does not appear, even though its operation, in the shape of its *contact*, is present all the time.]

[The author now proceeds to refute the definitions of 'Vyāpāra' or 'Operation,'—a term that has been introduced by the opponent into the definition of the 'Instrument.']

(313). What again, we ask, is this 'Vyāpāra', 'Operation' of the Instrument? (1) Is it the cause *produced* by it? (2) Or the cause having that Instrument for its substratum? The first is not possible; because no such cause is produced by the *minor premiss** (which is universally regarded as the 'instrument' of inferential cognition).

(314) †The Opponent may argue as follows—"The first perception of the *smoke* (which is the *inferential indicative, probans, Liṅga*) in the *mountain* (which is the *pakṣa, or 'Subject' of Inference*) can be regarded as the 'instrument' of the inferential conclusion, only on the ground that, through the remembrance of the Major Premiss (*invariable concomitance* of the *probans* with the Major term or predicate of the Conclusion), it actually does *produce* the *vyāpāra* or *operation* in the shape of the second recognition of the *probans*; and thus in reality the *cognition of the major term* (which is the inferential conclusion) is brought about directly by this *second recognition* of the minor term as concomitant with that which is invariably

° In the reasoning—the mountain is fiery, because there is smoke in it which is invariably concomitant with fire,—it is the recognition of the presence of smoke in the mountain which is called '*Liṅgaparamarsha*.'

† In the case of the inference in question, the man sees the smoke in the mountain, this is the *first recognition*; then he remembers the fact that smoke is concomitant with fire; and then comes the conception that this mountain contains the smoke which is concomitant with fire,—this is the *second recognition*.

concomitant with that major term. [And thus this is the cause of Inference, and it is produced by the *first recognition of the probans* which thus becomes the Instrument].”

(315) This however is not right. For in a case where the Inference (of the presence of Fire in the Mountain) is deduced from the very first perception of Smoke in the Mountain, accompanied by the remembrance of the invariable concomitance of Smoke and Fire—this concomitance having been perceived elsewhere than in the Mountain,—the inference follows directly from the aforesaid *first* perception of the smoke in the mountain; and as thus there would be no *second* perception of the smoke (which according to the opponent, would be the *cause* produced by the first perception; the said *first* perception would, according to your definition, have no ‘operation’ towards the Inference, and would on that account, not be regarded as the ‘Instrument’ of that inference! It might be argued that, “just as in the case of the collision of two things moving in opposite directions, the contact is regarded as being due to both the things,—so in the same manner, the ‘remembrance of concomitance’ leading to the conclusion may be regarded as due to the perception of it elsewhere and also that in the mountain; and thus as this perception would be followed by the second perception it would have this latter as its ‘operation’, and would thus fulfil the conditions of the ‘Instrument.’” This again, we reply, is not right. For the cognition of the minor premiss—‘the Smoke that I see in the mountain is that which is invariably concomitant with Fire’—may be obtained merely by the remembrance of the Smoke perceived *elsewhere* as concomitant with Fire; just as the cognition of the negation or absence of something appears only after the remembrance of the object of which it is the negation;

[and hence the cognition of the minor premiss cannot be regarded as being due to the *two* perceptions of *smoke* as urged above]. “What you say may be the case with the cognition of things that are always dependent upon something else (as in the case of the negation of an object); the case of the negation of the smoke however is different, inasmuch as the notion of ‘smoke’ is not always dependent upon the notion of its concomitance; because as a matter of fact we find that the first conception that we have of the smoke is of it alone, independently of any other concomitance relating to it.” But you cannot put forward any sound evidence in proof of the assertion that the ‘necessary dependence’ is not present in the case in question,—especially in face of the fact that we have already shown above in what manner the cognition of the minor premiss is obtained.* “But as a matter of fact, in the case of the inference in question, we find that what leads to the conclusion is the cognition of smoke *in the mountain*, and any previous cognition of it that we may have had has no efficacy towards the inferential conclusion; and hence any such cognition cannot be regarded as in any way helping towards the conclusion [at any rate without the intervening perception of the smoke on the mountain; and thus the much-discussed definition of ‘operation’ becomes applicable].” But this would be all right only after you had conclusively proved that the character of the ‘Instrument’ can belong to that only which is ‘operative.’

(316) [*Page* 275.] “Certainly in the case in question also that which is ‘instrumental’ in bringing about the cognition of the smoke as concomitant with Fire is the *nirvikalpaka*, abstract, or non-determinate, idea that one has of the

* The cognition of the smoke as concomitant with fire is obtained even before we perceive it in the mountain; hence it will be extremely difficult for you to prove that the notion of smoke is not always accompanied by that of its concomitance with fire.

smoke by itself (of the kind which invariably precedes all determinate cognition of things)." This again we cannot accept. For in the case of things that are in permanent union with one another (as in the case of Negation), the cognition of one of them does not necessarily depend upon any non-determinate cognition of it (but is brought about by the cognition of its companion or correlative); and as thus the determinate cognition of things is possible even without their non-determinate cognition,—there is no evidence in support of what you say with regard to the process of cognitions. "In the case of the cognition of permanent correlates we shall postulate a preceding non-determinate cognition." This is not right, we reply; for as the cognition of such correlates can be easily explained, as due to other causes (as *e. g.* the cognition of their correlatives) there can be no ground for assuming the non-determinate cognition. In fact, you yourself also admit that it is the peculiar characteristic of permanent correlates that the cognition of one is brought about by the cognition of the other.

(317)—"In any case that which brings about the *cognition of the minor premiss* (which will constitute the instrumental 'operation') may be regarded as the 'Instrument' of the inferential conclusion (and thus the definition of 'Instrument' or its 'operation' remains intact)." This again is not possible, we reply. For if this principle were admitted, even the sense-organs would have to be regarded as 'Instruments' of Inference in some cases (*viz.*, when the minor premiss is the result of direct Sense-perception). [And thus there would be no difference between Inferential and Perceptive Cognition, both of which would have Sense-organs for their 'instrument'.] We need not pursue this matter any further.

(318) There is yet another objection to the above-mentioned definition (in para. 310) of 'Vyāpāra' or 'Opera-

involves absurdities and incongruities.) ? If the objection which we have urged against you is not sound, what then 'tion':—By this definition the *contact* of the Ear with the Sound heard cannot be regarded as the 'operation' of the ear; and thereby the ear cannot be regarded as the 'instrument' in the perception of sound; while as a matter of fact (in all sense-perception) it is the *contact* (with the perceived object) that constitutes the 'operation' of the sense-organ concerned. No other 'operation' is possible in this case. For any such operation would have to be either momentary or permanent; but any momentary operation of the sense-organs other than 'Contact' is not known of; and if the operation were a permanent one, there would arise the same objection that we have pointed out on a previous occasion (*viz.*, that being permanent the operation could not be *produced* by anything). It may be asked—"Why cannot we regard the sound itself—to be the 'operation' (of the Ear)?" We reply—this is not possible; for as the Sound is the *object* of hearing, it can never be regarded as the *instrument*.

(319) *Page 277*. "What harm would there be if in certain cases one and the same thing were both *object* and *instrument*?" In the case of Hearing, we reply, we find that the Cognition of Sound is the *effect* or result of the whole process, and the *Sound* forms an integral qualifying factor of it; and when it thus forms a factor of the Effect, if it were also made a factor in the Instrument (of the same Effect), there would arise the partial incongruity of one and the same thing (sound) having the two mutually contradictory characters of the *cause* and the *effect*. "But this same incongruity is found in the case of the *contact of the Eye and the Jar* being regarded as the 'operation' of the Eye towards the (visual) cognition of the Jar (where the Jar forms a factor of the causal operation)." It may be so, we reply; but what is that to us (who hold that the explanation and definition of *everything* in the world

is the purpose in your quoting another parallel case? If on the other hand, the objection is sound, it will serve to invalidate the other parallel case also. We, who aim at final Release only, and hold all things to be inexplicable, have no love for anything of ordinary experience. It was for this reason that Janaka, the King of the Miṭhilā, being free from all attachment, and desirous of final Release only, said—'Let the whole of Miṭhilā be burned; nothing will be burned that is mine.'*

(320) Nor can 'Operation' be defined as *that which has the Instrument for its substratum* (the second alternative put forward in para 313). For by this definition the Cognition of the Minor Term as concomitant with the inferential indicative (*i. e.*, the minor premiss) will not be the 'instrument' of the inferential conclusion (as there is no *operation* subsisting in that cognition). Even if we were to accept the view that there is a non-determinate cognition of the inferential indicative (preceding its determinate cognition as concomitant with the Minor Term),—that nondeterminate cognition would not be the substratum of the latter cognition (and thus too the definition of 'operation' not being applicable, the instrumental character cannot belong to the minor premiss). † If the Operation, which subsists in (has for its substratum) something which is not the cause or instrument of the Inferential Conclusion, were regarded as the operation of that which is the instrument of that conclusion,—then this principle would lead to most undesirable consequences.

* This refers to the well-known verse in the Mahābhārata—*Miṭhilāyām praḍi-pṭāyām na mē kiñchana dahyatē*.

† This anticipates the objection that though the cognition of the minor premiss subsists in the Cognising Self, yet it could be regarded as the *operation* of the non-determinate cognition of smoke, which would thus become the 'Instrument' of the Inference of Fire. The answer is that in this manner anything might be the Instrument of anything.

(321) [*Page 279*]. It has been explained by the opponent (in para. 312) that the true Instrument (or Cause) is that which never fails in producing result (literally, which is never non-concomitant with the result). Now what does this mean? (1) Does it mean that the Result is sure to exist at the time when the cause exists? (2) Or it is sure to exist at the time subsequent to that at which the cause exists? The former is not possible; because it must be held that the cause must have an existence prior to the effect (it having been defined as the *invariable antecedent*). Nor can the second alternative be accepted; because if by this *sequence* (of the effect) be meant *immediate* sequence, then in that case, * if the character of 'Instrument' were attributed to a thing operating in some sort of way towards the result, such wellknown instruments as the Hand and the like would cease to be 'instruments'; while if the instrumental character were attributed to a thing on the ground of its continuing operative until the appearance of the result, it would have to be attributed to the nominative and such other agents also. If then you include the sequence to even such things as are not necessarily *immediate* antecedents (in view of the instrumental character of the Hand, for instance),—then also, your definition fails to include such instruments as the Hand and the like; because there are cases where after the Hand has carried on certain operations, obstacles appear and the result is not achieved (and thus the instrumentality of the Hand *fails to produce the Result*, and hence cannot be spoken of as '*phalāvvyabhichāri*'). If, on the other hand, you *intend* all the operations extending up to the appearance of this Result, then, inasmuch as no interruption would be possible, your theory would come to this that every agency tending towards the result is 'instrumental.'

* The Hand is regarded as the 'Instrument' of cooking, because it operates towards that end inasmuch as collecting fuel, placing the pot, and so forth. None of these operations however is followed by the result *immediately*; and so the definition of 'Instrument' fails to apply in this case.

(322) Further, when you say that there should be *non-failure to produce the result of that which is operative*,— (I) is it the operation that does not fail to produce the result ? or the instrument accompanied by the operation ? If the former, then the hand would cease to be an ‘instrument’; (especially in the case where, though certain operations have been gone through by the hand, the result fails to appear on account of impediments after those operations). For the same reason, the second alternative also cannot be accepted; and moreover in this latter case, the sacrificial performance could not be regarded as ‘instrumental’ in bringing about the attainment of Heaven [as the performance has ceased long before the result appears; and what precedes the result is not the *performance along with its operation, the Apūrva*, but the *Apūrva* only.]; specially as even Prabhākara—who holds that the ‘Instrument’ towards the attainment of Heaven is the * *Apūrva* which is what is meant by the sentence (*‘yāgēna svargam bhūvayēṭ’*), and not the *sacrificial performance* which has long ceased to exist,—admits that the *final act* in the sacrificial performance is instrumental towards the final result. [And thus according to this view also the sacrifice is an *instrument*; so it is not right that this should not be included in the definition of the instrument.]

[Another definition of ‘instrument’ is next taken up.]

° The Mīmāṃsakas hold that between the Sacrifice and the final appearance of the result, there persists an active force set going by the sacrifice. Without this it cannot be explained how the sacrifice, which has ceased to exist long ago, can be the cause of the result. So the sacrifice sets into motion the *apūrva*, and this finally brings about the result. Prabhākara’s view is that in this manner it is the *apūrva* and not the sacrifice that is the Instrument of the result. Though he lays down this as the general rule, yet in certain cases, for instance in the case of the *Ḍarśha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, which is made up of a number of minor sacrifices,—he holds that each of the minor sacrifices has its own *apūrva*, and this *apūrva* helps the next sacrifice in producing its own *apūrva*; and so on and on, the last of the series not having any further sacrifice to help, helps, and is thus instrumental in, the bringing about of the final result.

(323) "The instrument is that, being equipped with which alone, the Agent accomplishes the act; and hence the *Pramāṇa*, means or Instrument of Right Cognition, is that being equipped with which alone the agent has the right cognition." *This definition also, we reply, is not tenable. For it would imply that we would have to regard as 'Instruments of Right Cognition', even such well-known non-instruments as the 'destruction of the (momentary) qualities of the Cognising Self' (with which 'destruction' the Self is equipped at the time of the Cognition).

(324) If the definition be amended to read—"The Instrument of Right Cognition is *that cause of the action of cognition* equipped with which alone the agent has the right cognition",—this also cannot be accepted; as by this definition, in the case of the *right cognition of happiness*, we should have to regard as an 'instrument' of that cognition, also the operation of that which is its real instrument.† You may say—"Certainly, it is"; but this is not right; because the operation in question (*i.e.*, the Mind-Self contact) has no operation of its own; and as thus it does not operate in any way towards the action, it cannot be regarded as an 'agency' towards that action; and as the 'Instrument' is only a particular kind of 'agency,' the said operation can never be regarded as an 'Instrument.' You may add the qualification 'which is operative' (to the phrase 'cause of action' in the above definition). But this also will not be right; as in that case *that which is operative* could

*The Self has many such qualities as are appearing and disappearing at every moment,—according to the Logician; at each time that the Self has a cognition, it is sure to be equipped with the *absence* or destruction of many of these momentary qualities. Thus these qualities would fulfil the conditions of the definition of 'Instrument.'

† The Mind is the instrument of the cognition of happiness. Its operation consists in its coming into contact with the Cognising Self. This contact is the *cause* of the *cognition*, and without it the Self cannot have the cognition. Hence the definition would include this 'Contact' also.

not be regarded as the 'Instrument'; * because by this definition it will be the 'cause of action' *along with its operation* that should have to be regarded as the 'Instrument'; and as *the cause along with its operation* would not have any further operation, it would not have the character of the Instrument (which, according to you, must be something that is operative).

(Page 281) You may add the explanation that—"the instrumental character belongs to the *operative thing* as apart from the factor of *operation*; and certainly, the definition of Instrument does apply to that thing; that which has the *instrumental character* is also *operative*; and hence it is only the *operative thing* that is called the 'Instrument.'" This also we cannot admit; because according to this definition when a person is washing a piece of cloth by alternately lifting and dropping it, the cloth, which in reality is the *object*, would be the *Instrument*.†

‡ (325) Then again, it is necessary for you to explain what is the *instrumentality* of that which you seek to define. If you explain it as consisting in the characteristics pointed out in your definition, then you fall into the vicious circle (the knowledge of the Definition depending upon the comprehension of instrumentality, and *vice versa*). If in order to avoid this, you were to explain that the *instrumentality* of the instrument consists in its own *specific form* (apart from the characteristics mentioned in definitions),—then, inasmuch as the 'specific form' of each individual Instrument is distinct, any general definition of the Instrument would

* The sense is that by adding the qualification, you make the *operation* a constituent factor of the Instrument; and as such, in order to be an Instrument it must have some other operation towards the final act.

† The cloth is a 'cause of action'; and it has an operation; and it is only when the washerman is equipped with this operative cloth that he can do the *washing*. Hence the Cloth, by your definition, is an 'Instrument.'

‡ Unless we understand what is meant by the instrumentality of the Instrument,—*i.e.*, until we know the 'Instrument—we can have no interest in its definition.

invariably include instruments other than the one (the 'specific form' of which would be present to the mind of the enquirer); and thus the definition would become 'too wide'; as certainly the 'specific form' of the Eye (the instrument of vision) is not the same as that of the Ear (the instrument of audition).

(326) [Nor again can we accept the definition of the 'Means of Right Cognition,' as that, being equipped with which alone can the agent have the right cognition mentioned in para. 323]. For in that case, the Sense-organs would not be the 'Means of Right Cognition'; as it is found possible to have right cognition (*inferential* and the rest) by persons *not* equipped with sense-organs (which are necessary only in one particular kind of cognitions, the *sensuous*). You might say—"but that inferential cognition is not *Sensuous Perception*." True; but it is not with reference to *Sensuous Cognition* alone that you are seeking to put forward the definition (of the 'Means of Right Cognition'). It might be argued that, "in the case of *inferential* cognition, even though the same *particular* Instruments, in the form of a Sense-organ and the like, are absent, yet inasmuch as all Instruments belong to the same class ('Instrument') as the Sense-organ, there cannot be the absence of all Instruments of that class; for certainly even inferential cognitions one cannot have until he is equipped with things which are as much 'Instruments' as the Sense-organs." But this also does not solve the difficulty; as it is up till now impossible to ascertain what is the generic character of the 'Instrument' (to which the Sense-organs and other instruments belong).

(327) If then, you were to explain that, that thing being equipped with which alone the agent accomplishes *that right cognition*, is the *Instrument of that cognition*,—* we cannot

* This answer proceed on the basis of two alternatives—(1) are we to regard as instrument that thing with which the cogniser may be equipped at the time he has *some* right cognition? (2) or that with which he is equipped *at every time* that he has that particular kind of right cognition? The former is not possible.

accept this either ; because in that case even such things as the small loin-cloth or the clothing that the person is wearing at the time will have to be regarded as the 'Instrument.' [As there may be some right cognitions which a man will have when wearing such clothing, &c.] * If in order to meet this you were to add the qualification that—the Instrument of a right cognition is that thing equipped with which the agent accomplishes *all cognitions of the same kind as that cognition*,—this also cannot be accepted ; because as a matter of fact we find that all *inferential* and *verbal* cognitions belong to the same class of 'Indirect or Non-immediate Cognitions' ; and yet while *inferential* cognitions are accomplished when the agent is equipped with the knowledge of the Premisses, *verbal* cognitions are obtained when he is equipped with the knowledge of words : and under the circumstances, there can be no certainty as to *all Indirect Cognitions* being accomplished with the aid of one knowledge or the other ; and hence neither of the two can be rightly regarded as an 'Instrument of Right Cognition' ?. You might urge that the 'kinds' of Cognition you mean are 'Sensuous Cognition', 'Inferential Cognition' and the like (and not any such as 'Indirect Cognition'). This also will not be right ; because † *firstly*, if you include any one of these 'kinds' of Cognition in your definition of the 'Instrument of Right Cognition,' then it would not include the Instruments of other Kinds of Cognition ; thus there would be a partial failure of the definition ; *secondly*, if you include *all kinds* of cognition, then it would not include any Instruments at all ; [as there is no Instrument that accomplishes *all kinds* of cognition] ; *thirdly*, if there be no restriction (as to whether one or all *Kinds* of cognition are meant), then you would not have one all-comprehensive definition (which ought to be the first condition fulfilled by all definitions).

* This meets the second alternative.

† If your definition be *that* equipped with which the agent accomplishes *all sensuous cognitions*,—then this will not include the means of *inferential* cognition.

(328) [Page 283] Another definition of the Instrument is put forward :—“The Instrument is that in the absence of which (without which) the *Nominative* Agent and the Object do not bring about the action; thus the Instrument of Right Cognition is that without which the cognition and the cognised do not bring about the right cognition.” This also, we reply, is not right: * Do you mean (1) that the cognition is not brought about by the *cogniser* and the *cognised* which latter are themselves *existent*? (2) or that it is not produced by these, also when they themselves are *non-existent*? If you mean the former, then the definition fails to include the Instruments of inferential and such other cognitions of things past and future (in which case the *cognised* things do not exist). Nor is the second alternative tenable, since in that case, the definition would apply to the cogniser and the cognised also. For just as in the absence of the Eye and such other means of cognition, right cognition does not appear, in the same manner, in the absence of the cogniser and the cognised also, it would not appear; otherwise these two could not be regarded as having any causal efficiency towards the cognition. This last reasoning also serves to refute the view that it does not need to be specified whether the agent and the object are existent or non-existent (all that is meant being that without the Instrument these two cannot bring about the Cognition). Specially as by this definition, the character of ‘Instrument’ would become applicable to ourselves also, who in reality are only *Nominative* agents, in regard to our own cognitions which are brought about by God *through ourselves* (and thus as without ourselves, God, the agent, could not bring about our cognition, we would be ‘instruments’

* The author takes up the application of the general definition of ‘Instrument’ to the special case of the Instrument of right knowledge. The general definition is open to the patent objection that it is *too wide*; including as it does the *Dative* also: as without the *receiver* of the gift, the action of *giving* cannot be accomplished by the *giver* and the thing *given*.

of that cognition). * Under the above circumstances it would be impossible to justify the definition by asserting that (in the case of our own cognitions) it is possible for ourselves to have, from different points of view, the character of the 'Nominative agent', as well as the 'Instrument' of cognition. This, we say is not possible; because it is in a certain character—of the 'Nominative agent' for instance,—that we are related to our cognitions, and it is when we are absent *in exactly the same character*, that the cognition is not produced [so our character remaining the same in both cases, we cannot, in the case of our *presence*, when the cognition is produced, be regarded as 'nominative agents', and in the case of our *absence*, when the cognition is not produced, as the 'instruments.']

(329) Nor again can we accept the definition that the Instrument is that to which belongs the final operation or activity (leading to the accomplishment of the action). For, in that case, the *instrumental* character would not belong to the minor premiss of an inferential reasoning; for the simple reason that that premiss itself has no operation or activity at all. It might be urged that in the case in question the character of the 'instrument of cognition' belongs to the *non-determinate* cognition of the minor premiss which has an *operation* in the shape of the *determinate* cognition of the same. But this would not apply to those cases where the things cognised are such as admit of only *determinate* cognitions. † If, then, you were to rest upon the *mental impression* (produced by the cognition of the minor premiss, to be the *operation* of this premiss towards the inferential

° The view combated here is that there would be nothing wrong in holding that when we regard our cognitions as brought about by God, we are 'instrument-', while when we regard them as brought about by ourselves we are the 'nominative agents.'

† *Samavāya* or Inherent Relationship, *Abhāva* or Negation, and such other things are held to be such as can be cognised only *determinately*, admitting of no non-determinate cognition.

cognition),—then, inasmuch as the inferential cognition would, in this case, be brought about directly by this *mental impression*, it would not be a *valid* cognition. [For if the cognitions produced by mental impressions were valid, then remembrances would have to be regarded as valid, which the Logician denies]; if on the other hand, the *mental impression* were not effective in bringing about the inferential cognition then it could not be regarded as an *operation* of the agencies bringing about that cognition. And further, (if the *mental impression* is the operation towards the inferential cognition, then) the inferential cognition becomes one whose instrument (*i.e.* the minor premiss) is not cognised [because the *mental impression* is not perceptible by the senses, that of which that impression is an operation must also be imperceptible]. * Nor again would it be right to assert that what is the Instrument of inferential cognition is the Inferential Indicative or Middle Term, of which the *minor premiss* itself is the *operation* (conducting to the cognition. For in cases where we have an inference of something as having been inferentially cognised, the minor premiss is not produced by the inferential indicative, and as such cannot be regarded as the 'operation' of this latter. And further, in a case where we learn from a trustworthy person that there was 'Smoke' in some place, and thence we at once infer that in that case 'Fire' also existed there,—as the 'Smoke' (which is the inferential indicative in this latter inference) does not exist

* And thus the character of having its Instruments not perceived, which is regarded by the Logician as the distinctive feature of sensuous cognitions alone would be present in inferential cognitions also.

† We infer the existence of the organ of vision from the fact of there being visual cognitions, and from the fact of the organ of vision being an *organ* we infer that it is superintended by a guiding intelligence. Now the organ of vision cannot be regarded as productive of any cognition of a minor premiss with regard to itself; as the only cognition that the organ can produce is a sensuous perception. And yet it is *instrumental* in bringing about the second inference. Thus the definition of 'Instrument' not applying to this case becomes 'too narrow.'

at all at the time of the inferential cognition,—any chance of its being regarded as having the *minor premiss* (of this inference) for its 'operation' and thus being an 'instrument' (in the bringing about of the inference), is wholly cast away.

(330) Then again, if the 'finality' of the operation (that you introduce into your definition) be held to be in comparison with the operation of anything, then as the operation of all agencies would be 'final' with reference to some operation or the other, the character of having the 'final operation' (towards the action) would belong to all, and not to the Instrument only. Whereas if the 'finality' be in comparison with the operation of *all agencies* towards the action, then, inasmuch as the operation of the Instrument would not be 'final' in comparison with the operation of itself (which is one of the *agencies*), this Instrument also would fail to fulfil the conditions of the definition (its operation not being *final* in comparison with the operation of 'all agencies'). If it be asserted that the 'finality' meant is in comparison with the operation of the Nominative agent,—then, this also is not possible, we reply; because if the 'finality' were in comparison with the 'Nominative agent' taken by itself (independently of its operation &c.), then the definition would include that agent itself [as 'operation' of the agent would appear after, and hence be 'final' in comparison with, the appearance of the agent]; if, on the other hand, the 'finality' were in comparison with the '*operative agent*' (the agent along with its operation),—then also we would find the definition applying to the Nominative agent, as in comparison with each one of the operations of the agent another operation of his would be 'final'; lastly, if the 'finality' meant were in comparison with the Nominative agent *along with all his operations*,—then, the definition would not apply even to that which you accept as 'Instrument'; as the operations of the Nominative agent, in some form or other, do not cease till the desired result is accomplished (and hence there is nothing that can be

said to operate after *all* operations of the nominative agent have ceased). If, in order to avoid this difficulty, it were asserted that the operations of the nominative agent cease (before the appearance of the result),—then that agent could not be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of that result [as his operation would have ceased after having produced the operation of another agency, the Instrument for instance, it would be the cause of that operation, and not of the result].

(331) [*Page* 286]. It might be urged that by ‘final operation’ is meant that operation after which no other agency operates (towards the accomplishment of the result).

But this also cannot be accepted; because according to the view that there is a God, there can be no cessation, at any point of time, of the operation of the ‘Nominative agent’ (in the shape of God); and hence as there could be no operation appearing after the operation of God, it would be the God that would, by your definition, have to be regarded as the Instrument. If however, the existence of God be not admitted, then (there are other objections—*viz.*): (1) the *object* also (in the case of sensuous cognition for instance) has such an operation in the shape of its *contact with the sense-organ* (after which contact there is no operation of any other agency towards the cognition); and thus the definition of ‘Instrument’ would include the *Object* also; (2) and in the case of the action of *cutting*, the operation of the *Object* cut is the final operation, consisting in its contact with the instrument with which it is cut (thus the operation of the *object* appearing *after* that of the Instrument); and under the circumstances how would you exclude this *object* from your definition? (3) and lastly, the definition would fail to include such well-known *Instruments* as the Hand and the like (in the case of the *cutting*, where the operation of the hand is by no means the last and ‘final’ operation).

(332) Nor can the Instrument be defined as that after which the Result appears. Because, if the sequence intended

were mere sequence in general, not qualified in any way, then the definition would apply equally to all the Causes that tend to bring about that result; while if *immediate sequence* were meant, then if the immediate sequence were with reference to the *operative thing* (intended to be the instrument), the definition would not apply to such well-known instruments as the sacrificial performance (whose result appears long after the sacrifice has ceased to exist);—if on the other hand the sequence were with reference to the *operation* (of that which is intended to be the Instrument), the definition would fail to include the Hand and such other Instruments (in whose case the result, *cutting* for instance, does not follow *immediately* after the *operation of the Hand*, which consists in the raising and letting fall of the axe, which is followed by the *coming into contact with the axe*, which is an operation of the object that is cut);—lastly if the sequence meant were with reference to the whole *series* of operations (tending towards the result), then the definition would apply to all the *agencies* (and not to the *Instrument* alone).

(333) [The last definition of Instrument is open to yet another objection.] If by the 'operation of the Instrument' be meant *that cause of action (final result) which is the effect of (proceeds from) that instrument*, then, inasmuch as the cause that brings about the action of inferential cognition is the minor premiss (cognition of the inferential probans) which proceeds from (is brought about by) the sense-organs, the inferential cognition would come to have for its 'instrument' that sense-organ (and thus there would be no difference between sensuous and inferential cognitions). In answer to this it might be urged that—"The operation meant is that cause of action which proceeds from something *which is actually the cause of that action*, and thus as the sense-organ is not actually the cause of inferential cognition, how could it be the 'Instrument' of that cognition?"

But this is not right; because what is that *causal character* which is not present in the sense-organ as leading to inferential cognition? If it be said that it is the character of being the necessary invariable antecedent (to inferential cognition), then we reply, that the character of being an antecedent does belong to the sense-organ (which certainly exists before the cognition appears); then as regards the *necessary* character of this antecedence, if you regard this also as a necessary condition in the 'Cause', then it is for you to put forth all the effort you can for proving this *necessary antecedence* of the sense-organ; as otherwise (*i. e.* if the sense-organ did not exist before the appearance of the inferential cognition), the sense-organ and the probans not existing at the same time, (we would have no cognition of the Inferential Indicative or Probans which is cognised only by the sense-organs, and) there would be no 'instrument' for the inferential cognition (as it is the sensuous cognition of the probans that is held to be that 'instrument'). If the 'Contact of the Mind' were held to be the necessary 'instrument' for right cognition,—then, in the first place, inasmuch as this 'contact' is present in all kinds of cognitions, there would be no distinction between *Right* and *Wrong* Cognition; and secondly, the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition would, in this case, cease to be 'instruments' (of Cognition,—the contact of the Mind being the only 'instrument of cognition'); specially as it is a rule that when a certain generic entity is the necessary condition in another generic entity, it is only a particular form of the former that can be the necessary condition in the particular form of the latter hence inasmuch as the particular Sense-organs are universally recognised as the instruments of sensuous cognitions, which are only a particular kind of 'cognition,' the 'Sense-organ' *in general* must also be regarded as the instrument of *cognition in general*). And thus in some way or other, it has to be proved that the Sense-organ is a necessary

antecedent of 'Right Cognition' ; and hence the objection that we put forward above becomes fully established. It might be urged that,—“The *necessary antecedence of the sense-organ* may be a necessary condition in 'Right Cognition' in *general* ; but it cannot be so in the particular cognitions, Inferential and the like.” But this is not possible ; because, inasmuch as you do not add any qualifications (to Right Cognition and Inferential Cognition, etc.), what you say here does not go any further than what has already been said above ; and thus if you admit the fact of the necessary antecedence of the sense-organ being a necessary condition in 'Right Cognition' in general, you have no loophole (unless you add some qualifying conditions) for denying the same with regard to the particular Right Cognitions. Otherwise there would be no instrument for any individual cognition (as such an instrument is inferred only from the fact of its being instrumental in bringing about cognitions of the same kind).

(334) The Opponent gives up the task of establishing a general definition of 'Instrument,' and adds:—“In other cases the Instrument may be whatever it is ; but the 'Instrument of Right Cognition' (which alone is what we undertake to define) is that which distinguishes (lends its name to) each of the intended particular kinds of 'Right Cognition' ; there are four kinds of right cognition, *the sensuous &c.*, which bear (and are characterised by) distinct names, and are recognised as distinct from one another ; neither the person who cognises nor the thing cognised can be the basis or means of this distinction ; it is only each of the four 'Instruments of Right Cognition' (*Prāmāṇas*) which pertain specifically to each of those four kinds of cognition, each to each ; and hence it is these Instruments that are the basis or means of the distinct conceptions (that we have of the four kinds of cognition) as well as of the four distinct names.”

(335) This is not right. Because the introduction of the word '*vivakṣiṭa*,' 'intended', in the above definition is like the writing of the deceitful astrologer,* and may, like it, be made to mean anything and everything ; specially as there is no limit as to what may or may not be 'intended' by different men at different times. Then again, inasmuch as *the character of being brought about by the perceived object* belongs to Direct Perception as distinctively as *that of being brought about by the sense-organ*, the *object* also would, by your definition, have to be regarded as the 'Instrument' of that perception. And lastly, in the case of the assertion of the trustworthy person, the speaker also would be something that distinguishes that particular kind of right cognition, and as such, he also will have to be regarded as the 'instrument' of that cognition. If, in answer to the last objection, you were to say—" Yes, certainly so (the trustworthy person is certainly the instrument of right verbal cognition),"—then we repeat the answer that we gave to a similar assertion of yours on a previous occasion (para. 307).

(336) For the same reasons that have been detailed above, we also reject the following definition of the 'Instrument of Right Cognition.'—"It is that which distinguishes the *non-material cause of Right Cognition—viz: the contact of mind and soul—with a view to the distinction of the intended kinds of Right Cognition.*" [This definition also contains the word 'intended' and hence is open to the above objections].

Thus have been shown the objections against all explanations of the *Instrument of Right Cognition*.

* The deceitful astrologer, on being asked as to whether a man will get a son or daughter, gives his opinion in the words '*puṭro na puṭri*,' which may mean *puṭro na* (not a son), *puṭri* (but a daughter); or '*puṭrah*' (a son), *na puṭri* (and not a daughter). In the same manner, what one may *intend* to call 'Right Cognition,' at one time, may not be so *intended* at another time ; and thus there would be no finality to the definition of *Pramāṇa*.

-Section (18).

A [Having refuted the definitions of the Instrument of Right Cognition, the author proceeds to refute the definitions of the different kinds of Right Cognition, and begins with the refutation of the definition of Sensuous Perception].

[The first definition taken up for criticism is that propounded in the *Nyāya-sūtra* I-i-4.]

I (337) In the above manner the definitions of all the particular 'Instruments of Right Cognition' also are to be refuted. And first as to Sense-perception (*Pratyakṣa*).—It has been said (by Gautama in his *Nyāya-sūtra* I, i—4) that *Sense-perception is that valid cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.* Now with regard to this, we ask—For what purpose do you give this definition? (a) Is it for the purpose of cognising Sense-perception as distinguished from everything else, whether homogeneous (as the other means of valid knowledge), or heterogeneous (as the object of knowledge)? (b) Or are the characteristic features indicated in the definition set forth to make us apprehend *Pratyakṣa* as that which gives rise to *direct* cognition? (c) Or is the purpose of the definition only to make it possible for people to make use of the word? (d) Or is it for ascertaining the signification of the word '*Pratyakṣa*'? (e) Or, is it for some other purpose?

(338) The *first* of these alternatives cannot be maintained. For what, we ask, do you understand by 'homogeneous'? Do you mean (a) such homogeneity as is based on the class-character 'sense-perception'? or (b) homogeneity resting on something else? The former alternative is inadmissible; for if the characteristic mark indicated by the definition is not excluded from the homogeneous things, for the differentiation of which from sense-perception the definition is intended, the definition fails to serve the purpose of differentiation; and if, on the other hand, (to escape the above difficulty) we assume that the

characteristic mark is excluded from those things, then the definition shows itself to be too narrow (inasmuch as it does not take in those *homogeneous* things which, ex-hypothesi, are also classed as 'sense-perception'). Nor is the latter alternative (b) tenable; for in that case the introduction into the definition, of the word 'heterogeneous' would be purposeless; since all things are homogeneous inasmuch as they share the quality of being objects of cognition and so on. It now might be said that the homogeneity meant is that which depends on the class-character, 'means of right cognition' (i.e. that by *distinction from homogeneous things* there is meant the distinction of Sense-perception from Inference, Upamāna, etc., all of which are 'means of right cognition'). But in that case, as that which is the thing to be defined, viz., Sense-perception, is itself a 'means of right cognition,' and hence has the character of 'homogeneous,' and thus falls within the category of things meant to be excluded by the definition, there will be nothing left to be included in the definition. In answer to this it might be argued that what it is intended to exclude by the definition is that which, on the ground of the class-character of 'means of right knowledge' is homogeneous with (with regard to) the thing to be defined (viz. Sense-perception); and truly that which is defined can not be said to be homogeneous *with itself*; since the genitive-case (*lakṣyasya sa-jāṭiyam*) indicates difference. In that case, we reply, you might as well say only that the definition is meant to distinguish the thing to be defined from whatever is *different* from it; without mentioning 'homogeneousness' based upon the class-character of 'means of right cognition'. And in that case, if the other party (for whose benefit you propound your definition) knows what is different from the thing to be defined, it follows that he also knows the thing to be defined as different from the other things; and thus as the purpose of your definition is accomplished before the definition is given, the enunciation of the definition serves no purpose.

(339) However, let us grant that the purpose to be served by the enunciation of the definition may be stated in diverse ways, in accordance with the diversity of the aims of the persons propounding the definition. But another difficulty arises. For what the definition aims at, *viz.*, the cognition of what is different from the thing to be defined, cannot, in the first place, be accomplished unless the definition be comprehended; for if this were possible, very undesirable conclusions would have to be accepted*. Nor, in the second place, can that end be accomplished by the definition, even if comprehended; for the reason that it is extremely difficult satisfactorily to establish the definition. Let us test the definition, under discussion, of Sense-perception. Can the origination of the contact of thing and sense-organ be said to be known by Perception?—No; for in that process there is a factor (*viz.*, the sense-organ, or, sense-power) which is absolutely imperceptible. Can that origination be said to be known by an Inference based on the effects which it produces, (these effects constituting the middle term of the Inference) ? or by 'Presumptive Reasoning' (*viz.*, that certain effects could not be accounted for unless we assume the aforesaid contact) ?—The answer again is 'No'. For Inference and Presumption indicate only that the effect in question has *some* cause, but do not intimate the specific character of the cause; and hence, no uniform definition can be based on them. But, it may be argued, a specific kind of cause may be concluded from the fact that the effect is of a specific kind (*viz.* direct, immediate, cognition). Well, we reply, then you admit that the fact of the effect being of a specific nature has to be previously cognized;—and why then not accept this at once as a sufficient basis for the distinction of the thing to be defined from other things, both homogeneous

* If the mere *existence* of definitions were capable to effect the desired differentiations, all things would be differentiated by all definitions, each acting in its own way.

and heterogeneous? There truly is no need of your ill-conceived series of assumptions.*

(340) "With all this," our opponent resumes, "our original definition remains unrefuted; since it has not been shown to be either too wide or too narrow." But we refuse to admit this. We have clearly shown that your procedure is faulty, inasmuch as you, while it was open to you to accomplish your end by a simpler means,—*viz.*, by basing the definition of *Pratyakṣa* directly on the cognition of the specific nature of actual sense-cognition, which cognition appears first, and must necessarily be accomplished before any further step,—you have had recourse to a means which are more difficult and complicated; inasmuch as the idea on which your definition is based appears at a later stage only, and must not be formed necessarily. The mistake you have committed is analogous to that of a man who has a lamp burning already, but, in order to dispel darkness, puts himself to the needless trouble of lighting a second lamp. The man who acts thus is justly found fault with, although no fault is to be found with the second lamp (just as no fault may possibly be found with your definition viewed in itself). The fact is that the presence of a simpler means, which might have been employed, imparts to the employment of other, less simple means, the character of a *fault*; just as the presence of 'inherent absurdity' (*svarūpāsiddhi*; a certain logical fallacy) vitiates every means of right knowledge. Therefore, although your definition may not have the faults of being too wide, etc., it yet is vitiated by the general defect pointed out.

(341) [PAGE 295] This also serves for the rejection of the second alternative (stated in para. 337). For it is impossible

* The reasoning objected to is as follows: (1) The peculiar character of certain cognitions,—*viz.*, their being direct, intuitive—is used to establish the inference that they are due to the contact of sense-organs and objects. (2) The inferred circumstance thereupon is employed as the basis of the definition of *Pratyakṣa*.

to comprehend that definition unless we already know what is meant by 'directness' ('immediacy', of Perception); and if the comprehension of the definition were reached on the basis of that knowledge, there would be an objectionable 'inter-dependence.' Even if there were something other than 'directness' (as e.g. the character of *being produced by the object*), which would indicate the fact of *Pratyakṣa* being produced by the senses, that *something*, as being invariably, concomitant with 'directness', should itself be put forward as the definition of Sense-perception; for the reason that the apprehension of it would be nearer at hand (earlier to appear, than what you put forward as your definition). The Opponent will perhaps argue that this 'something else' need not necessarily be of such a kind that the character of *being produced by the senses* is invariably concomitant with it; since even if it were lesser in extension than this latter character, it might serve as the inferential mark which indicates that character.* But this does not remove your difficulties; as this 'mark, being of lesser extension than the character of *being produced by the senses*, which is sought to be defined, there would be instances of this latter where the said 'mark' would be absent; and as in these instances, there would be no means of knowing the character of *being produced by the senses*, it would be impossible for you to form an adequate idea of that character; and under the circumstances, how could you have any idea of 'directness' which can proceed only from the cognition of the character of *being produced by the senses*?

* The characteristic feature in the definition of a thing must be such that it includes all special cases; i. e., wherever the characteristic is, there the thing defined also is. The 'something else'—let us say 'being produced by the object'—however is not such a characteristic; for there may be '*arīhajaṭva*' where no Perception is, as in the case of a wayfarer who, while the herbs, flowers, etc., by the roadside make an impression on his sense, may not perceive them because his mind is otherwise engaged. The Vedāntin therefore is wrong in suggesting that this 'something else' should be introduced into the definition of Perception.

Moreover, when you accept 'being produced by the senses as the characteristic feature of the definition of Perception although in some cases of Perception such 'being produced by the senses' cannot be ascertained, since there are no valid means to do so, and hence their 'being produced by the senses' cannot be cognised as invariably accompanying the character of 'directness of cognition';—what fault then, we ask, has been committed by other indicative things which do not invariably accompany 'directness of cognition,' (that they should be denied the honour of figuring in the definition as characteristic features)? "But" the opponent says, "in a case where we have not that particular feature to indicate the 'being produced by the senses' of *Pratyakṣha*, the required cognition may be attained through some other indicative feature." Then, we reply, this latter should be accepted as the feature at once indicating 'Directness'; and then there will be no need of the round-about method of inferring this directness from the feature of 'being produced by the senses,' which latter is, in its turn, 'inferred from some other indicative feature.' "But," the Opponent rejoins, "neither of these two indicative features is such that 'directness' is invariably concomitant with it; and hence neither of them is accepted as the characteristic element in the definition of Perception. 'Being produced by the senses', on the other hand, is such that 'directness' is invariably concomitant with it; and for this reason we employ it for the purpose of definition." But this also we reject. For, as a matter of fact, both those indicative features equally are capable to bring about the inferential cognition of 'Directness'—which is the aim of the definition; and hence there is no use of the 'being produced by the senses,' although this may be invariably accompanied by 'Directness.'

(342) Nor can we accept the third alternative proposed in para. 337. For this would mean that 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs and the objects

is to be regarded and spoken of as Sense-perception' ; and this meaning of the definition cannot be maintained, for the reason that the distinguishing feature referred to (*viz.* 'being produced by the contact, etc.')

is something that cannot be comprehended. If that feature were to be understood through the character of 'directness' (*i. e.* if a cognition were to be regarded as produced by the said contact because of its being of the nature of direct apprehension), then this 'directness' itself should be taken as the basis of the usage of the word 'sense-perception' ; since that cognition of 'directness' is a primary, non-mediated one.

(343) For the same reason, the fourth alternative (stated in para 337) cannot be accepted (*i.e.* we cannot allow that the definition, under discussion, of *Pratyakṣa*, serves the purpose of settling the meaning of the term '*Pratyakṣa*.' Moreover, this alternative is open to a further charge, *viz.*, needless complication.* Nor, finally, can we admit the fifth alternative, *viz.*, that the statement of the definition is 'for some other purpose.' For no such purpose can be pointed out.

(344) The above stated reason† also serves to set aside another definition of Sense-Perception ; *viz.*, that it is what is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with that form, or character, (of the object) which manifests itself (in the cognition) to Consciousness.—This definition moreover is open to yet another objection. The definition of course is meant to be of one special kind of the Means of Right Cognition, and hence it must be pointed out what part of the cases included in your definition of 'Means of Right Knowledge' is included

* It is very much simpler to regard the word 'Sense-perception' as denoting *direct application* than to make it signify *that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.*

† *Viz.*, that the fact of a cognition being produced by the contact of the sense-organ with an object cannot be ascertained ; or else that the statement of the definition cannot be shown to have a purpose.

in the definition under consideration, and what part is excluded. Now your definition of the 'Means of Right Cognition' shows that all wrong cognition is excluded from it. But from this it follows that the above definition of Perception, as it stands, is not a correct definition, inasmuch as even *wrong* perceptions (such as of silver in the shell) are produced by the contact of the sense-organ with that form (of the object) which, in the cognition, manifests itself to consciousness; for what does so manifest itself is the character of *being* (and of *being a substance* and so on). And if, in defence of the definition, it should be said that the definition understands by 'the form which manifests itself' the particular character of the object (so that the definition would exclude the perception of shell-silver (where the particular character of 'being silver' does not exist, and therefore is not in contact with the sense-organ), we must demur to this also. For, we ask, does the definition mean that Sense-perception is cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organ,—(a) with some only of the forms or aspects manifesting themselves?—or (b) with all such aspects? On the former alternative (a) the definition would, in the first place, fail to exclude wrong cognitions (such as that of shell-silver, in which *some* particular forms at any rate manifest themselves); and it would in the second place, fail to exclude non-determinate (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition (in which no particular character whatever manifests itself, the object being realized only as *something*).

(345) Nor again is the second alternative (b) possible; since none of the alternatives springing from it can be admitted. For, we ask, when you say that the sense-organ is in contact with all the forms (aspects, features) which manifest themselves, do you mean that the organ is in contact with that which has the character of 'manifesting itself' as a permanent qualification? or with that which possesses

that character as a mere temporary mark?*

The former alternative cannot be accepted: for before actual Perception takes place, those aspects do not possess the quality of 'manifesting themselves' and if this quality is to be viewed as a necessary factor of the *cause* of Perception, it must be in existence before the Perception takes place (it must possess the antecedent existence required in all Causes). Then, as to the second alternative, let us examine the further alternatives springing from that. Do you, we ask, mean to attach significance to the *present* tense implied in 'manifesting itself' (*bhāsamāna*; which is a Present Participle) ? or do you not? You cannot do the latter; for the cognition 'this is a jar' is one that is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with all the aspects which manifest themselves, and yet it cannot be regarded as a valid Sense-perception with regard to the Self† for the reason that the Self does not form an object of that cognition, while yet the validity of a cognition depends on its having a definite object. For it has to be acknowledged as a rule that *Pratyakṣatva* (*i.e.*, being of the nature of Perception), which is a special class of *prāmānya* (*i.e.*, being of the nature of Valid Knowledge) can refer to those objects only with regard to which it possesses validity. Were this not so, what answer could you give to the person who would bring forward the perception 'this is a jar' as a valid proof for the existence of a piece of cloth?

(346) "Well," our opponent says, "I give the following reply—The cognition of the jar is not the perception of the

* Is 'manifesting itself' to be viewed as a permanent intrinsic feature (*Viśeṣaṅga*) of those aspects which manifest themselves; or as a mere *upalakāṣaṇa*, *i.e.*, a temporary adventitious (extrinsic) character?

† If the 'manifesting itself' of the definition were not limited to aspects manifesting themselves at the time of Perception, it might be said that when a jar is perceived the Self also is perceived; for all Perception is produced by the contact of the Self also with the sense-organ; and the Self, although not manifesting itself at the time of the perception of a jar certainly does manifest itself, in Perception, at other times; as in the inward perception 'I am.'

cloth, for the simple reason that it is not produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the latter (*i.e.*, the cloth)." But we ask, in return, is then the cognition of the jar by the contact of the sense-organ with the Self, the perception of the Self? "How could this possibly be?"—the opponent will perhaps reply,—“considering that, as a matter of fact, the Self does not manifest itself in the cognition of the jar, although this cognition be produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the Self?" But have you then forgotten that you are at present arguing on the basis of the supposition that the implication of *present* time, contained in the participle '*Uḥāsamāna*, is not to be attended to (and that hence it does not matter whether or no the Self manifest itself together with the cognition of the jar)? For certainly, the Self *does* manifest itself at some times, and to some persons; were this not so, it would have to be regarded as *unknowable* (which the Logician does not admit).

(347). The Opponent attempts a further explanation "The Sense-perception as defined above means perception with regard to *its own* object, not with regard to other objects also." But this also does not advance us. For if the 'its own' refers to Perception in general (to 'any Perception'), the objection urged above remains in force (*i.e.*, the perception of the jar would be the perception of the Self also, the latter also being the object of some inward, perceptual cognition). If, on the other hand, an individual cognition were referred to by the 'its own,' then the definition as it stands would be too wide; inasmuch as neglecting that unique character which belongs to the thing to be defined, it extends to Perceptions other also than that one particular Perception; for it is clear that other individual cognitions which also fulfil the condition of the definition do not possess the unique character of that particular cognition which it is intended to define. The Opponent will perhaps

plead that the intention is to define other particular cognitions *also*, and that a definition in reality is too wide only when it extends to things not intended to be defined. But this also we cannot admit. For that particular unique character which you hold to be that which it is intended to define cannot be the character of other Perceptions; and how therefore can you attempt, by means of the word *also* (in 'other particular cognitions also') to include more than one perception, reducing all of them to one common category (and thus renouncing that very uniqueness with which you started)? The fact is that whatever of *common character* (pertaining to all perceptions) there may have been in your original definition, has been reduced by you to one individual unique character, when you introduced into the definition the words 'its own object'. The objection to making the phrase 'its own' refer to any Perception in general, has already been stated. Moreover the phrase 'its own' cannot possibly be made to denote a character present in all perceptual cognitions. And in the absence of this a Perception having one thing for its object would have to be regarded as valid with regard to another object!

(348) Nor can the former alternative (mentioned in para. 345) be accepted; that is to say, it will not be right to assert that significance is intended to be attached to the Present tense in '*bhāsamāna*'. For none of the alternatives that this would give rise to can be maintained. With reference to what would the *manifestation* be in the 'present'? (1) Would it be with reference to the 'contact'? (2) Or to anything? If the former, this view would in no way differ from the view that the 'contact of the sense-organ' is with the object as *qualified (vishīṣṭa)* by the character of *being manifested* (which also presupposes the fact of the *manifestation* being *present* at the time of the 'Contact'); and as such it would be open to the same objections that we have pointed out against this last view (in paras. 345-

48): And as regards the second alternative, it would simply mean that no significance whatever is intended to be attached to the Present Tense; as in this case the *character of being manifested* (*bhūsamānaṭva*) would have to be regarded as belonging to objects that *have been manifested* in the past, and also those that *will be manifested* in the future (as these also would be 'present' with reference to something or the other),—both of which are intended to be excluded (by making the Present Tense significant).

(349) It might be urged that what is meant is that the object is manifested *after the contact of the sense-organ*; and hence this *present character* of the manifestation is certainly intended to be signified. But this is not right, we reply; because the Self also becomes manifested *after the sense-contact*; for certainly it cannot be denied that the time at which the Self is cognised by the Mind is *after-sense-contact**. "What we mean," says the opponent, "is not any *sense-contact* in general, but that *particular sense-contact after which the manifestation of the object comes about*." This again is not right, we reply; because in many cases (where the cognition of the jar is followed by the idea of the Self) it does actually happen that the *manifestation* of the Self comes about immediately after the sense-contact of the Jar (and so, according to you, the perception in this case would be a *valid sense-perception of the Self*). In answer to this it might be urged that "this manifestation of the Self is a totally different manifestation, and not *that* (particular) manifestation (of the jar, which is what is intended)." But (you thus limit the 'manifestation' of your definition to the particular manifestation of some particular thing), in that case, your definition would become too narrow; inasmuch as it would be applicable to the case of the manifestation of that one thing only (and not to all *Sense-perception*).

* As certainly some sense-contact must have occurred at some point of time previous to the Cognition of the Self.

(350) *The Opponent adds a further explanation:—"There would be no incongruity if we were to assert that the *Valid Sense-perception* of a certain thing is that manifestation of this thing which comes about from the sense-contact of the thing." But this also we cannot accept. For the manifestation (cognition) of the jar, according to the logician, proceeds from the contact of the (cognising) Self with the sense-organ; and hence by your definition, the manifestation of the jar would be the *valid sense-perception* of the Self! You might retort—"As the Self is not the object of that manifestation, how could it be as you say?" But then, in your explanation, you do not say that the thing with which the sense-organ is in contact is that same thing which forms the object of the cognition in question; you only say, in general terms, 'the sense-contact of *the thing*;' and it is for this reason that we have put forward the above objection. If, however, you do not add the specifying qualification of the contact being with *that thing* which is the object of cognition,—then, if by 'cognition' you mean all cognitions in general then the aforesaid objection remains in force (as the Self also is an object of some cognition); if, on the other hand, you take it to refer to a particular individual cognition,—then the definition fails to include *all* Sense-perception. For in that case the word 'that' would be different for each individual cognition; since there is no such generic (comprehensive) concept as 'this' or 'that' (which would include all things that can be referred to by those words).

(351) Even for Prabhākara, who holds that every cognition consists of three factors (the *cognition*, the thing *cognised*, and the *cogniser*) [and who, for this reason, will readily admit that the Sense-perception of the cognised jar implies the Sense-perception of the cognising Self],—the objection would remain that, by the aforesaid definition, the cognition of the

* The reasoning in this paragraph is based to a great extent on verbal quibbling; hence the real drift can hardly be grasped in the English version.

Cloth would be the valid sense-perception of the Jar,—just in the same manner as we have shown above that the cognition of the jar would be the valid Sense-perception of the Self. If with a view to avoid this incongruity, you were to add the qualification ‘that which is produced by the sense-contact of *that* thing’,—then inasmuch as the words ‘that’ and ‘which’ would refer only to individual things, the definition would fail to include *all* Sense-perception. If then the denotations of the words ‘that’ and ‘which’ consisted of all-comprehensive concepts (including all things), then the cognition of the jar would have to be regarded as the valid Sense-perception of other things also (the words ‘that’ and ‘which’ of the definition referring equally to *all things*).

(352) If now (with a view to avoid the objection that the cognition of the jar would have to be regarded as the Sense-perception of the Self) * you were to add the *qualifying* clause ‘other than the Self,’ then, in that case, there would be no Sense-perception of the Self† (which is regarded by the Logician to be *perceptible*). And further, if the word ‘that’ were to be taken as including *all things*, then, there being no specification available, the cognition of the jar would have to be regarded, as the Sense-perception of the Cloth as well !

(353) The objections that we have put forward against the last (second) definition of Sense-perception are found to be applicable to the first definition also (mentioned in para. 337) —viz. that ‘Sense-perception is that valid cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object-

* The definition being—“the cognition proceeding from the sense-contact of a thing *other than the self*, is the Sense-perception of that thing. Or ‘the cognition that proceeds from the sense-contact of a thing is the Sense-perception of that thing (which is *other than that self*).’

† As the first objection would be accepted by the Prābhākara, the author puts forward another objection which is valid against the Prābhākara as well as the Naiyāyika.’

For by this definition also, the Sense-perception of one object will have to be regarded as the valid cognition of another object. And if, in order to avoid this difficulty, you were to add the explanation that—"that cognition (which proceeds from the contact of a certain object is to be regarded as the Valid Sense-perception of that object,"—then you lay yourself open to the objections which we have shown above to hold good in both cases—*i. e.*, both when you regard the words 'this' and 'that,' as pertaining to particular individual things, as well as when these are regarded as referring to all things (see paras. 350-51).

(354) Then again, the word 'Valid' ('*avyabhichāri*') in your definition is absolutely useless. For the cognition of *silver* in the *shell* is not produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the *silver*.* It might be urged that in this case also there is *with the silver* also, a *contact*, in the form of (and through) the impression that is present in the mind (having been left there by some previous perception of real silver).† But this we refuse to admit, on the ground that the 'impression' that is present is not that of the 'silver-ness' (generic character of 'silver') *as residing in what is before the eye, (i. e., the shell)‡*; and the *invalidity* too of the cognition is only in reference to such *silver-ness*, and not to *silverness in general*, which latter does really exist elsewhere (and a cognition of which would not be *invalid*).

(355) §If 'Sense-perception' be defined as 'direct or immediate cognition,'—then it would include also those direct or

* And hence this invalid cognition would be precluded by the qualification 'brought about by the contact of the *object* and the sense-organ'; and the word '*avyabhichāri*', meant to exclude such invalid cognitions, would be useless.

† And that hence this would not be excluded unless we add the qualification *avyabhichāri*.

‡ The impression is that of real silver; whereas what is cognised is the character of silver as residing in the object before the eye; and with regard to this latter then, there being no impression, there can be no *contact* in the form of the impression either.

§A third definition of 'Sense-perception' is now taken up.

immediate cognitions *which are wrong*. It might be urged that,—“we may add to the definition the qualification *valid or not incorrect* (from the standpoint of the Logician); or we may (from the standpoint of the Prābhākara*) absolutely deny the existence of any *wrong cognition*—which, according to him, is nothing else than the *non-perception of the difference* between the two things concerned.” But this view, we reply, cannot be maintained; as none of the alternatives of which it is capable is tenable. (a) Does the definition serve its purpose (of differentiating, and of ordinary usage in speech and action) when it has been itself comprehended? (b) or does it serve it while it is itself uncomprehended? The latter view cannot be accepted; because in that case, there would be no need for stating the definition; as the only purpose served by the statement of the definition is that it tends to bring about the comprehension of that definition,—and according to the view in question, the purposes of the definition are served while it is itself uncomprehended (so that its comprehension is not required for any useful purpose). Then as regards the first of the two alternatives mentioned, we ask—is the comprehension of the definition brought about by something else? or by your own statement? If by something else, then there is no necessity for the trouble that you take in stating the definition; as the only purpose served by the statement of the definition is the bringing about of its comprehension, and this comprehension is brought about by something else. If, on the other hand the comprehension is brought about by your own statement of it, then, we ask,—does your statement afford the comprehension of the ‘directness of perception’ by reason of its being the assertion of a trustworthy person (yourself)? or by reason of its having

* According to Prabhākara, when we have the idea of silver in the shell, we have simply the *absence* of ‘the cognition of the difference between the two substances,—and not any *positively wrong cognition*. So according to this view, there is no such thing as ‘Wrong Cognition,’ which would be included in the above definition.

the character of an 'inferential indicative' (and thereby affording an *inferential* cognition of that *directness*? The latter view is not possible, because it can not be shown that your *statement* is 'invariably concomitant' with the *directness of perception* (and without concomitance, the former cannot be a true *inferential indicative*). Nor is the former view tenable; because your *trustworthiness* is not accepted by your disputant; if it were accepted by him, then all that you seek to prove would be established by your merely asserting it, and there would be absolutely no need for you, in any case, to put forward reasons (in support of your views).

(356) The Logician now adds the following explanation:—“In stating the definition of Sense-perception what we do is to point out the fact of the character of 'directness' being the basis or reason of a certain cognition being spoken of as 'Sense-perception', to a person who knows what 'directness' is, but does not know that it is the basis or ground of a cognition being called 'Sense-perception.' And this pointing out is done only by way of inference, and not by a trustworthy assertion. Hence in stating the definition we are only putting forward the following inferential reasoning based upon universal negative premises:—*All Auditory and other Valid Cognitions,—or All Direct or Immediate Cognitions*—should be recognised or viewed as 'Sense-perception',—as they are Direct Cognitions,—*because every cognition that is not called 'Sense-perception' is not immediate*—as we find in the case of inferential cognitions';—the cognitions in question however are *immediate*,—hence they must be called 'Sense-perception.' The sentences too that put forward this reasoning are put forward, by the disputant, not as 'trustworthy assertion', but only as recalling to the mind the 'invariable concomitance' which is already known and accepted; or even when the invariable concomitance is not already known, the statement of the reasoning serves, at the time that the reasoning is put forward, to produce, in the mind of the opponent to whom it

is addressed, a desire to comprehend that concomitance, and thereby to bring about the knowledge of the invariable concomitance needed for the Valid Cognition (afforded by that concomitance); and thus there is no room for the objections urged in the preceding paragraph."

(357) The above explanation cannot be accepted. What do you mean by saying that "the cognitions should be recognised as *Sense-perception* (*pratyakṣatayū vyavahartayāḥ*)?"* Does the peculiarity of this recognition, or *vyavahāra*, consist in the peculiarity of its object (in the shape of the *character of Sense-perception*)? or in the peculiarity of the word to be employed in the *recognition*?

(358) In the former case, [does the person, to whom the above inferential reasoning is addressed, already know, by some other means, the *recognition* or *vyavahāra* of the particular object, —i. e., the *character of Sense-perception*? or does he not know it at all?] if he did not already know it, then, how could he have any idea,—even by the help of the statement of your definition—that with regard to the Direct Cognition, he † *should* bring about that *recognition* (i. e. that he *should* recognise Direct Cognition as 'Sense-perception')? As certainly a person who does not know *fire* can never be made, even by means of inferential reasonings, to understand

* The assertion 'they should be recognised as Sense-perception' cannot be regarded as declaring mere recognition in general; as in that case the additional words 'as sense-perception' would be absolutely redundant. So it must mean that the Cognitions in question are the objects of a *particular* recognition. Now, what is this particular recognition? Recognition or usage is of two kinds—(1) in the form of mere ideas, and (2) in the form of speech. Does then the assertion mean that the Cognitions in question are the objects of a *recognition* in the form of an *idea* of which the object is the *character of Sense-perception*? or does it mean that they are the objects of recognition in the form of being spoken of as 'Sense-perception'? That is to say, do you mean that they are to be *known* as 'Sense-perception' or that they are to be *spoken* of as 'Sense-perception'?

† And it is this idea that is expressed in the word '*vyavahartayāḥ*'; the sense is that until one already knows what a certain thing is, he cannot have the idea that *he should do that thing*.

the *relationship of fire*. If, on the other hand, he already knew it, then, inasmuch as it is absolutely unnecessary to make known what is already known, the statement of its definition, in the form of an inference, would be entirely useless. "But," the opponent rejoins, "One may have some sort of a vague notion in general terms that there is *some object* of the *Recognition of Sense-perception*, but he may not know the particular thing that should be recognised as 'sense-perception;' and it is to such persons that the definition is stated in the above mentioned inferential form." This also, we reply, is not possible. For what does such a man know? Does he know, merely in a vague and general manner, that a *recognition* has a basis (or object)? or that any *particular* recognition has such a basis? In the former case, the knowledge would be of no use in the case in question; as what we are considering is the case of a particular Recognition or usage (of 'Sense-perception,' and not of mere *usage in general*). In the latter case, to what would this *particular character* of the Recognition be due? (*i. e.*, is it due to the peculiarity of the *object* or to that of the *word*?). Thus you are forced back upon the dilemma put forward by us in para. 357 (the former of which two alternatives we have already shown to be untenable, and the latter also, we are going to show in para. 360, cannot be accepted).

(359) [Page 308] In the above manner the acceptance of all definition has to be rejected. For instance, things* cannot be accepted simply because there is a mere valid cognition (pure and simple) [produced by their definition]; as in that case, the rule of acceptance would be too wide (and confusing). If on the other hand, the thing has to

* Shall we accept the Jar as existing simply because its definition provides us with some vague valid cognition, in a general way? or, because its definition, afford a valid cognition of the Jar? In the former case, the valid cognition with regard to one thing might be the ground for the accepting of another thing. In the latter case, there is a vicious circle: the idea of the Jar afforded by the definition depending upon the Valid Cognition of that same Jar.

be accepted on account of the Valid Cognition of *that thing* (afforded by the definition), then who could avoid the inevitable vicious circle? If, in order to avoid this, the 'cognitive character' were held to be a peculiar characteristic (of the *Cognition* of that thing, and not of the thing itself, as in the latter case alone could there be the aforesaid 'vicious circle'),—then that would be a strong footing acceded to the theory that the *Cognition* has the shape or form (of its object).^{*} Then again, just as the inferential and other characters (' *anumānaṭva, āgamatva &c.*') do not proceed, or arise, from any *objects* (but from the Premises, Words, &c.),—so, in the same manner, the *character of the Cognition of the thing* also would proceed, not from the thing, (but from something else), [as by the view under consideration this character belongs to the *Cognition, and not to the thing*]; and thus the *object* would become a non-entity; [the *Cognition pertaining to Cognition, and not to things*]. †

And further, the particular cognition of a certain thing could not be accepted without a cognition of that cognition; and so on and on, for each cognition,—there being no end to this running after the series of cognitions! The Opponent might ask—"Under the circumstances, what would be the refuge for all the usage (of Speech and Action) with regard to things and their cognitions,—the usage which is always

* The Logician's standpoint is that the cognition differs from its object simply because, while the latter has a form, the former is formless. This view will not be compatible with the theory that the 'cognitive character' is a peculiar characteristic of the *cognition*, and not of the *thing*. Because this latter view would be possible only if there were an absolute identity between the *Cognition* and the thing *Cognised*; and this would mean that both are with form. And further, this identification of the *Thing* with its *Cognition* would be accepting the Idealistic position of the Bauddha.

† This is meant to combat the view that 'cognitive character' belongs to the *Cognition*, not by its own nature, but by reason of its relationship to the object *cognised*, and thus the necessity of the external object, as apart from the *Cognition*, remains. What the author means is that even so, the character would proceed from the *Cognition*, and not from the *Object*; just like other characters of cognitions—*inferential, verbal* and the like.

appearing before us; on the strength of the unanimity found with regard to it among all men and Scriptures?" To this we reply—These usages being found absolutely incapable of being established by the various theories propounded (by the Logician and his allies),—their sole refuge lies in surrendering themselves to the feet of the Philosophy of Indescribability.*

(360) Nor can we accept the second alternative mentioned in para. 357—That is, the peculiarity of the Recognition or *Vyavahāra* consists in the peculiarity of the word to be employed in the Recognition. Because, according to this view, the meaning of the inferential reasoning put forward in para. 356 would be as follows:—'The Auditory and other cognitions should be spoken of as (called) *Sense-perception* because they are direct or immediate cognitions, and so forth' And this also would not be right. As if you apply the word 'Sense-perception' to Immediate Cognition, simply because the word is not applied to the Non-immediate Cognitions, —*inferential* and the like,—then, for exactly the same reason, you should apply, with regard to the Immediate Cognition, all such words as '*hares horn*,' '*ja-va-ga-da-ḷa-sha*' † and the like (which latter also are not applied to non-immediate cognition)! In answer to this, you might urge that, "as a matter of fact, such words as '*ja-va-ga-da-ḷa-sha*' and the like are not known to have any meaning at all (being absolutely meaningless), for the simple reason that they are never used for expressing any thing; then, as regards such words as '*hare's horn*' and the like, these also are known as pertaining to (denoting) things that have absolutely no existence; on the other hand, such words as '*sense-perception*' and the like are universally known as pertaining to things that are really existent, as we often meet with such

* That is, the whole usage must be regarded as 'indescribable.'

† This is one of the '*pratyāhāra-sūtras*' of Pāṇini, where we have a combination of all the letters of the alphabet.

expressions as 'such and such a thing is quite perceptible by the senses' and so forth; and certainly, this makes a great difference (between the case of the word 'Sense-perception' and that of such words as 'hare's horn' and '*ja-na-ga-lu-li-shu,*' &c.)." This again will not serve your purpose, we reply. Because even this distinction cannot exclude such words as 'visual' and the like (which also are not applied to *inferential* and other cognitions); and hence, by your reasoning, these words would be applicable to each and every *Immediate* Cognition (and not to those obtained through the eye alone). "But," the Opponent rejoins, "as a matter of fact we find that even though the *Auditory* Cognition is *immediate*, the word 'visual' is not applied to it; which is not the case with the word 'Sense-perception' (which is found to be applied to all *immediate* Cognitions); and this makes a difference (between the cases of the words 'visual' and 'Sense-perception')." Well, in that case, the statement of the definition would be addressed to that person who already knows that 'the word *Sense-perception* is not applied to that cognition which is not *immediate*, and is applied to all those cognitions that are *immediate*'; and as such a person will have already ascertained the denotation of the word 'Sense-perception', just like the denotation of any ordinary word, by means of positive and negative induction (implied in the above two propositions),—the statement of the definition would be absolutely useless.

(361) The same reasonings should also be taken as refuting the theory that what is sought to be proved by the *inferential* reasoning put forward in para. 356, is that the Cognitions in question should be spoken of as *distinguished from inferential and other cognitions*; [as this differentiation also would be learnt by positive and negative induction from usage, and no statement of the definition would be needed for that purpose]: It might be urged that, 'the statement of the definition serves the purpose of reminding the person

of the denotation of the word which he knows already." But this also cannot be admitted. Because for one who knows the conventional meaning of the word 'Sense-perception,' all that would be needed for reminding him of that meaning would be simply the mention of the word 'Sense-perception,' and the statement of the definition would remain as useless as ever. In fact, if a person already knowing the meaning of a certain word, while remembering that meaning by the help of the word only, were to stand in need of being reminded of it by means of the statement of its definition,—then it would be necessary to put forward definitions again in order to remind him of the meanings of the words contained in that definition; as the two cases would be exactly analogous; and so also with regard to the meanings of words contained in this latter definition; and so on and on, there would be no end to such definitions!

(362) The Opponent proceeds—"The statement of the definition has certainly no use when addressed to the opponent in a discussion, as he does not acknowledge the trustworthy character of his disputant; in fact in all scientific works, definitions are stated for the purposes of the pupil; he regards the author of the work as trustworthy and authoritative; consequently when the teacher puts forward to him the definition in the form—'what you already know to be expressed by the word 'Immediate-Cognition' is also what is meant by the word 'Sense-perception,'—this statement of the definition convinces the pupil as regards the meaning of the word, simply by reason of its being *a trustworthy assertion* for him." This is not right, we reply; as if scientific works are addressed only to pupils, and not to opponents, then, inasmuch as the pupil would be convinced of the truth of the theories by a mere categorical statement of these, there would be absolutely no need for the putting forward of any reasonings, &c.

(363) In answer to this, if you hold that, "that sentence in scientific works which contains the statement of reasonings, &c., may be regarded as addressed to the Opponent, while the statement of the definition is of use to the pupil only, who is convinced of the trustworthy character of the author of the work,"—even then, your position will not be tenable; as the purpose for which the teacher would propound the definition would, according to you, be the mere pointing out of the meaning of a certain word; and this purpose is served by other works, which have been composed by the sages with the professed purpose of pointing out the conventional meanings of words,—such works, for instance, as those dealing with the meanings and genders of words, grammar, and so forth. Then if the subject-matter of your scientific work were only such as is already dealt with and accomplished by other works, then why do you not make it your business to ascertain the etymology of words, pointing out the roots from which they are derived and the affixes by which they are formed? Why too do you not proceed to mention the genders of words? For certainly ignorance on these points also is conducive to defeat in a discussion (just as much as the ignorance of the meanings of such words as 'Sense-perception' and the like). Or it may be that you do not deal in your works with the subject-matter of grammar, but restrict yourself to the expressing of the meanings of words. But even then, your work remains extremely deficient on that point; as there are many other words explained in other dictionaries,—why have not these words been explained by you? If you reply that you explain, in your works, not all words, but only those that are of use in your own books,—then too, just as you have to state the definition of a word occurring in a certain sentence in your book, in the same manner, it would be necessary for you to state the definitions of words appearing in the statement of the former definitions; and so on and on, there would be no end to the definitions of words occurring in those

definitions; as each one of these words will have been used in your books, (and as such calling for definitions from you)! If you say that you point out the meanings of such words as 'Sense-perception' and the like, because as regards the meanings of these words, there is a difference of opinion among various disputants putting forward diverse definitions; while with regard to other words, there being no such difference of opinion, you do not explain these latter,—then too we reply, there is a deficiency in your works. As there are many words (not explained by you with regard to the meanings of which there is a clear difference of opinion; for instance (1) with regard to the indeclinables *vā* (or) and the like, some people hold that they have independent denotations of their own, while others hold them to be merely illuminative (of the meanings of other words); (2) such words as '*chhidhura*' and the like are regarded by some to have an active and by others a passive signification; (3) the word '*bhūva*' is regarded by some as meaning 'the individual form of a thing' and by others as denoting the genus of 'being'; (4) the word '*adhikarāṇa*' is held by some to denote *something that prevents a thing from falling*, and by others as expressing that *in which something else inheres*; and so forth. Why then have you not put forward definitions of these? We desist from further prolongation of discussion on this subject.

[It is not possible to define what the 'immediateness' of the cognition is.]

(364). Further, we ask—what do you mean by the 'immediateness' of the Cognition? It cannot be defined as consisting in the fact of the Cognition being the manifestation (in consciousness) of the object with specific qualifications.* Because, if the character of *being with specific qualifica-*

* The qualification 'with specific qualifications' has been added for the purpose of excluding Inferential Cognition etc., where though the object is manifested, it is so only in its general form and not as endowed with its specific qualifications.

tions were a mere extrinsic or **accidental feature* of the object cognised, then the said 'immediateness' would apply to *inferential* and other cognitions also.† If, on the other hand, the character be an intrinsic and permanent attribute of the object, then for the sake of the cognition of that attribute also, we should have to have another attribute; and so on and on, a whole series of attributes would be necessary; and if there were to be any end to this series, then of the *last* 'attribute' of this series, if there could be a cognition without a further attribute,—then, inasmuch as the cognition of that attribute would not have the character of 'Sense-perception', the whole series, down to the very first cognition, would have to be regarded as '*Non-sensuous*'. If, on the other hand, there were to be no end to the series [i.e., if every attribute were to be perceived by the senses along with all its attributes]. ‡ then the Sense-perception embodied in the minor premiss (wherein the concomitance of the minor term and the inferential probans is asserted) also would be one that would include within itself the Sensuous perception of *all its attributes*; and as the inferential conclusion following from that premiss would also pertain to the same object (the

* The distinction between *apuhayana*, an accidental feature or character, and *Vishāyana*, permanent attribute, has been explained in a footnote under para 345.

† Even though in the inferential cognition of fire in the mountain, the fire that is cognised is only in the vague generic form of *fire in general*, and not as fire with certain definite properties of *colour* &c.,—yet there can be no doubt that the fire is cognised along with such accidental peculiarities, as *existing in the mountain, giving out smoke*, and so forth, which even though not its intrinsic permanent attributes, are yet its specific qualifications for the time being.

‡ In the inferential cognition, the mountain contains fire because it is smoking, the minor premiss is in the form 'wherever smoke is, there is fire.' This being a fact of *sense-perception* would mean that the *smoke* as well as the *fire* are cognised by the senses, *along with all their attributes*. And from this it should follow that the conclusion drawn from this premiss involves the cognition of *fire with all its attributes*, as the *fire* that forms the predicate of the inferential conclusion must be of the same character as that appearing in the premiss. Hence there would be no difference between the fire as cognised by Sense-perception and that cognised by Inference, and thus the latter would fulfil all the conditions of 'immediateness.'

minor term with all its attributes), the inferential cognition would have to be regarded as 'immediate.'

(365). In reply to this it might be urged that,—“inasmuch as the premiss does not provide a comprehensive cognition (of all *attributes*, of *fire*, for instance), there could be no inferential cognition of these.” But in that case, in the first place, there would be no possibility of any comprehensive cognition of all those attributes; and secondly, there would be no possibility of any *inferential* cognition of any *individuals*.* [It might be argued that no generic entity can be cognised without a cognition of the individuals constituting it. But] just as the generic entity cannot be cognised without the individuals constituting it, so the individual also can never be cognised without its endless attributes. If you think that—“in the case of the inferential cognition it is not necessary to have the idea of all the endless attributes† of the object of that cognition, for the simple reason that in this case the cognition does not remain incomplete without that idea (while in the case of the cognition of the generic *class*, it is incomplete until there is some idea of the innumerable individuals constituting it,)”—then‡ we would meet that by the counter-argument that, as a matter of fact, the cognition of the

* Because, just as the inferential conclusion cannot pertain to the fire with its endless attributes, in the same manner it could not pertain to the endless *individual* fires;—the object of inferential cognition being only the *fire* as a generic entity.

† We cannot have any cognition of the class unless we have an idea of the individuals constituting it. But the inferential cognition of fire in the mountain is found to be accomplished even without our having any knowledge of its endless attributes.

‡ The idea underlying this rather obscure passage is that we cannot accept the categorical denial that the cognition of fire does *not* need for its completion, the cognition of its endless attributes. As a matter of fact, we have as much reason to regard the cognition of attributes as indispensable for the cognition of the object to which they belong as the cognition of the individuals is in that of the class containing them. And under the circumstances, if you do not regard as indispensable, the cognition of the attributes as an integral part of the inferential cognition, then, inasmuch as it cannot be denied that we have their cogni. on, it will have to be taken as Sense-perception.

individual thing (fire, for instance) is not found to be complete without some idea of its endless attributes; and hence [if this necessary idea of the attributes of the object of inferential cognition were not regarded as forming an integral part of that object] that idea of the attributes would have to be regarded as 'sensuous'!

(366) And further [inasmuch as under this alternative it would be absolutely necessary to postulate the cognition of an endless series of specific attributes], rather than assume the cognition (manifestation) of an *endless* series of attributes, which are never found to be actually cognised, it would certainly be much simpler to assume the presence of a *single* attribute in the shape of 'immediateness'! Specially as the only ground that you have for making the assumption of the endless attributes is the necessity of finding a basis for the well-recognised fact of certain cognitions being universally regarded as 'immediate'! And certainly this fact could be easily explained on the basis of the single attribute of 'immediateness' (which obviates the necessity of assuming an endless series of attributes). Nor, on this ground, would it be right to assume the single attribute of 'immediateness' (as serving the purposes of the required definitions of 'Sense-perception'); because of the same reason that has been shown above.* This matter (of the definition of 'immediateness') we shall deal with in greater detail later on (when we shall examine the nature of the generic character of 'immediateness.')

* This reason has been variously explained by the commentators—(1) The *Shāñkari* explains the reason as 'because such an immediateness would apply also to the *inferential* cognition of the immediateness of the object cognised.' (2) The *Chit-sukhī*—“Because no such character as 'immediateness' is found to be actually cognised in any case; and because the well-known fact of certain cognitions being universally regarded as *immediate* can be explained on the basis of the *immediateness* which, according to the Vedantin, is as *incapable* of definition or explanation *anirvachaniya*) as ev' ything else. The *Vidyāsāgari* favours this latter interpretation.

(367) [Page 317] What again do you mean by the word 'vishēṣa' ('specific qualifications,' as occurring in your definition of 'immediateness')? If it means 'that which differentiates or distinguishes,' then your definition will fail to include the *non-determinate* Perception.* If on the other hand the 'vishēṣa' be held to be the specific individual form of the object as apart from everything else in the world, and 'Sense-perception' to be the manifestation of this individual form,—which can be said of *non-determinate* perception also,—then this character of 'Sense-perception' would not apply to the *sensuous* cognition, from a distance, of a thing in its vague, generic form†. Because if even in this vague generic cognition the thing were to be cognised as 'apart from all the rest of the universe,' then there would be no possibility of Doubt, etc., in any case.‡ It might be argued that in the case of the vague generic cognition also, there is a 'manifestation of specific qualifications,' inasmuch as there are present (even in such cases) such distinctions as those due to the *cogniser* and so forth.§ But in that case, the same being true of the *inferential* and other kinds of cognition also, these also would become included in 'sensuous perception.'

* As in this there is no notion of any kind of differentiation or distinction; and yet it is regarded by the logician to be 'sense-perception' *par excellence*, which has been defined by the *Nyāyasūtra* as something that is 'non-determinate' (*anirdeśhya*).

† When from a distance we see a tree, we perceive it simply, in a general way as a 'tree,' and not as having certain properties that go to individualise it and show it to be 'apart from all other trees, and all other things in the world.'

‡ We have a doubt only when we have a vague perception of the thing, and do not perceive exactly whether the thing we see is a post or a human figure. If in all cognitions, we were to perceive the thing as apart from everything else, then the post would be perceived *as post*; and hence there would be no possibility of our ever regarding it as a human figure.

§ The sense of this is that the perception need not be the manifestation of the thing as distinguished from all other things, etc.; if there is the manifestation of some sort of distinction, that is enough. And even though in a generic cognition we may not perceive any other distinguishing feature of the thing, yet the fact is always present in our mind that we, as the cogniser of that cognition, are distinct from the cogniser of other cognitions. And thus the vague generic cognition also fulfils the necessary conditions of 'immediateness.'

(368) "The 'immediateness' of Perception may be explained as consisting in its being *an apprehension brought about by the instrumentality of the sense-organs.*" Against this some people put forward the objection that, inasmuch the 'sense-organ' also is defined as that which is the instrument of 'immediate cognition', there is a mutual inter-dependence (between the two definitions). But this objection is not quite right; because it is quite possible to define 'sense-organ' as* *that which, while itself unknown, is the instrument of valid cognition, and is qualified by the positive character.* There is however another and a much sounder objection against the above definition of 'immediateness'; *viz.*, that unless we fully recognise the special features of the effect (*i.e.*, the cognition) with regard to what would the sense-organ be regarded as 'instrumental'?†

(369) This same reasoning—*viz.* the impossibility of ascertaining the 'instrumental' character—serves to reject the view that "there is (in the case of sensuous Perception) a *cognisedness* of things which is of a peculiar character ‡; and it is in the productiveness of that *cognisedness* that the 'immediateness' of the cognition consists;"—specially § because so long as we do not ascertain (hit upon)

* Inferential and other kinds of cognition have their instruments also duly cognised. The sense-organs however are not themselves known. The *positive character* is added in order to preclude 'non-apprehension' which is recognised by the Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsakas to be a distinct means of valid cognition (of negation). And as this definition of the sense-organ does not contain the words 'immediate cognition,' there need be no 'mutual interdependence' in the definition of 'immediateness' just put forward.

† Until we have fully grasped the distinctive character of the cognition, we cannot recognise the instrumental character of the sense-organs. Thus the recognition of this latter cannot be necessary for grasping the real character of the cognition; consequently there arises a 'vicious circle'; the knowledge of 'immediateness' depending upon the cognition of the instrumentality of sense-organs, and *vice versa*.

‡ This 'peculiar character' is that whereby the object is spoken of as 'directly perceived.'

§ Unless we have some basis for a comprehensive idea of *all* sensuous cognitions, we cannot form any such notion as that 'all sensuous cognitions are the cause of the appearance of *cognisedness*.' The sense is that if the opponent succeeds in pointing out any such basis of uniformity among all sensuous cognitions, that uniformity might be regarded as constituting the true definition of sensuous Perception.

some uniformity (among all sensuous cognitions which could enable us to speak of them *all* as bringing about *cognisedness*), we cannot very well know what their causal efficiency is (with regard to that *cognisedness*). Nor could that uniformity be regarded as established simply by the fact that without such uniformity the peculiar character of the *cognisedness* cannot be explained. Because that peculiar character can very well be explained by the peculiar character of other causes * (*i.e.*, causes other than the sensuous cognition).

(370) Nor can the 'immediateness' of cognitions be explained as *the character of being produced by the cognisable object*. Because this definition would be too wide. † If (in order to avoid this) it be defined as the character of being produced by the object cognisable *by itself* (*i.e.*, *by that same cognition*)—then, we reply, that this cannot be accepted as a comprehensive definition (including all sensuous cognitions), as the denotation of the word '*sva*', 'itself', is distinct with each individual cognition; and also because this definition also is not free from the faults noticed before. ‡

(371) If again, *Immediate Cognition* be defined as that cognition by which, when the object has been cognised, there is no further desire to cognise it §—then, we reject this also. Because in the case of such dear things as one's child, &c., we find that even after the child has

* Such as, *e. g.*, the circumstantial details under which the cognition appears.

† The cognition of the jar may be regarded as the 'Sensuous Immediate Cognition of the cloth.' As this cognition would certainly be produced *by a cognisable object*,—though not necessarily by the object that is actually cognised. And as the self is a cognisable object and *all* cognitions—sensuous, inferential, &c.—are equally produced by the self, all cognitions would be Immediate and Sensuous.

‡ The fault referred to is the one explained in the second foot-note to para. 369.—Or it may be the very patent objection that all cognitions—inferential, &c. also—may be regarded as *produced by objects cognisable by them*.

§ The idea underlying this definition is that even when we have cognised an object by Inference or Word, &c., we desire to *perceive* it directly by our senses; which is not the case when we have once perceived it directly.

been directly perceived, the desire to see it still continues.* If, in order to avoid this, 'Immediateness' were defined as that character by reason of which, when the cognition has appeared, there is no desire for any such further cognition as is not of the same kind, †—This also cannot be accepted: because in the first place, it is not known yet (*i.e.* until you have provided a correct definition) what cognition is of the same kind (as any particular Sensuous Cognition); and under the circumstances, it cannot be ascertained what is not of the same kind;—secondly, ‡ in the case of *inferential* or *verbal* cognition of the prosperity of our enemy, we have no desire to have any *sensuous* cognition of that prosperity (and thus your definition of Immediate cognition will include that inferential cognition also, as the *sensuous cognition* that we do not desire would be *not of the same kind* as that);—and thirdly, some people urge the objection that in the case where we see fire, if we have a doubt as to whether it is fire or the red Ashoka-blossom, then we desire and do have the *inferential* cognition that it is fire, following from our perception of smoke.§

(372) Another definition is now put forward:— || "The 'immediateness' of the cognition consists in its being a *direct*

* Even when the child has been seen, one wishes to see it again. So under the present definition the first *seeing* of the child would not be 'immediate' cognition.

† That is to say, when the thing has been cognised by Sensuous Perception, there is no desire to have any inferential or verbal cognition of the same thing,—even though there may be a desire for further *sensuous* cognitions, as in the case just mentioned.

‡ When we have heard of something good happening to our enemy, we do not wish to go and see it; and thus the verbal cognition of the prosperity would be one of which there would be no desire for a cognition which is *not of the same kind* (*i.e.*, which is *sensuous*).

§ Here then even after the Sensuous Perception of fire we have the desire for its *inferential* cognition; and thus this *sensuous* perception would not be included in your definition.

|| The sense-organ, or sense-power, itself is regarded by the Logician as *imperceptible*; hence the direct apprehension brought about by an unperceived instrument would be *sense-perception*; but 'mind' also is unperceived and it is the instrument of

apprehension which has its specific cause unknown;—or this same with the further qualification ‘positive’ added to the ‘cause (*i.e.*, that direct apprehension which has its positive specific cause unknown).” But this also cannot be accepted; as it would fail to include the sensuous perception of ‘long’ (‘short’, ‘similar’) and such other characters, * which stand in need of ‘and are to that extent brought about by) the cognition of the correlative (basis or standard of comparison). It might be argued that in this case the *basis* or *standard* that is *known* is not the *cause* of the other cognition; it is only the *cognition* of that basis or standard that is its cause; specially as we find that we can have the cognition of something that we see as being *longer* than another thing which may not exist at the time (and which we might have seen sometime before; [and which, being nonexistent at the time, could not be the *cause* of the cognition]. † But exactly similar is the case with *inferential indicatives*; like ‘smoke’, &c., ‡ [where also all inferential cognitions, of fire for instance, are brought about by the *cognition of the inferential indicative* which cognition constitutes the minor premiss]; specially as

inferential cognition;—hence in order to exclude this, the word ‘specific’ is added,—Mind being the *general* or *common* instrument of *all* cognitions. The subsequent addition of ‘positive’ is with a view to the Mimāmsaka, who holds the cognition of ‘negation’ to be due to *non-perception*; and as this would be the *unknown specific* cause of the cognition of negation, the definition would apply to this also. As however this cause would be a *negative* one, the addition of the qualification ‘positive’ would exclude it.

* A thing is known as ‘long’ only in comparison with a shorter thing; the shorter thing therefore may be regarded as a *cause* of the cognition of ‘long’; and thus this latter cognition will have its cause (at least one of its causes) ‘known’. Similarly with the cognition of all characters based upon correlatives.

† And thus in this case also, the cause is the *cognition* of that other thing; and as the cognition cannot be ‘known,’ the cognition of ‘long’ &c. having an *unknown* cause, will fulfil the conditions of the definition.

‡ All inferential cognitions are brought about by the *cognition of the inferential indicative*, contained in the minor premiss,—which cognition also, like your ‘cognition of the past thing’ being *unknown*, inferential cognitions would fulfil the conditions, of your definition.

even with reference to the past we have an inferential cognition 'there was fire at that place,—because I had seen smoke issuing from it'.* Then as regards the view that the object cognized is regarded as the *cause* of the cognition only in so far as it is a qualification† (determining factor) of the cognition,—the same may be said with regard to the aforesaid 'basis' (or correlative also,—which is a determining factor in the cognition, and as such may be regarded as its *cause*).

(273) "In the above definition," the opponent explains, "what the adjective *specific* shows is that the cause meant is the *Instrument* (and not any and every cause.)‡" But this also we cannot accept. For in a case where some future event is inferred from an *inferential indicative*, which also is *inferred as something to come in the future*,§—this inferential indicative being yet in the future, and hence non-existing, could not be regarded as the *Instrument*; and hence this inferential cognition would not be one that has its *Instrument known* (and would thus become included in the definition).

* This special case is put forward in answer to the view that it is the inferential indicative (smoke) that is the cause of Inference, and not its cognition. We see smoke in the morning, but owing to certain pressing circumstances we fail to deduce the conclusion at the time. In the evening however, some circumstances happening to remind us of our having seen smoke, we *infer in the evening* that 'fire existed at the place, because smoke had been seen there'; in this case it cannot be denied that it is the *cognition of smoke* that is the *cause* of the inferential cognition.

† And hence there need be nothing very incongruous in regarding the Inferential indicative as the *cause* of Inferential Cognition.

‡ What is meant by this explanation is that in the case of Inferential cognitions, it is the inferential indicative that is the *Instrument*; the cognition of this being only a *process* tending towards the same end; and as such capable of being regarded as a *cause*, though not an *Instrument*; and as the inferential indicative must be *known*, no inferential cognition could be such as would have its *Instrument unknown*.

§ As when perceiving certain atmospheric conditions, we infer that 'clouds will come,' and from that again we infer 'there will be rain.'

(374) "In all cases of inferential cognition," the opponent adds, "the cognition of the Inferential Indicative may be accepted to be the 'Instrument'; and as according to me all cognitions are *self-illuminated*, the cognition of the Inferential Indicative also would be 'known'; and hence all Inferential cognitions would have their Instruments *known*." This can not be, we reply; as we have no proof for the view that it is the *known* 'cognition of the inferential Indicative' that is a factor in the 'Instrument' of Inferential Cognitions;* specially as the cognitions pointed out above (viz. those of the inferential Indicatives yet to come) can not be regarded as 'instruments' [as if these also were so regarded, then an inferential cognition would have two 'Instruments'—the 'Inferential Indicative' and the 'Cognition of this indicative,' and this would be opposed to the very idea of 'Instrument.'] In fact, if the character of *being known* (as belonging to the cognition of the Inferential Indicative),—even though a mere circumstantial non-essential accident—were accepted as an essential factor in the Instrument, then the definition of 'Sense-perception' would not apply to the *perception of the jar*, which might by mere chance appear immediately after the *inferential cognition* of the eye (where the inferential cognition, though a mere accidental circumstance, would be regarded as a factor in the 'Instrument' of the succeeding Perception); and as thus that Instrument would be *known*, the Perception would not have its Instrument *unknown*.

(375) If it be added that in the case of Inferential cognitions, the instrument is *always* 'known' (while it is only in very few cases of sensuous Cognition that the instru-

* And hence we have no authority for accepting the view that the Instrument of Inferential Cognitions is *known*. The reason for this denial of proof is that the character of *being known* is what the logician calls *anyathāsiddha*, by which is meant all that is *non-essential*, tho' merely accidental circumstances which are found to be, by chance, concomitant with the cause.

ment is *known*),—this also can not be admitted; as in the first place, if the qualification 'always' were meant to be added to the affirmative assertion (viz. that Inferential cognition is that which has its instrument *always known*), then it would be absolutely superfluous; (as this idea of *invariableness* is present in the very conception of the 'Instrument,' which is a kind of 'cause,' and all causes are '*invariable antecedents*')*; on the other hand, if it were added to the negative assertion (that 'sensuous perception' has its instrument *always* 'not known')—then the definition would fail entirely; inasmuch as it is possible to have sensuous Cognitions proceeding immediately after the sense-organ concerned may by chance have become known.† Nor may it be urged that the 'invariableness' spoken of is one that is regarded as an integral part of the 'Instrument' itself. Because even then, the aforesaid 'superfluousness' remains:—'invariableness' entering into the very conception of the 'Cause', there can be no need of stating it. It might be argued that—"the addition of the qualification 'always' is not altogether superfluous; as without the qualification, the definition becomes faulty (becoming 'too wide')." But the faultiness or discrepancy in the definition remains all the same, even after the addition of the qualification [because 'invariableness' being involved in the conception of the 'instrument' itself, if the presence of this word does not suffice to save the definition from becoming 'too wide', then the actual addition of the word 'always' or 'invariably' also cannot save it from that contingency, specially as that which is not an *invariable antecedent* is never regarded as 'cause'; for instance] Colour is not a 'cause' in the sensuous perception of Taste. It might be argued that Colour is not a 'cause' because it is merely an

* And thus to say that inferential cognition has a 'known Instrument' is the same as to say that it has an instrument that is *always* known.

† For instance, in the example quoted above, the perception of the jar appearing after the eye has been cognised by means of inference; thus the definition becomes too narrow.

accidental (non-essential) concomitant. Then, we reply, the same may be said with regard to Inferential Cognitions also (as shown in para. 374).

(376). [Page 322] Then again, when you make the denial (of the knowledge of 'instrument' in the case of Sensuous Perception), it is incumbent upon you to fix upon some uniform character (that would apply to *all* Sensuous Perceptions); as in the absence of such a uniform character, to what would the 'invariableness' pertain? [The very idea of 'invariableness' involving the necessity of a conception of *all* individual cases]. Thus there is no escape for you unless you point out the uniform character of the effect under consideration (i.e. Sensuous Perception). In fact, even if you omit the word 'always' in your definition, there is no escape for you until you have pointed out the aforesaid 'uniform character.'* If, in order to avoid having to point out of this *uniform character* (of all sensuous cognitions), you were to assert your definition *with regard to each individual sensuous cognition in the form*—'the instrument of this particular cognition is *not known*',—then we would say that it would be extremely difficult for you to prove that even that individual cognition has not for its instrument things (the eye, for instance) known before that cognition. Hence it is necessary for you to prove that the *general* character (of *having the instrument known*) is absent in *all cognitions* of the same kind, *i.e., sensuous* [as the assertion of the character with regard to each particular individual would, as shown above, fail to include *all sensuous cognitions*'].

* I. E. Even if you define sensuous cognition as that which has its Instrument not known, and not as that which has its Instrument *always* not known, it will be necessary to find some uniform character which could enable us to form a single conception of *all* sensuous Cognitions. The sense of these objections is that, until the uniform character (pertaining to *all* sensuous Cognitions) is pointed out, there can be no escape from the above difficulties;—and if such a uniform character is pointed out then that would suffice for a definition of 'sensuous cognition', and there would be no need for any other.

(377). Another definition of Sensuous Perception and Immediate Cognition is next taken up:—If Perception be defined as that valid cognition of an object which is not intervened by anything else,—then it should be explained with reference to what would this ‘intervention’ be? and also what is that ‘intervention’? “The intervention is with reference to the sense-organ (*i.e.* between the object perceived and the sense-organ perceiving),—and it is *non-proximity* (or non-contact).” But then, it comes to be only another and a round-about way of saying that *immediate cognition is the manifestation of an object in contact with the sense-organ*; and we have already shown that this definition is not tenable; specially as it would include the *inferential* cognition that we may have of our own *eye-ball* (which is in contact with the organ of vision, eye)!

(378). If then Sensuous Perception or Immediate Cognition be defined as* *the cognition that does not proceed from a cognition*,—then it would not apply to many determinate Cognitions (which, according to the Logician, follow from the corresponding Non-Determinate Cognitions).†

(379) [Page 324]. The above reasoning also serves to refute the definition of Immediate Cognition as ‘that which does not proceed from the cognition of any other thing.’‡ Because the Determinate Cognition has for its

* Inferential Cognition proceeds from the cognition of invariable concomitance; Verbal Cognition from the cognition of words; and Analogical Cognition from the cognition of similarity. Hence it is only Sensuous Cognition that does not proceed from any cognition.

† According to the Logician, when we see the jar, the first cognition that we have is purely non-determinate, or vague; and from this the determinate or definite cognition of the jar follows. Thus this latter cognition proceeds from the preceding cognition; and as such cannot be included in the definition.

‡ This definition is put forward with the view that Inferential and other cognitions are brought about by the cognitions of something other than the object of those cognitions, while the Non-determinate cognition has the same object as that of the following determinate cognition; and as such both of these become included in this new definition. The author however contends that this definition also fails to include the Determinate Cognition. Because the object of this latter cannot be regarded to be exactly the same as that of the non-determinate cognition; as the latter does not cognise the

object also the determining or differentiating characters, which are something more than that which forms the object of the non-determinate Cognition, specially as for the bringing about of the Determinate Cognition *it would be necessary to have the cognition of that (something totally different from the object of the cognition itself) from which that object would be differentiated.

(380) The Opponent propounds another definition :—
 “Immediate Cognition is that which does not proceed from the cognition of anything that is not included in its own objective. Nor does this definition fail to include the Sensuous Perception of an object which (as in the Determinate Cognition) is perceived along with something else from which it is distinguished—i.e. its correlative. Because this something else also, being virtually included in the objective of the Perception, is accepted as being the Object of that Perception; just as in the case of Recognition† the idea of ‘that’ is regarded as included in the Sensuous Perception. Or (in view of such cognition) we may add to the definition a further qualifying clause, ‘apart from its correlative’ (Immediate Cognition thus being that which does not proceed from the cognition of anything that is not included in its own objective, with the exception of its own correlative.” But this definition also cannot be accepted. For in the first place, it is corroded (rendered unacceptable) by the word

determining characters which appear in the determinate Cognition. And hence this also, as proceeding from the non-determinate cognition, would be one that proceeds from the cognition of something other than its own object.

• The opponent might argue that even though a few additional characters enter into the objective of the determinate cognition, its object proper remains the same as that of the Non-determinate Cognition. In reply to this it is argued that the determinate cognition has for its object something as possessed of definite characteristics and thereby *differentiated from other things*. And thus that cognition would depend upon the cognition of these other things also.

† When we see a certain thing and recognise it as being *the same as that which we had seen elsewhere*, the notion of ‘that’ entering into this recognition is accepted as forming part of the recognition.

'*sva*' ('its own').* Secondly, if we took each individual cognition by itself, then we could not ascertain the fact of its *not proceeding* (from the cognition of something else, &c.) †; and if in order to avoid this, you were to have recourse to the remedy that all cognitions *of the kind* of the individual in question are found to be such as cannot rightly be regarded as proceeding from any cognitions of the other kind,—then it becomes necessary for you to postulate a definite comprehensive *kind* or *class* of cognitions (whose cause or source no other cognition would be, and which would be your immediate Sensuous Cognition); ‡ and thus you fall into the same pit as before.

(381) Another definition of 'Immediateness' is now put forward :—“ The *Immediateness* of a cognition consists in its presenting to consciousness something that is characterised or determined by its own time (*i.e.* the point of time at which the cognition itself appears).” This also we cannot accept. Because in the first place, in this case also it is not easy to ascertain the meaning of the word '*sva*' (*its own*) §; and secondly, in what way could

* If the word '*sva*' refers to all cognitions, then the definition includes all kinds of cognitions,—sensuous, inferential, and the like. If however, it refer to only an individual cognition, then it cannot apply to *all* sensuous cognitions.

† For ascertaining any causal relationship, it is necessary for us to have comprehensive notions of *all* individual effects as proceeding from a certain cause. And conversely the absence of causal relationship also cannot be ascertained without a similar comprehensive notion. This comprehensive notion we could not have, if we took every individual cognition by itself, and as such we could not be sure of it not proceeding from the cognition of something else.

‡ That is to say, you cannot have any idea of a comprehensive class, without the idea of some character that is common to all individuals included in the class. Thus then, before you have a definition of 'sensuous cognition' you must have the idea of some character that subsists in all sensuous cognitions, and not in any other kind of cognition. Well in that case, this same common character will serve as the definition applying to all sensuous cognitions, and there would be no necessity for propounding another definition.

§ As shown in the second note on the preceding para.

this definition exclude the inferential and other kinds of cognition? The Opponent might answer as follows—* “In the case of Inferential Cognition, the object cognised is determined or characterised by the time that enters into the notion of invariable concomitance (and not by that of the cognition itself). Even in the case of the inference of the rise of the ocean-tide from the perception of the full-moon,—where the object inferred (the tidal rise) is determined by the time at which the inference appears (and as such this would appear to be included in the above definition of Immediate Cognition),—what makes the object to be determined by the time of the inferential cognition is the fact of its entering into (forming an object of) the idea of invariable concomitance (*whenever there is full-moon, there is a rise in the ocean-tide, where the tidal rise is determined by all points of time where the Full Moon appears*).” This explanation cannot be accepted. Because even though it may be possible to show that the object is determined by all points of time—yet the fact remains that in the case of inferential cognitions of the kind you mention (*viz.* of the tidal rise from the full moon), the object is determined by the time of the cognition (and as such comes within the pale of your definition of immediate Cognition). Nor will it serve your purpose if you add the qualifying clause that “that cognition is to be regarded as *immediate* which has *all cognitions of its kind* such as have their objects determined by their times” †; because if you already know what forms the distinguishing characteristic of the *kind or class* to which all immediate Cognitions belong, then what

* The sense of this is that in the case of inferring fire from smoke, the fire that is cognised, is cognised as something that exists *wherever* smoke exists,—and thus the fire is not determined only by the time of the Inference but by all times at which smoke exists.

† The sense of this qualifying clause is that in the case of Inferential Cognitions only a few stray instances can be found where the object is determined by the time of the cognition; and it is not so with *all* inferential cognitions. As regards Immediate cognitions, they are all such as have their object determined by their time.

is the use of putting forward another definition at all? In reality however we shall show later on* that it is not possible to have any such *kind* or *class*. The opponent might add a further qualification—*viz*: “with the exception of what is brought about by the notion of invariable concomitance &c.”† This also we cannot accept; as the qualifying clause itself being enough to exclude all Cognitions (that are not Immediate), it would be useless for you to introduce the qualification of *time*. Though we shall show later on‡ that even that qualifying clause cannot serve to exclude the other cognitions.

(382) Some people have urged against the above definition of ‘Immediateness’ the following objection:—§ “As the Logician denies the self-apprehension of Cognitions, it is not possible for any cognition to have for its object something determined by its own time.” But this is not right. Because the *time* meant (as the determinant of the object) is that which actually, by chance, happens to be the time of the particular cognition || ; and what the definition really comes to mean is that the Immediate Cognition is that which manifests or discloses (presents to consciousness) something existing at the present time; and as to what is this ‘something existing at the present time,’ everyone can explain that; as has been thus declared (in the *Shlokavārtika*):—‘That

* Page 330, ‘Pandit’ edition, where it is shown that *Immediateness* cannot be regarded as a particular *jāti* or kind of Sensuous Cognition.

† That is to say “Immediate cognition is that cognition which, *not being brought about by the notions of invariable concomitance, &c.* has its object determined by its own time.”

‡ Page 335, ‘Pandit’ edition.

§ The sense of the objection is that the *time of the Cognition* is that point of time which is qualified (and hence accompanied) by the Cognition; and hence if a cognition had for its object something determined by its time, then the cognition itself would form a factor in its own objective; and this would involve the *self-apprehension* of the Cognition.

|| The time thus is not something inherent in the Cognition—whereby its apprehension would involve self-apprehending by the Cognition—but an accidental adjunct.

which exists at the present time and is in contact with the eye and the other sense-organs, is apprehended by these.' [4-84] Hence the only valid objection against the definition is what we have shown above (in para. 381).

(383) Nor can Immediate Cognition be defined as* "that which proceeds from such indication of the object as is not due to any agency except the six kinds of 'Contact.'" Because this would not be possible in the case of those immediate cognitions which are brought about by certain discrepancies (in the perceiving organ).† If in order to avoid this difficulty you were to assert that your definition would apply to *valid* immediate cognitions (and not the invalid ones brought about by discrepancies),—we cannot accept this; as both *valid* and *invalid* cognitions being equally *immediate or direct*, the 'immediateness' that you have got to define is that which should apply to both valid and invalid immediate cognitions; (while this definition can apply to valid ones only). [The above objection may serve to silence the Logician who holds that in the case of all erroneous cognitions, there is actually a cognition which is erroneous] The ‡Mīmānsaka however holds that there is no such actual cognition as *Erroneous Cognition* (all Misconceptions being only cases of *absence of cognition*); and in this view also, the definition in question would be open to the objection that it will not be right to take the 'six kinds of contact' either one by one, or all together.§

* According to the Logician Sensuous Perception is brought about in six different ways of contact. *Vide-Nyāyamuktāvalī*.

† For instance, where the conch is *seen* as yellow, on account of an excess of bile, though there is an immediate cognition of the yellowness, there is no kind of contact with it and the eye.

‡ Holding what is technically called the 'Akhyāṭi' view of Misconception.

§ If in the definition we take the contacts one by one,—that is if we take the contact to be the one with something that is inherent in the object perceived—then the definition would fail to include the Immediate Cognitions got at by other kinds of contact (which are equally regarded as immediate cognition). If then you take all the *contacts* together, then each one of the contacts themselves would

(384) Another definition is now put forward :—“Immediate Cognition is the cognition of the specific form of the object,—that is to say, the appearance or manifestation of the object in its own specific (individual) form.” This definition also cannot be accepted ; as it includes the *Inferential* and other kinds of cognition also. “There is certainly this difference that Inferential and other Mediate Cognitions, are dependent upon (the cognition of) the Reason (Inferential Indicative or Probans) and such other extraneous things ; and as such these are cognitions of such things as are related to the time determined by those extraneous things ; whereas in the case Immediate Cognition such is not the case.” We cannot accept this ; because the principle that you lay down with regard to the Inferential Cognition is not true ; for instance, in the case of those inferential cognitions in which the Probans brings about the apprehension of things to come,—the inferential cognition cannot be said to have for its object a thing that is determined by the time of that Probans. (As the Probans apprehended is at the *present* time, while the Subject of the Inferential Cognition is in the future.) This also meets the following reasoning of the Opponent : —* “If the Inferential Cognition is not the manifestation (presentation to consciousness)

individually become excluded ; as each individual contact would also be an agency that is not ‘all the six kinds of contact’ collectively. And so the definition would not apply to any Immediate Cognition.

* The sense of this objection is as follows :—“If the determination by the time of the Probans were not made a necessary condition of valid Inferential Cognition, then we would have to regard as valid the inference that we would have of Fire, from the mistaken idea of smoke in regard to mist ; when it happens that by chance fire is actually present there. Here we have the fire cognised as determined by the time of the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke ; and in so far the cognition will have to be regarded as valid. If however the determination by the time of the Probans be made a necessary condition, then as in this case, the time is not one at which the real Reason, smoke, is cognised, the resulting cognition of fire, even though by chance correct, cannot be regarded as *valid*. Hence it is necessary to accept this latter determination as a necessary condition of validity in Inferential Cognitions.”

of the more extensive term (the Major Term) *as determined by the time of the Probans (Middle Term)*—then, in a case where the Major Term is inferred by means of a false Probans or Middle Term, if by chance it so happens that what is cognised is that which is actually accompanied by that Probans, this cognition would have to be regarded as valid to that extent, inasmuch as the Major Term cognised is determined by the time at which the invariable concomitance (between the Major Term and the Probans is cognised); and this valid cognition would be one that could not be classed under one of the four kinds of valid cognition." This reasoning we say is not right; specially as, in the first place, in the case of the inference of past objects, it is not possible for the objects to be *determined by the time of the Probans*; and secondly, because we have already shown (in para. 259) that, even with your necessary condition (of determination by the time of the Probans), it is impossible for you to avoid the contingency of having to accept the validity of the cognition (that you have brought forward) in so far as it pertains to the Fire (which is really present at the place).

(385) Nor can Immediate Cognition be defined as *unmixed apprehension*. Because this definition will not apply to the *sensuous perception** of a thing which is perceived along with a certain qualification (the perception of the thing in this case being mixed up with the perception of the qualification). If it be urged that "what is meant is that there should be no mixing up in the *instrument*,"—† then we reply that, in that case the definition would not apply to that Sensuous-perception (of the *Man with the stick*, for instance) wherein there is apprehended something (for instance, the *stick*) which is an 'Instrument' of something other than

* For instance, when we have the perception of the *man with the stick*, the perception of the man is mixed up with that of the stick.

† As the qualification will not be the Instrument, the definition would include the sensuous perception of the thing along with its qualification.

the Perception itself (the *stick* being an 'instrument' in the making of the jar). If in order to avoid this you were to add that there should be no mixing up of the instrument of the cognition itself, then, this will be open to all the objections that we have shown above (para. 380) in connection with the insertion in the definition, of the word '*sva*,' *itself*.

(386) [Page 329] Another definition is put forward—
 "Immediate Cognition is that wherein there is a congregation of the absence of all such interventions as those of the *invariable concomitance* and the like (which are necessary in the inferential and other kinds of cognition)". This also we cannot accept. Because, in the first place, this definition will not apply to the *sensuous perception* that we often have of the invariable concomitance itself (of fire and smoke for instance); and secondly, the definition is 'impossible' [*i.e.* it fails to exclude non-sensuous cognitions]; inasmuch as the *inferential* cognition that we have of the fire in the mountain is in the form 'the mountain is fiery' [and in this we *have* the absence of all cognitions of the invariable concomitance of fire and smoke]; then again, in verbal cognition, the cognition that the word affords is not that of itself [and thus here also we have a cognition wherein there is an absence of the cognition of the word]; and thus *inferential* and *verbal* cognitions would become 'sensuous' (by your definition).

(387) If then, Immediate Cognition be defined as *unintervened apprehension*,—this also we cannot accept. Because not one of the many possible (alternative) interventions can be maintained (as being the one whose absence is intended). For instance, if the 'intervention' intended be the *presence of some other particular substance*, then all the cognitions that we have of such omnipresent substances as are imperceptible would have to be regarded as 'immediate' (as in the case of omnipresent things the presence of no other thing is ever possible). If again by 'intervention' is meant ^o*the previous*

^o In the case of inferential cognition it is necessary that it should be preceded by the apprehension of the probans; and so forth in all non-sensuous cognitions.

existence of the apprehension of that which brings about the cognition in question,—then the Cognition of Priority and Posteriority would have to be regarded as always *Non-sensuous* (as these cognitions are always preceded by the apprehension of something with reference to which the Priority &c., would be cognised).* Then again, if ‘intervention’ be explained as consisting in the *qualification of the qualified*,†—then we ask, does the *qualification by Fire* come into existence, in its own form, only in something, the mountain, that is *qualified by the smoke*? Or is it that the cognition of the *qualification by Fire* appears only in that which is *qualified by the smoke*? The former alternative would be contrary to the well-known relationship of cause and effect (between fire and smoke; as on this supposition *Fire* would come into existence after the *smoke*; of which latter therefore it could not be the *cause*). In the case of the latter alternative, if in cognition, the *qualification by smoke* would appear as the *qualification of the ‘subject’* (the Mountain), then you would have the **absurdity** of the Pro-bans (Smoke) residing partially in itself‡; on the other hand, the *qualification by smoke* were cognised as the *qualification of the ‘Predicate’* (Fire),—then, this ‘intervention’ would be present in the case of the sensuous Cognition of the invariable concomitance (of Fire and Smoke) also; and hence there would be no immediateness in the case of this perception!§

* When we apprehend a thing as prior, or posterior, it is always in its relation to something else. Thus the cognition of priority would necessarily be preceded by the cognition of that something; and thus there would be an ‘intervention’ of the kind proposed by you.

† In an Inference we cognise the object *Fire* as qualifying the *Mountain*, which again is qualified by the *Smoke*; In sensuous Cognition, on the other hand, there is no such qualification.

‡ As in this case the form of the inference would be—‘*The Mountain qualified by smoke is fiery because it is smoky*’; and here *smokiness* being spoken of as residing in the *mountain qualified by smoke*,—this would mean that the smoke, in part, resides in itself.

§ The whole of this series of reasonings may be thus explained :—Inferential Cognition you hold to be *intervened*; why? (1) Is it because it apprehends the *qualification*

(388) *Immediate Cognition* may again be defined as a particular kind or species of cognition. To this definition some people object on the ground that it cannot be ascertained if this *class* of cognition is more or less extensive than the class 'Direct Apprehension';* specially as Remembrance also is (in one way) *immediate*. But this objection cannot stand; as Remembrance is not regarded (by the logician) as 'immediate cognition'; specially as in the first place, Dream-Cognition (which alone appears in the form of *immediate* Remembrance) is not regarded as Remembrance; and secondly, even if it be regarded as 'Remembrance',† *immediateness* is held to be merely *imposed* upon it (and not really belonging to it); and as regards those cases where, by the power of thought, people imagine the presence before their eyes of the qualities belonging to the object of their love (and such other things as have impressed their minds) [which imagination is regarded as *immediate cognition*],—these cases must be held to be similar to the ordinary view regarding conception of silver in the piece of shell (which misconception also has the form of *immediate cognition*); and lastly, as regards the cognition of the presence of the loved person that one has when he

fire, which actually appears after the mountain qualified by smoke? (2) or because it apprehends the *qualification by fire*, which is cognised as existing in the Mountain qualified by smoke? (3) or because it apprehends the qualification of the mountain by the fire which is qualified by smoke, the form of the inference in this case being 'this mountain which is smoky is fiery? In (1) Fire ceases to be the cause of smoke; in (2) the smoke is made to rest partially itself; and in (3) inasmuch as the Sensuous cognition of the invariable concomitance of Fire and Smoke also apprehend Fire as qualified by smoke, the cognition being in the form 'that which is smoky is fiery', which is similar to the inferential cognition according to (3),—this cognition would have to be regarded as non-sensuous.

° If 'Immediate Cognition' were more extensive than 'Direct Apprehension', then 'immediateness' would also belong to cognitions other than the Sensuous, which latter alone are regarded as 'direct apprehension'. If, on the other hand, 'Immediate cognition' were less extensive than 'Direct Apprehension', then Remembrance also, which is *immediate Cognition* (inasmuch as brought about by an instrument which is not cognised), would have to be regarded as 'Direct Apprehension'.

† As it is by Prabhākara.

closes his eyes,—this must be considered as similar to the cognition that one has during a dream.

(389) [Page 331]. The following objection however might be reasonably urged against the above definition of 'Immediateness':—when we have the *anuvyavasāya* (representative) cognition of the cognition of the atom (in the form 'I have the cognition of the atom),—[we would have in this a mixture * of the two class-characters of 'immediateness' and 'mediateness', the *anuvyavasāya* being 'immediate', and the cognition of the atom being 'mediate']; nor can we agree to the view that the cognition of the atom also is 'immediate' (and hence there is no mixture); because if this cognition were accepted as 'immediate' (on the ground of the atom being *immediately* cognised by the Mind), your opponent might, with equal reasonableness, assert that the cognition of fire (that we have in the case of the inference 'the mountain is fiery because it has smoke') is not *inferential*, but *sensuous*, as brought about by the instrumentality of the mind, on the ground of its having been produced by a *mind-soul* contact, which is of an entirely different kind from that which leads to the cognition of the 'Probans' (*i.e.* Smoke). †Similarly too in the case of Recognition ('this is the same object that I had seen yesterday'), has any one any such direct apprehension as that 'I see the existence of this object at a particular place and at a particular point of time yesterday' ? And it would be only on the basis of such direct apprehension that we could regard the

* The sense of the reasoning is that if 'immediate cognition' is a class, 'mediate cognition' also would be a class; and as there are cases where the two are found to co-exist neither can be regarded as a class,—'Sankara', Mixture, being regarded by the logician himself as a ground for not accepting a *jāti*.

† The Vedantin urges that in Recognition also we have the mixture of the two characters of *immediateness* and *mediateness*, 'this' being the object of *immediate* cognition, and 'that which I saw yesterday' that of *Mediate* Cognition. The whole of this Recognition could be regarded : *immediate* only if we ever had any such idea as that I see with my eyes the fact of this object having existed yesterday. As a matter of fact no such idea is ever present in our mind, in the case of any Recognition.

Recognition to be *wholly* immediate. For these reasons it must be admitted that in both these cases (of Recognition and of the Anuvyavasaya of the cognition of atoms) the view that the cognition is wholly *immediate* is entirely opposed to actual experience.

(390) If the class 'Immediate Cognition' were based upon the authority of our Sensuous Perception, then with regard to any cognition, there could be no difference of opinion as to whether or not it was *immediate*; as certainly people do not quarrel over the character of the perception of such things as the jar and the like (which are based upon the authority of Sensuous Perception.) "But", the Opponent urges, "in some cases, where the thing is not distinctly apprehended, there is certainly a difference of opinion as regards the character of the cognition." But, we ask—*what do you mean by the apprehension of *distinctness* in regard to that which is not made of constituent parts? If you mean by it, *the apprehension of (distinctness) along with other generic characters inhering in the same thing*,—then, inasmuch as this would be applicable to the generic character of '*jñānaṭva*', to the same extent as to that of '*sākṣāṭṭva*',—it would be necessary for you to point out a difference between the two cases, by reason of which there is a diversity of opinion (among philosophers) as to the 'directness' of cognitions, and not as to their generic character of *jñānaṭva*†. As a diversity of opinion among propounders of philosophical systems must not be due to mere jealousy; nor must it be merely

° It is only when a thing is made up of parts that its appearance is indistinct or distinct, according as some only or all its parts are manifested; Cognition however is something that has no parts. The reading of the Viḍyāsāgarī 'sphṛtāvabhāsa' does not appear to be satisfactory. The next sentence explains the expression as, *the apprehension (apparently, of distinctness) along with a number of other properties*. Hence the translation follows the reading of the *Shāṅkari*.

† That it to say, while we are all agreed that "there is *jñānaṭva* in cognitions we are divided as to its possessing '*sākṣāṭṭva*'.

for the sake of a wordy wrangle ; it must be for the sake of truth.

(391) Then again, it will not be possible for you to escape from the contingency that by your definition both *directness*, and its opposite *indirectness*, will be found to inhere in such inferential cognitions as have their Probans, or Middle Term perceptible by the senses.* In answer to this it might be argued that, "it is not *indirectness*, but only *Directness* that is a generic entity,—the former being merely a negation of the latter." But it would be necessary for you to prove that such (and not the converse) is the case (before it can be accepted);—you would have the further incongruity that, in accordance with you, who hold God to be directly cognisant of all things, both *directness* and *indirectness* would belong to the inferential cognitions appearing in the mind of God, who (according to you) would also have the direct perception of the 'Probans' leading to those cognitions.† In answer to this, it might be urged that what makes a cognition called 'inferential' or 'verbal' &c. is the fact of *its being brought about by the cognition of the Probans and by that of Word*, and so forth (and hence God's cognitions cannot be called 'inferential' because all His cognitions, being eternal, are not *brought about* by anything). But in the same manner, it could be argued with equal reasonableness that what makes a cognition called 'direct' is the fact of *its being brought about by sense-contact*; and so (as God's cognition is not *brought about* by any thing) that cognition cannot be called 'direct.'

(392) Then again, as a rule, every generic entity or conception is based upon a certain character which

* This is levelled against the view that 'directness' or '*sākṣāttra*' is a generic entity or *jāti*. By a rule of the Logicians whenever there is a cross division due to two characters being found to be mixed up, these characters cannot be accepted as generic in their character. In the case of the inference of fire from smoke, the cognition, so far as the smoke is concerned, is *direct*, and in regard to the fire, *indirect*.

† The cognition being *direct* in view of this sensuous perception, and *indirect* in view of its being *inferential*.

(inhering in a number of things) is indicative of the generic or universal, comprehensive) nature of that entity or conception ; and as a matter of fact, in view of the objections shown above, we find no such indicative character as would form the basis of the generic entity 'Directness' '*Sākṣāt̥tva*'. Nor may it be argued, in answer to this, that inasmuch as the Opponent does not accept the rule with regard to the presence of the said indicative character, its presence need not be necessary in the case in question. This, we say, cannot be rightly put forward ; because in that case (in the absence of some such character indicative of 'directness') *there would be no possibility of any such doubt arising in our minds as—'did I see this, or was it told to me by some one?' (a doubt that arises in our mind when we remember a certain thing);—specially as according to you, when we remember a certain past direct cognition, what appears is that there is a direct cognition of that cognition brought about by the peculiar agency of what you call 'Cognitional Contact'; and if there were no character indicative of 'directness,' how would you explain the fact that *at the time of remembrance* we do not regard the previous cognition as 'direct.'

(393) †As regards the view that 'directness' is a property belonging to the thing cognised (and not to the cognition),—this we shall relate under the section on the *Self-Apprehension of Cognition* (in the author's other work, the *Īśvarābhisaṅghi*.) ‡

* If *directness* belonged to the cognition itself,—and was not a character based upon some other circumstances, then whenever anything would be remembered which had been directly perceived, its *directness* would also be cognised ; and there could be no such doubt as to whether the thing had been directly perceived, or only indirectly heard of.

† This takes up another definition of 'Direct Apprehension'—Directness being the property of the thing, the apprehension of such a thing is Direct Apprehension.

‡ On a former occasion (para. 80) the author refers to his '*Svapakashavāḍa*' forming part of his other work the *Īśvarābhisaṅghi* ; so it seems that he refers to the same here also ; specially as in the section of the present work where he has dealt

(394) "With all this, however", says the Opponent, "it cannot be denied that there is a universally accepted usage and idea of 'Directness'; and on the strength of this usage, you cannot after all escape from admitting that there is such a thing as 'Directness', even though it be necessary, on that account, to postulate a category over and above those ordinarily accepted. Even if you regard this universal usage as a 'mistake,' you will have to admit that every object of mistaken cognition has a real existence somewhere (so even though the universal idea of *directness* be a mistake, *directness* cannot be a non-entity)." But this also we cannot accept; because (even granting that such a thing as *directness* really exists) if this *directness* itself were directly apprehended, then there would be no difference between us; and so on and on, all the objections we have urged above become equally applicable in the present case also. If, on the other hand, *directness* be held to be cognisable by Inference and other means of cognition (and not by Direct Apprehension),—then in that case, we would point out that you can have no such Probans (or Word), &c. as would bring about the inferential (or verbal) and other cognitions of Directness; where too, in this case, would there be any comprehension of the *invariable concomitance*, and such other factors (necessary for those kinds of cognition)? Thus your view would be open to quite a series of unanswerable objections. And over and above all this, how would you escape from the opposition of all those arguments whereby you yourself seek to prove that there can be no more than *seven* categories?

(395) Another definition of Direct Apprehension may be put forward as that cognition wherein there is a congregation of the absence of all such characters as are produced by

with the self-apprehension of Cognitions, he has not taken up the question referred to here. Though the *Vidyābhāṣā* commentary takes the present passage to mean that the view referred to has been refuted by the refutation (in para. 80) of the definition of the objective.

'*Probans*' ('*Word*' '*Similarity*.) But this also we cannot accept; as this would apply to all *Doubts* that we have with regard to imperceptible things (as these doubtful cognitions are not produced either by Probans or by Word, or by Similarity). You might amend your definition by adding that a Direct Apprehension is that *right cognition* which &c., &c. (Doubtful Cognitions not being *right* cognitions). But in that case, it would fail to include Mistaken Perceptions (which are *direct* apprehensions, even though not right).

(396) Nor again can Direct Apprehension be defined as *that cognition which is not produced by those specific agencies which bring about the inferential and all other kinds of cognition that are meant to be excluded (from the Category of 'Direct Apprehension')*. Because, in that case, what would there be to prevent us from adopting the converse course, and defining Inferential Cognition itself as *that which is other than the Sensuous and other kinds of Cognition* *? And further, just as, according to you, we have a comprehensive notion of the 'directness' of cognitions on the basis of their not being produced by the causes of inferential and other kinds of cognitions,—so, in the same manner,† even from among those cognitions that you seek to exclude (*viz.*, the inferential and other

* The sense of the Objection is that in this manner, there would be a vicious circle :—Each cognition being defined as the negation of all other kinds of cognition.

† Just as you have the comprehensive notion of all sensuous cognitions as those that are not brought about by the causes of inferential and other kinds of cognition, so, in the same manner, it would be possible for us to form a comprehensive notion of two kinds of cognition,—for instance, the inferential and the verbal *combined*—as those that are not brought about by the causes of sensuous and analogical cognitions; of Sensuous and Verbal cognitions as those not brought about by the causes of inferential and analogical cognitions, and so forth. The absurdity meant to be brought home by this reasoning is that if it were possible to form a comprehensive notion of all Sensuous cognitions on the basis of its definition as that which is produced by the causes of those cognitions that are meant to be excluded from it,—then in the same manner, on the basis of the condition of not being produced by the causes of the cognitions meant to be excluded from Verbal and Inferential cognitions, it would be possible for us to form a comprehensive notion, inclusive of, and common to, all Verbal and Inferential cognitions; and this would be an absurdity.

cognitions), it would be possible for us to form comprehensive notions common to more than one kind of cognition on the basis of their being not brought about by the causes of the one or the two (or the three) kinds of cognitions, which we would intend to exclude. To this it might be objected that "we seek for the basis of such ideas and notions as we already have; and we do not proceed to form notions and ideas on supposed bases." But this cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, in all cases, we postulate such causes or bases as are found to be not over extensive.* Lastly (if the negative character of not being produced by the causes of other cognitions were the ground for all sensuous cognitions being regarded as 'direct,' then) the required comprehensive notion of all Sensuous cognitions would come to be formed on the basis of that negative character itself, and not on the basis of any thing else (in the shape of the positive character of 'directness'); and in that case we would form all our comprehensive notions--of the 'cow' and such other things--on the basis of the negative character of being different from all other things that we see (*i.e.* the cow would be defined as that which is not any-thing that is not-cow), and this would remove the necessity for our postulating any such generic characteristic as 'goṭva' and the like (which we postulate simply with a view to explain, and find a basis for, the comprehensive notion of all cows).

'Under the circumstances, if you can have no positive conception having a basis other than a mere negation,—then what would be the fault of the upholders of 'Apoha?'† (41.)

* That is to say, just as the character of being not produced by the causes of inference &c., is accepted as the basis for the comprehensive notion of all sensuous cognitions, because the said character does not apply to any thing else except sensuous cognition; so in the same manner the character of not being brought about by the causes of verbal and analogical cognitions, would not apply to any cognition except the inferential and sensuous cognitions; and thus that character could be regarded as the basis for the cognition of sensuous and inferential cognitions combined.

† According to the Bhaṣya, the denotation of the word 'gṛ' (cow) does not consist in 'goṭva' the generic entity 'cow', but in the negation of the not-cow. This

(397) There may be some people who would define Sensuous Perception as *that cognition which is valid, while being other than the valid cognitions brought about by words, inferences or analogies*. If these people are not themselves ashamed of putting forward this definition, then they should be asked the following questions:—* Is each factor of this definition to be taken as the required definition? or all the factors together? In the former case, the definition would become 'too wide.' If they accept the second alternative, then we ask—do you take the three factors (Inference, Word and Analogy) conjointly, of which there should be a negation (or absence) [in the case of Sensuous Perception]? or do you take the negations themselves conjointly? It cannot be the former; as in that case also the definition becomes too wide,—the definition becoming applicable to each of the three kinds of cognition (inferential, verbal and analogical); inasmuch as none of these is such as is brought about by Word, Inference and Analogy conjointly (and hence the negation of all the *three combined* would be present in the case of each of these cognitions). Nor is the latter alternative possible; because even though † the conjunction or combination of the (mutual) negation of the three kinds of cognition is present in the three kinds of cognition taken conjointly,—yet these three are not regarded (by you) as 'Sensuous Perception' (as they should have to be by your definition).

comes to the same thing as to say that the comprehensive notion of positive things is based upon negation.

* I. E. do you mean that sense-perception is (1) the valid cognition not brought about by words, and (2) the valid cognition not brought about by inference; and also, (3) the valid cognition not brought about by analogy? Or that it is the valid cognition that is not brought about by any of these? In the former case, if we accept (1), then the definition applies to inferential and analogical cognitions also, and so on with (2) and (3).

† The three cognitions together are neither inferential cognition, nor verbal cognition nor analogical cognition. Hence the combined negation of the three would be present in the three taken conjointly, which would therefore fulfil the conditions of the definition.

(398) In answer to this it might be urged that the 'negations' meant (by the definition) to be the defining characteristic are those inhering in one substatum, and not those subsisting in more than one (and hence the three kinds of cognition taken conjointly being *more than one*, they cannot become included in the definition). But this also is not right; because, as we shall show later on* though the constituent members of the *group* (of the three cognitions) are more than one, yet the *group* itself can be regarded as 'one'—just as even though the number of inferential cognitions is very large, yet the group or class 'Inferential Cognition' is *one* only. [And thus even with the qualifying explanation the definition remains 'too wide']. In order to avoid this you may seek to add a further qualification to your definition:—*viz.*, 'that which is not a group' (thereby seeking to exclude the group formed of the three kinds of cognition, *verbal, inferential and analogical*). But this also will not serve your purpose;† because even then, as a matter of fact, the 'inferential and other cognitions' would be something *qualified by the character of being a group*; and as such these cognitions themselves would certainly have to be regarded as 'that which is not a group'; otherwise [if you do not admit this, and assert those cognitions to be the *group*, then inasmuch as they are also *qualified by the character of being a group*, your assertion would come to this that the *group* is qualified by the character of being a group; and] there would be a partial operation (*i.e.*, of qualification) by the *group* upon itself, which is highly objectionable. You may urge that, the character intended by the definition is that belonging to *cognitions* [that is you define Sensuous Perception as *the cognition* which has the said character,—and certainly the

* Page 329 ('Pandit' Edition).

† The meaning of this is that what is qualified by something cannot be that thing; since the cognitions (inferential, etc.) being qualified by the *group character* cannot be regarded as identical with this latter. Hence they also become, 'that which is not a group,' and thus fulfil the conditions of the definition.

group of inferential and other cognitions is not a cognition, and as such they do not fall within the definition]. But this also does not save you; as the inferential and other cognitions, even through qualified by the character of being a group, do not cease to be *cognitions* (and as such they cannot fail to be included in your definition).

(399) [Page 339] Then again, [you have asserted at the beginning of the last paragraph that the negation meant to be the defining characteristic is that inhering in *one* substratum only; by this], do you mean—(1) that the substratum of the negation is one non-differenced individual? (2) or that all the substrata of the negation are of the same class or kind? (3) or that all the substrata have one and the same character? (4) or that the substratum is qualified by the number *one*? (5) or that it is not qualified by *two* and the other higher numbers? If you mean the *first*, then, in the first place, the definition having such a qualification would be too narrow (failing to apply to any sense-perception except the *one* particular perception), as the 'non-difference' of the individual cognition would be that cognition itself (and no other cognition), and as such it would be wholly exclusive (of all other sensuous cognitions; ; *secondly* the incongruity involved in the definition in this case would be that the *thing to be defined* (i.e., Sense-perception) would be a qualification of the *d-definition*, and as such the definition could not be regarded as belonging or pertaining to the *thing to be defined**; because a thing cannot qualify itself. If (in order to avoid this incongruity) it be asserted that the *non-difference of the individual cognition* is not intended to be a necessary and inseparable qualification (or condition) of the definition, but only an adventitious or temporary mark, then the definition becomes open to the objection urged above (as to its being 'too wide'

* The sense of this is that the definition containing the term to be defined cannot be accepted as correct.

and including each of the three kinds of cognition meant to be excluded).*

(400) If you accept the second of the alternatives mentioned above, then, *the belonging to that same class* might well be regarded as the definition,—as it would certainly be necessary to know what this *class* is before we grasp the meaning of your definition (and when we once understand what the class ‘Sensuous Cognition’ is, there would be no further need for a definition). Nor is the third of the alternatives acceptable; because the inferential and other two kinds of cognition also have one and the same common character of being *indirect* (and as such would become included in the definition). Nor again is the fourth alternative tenable; as in the first place, according to the Vaishēṣikas all Valid Cognitions are ‘Qualities,’ and as such cannot be possessed of another quality (in the shape of the number ‘one’); and secondly, even if the number ‘one’ could subsist therein as quality, it would be possible for the *three* negations of the three kinds of cognition (inferential, verbal and analogical) to be co-ordinate or co-existent with the number ‘one,’—the *three together* forming a *group*, and thus being capable of being regarded as ‘one’ [and thus these cognitions also become included in the definition]. Nor lastly is the fifth of the above alternatives tenable; as according to the theory of the Vaishēṣikas (that cognitions are qualities) the absence of ‘two’ and the other higher numbers (all of which are qualities) would be found in the inferential and other two kinds of cognition also (which latter therefore would become included in the definition); but even if you do not accept the Vaishēṣika theory,—as a matter of fact, ‘two’ and the higher numbers are found to be present in individual

* The non-difference of the individual not being regarded as a necessary factor of the definition, the real definition becomes reduced to the mere *negation of the three kinds of cognition*—and the negation of all these conjointly is absent from each of the three taken individually, which therefore become included in the definition.

Sensuous Cognitions also (as certainly it cannot be denied that there are two, three, or more Sensuous Cognitions). [And hence your definition would fail to apply to Sensuous Cognition also !]

(401) In answer to this it might be urged that—"even then, it cannot be denied, that the numbers, *two* and the rest, do not subsist in their entirety in any one Sensuous Cognition ;—and it is the absence of such numbers *in their entirety* that is meant by us,"—then, this also is not possible, we reply ; because what is that 'entirety' which, you say, is not present in a single individual ? If you mean by it that—"the numbers *two* and the rest must subsist wholly *in that thing alone*, and certainly this they do not do in any single individual," then, we reply, the number 'one' would, in that case, not subsist anywhere *in its entirety* ; as the number 'one' cannot be said to subsist in any *one thing only*, as in that case the number 'one' would not be found anywhere else. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the numbers 'two' and the rest also subsist, *in their entirety*, only in that individual which is possessed of the number 'one' ; and hence your explanation does not make any difference at all (the objection urged at the close of the last paragraph remaining in force).

(402) [Page 341] "There is certainly this difference between the two cases that the number 'one' subsists in one individual only, and not in any other (while *two* and all other numbers subsist in one thing and also in others)." This is not right, we reply ; for, in the first place, if such were the case with 'Unity' (the number 'one'), then the same might be said with regard to the individual entity of 'Being'* ; and secondly, in that case your definition would not be comprehensive (being applicable to the *one* particular cognition only, and not to *all* Sensuous Cognitions). "But the

* That is to say, 'Being' also, like 'Unity,' would be different in each individual thing.

case of *Being* is not similar to that of *Unity*: 'Being' is one only, and it is a *class* (including many individuals), while 'Unity' is different in each individual (being as many as there are individual things), and it is a *Quality*." You are clearly deceived (by the Vaishēshikas): Otherwise, how is it that you are uttering these incoherent words,* even though, as a matter of fact, in ordinary experience and usage, you do not perceive any difference in the characters of the ideas of 'Being' and 'Unity'? "But if both *Being* and *Unity* were classes, it would not be possible to ascertain which of the two is the 'higher' and which the 'lower' (*i.e.*, which is the more and which the less extensive, a distinction which is found to be possible in the case of any two classes that we may take up)." †This argument, we reply, would apply equally to both. And the very fact that it is necessary for classes to be ranged into 'higher' and 'lower' would supply the basis for regarding the one or the other as being, in a certain instance, less extensive than the other.‡ If it be asked—"What would be that instance?"—we reply, even if we are unable to fix upon such an instance, that does not vitiate our argument; just as in the case of the inference of the existence of fire in the mountain, even though we may be unable to locate the fire exactly within a few inches of its actual position, that does not invalidate the inferential cognition of fire.

(403) "There may or may not be a comprehensive notion of 'Unity,' what have we to do with the consi-

* Just as 'Being' is found to be a 'class' extending over all things that *are*,—so, exactly in the same manner, 'Unity' is found to extend over all single things. Even in face of this sameness of character you speak of a difference, in accordance with the figments of the Vaishēshikā system.

† That is to say all that this argument may prove is that both cannot be *classes*. So it may be that 'Unity' is a *class*, and 'Being' a mere *quality*; or that both are only *qualities*.

‡ The said fact would justify us in regarding either 'Being' or 'Unity' as less extensive than the other.

deration of that question? (our business is to define Sensuous Cognition, and) Sensuous Cognition is that in which the numbers 'two' and the rest do not subsist in their entirety, and where there are the three afore-said negations (of character of being produced by Word etc.)" This we cannot allow; as in the three cognitions, inferential and the rest also, the numbers 'three' and the rest do not subsist *in their entirety*; if they did so, then these numbers could not subsist in anything else (*i.e.*, there could be nothing else to which those numbers would belong)! In answer to this it might be said that the number 'three' subsisting in other things, would be an individual 'three' other than that subsisting in the inferential and other cognitions. But this also is not right; because as a matter of fact, there is no particular 'three' that subsists *in its entirety* in the three cognitions, inferential and the rest.

(404) "We may define Sensuous Cognition as that wherein no individual 'three' subsists in its entirety." In that case, we reply, the definition would be 'too narrow' (*i.e.* failing to apply to Sensuous Cognition); as you, who have renounced the Vaishēṣhika theory (that sensuous cognition being a quality cannot have another quality in the shape of Number) must admit that the character of 'Sensuous Cognition' is co-existent with an individual 'three'; as otherwise we could never speak of 'three sensuous cognitions'; for as a matter of fact that alone is called 'three' wherein the number 'three' resides in its entirety.

(405) [Page 343] And, apart from what we have just said, this last definition of yours would be open to the same objection that we have pointed out before—namely, that it would be 'too wide'. We have already shown (in para 397) that your definition is 'too wide' inasmuch as it includes the Inferential and other kinds of cognition, as in these

latter cognitions,* as characterised or qualified by the number 'three', there subsist the three negations which you intend to be the distinctive features of Sensuous Cognitions. Now in order to avoid this, you add the qualifying clause *that wherein the individual number 'three' does not subsist in its entirety*. But as a matter of fact even this qualification does not save the definition from being 'too wide'; as this condition also is fulfilled by the inferential and other cognitions; because in these, *as characterised by the number 'three'*, there does not subsist any individual number 'three in its entirety.' And in these cognitions, *as characterised by the number 'three'* (and thus being made a *unified triad*), even though another number 'three' might come to subsist, †yet this latter would be only one that resides in other things also, and does not subsist *in its entirety* in these Cognitions alone. Even if we could find the number 'three' subsisting in its entirety, in the things of which it is a mere adventitious and temporary feature, this fact would serve to make the definition inapplicable to such things; and it would not have any such effect with regard to those things of which the number 'three' is an inseparable or permanent characteristic. Hence (inasmuch as the inferential and other cognitions belong to this latter class) the fact remains that the definition (applying to these Cognitions) is "too wide". This is specially so, as all the ‡ three negations (mentioned in the definition) subsist

*The sense of this is that the cognitions *as thus characterised* are reduced to unity—a single entity having three constituent factors, a *unified triad*.

† Because if the same number subsisted there, it would mean that the number resides in itself, at least partially,—the number forming a necessary constituent of the *triad*.

‡ The sense is that if the inferential verbal and analogical cognitions are taken collectively, then we can affirm that the mutual negation of the three kinds of cognition resides in that group; as the three collectively is neither inferential, nor verbal, nor analogical; with regard to each *individually* however this could not be affirmed,—for instance, the negation of Inferential Cognition cannot be said to subsist in Inferential Cognition, and so on; and hence the three cognitions taken collectively become included in the definition

in the thing—the three kinds of cognition—when it is regarded as a group, by reason of its being characterised by the temporary mark of the number ‘three’; and thus the three negations mentioned in the definition subsist in the thing when thus qualified (by the collective character), and not when it is not so qualified; for the simple reason that with regard to each of these three individually, the existence of the *three* negations could never be affirmed. [And thus these three cognitions collectively become included in your definition.]

(406) [Page 344] The Opponent says:—“The three cognitions *taken collectively* are precluded by the presence of the word ‘pramīti (*valid cognition*)’ in the definition; for the character of ‘valid cognition’ belongs to the inferential and other kinds of cognition, *in their individual natural form*, and not when they are *qualified by the number ‘three’ along with the three negations*; and thus we would define Sensuous Cognition as *that which has the character of valid cognition, and wherein there subsist the three negations.*” This also we cannot accept. Because for you also, it will be necessary to accept the view that *the character of valid cognition* and the ‘three negations’ reside in the ‘Sensuous Cognition’ that you are defining, only in so far as this latter is characterised by some other property; *viz. *that of being the right apprehension of things as they actually are*; as if you do not affirm some such condition as accounting for the fact that only some—and not all—sensuous cognitions are ‘valid’, then either all these cognitions would be ‘valid’, or none would be so!

‘For if the restriction (of a certain character) were not dependent upon—or regulated by—something else,

*The sense of the reply is this:—Only that Sensuous Cognition can be regarded as *valid* which apprehends things rightly. And as the same is the case with the inferential and all other cognitions also, and as the ‘three negations’ have also been shown to reside in these latter, they also are included in the definition.

then, either it should be accepted as existing everywhere or as not existing anywhere; because as a matter of fact, it is only on account of the presence or absence of some regulating or restrictive agency, that it is possible for things to exist in some places and not in all.' (42).

(407) Now then, (the presence of some such regulating and restrictive property in your Sensuous Cognition being absolutely necessary), does this restrictive property subsist in its substratum as an inseparable quality, or as a mere temporary mark? In the former case, if that which is the inseparable quality of the substratum of *the character 'valid cognition'* were also the inseparable quality of the 'three negations' also,—then, inasmuch as the 'three negations' have been shown to subsist in the inferential and other cognition also, it would follow as a necessary corollary that the '*character of valid cognition*' also subsists in that which is characterised by the 'three negations'; and thus the addition, to the definition, of the '*character of valid cognition*' would fail to exclude the inferential and other cognitions. If however *the character of valid cognition* subsisted in a substratum characterised by a quality other than that which characterises that which is related to the 'three negations',—then, by your view also, *the character of valid cognition* would not be co-substrate with the 'three negations',—as one thing can be regarded as *cosubstrate* with another, only when both have for their substratum the same thing characterised by the same qualities. If, on the other hand, you were to assert that *the character of valid cognition* is '*cosubstrate*' with the 'three negations' (even though the qualities of their substratum may differ), because that which subsists in a thing qualified by certain properties can be spoken of as subsisting in that thing,—then the aforesaid objection,—that the definition would apply to the inferential and other cognitions also—would remain in force.

(408) [Page 346] Nor again is the second alternative (noted in the above para.) possible. Because that same 'thing', which is characterised or marked by a certain property as its temporary or adventitious feature,* is also what is qualified by the number 'three'; specially because when a certain thing is qualified by a property,—even as qualified by that property it is connate (or identical) with itself (even as without that property); e.g. the 'man *with the stick*' is also a 'Man.' And thus *the character of valid cognition* comes to subsist in the Inferential and other Cognitions qualified by the number 'three,' these being non-different from that which is temporarily characterised by the adventitious property (of being a *right* apprehension); specially as these cognitions also are found to be characterised by the adventitious restrictive characteristic (of being the right apprehension of things),—being, as they have been shown to be, non-different from that which is characterised by this latter characteristic. And thus the taint of being 'too wide' becomes irrevocably fixed upon your definition.

(409) The opponent says:—†“ But the thing in question (the inferential and other cognitions) is characterised by the adventitious characteristic (*of being right apprehension*), not as qualified by the number 'three,' but in its own pure form.” This, we reply, is not satisfactory; as it has already been shown that that which is qualified (by the number 'three') is the same as that which is characterised by the characteristic (of being valid cognition). “ Yet it is not characterised

* In the shape of being the right apprehension of things as they really are. The Inferential and other cognitions are qualified by the number 'three' and they are also right apprehensions very often. So even as qualified by the additional qualification of number 'three,' they may be regarded as non-different from *that which is characterised by the adventitious circumstance of being the right apprehension of things.*

† Inferential cognition is right apprehension, by itself—and not as qualified by number 'three.' And hence the three cognitions *conjointly* cannot be said to be characterised by that character, and hence included in the definition.

n its *qualified* form." That does not matter; because even in its *unqualified* form it is not characterised.* Otherwise (*i.e.*, if the character of valid cognition were to characterise a cognition *only in its unqualified form*) in the case in question also there would be no co-ordination (between the *character of valid cognition* and the *Sensuous cognition* sought to be defined) [because the Sensuous Cognition is represented in the definition in a *qualified* form,—that which is qualified by the 'three negations'; and from what the opponent has just said, such a qualified cognition could not be characterised by the character of being *valid cognition*].

(410) We desist here from further discussion. All the objections that we have urged against the above definitions of Sensuous Cognition may be applied also to any other definition that may be put forward. It was in view of this fact that Kumārila Bhatta has declared (in his *Shlokavārtika*, Sūtra 4, Shl. 2):—'Of what use would be the statement of the definition?' Though as a matter of fact he said this with regard to something entirely different,† yet it is found to be quite true even when taken as the statement of a general truth.

* That is to say, when we speak of an inferential cognition as *right apprehension* we do not speak of it as being *qualified* by certain qualities; nor do we necessarily speak of it as being so only in its *unqualified* form. The sense is that if the character of valid cognition were always found to subsist only in such substrata as are *never qualified by the number 'three'*, then, in that case, the contention of the Opponent would be right, that inferential and other cognitions being qualified by that number (in the definition) cannot fulfil the conditions therein laid down. †As a matter of fact however, we have no such conception as that *that alone which is not qualified by the number 'three' is valid cognition*.

Kumārila Bhatta has said this in objecting to the view that the fourth Mīmāṃsā Sūtra contains the definition of Sense-perception.

B—[Definitions of *Pratyakṣa* having been proved to be impossible, the Author proceeds to show that the definitions of *Anumāna* are equally untenable: Of the principal factors in the inferential process, the author begins with the *probans*, and shows that no adequate definition of this is available.]

(411) How again do you define 'Inference' ? " Well, 'Inference', when regarded as the *instrument* (of inferential cognition), may be defined as the '*parāmarsha*' (the recognition of its concomitance with the Subject of the inferential cognition) of the '*liṅga*' or *probans* (the inferential mark, 'middle term')." In that case we ask—What is that '*liṅga*' or 'inferential mark' ? " The *linga* is that which being invariably concomitant (with the *Probandum*, 'Major Term'), resides in the '*pakṣa*' ('Subject' or 'Minor Term')." But, inasmuch as according to you, the true '*pakṣa*' is that wherein the residence of the *probandum* is suspected,* we ask—is this *suspicion* a mere accidental property or adjunct (of the *pakṣa*)? or is it its inherent, inseparable quality? In the former case, even after one had *ascertained* the presence of the *probandum* (fire), in the *pakṣa* (the mountain), if one were to recall to his mind the fact of the *probans* being invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, this would also constitute the right sort of '*parāmarsha*' for you (in view of the suspicion that had existed before).† Nor can the '*suspicion*' be held to be effective only *while it exists*; for the simple reason that it is an *accidental property*; because an accidental property, by its very nature, remains so, even when it has ceased to exist.‡ If on the other hand, the

* The Nyāya Definition of *Pakṣa* is *सन्दिग्धलाघ्यवान्*—the suspicion must be there; or else no inference would be called for; it is the inference that confirms what was suspected.

† As the '*suspicion*' is held to be a purely accidental property, it is not necessary that it should be always present. And thus as the *parāmarsha* would be appearing even after the inferential cognition had been got at,—there would be an endless series of inferences. In order to avoid this difficulty the *Probans* might be defined as that which resides in the *pakṣa* with regard to which the suspicion of the presence of the *probandum* is *present at the time*.

‡ For instance, a house continues to be called after its inhabitant even long

'suspicion' be regarded as an inherent quality inseparable from the *pakṣa*, then as the *qualifying* 'suspicion' would disappear after the inference (of fire) has been accomplished, the *qualified* (*pakṣa*) also would disappear (by the law that the *qualified* ceases on the cessation of the *qualification*); and then the inferring person would not have the place to which he could turn for the thing, fire, in his search of which, he had recourse to the inference).^{*} In answer to the above it might be argued that—"It is in regard to the *qualified* factor of the *pakṣa* (and not to the *qualified* and the *qualification* combined) that the presence of the *probandum* is proved by the *probans* as residing in that *pakṣa*; and as for the irregularity of 'diverse substrata' involved in this—i.e., in the fact that while the *probans* resides in the *Pakṣa* as *qualified* by the 'suspicion', the *probandum* is proved to subsist in the *pakṣa* independently of the qualifying 'suspicion',—such an irregularity is one that is not undesirable, (for the simple reason that the *unqualified* thing is present in its own independent form, even when *qualified*).” This however we cannot admit. For when you accept the 'diverse substrata' with reference to the *pakṣa* in its unqualified form,—then you entirely give up your definition of 'Vyāp'ti' (Invariable Concomitance) between the *probans* and the *probandum*, as consisting in the fact that the two have always *one and the same* substrate. “Even in the case in question, the Invariable Concomitance as defined by us does not cease to exist; inasmuch as the substrates are practically one and the same,

after he has gone away. In the typical example of 'Upalakṣaṇa', the crow on Dēva-dīpta's house continues to be spoken of as the distinguishing mark of the house, long after it has flown away.

* When the *Paṇḍa* disappears, the *Paṇḍin* loses his character, and may be said to disappear also. So when the Suspicion ceases, the Mountain qualified by it also ceases. And as the inference had led the fire-seeking man to infer the presence of fire in the mountain, when the mountain has disappeared, he has nowhere to turn to for his fire. So the inference proves useless.

so far as the *pakṣa* itself is concerned (the *probans* has the *pakṣa* for its substrate, and the substratum of the *probandum* also is the same *pakṣa*, but with a further qualifying 'suspicion').” This cannot be, we reply. If your reasoning be admitted, then the general statement of the invariable concomitance (in the Major Premiss) between the substrate of the *probans* in general, and that of the *probandum* in general, would also imply the presence of the *probandum* in a particular substrate of the *probans*,—as without the particular, the universal or general would not be possible;—and thus there would be no need for the statement (in the Minor Premiss) of the presence of the *probans* in the *pakṣa**; as this statement would not help in the proving of either the general or the particular co-substrateness mentioned above. In fact the only useful purpose that this Minor Premiss could serve would be simply to show that the reasoning is not open to the fault of 'superfluity' (of proving what is already proved); and we know that this is not a 'fault' in the case of inferential reasonings for one's own purpose†; and thus there would be no room for this premiss in any case of inferential reasoning; and yet this is what you maintain. That 'Siddhasādhana' is not a fault in the case of reasoning for one's own benefit is proved by the fact that those who desire Final Release always accomplish for themselves the direct knowledge of Self requisite for that purpose, by means of bringing about a commixture of the three means of knowledge, viz. 'studying of scriptural texts', 'reasoning' and 'reflection' [and as the 'study' points to the same Self as the

* The proposition 'all smoky places are fiery' cannot be true as a universal proposition, unless all particular smoky places are fiery. So this proposition also implies that the particular place—the mountain where smoke is—is also fiery; and thus the conclusion proceeds directly from the Major Premiss, the Minor Premiss being superfluous.

† 'Siddhasādhana' means the proving of what is already accepted by the other party. There being no other party in the case where one reasons for his own benefit, this fault is not possible.

'Reasoning' and 'Reflection', there is always be a 'siddhasa-dhana].

(412) The above reasonings also serve to set aside another definition of the '*Probans*'—namely, as that which, while invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, subsists in the *pakṣa* which is capable of being suspected as the substrate of the *probandum*. [This capability also lasting as long as the thing lasts, the possibility of *suspicion* would remain even after the inferential conclusion had been arrived at; and so on, all the aforesaid arguments would come in here also].

(413) "In order to avoid the above difficulties," says the opponent, "we shall define the *probans* simply as that which is invariably concomitant (with the *probandum*)." This also will not help you, we reply. For, we ask—does the inference consist in reflecting on that which you intend to be the concomitant *probans*, merely in its own simple form, or as concomitant with the *probandum*? The former is not possible; as in that case whenever a man would think of the *smoke* and such other things (that might be concomitant with some *probandum*), even though he may not be cognisant of the fact of its being so concomitant, you would have to accept it as an inferential process! Nor is the second alternative possible; as in that case the cognition of the mere concomitance of the *probans* with the *probandum* would constitute *Inference* (which would be absurd, also according to the Logician); as it must be admitted that the cognition of the said 'invariable concomitance' apprehends the fact of the *probans* being concomitant (and this is all that your assertion makes the necessary factor in 'inference'). * For these same reasons we reject also the view that 'Inference consists in the *second* or the *third* cognition of the *probans*,' specially as in this latter case, the character of 'inference'

* The above difficulties are sought to be met by the assertion that while the *first* cognition of concomitance forms the *premiss*, its *second* or *third* cognition would be the inference following from that premiss.

would have to be admitted in the case of the mere *series* of cognitions of invariable concomitance (that we may have, without proceeding to the inferential conclusion); and further, when a person, having at first cognised the invariable concomitance, would again come to cognise the joint fact of the *probans* being concomitant, and the *probandum* being that with which it is concomitant,—this would contain the *second* cognition of concomitance, which, according to you, would be 'Inference'. Nor can this be truly regarded as 'Inference'; as in this case, as in the case of all Inferences open to the fault of 'Siddhasādhana', the conclusion being free from doubt, the true character of the '*pakṣa*' is found wanting*; and hence the *probans* which would reside in, and qualify, such a *pakṣa*, could not be a true '*pakṣa-dharma*'. It might be argued that this does not matter in the case of an Inference for one's own benefit (as it has just been shown by the Vedantin himself that *siddhasādhana* is no defect in such cases). But this also does not help to save you from difficulties of other kinds:—for instance, the cognition of invariable concomitance in question fulfilling all the conditions of the definition of 'Perception', if you regard it as 'Inference' you attribute to one and the same cognition the two incompatible characters of being 'direct' or 'immediate' (as Perception) and 'indirect' or 'mediate' (as Inference)!

(414) [Page 351] "With a view to avoid this difficulty, we shall define 'Inference' as that which, while *not having for its object that with which the probans is concomitant*, takes cognizance of that which is concomitant." This also will not help you, we reply. For, if the inference would not take any cognizance of that with which the *probans* is concomitant, it would fail to take cognizance also of that which is concomitant; as the latter is cognised always along with its correlative,—the cognition of concomitance being always in

* A true *pakṣa* is that with regard to whose relationship to the *probandum* there is at first a suspicion only.

the form 'this is concomitant with that'; and thus in this, the cognition of both *this* and *that* being necessary, the cognition of that with which there is concomitance must be regarded as a necessary factor in the cognition of concomitance; as this is a necessary qualifying adjunct of that which is concomitant; and as such no cognition of this latter is possible without that of the former. In answer to this it might be urged that it is not intended that the Inference should not take cognizance of any and every thing with which the *probans* may be concomitant; but only that it should not take cognizance of that particular individual (with which the particular Inference may be concerned).* This also is not right, we reply; because even so, the character of 'Inference' would have to be applied to the cognition of the concomitant thing by a person whose cognition of concomitance has arisen either from the assertion of a trustworthy person—that 'Fire and smoke are concomitant,'—or from reflection, at the time that the smoke and fire are not perceived, over the previously frequently cognised concomitance of fire and smoke [because in both these cases the cognition of the *Fire* with which smoke is concomitant, does not pertain to any *particular* fire, but to fire *in general*; and thus your conditions are fulfilled]. "By the '*parāmarsha*' of the *probans* (as concomitant) we do not mean the mere knowledge of it—and it would be only thus that it could apply to the very first cognition of it that we may happen to have;— what we mean by it is the *recognition* of it (as concomitant)." This also is not right, we reply; as even so the character of 'Inference' would have to be admitted in the case where the concomitance having been cognised in the first instance, either through the assertion of a trustworthy person, or by a mere reflection the cogniser may happen to have the *recognition* also in the form that 'this is the concomitance that I had known

* This meets the above difficulty, inasmuch as Perception always pertains to *particular* things.

through trustworthy assertion, or through mere reflection. [So the objection remains in force.]

(415) The Opponent seeks to avoid the above difficulties by defining 'Inference' as consisting of that *parāmarsha*, or reflection of concomitance, which pertains to a particular individual *probans*; (i.e., the reflection in the form 'this smoke is concomitant with fire,' and not in the general form 'smoke is concomitant with fire'). But in this case the definition would become too narrow; as the definition that pertains to one particular individual cannot apply to cases of other individuals. If, in order to avoid this, you add that it is not any one particular individual *probans* that you mean, but particular individuals *in general*,—then the definition becomes too wide (as shown before).

[The explanation of the character of the Probandum is as impossible as that of the Probans.]

(416) Then again, we ask—The presence of *fire* (the *probandum*) in the mountain that you cognise through the presence therein of *smoke* (the *probans*),—does this presence of fire refer to all time? or to the particular time (at which the presence of smoke is cognised)? The former is not possible; as in that case, just as the man seeking fire repairs to the mountain at the time that he sees smoke issuing from it, so would he also repair to it, at all times (even when he does not see the smoke: while as a matter of fact such is not found to be the case). Nor is the second alternative tenable; as the concomitance (of Smoke) upon which the inference is based is not with the particular fire existing at the time the smoke is seen (but with fire in general). "What we mean by the 'particular time' is the time at which smoke (any smoke in general) exists (and not that at which any particular smoke exists)." But in that case, in some place or other, at other times also, smoke would be existent; and this other time also would be 'the time at which smoke exists'; and thus even at this time the man

seeking fire would repair to the mountain. "But what we mean is the time of the existence of that particular smoke." This also cannot be right; as if by 'that particular' you mean the particular individual smoke one sees issuing from the mountain at the time, then, this would be a smoke with which the concomitance of fire has never been known; if, on the other hand, by 'that particular' you mean any and every particular smoke, then you become open to the objection just urged by us (that the man seeking fire would repair to the mountain at other times also, on account of the presence of some particular smoke at some place in the world). Even though it is true that you make it necessary for your Inference that the *probans* (smoke) should reside in the *pakṣa* (mountain) (and not anywhere in the world),—yet all that this does is to save you from the absurdity of the man seeking for fire in places other than the mountain; but how could that save you from the absurdity of the man seeking for it at other times (than the time at which the smoke is actually seen)? If, in order to escape from this, you insert the particular time also as a necessary element in your inferential '*pakṣa*' (defining it as that wherein the probans resides *at the time of inference*, thereby the presence of fire proved by the inference would be at the time of the presence of smoke),—after that particular moment of time would have passed, how could the man seek for fire in your '*pakṣa*' (which also would have ceased to exist, on the cessation of the point of time which was a necessary factor in that *pakṣa*)? If then you were to lay down the 'time of smoke' as an element in your '*pakṣa*' (thus avoiding the said difficulty by reason of the fact that the man would seek for fire in the mountain only so long as he sees the smoke issuing from it);—then, in that case, you would be open to all the objections that we have urged above (the 'time of smoke' being that of any smoke in the world, and so forth); If, to guard against this, you make it *the time of that particular smoke*,—then this involves the absurdity of a thing

subsisting partly in itself [the *pakṣa* is the mountain *as qualified by the time of the particular smoke*; and it is this particular smoke that, as *probans*, subsists in that *pakṣa*.]

[The defining of the Probans and the Probandum has been proved impossible; it is not possible for the Logician to supply an adequate explanation of the 'Invariable Concomitance' of these two upon which all Inference is based.]

(417) Then again, you have to explain the meaning of the word '*Vyāpti*' (Invariable Concomitance). "By *Vyāpti* we mean *avinābhāva*—that is to say, when two things are so related that one does not exist without the other, they are said to be *invariably concomitant*." But what do you mean by this? Do you mean that the one exists when the other is not absent? or that the one is absent when the other is absent? * If the former, then, inasmuch as 'non-absence' is synonymous with 'presence', the relation would come to this that when one is present the other is also present; † and further, by this definition the relationship between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron' also would be 'Invariable Concomitance.' "But Invariable Concomitance is not only an *occasional, casual or accidental* relationship; it is meant to be a *universal* relationship (that holds good *at all times and places*)." ‡ What do you mean by this 'universality' of the relation? "Well, it only means that the relation subsists in all individuals of that class." This character then can never be ascertained until there is a knowledge of *all* individuals of that class; and as a matter of fact, it is not possible for all these individuals to be known; for the simple reason that at any time there is no possibility of the presence of the right means of knowing

* The latter alternative is taken up in para. 423 (page 358, 'Pandit' Edn.)

† And in this manner, you would give up Negative Concomitance completely.

‡ And the relation between 'Earth' and 'Capable of being cut by Iron' is not such a one. As Diamond which is 'Earth' cannot be cut by Iron.

all those individuals.* “At the time that one perceives certain individuals as being invariably concomitant with something else, all individuals of that class come into contact with the percipient organ—not indeed into direct contact, but into that contact to which we give the name of the ‘contact of universality,’ whereby the perception of one individual of a class brings along with it an idea of all individuals of that class.† Without accepting this theory, to seek to explain or understand ‘Invariable Concomitance’ is as futile and foolish as the longing for a child by a woman who has married an impotent husband,—this is the taunt propounded by Vāchaspaṭi Mishra.” This is not right, we reply. For, if at the time of cognising ‘Invariable Concomitance’ through the ‘contact of universality’ all individuals of a class, were cognised,—then a man, who would cognise the ‘concomitance’ of such universals as ‘knowable’ and the like (which include *all* things), would have to be regarded as omniscient. Nor is there available for you the counter-magical-formula, in the shape of the assertion that—“in thus putting forward ‘Omniscience’ you seem to imply as if nothing were unknown to you, and thus omniscience belongs to you also !”

(418) [Page 355] “But as a matter of fact, at the time that one cognises the Concomitance of ‘knowability,’ he does cognise *all* things,—not indeed in their particular individual character, but merely as ‘knowable.’” This is not right, we reply; as if the particular thing is ‘knowable’ as endowed with its individual character (as indeed everything in the world is), then the thing along with its individual character is also a substratum of ‘knowability’; and as such how could it fail to be cognised by the cognition of ‘knowability’? If however it is not ‘knowable’ as endowed with its individual character, then it cannot have that

* The individual object is perceived through Sense-contact; and it is not possible for all individuals to be in contact with any sense-organ of the person.

† And thus the requisite knowledge of all individuals is always available.

character ! For certainly whatever individual character a thing has, it is always 'knowable' by that ; and hence when a thing is known as 'knowable', it would be known in all its existent individual character. And if you admit the possibility of this, then just please find out what is passing in my mind,—then only can I put faith in your assertion !

(419) In answer to the above, the Opponent urges the following :—“Just as among things, there are several kinds of Difference,—in the form of ‘Mutual Negation’, ‘Diversity of Properties’ and so forth—so is there also a ‘one-ness’ among things. And all such properties as ‘knowability’ and the like (that belong to all things) are nothing more or less than what constitutes that *one-ness* among things. Consequently when a thing is known as ‘knowable’, what is known is only the particular individual thing (actually cognised) as one (identical) with all knowable things ; and as this does not involve the knowledge of all things, why should the cognition of ‘knowability’ imply omniscience ? Nor may it be argued against this, that the Diversity of individual things also is something ‘knowable’, and so, whenever a thing is cognised, this diversity also would be cognised as one of the things possessing that *knowability* (which constitutes the identity of the perceived thing with all things knowable). This does not matter ; inasmuch as this Diversity also, when known as ‘knowable’, is known only as ‘one’ with all things (and as such our aforesaid argument remains unshaken). Hence the declaration—‘that man by whom any one *bhāva* or character has been perceived in its real form, by him have all things been perceived *ṭaṭṭvataḥ*’—that is to say *as one through that common character*.”

(420) This above reasoning, we reply, is not right ; as if what you say were true, then there would be the possibility of such a self-contradictory conception as that ‘the many are one’. The contradiction might be sought to be explained by the fact that the ‘diversity’ is due to other characters,

and the 'oneness' to an altogether different character—of *knowability* for instance (that is to say, the jar is different from the cloth through its character of the jar, but is one with it, as both are 'knowable'). But in that case, inasmuch as the diversity among all individuals (knowable things,) is also a substratum of 'knowability', its cognition would certainly imply the omniscience urged above. *

(421) Then again, we ask—Even granting that the particular individuals of a class are perceived by your 'contact of universality'; what is your proof for (means of knowing) the fact that there is a relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) among them? It might be held that, "just as the sense-organs are the means for perceiving the individuals, so in the same manner the said relationship is perceived by the sense-organs that apprehend Invariable Concomitance." But in that case, as the sense-organs would supply the right cognition of such concomitance, there would be no possibility of any discrepancy (or mistake) in the notion of concomitance thus obtained; ;—while as a matter of fact, we do meet with such discrepancies. "In these latter cases, the cognition of the relationship is regarded as *wrong*, only because of its subsequent sublation." This will not help you; as, all circumstances being similar, there can be no justification for regarding one cognition as 'right', and another as 'wrong'; specially as it is not easy to differentiate the intricacies of what is, and what is not, a deficiency (in the cognition, sufficient to make it sublated). It might be urged that—"from the very effects (in the shape of subsequent sublation and the like) we can infer the fact that there is a difference in the circumstances (of the two cognitions, whereby we would be justified in regarding one as 'right' and another as 'wrong')." You may infer this fact; but it becomes necessary for you to

* Diversity among things can be known only when they are all known with their distinctive characters. Hence the cognition of Diversity implies the cognition of all things.

explain what that 'difference' or 'diversity of circumstances' is. The 'peculiarity of circumstance' cannot be held to consist in the presence (in one case) and absence (in the other) of all universal relationships. For as at any one time, the *future* relationships are not present, the 'peculiarity of circumstance' would never be complete, and as such could not bring about the desired effect (of pointing out one cognition as right and another as wrong). If it be argued that even though the future relationships are not present, yet whenever the relationship is cognised; it is cognised as subsisting between any two individuals, in general, of the two classes concerned, and consequently (even though the particular *individuals*, now before the eyes, might not have been previously known as having the relationship), the previous existence of the relationship (cognised before, as subsisting between any two individuals) would be there to constitute the necessary 'peculiarity of circumstance,'—then we would reply that this previous existence of the relationship would be available in a case where the present cognition of relationship is *wrong*, as well as in that where it is *right*; for as a matter of fact, the wrong cognition (of concomitance) also never appears, unless there has been some sort of cognition in the past of that relationship.*

(422) The Opponent urges—"What of this? We shall assume some other peculiarity in the cause (of the cognition of concomitance) on the basis of the (well-recognised) difference in the effects produced (in the shape of right and wrong cognitions)." But in that case, you will have to explain if this peculiar cause is one that aids the sense-organ (in the perception of concomitance), or it is an altogether different (independent) cause. The former is not possible; as there is no ground for assuming that the sense-organs can

* The 'Earth' is wrongly cognised as concomitant with 'capable of being cut by iron,' only after many earthy substances have been found to be so capable.

have any agency in bringing about the valid cognition of *past* and *future* relations (the senses acting only upon things in the present); on the contrary, as a matter of fact, a due comprehension of concomitance between two things known before is found to appear only after the sense-contact (with those things) has ceased, and the man has had time to reflect upon the facts (in connection with his cognition of the things concerned). It might be argued that, even at this time there is a particular sense-organ, the Mind, functioning. That may be so; but there is no proof for the fact that the Mind is the *instrument* for bringing about the peculiar effect in question; specially in view of the fact that every contingency (for the explaining of which you postulate the instrumentality of the Mind) is explained on the basis of other assumptions which are found to be necessary on other grounds also. It may be that in the cognition in question also, as in the cognitions produced by the Eye and the other organs, the Mind is some sort of a cause (not necessarily the principal one, so as to be called the 'instrument' of that cognition); but just as in the case of the visual cognition (though the Mind is some sort of a cause) it is the Eye, that is regarded as the 'instrument,' so in the case of the cognition of concomitance also, the 'instrument' must be something else (different from the Mind); and this would be either a seventh Sense-organ, or some other 'instrument of cognition.' If you do not admit this, then for visual cognition also the Eye could not be regarded as the 'instrument'; as in this case also the Mind may be regarded as the 'instrument,' just as it is in the case of the feeling of pleasure, etc; and the Eye would have to be regarded as a mere subordinate auxilliary. Nor again is the second alternative tenable (*viz.*, that the 'peculiar cause' of the cognition of concomitance is something altogether independent of the sense-organs); as in that case, this 'cause' would be either a 'seventh sense-organ,' or a 'means of valid cognition' distinct from those accepted (by you)!

(423) Nor can the second meaning suggested (in para. 417) of the word ‘*Avinābhāva*’—‘Invariable Concomitance’—be accepted. That is to say, it cannot be defined as the negation of that ‘*vinābhāva*’ which consists in the fact of the one being not absent while the other is absent. As by this definition, there would be Invariable Concomitance between ‘Earth’ and ‘capability of being cut by iron,’ in view of the fact that there are cases (*i.e.* that of *Ākāsha*) where there is absence of both ‘Earth’ and ‘capability of being cut by iron.’ [And thus in this case the one being absent while the other is not absent, we have *the negation of the fact of one being absent while the other is not absent*; and this fulfils the conditions of your definition]. “It is the universal simultaneity of the two things that is intended, and not mere occasional simultaneity (*i.e. in all cases* where the one is absent, the other must also be absent); it is for this reason that the expression ‘*avivābhāvaniyamāt*’ is used (by which is meant *the necessity or certainty of concomitance*).” This is not possible, we reply; for the ascertainment of this *universal absence* (absence in all cases) will be as impossible as that of universal concomitance (as shown in para. 417). If such an ascertainment were possible, it would be easier to ascertain universal concomitance than universal absence; and under the circumstances, what would be the use of this roundabout method of explaining your position by means of ‘universal absence.’?

(424) Some people offer the following definition of ‘Invariable Concomitance’:—“When the *probans* and the *probandum* are so related that it is absolutely impossible for the *probans* to be present in a substratum where the *probandum* can never subsist,—then, in that case, the concomitance of these two (*probans* and *probandum*) constitutes what is meant by ‘Invariable Concomitance.’” This also is not the right definition, we reply. By what, we ask, is the *impossibility* of the *probans* subsisting where the *probandum* cannot subsist

ascertained? By any of the means of right knowledge? Or by argumentation (reasoning)? If the former, then,—in the first place, it cannot be ascertained by means of the sense-organs; as that would be absolutely impossible (all the factors concerned not being in contact with them); and further because, if this were ascertainable by Sense-perception, then there would be no possibility of any doubts arising as to the validity of the *probans*—as to whether or not it is really invariably concomitant with the *probandum*. Nor, in the second place, could the afore-mentioned ‘impossibility’ be ascertained by means of Inference; as if it were, then there would be an endless series of Inferences (for each Inference). Thirdly, the impossibility cannot be ascertained by means of ‘Presumption’; as Presumption (according to you, Logicians) does not differ from Inference; and further because, even if it were different, it would prove the said impossibility only by showing that there is no possibility of the *probans* subsisting without the *probandum*; and when this will have already been proved by ‘Presumption’, what would be the use of any further Inference (based upon that relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*)? And if the Presumption were not to prove the ‘impossibility’ in the said manner, what would it prove in regard to the *probans* and the *probandum*?*

(425) We grant, for the sake of argument, that ‘Presumption’ would somehow prove the required ‘impossibility’; even then, it becomes necessary for us to ask what exactly is your view. (1) Do you mean that ‘Invariable Concomitance’ is that concomitance (of the two) *in some place and time or the other*, which is accompanied by the proof of the impossibility of the existence of the *probans* in a place where the *probandum* cannot exist? (2) Or that it is the concomitance *in all places and at all times*, as accompanied by that proof of impossibility? (3) Or that it is more concomitance

* As in that case there could be no concomitance between them.

in *general* (vaguely), as thus accompanied,—and that you do not care to enter into particular details? (4) Or that it is the concomitance in all places and at all times, and that this concomitance is ascertained by the proof of the impossibility of the existence of the *probans* where the *probandum* cannot be present ?

(426) The *first* of these is not tenable ; as you cannot establish any of the alternatives that are possible under this view. For instance, does the proof of the impossibility of the existence of the *probans* where the *probandum* cannot exist pertain to all particular individuals (of the 'probans' and 'probandum')? Or only to a few individuals in a vague general sort of way ? By the first alternative, wherever it would be necessary to bring forward the Inference, it would be necessary to bring up the 'Presumption' which would prove the impossibility of the contrary (that is to say, the impossibility of the *probans* existing where the *probandum* cannot exist); and as what is required to be proved by the Inference would have been already proved by this 'Presumption', there would be absolutely no use for the trouble of having recourse to the Inference. By the second alternative, even when in regard to some few individuals the concomitance of the two is not possible, if it is found in a few other individuals, these latter would suffice to afford scope for the proof of the impossibility of the contrary (i.e. of the impossibility of the *probans* where the *probandum* is absent); * because the 'contrary' (whose impossibility is sought to be proved) would, by this alternative be of this general form — 'the presence of smoke is always apart from (not concomitant with) the presence of fire'; and what the proof of the impossibility of this 'contrary' establishes is the fact that the presence of the two (the *smoke* as the *probans* and the *fire* as the *probandum*) is not incompatible; and as this 'non-incompatibility' would be established

* And this could not establish *Invariable* concomitance.

even by the two being found together *in some cases* (and not necessarily in all cases),—the concomitance between ‘Earth and ‘capability of being cut by iron’ will have to be regarded as ‘Invariable Concomitance.’

(427) Nor is the *second* form of your view (mentioned in para. 425) tenable. As in that case the defining clause “accompanied &c.” would be absolutely useless; you might simply say “concomitance at all times and in all places”; and we have already shown that even this will not be right. Nor can the third form of your view be maintained. As that is rejected by those same arguments that we have put forward above (in para. 426) in connection with the alternatives as to whether the proof of impossibility pertains to all individuals, or only to a few individuals in a general way. Nor lastly, can the fourth form of your view be accepted. For the universal character of the proposition, ‘what is smoky is fiery’, would be expressed only in the form—‘All individual smokes are related to (concomitant with) fire’; and if this form of the proposition is comprehended at the time of the cognition of your ‘Invariable Concomitance,’ then, inasmuch as the smoke in the *pakṣa* (mountain) would also be only one *particular smoke*, the concomitance of this also with *fire* would have been already cognised (by the cognition of the said Invariable Concomitance); and thus the further cognition (in the inferential conclusion) of the same previously cognised presence of fire in the *pakṣa* would be a mere ‘Remembrance’; and there would be no room for your ‘Inference.’

(428) In answer to this it might be said that what has been cognised previously has been cognised only in a general way; while the Inference is in a particular form. But this also is not right. For what is this ‘particular form’ that is meant to be inferred? Is it the particular individual, which is the ‘particular form’ of ‘firiness’? Or is it the connection of that individual with a particular point of time and place (at which the presence of fire is cognised)? It cannot mean

the former; as you yourself have admitted that *all individuals* have been cognised by the cognition of Invariable Concomitance (so that there can be no other individual left to be cognised for the first time by your Inferential Conclusion). Nor can it mean the latter; as that which is your '*pakṣa*', which is a particular thing *having smoke*, and which has been 'remembered' (in the manner shown above) as *having fire*, is distinctly cognised by means of the Eye, as being a Mountain *at a particular time and place* (the time and place also thus being cognised by the Eye). This fact of time and place being cognised by means of the Eye will be admitted by you, in the same manner as you admit the fact that the recognition of a certain thing, as 'this (what I see now) is the same as that (what I had seen in the past)', involves a 'recognition' also of the particular time and place at which the thing is seen now,—this 'recognition' being obtained by means of the Eye as aided by impressions left by the previous cognition. [And just as in this case you do not object to Recognition being obtained by the Sense-organs, so you can have no objection to the *Sensuous* character of the Recognition involved in your Inferential Conclusion]. And thus (your conclusion being only a matter of Sense-perception) there is no room for 'Inference.'

(429) *Nor can the 'impossibility of the *probans* subsisting where the *probandum* cannot subsist' be ascertained by Analogy; For all Analogies pertain to particular cases; and as such they cannot apply to cases like those under consideration (all of which pertain to universals, more or less).

(430) Nor can the said 'impossibility' be ascertained by Verbal Authority; as in cases where no trustworthy teacher is available, no comprehension of 'Invariable Concomitance', would be possible, (if such comprehension were dependent upon Verbal Authority).

*The author takes up the thread of argumentation from para 424.

(431) The sixth proof, 'Negation', might perhaps be available for you. But when we proceed to ascertain the character of that Negation, it is not found to be possible: For instance, the 'Negation' must be asserted in this form:— 'If the *Smoke* ever existed apart from *fire*, it would certainly be so perceived;—as a matter of fact however, it is never so perceived;— hence from this non-perception it follows that it *never* exists apart from *fire*." But this proof is not right; we ask—does this 'Negation' proceed on the basis of the fact that its basic premiss is found to be not untrue only in a few cases? or on that it is never in any case found to be untrue? It cannot be the former; as in that case there would be an 'Invariable Concomitance' between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron'. Nor can it be the latter, as in that case, there arises the question—Is the 'non-perception in all cases' the non-perception of *only that which would be capable of being perceived*? or is it 'non-perception' pure and simple? It cannot be the former; as it is not possible for that which is *capable of being perceived* to be 'non-perceived' in all cases. Nor can it be the latter; as in that case 'invariable concomitance' becomes possible between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron' **also**. In answer to this it might be urged that the truth of this 'concomitance' is found to fail in the case of diamond (which, though 'Earth,' is not 'cut by iron'). But even this cannot help you; as at the time that the diamond is not seen, there is no idea of the failure of the truth of the said 'concomitance'. "True; but when the diamond *is* seen, the failure of the 'concomitance' becomes patent; and 'Invariable Concomitance' is possible only in cases where it is *never* found to fail." This cannot be right: for even in cases where we fail to perceive any failure of the truth of a proposition, there is no guarantee that *in the future* also its failure or falsity will never be perceived. [And thus there can be no surety with regard to any 'Invariable Concomitance'].

(432) [Thus then it has been proved that the *impossibility of the probans subsisting where the probandum cannot subsist* cannot be ascertained by any of the Means of Right Knowledge]. Nor can this 'impossibility' be ascertained by reasoning or argumentation (the second part of the question put by us in para. 424). For if you accept the theory that 'Reasoning' has its basis in 'Invariable Concomitance', then you land yourself in an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, you do not accept that theory, as in that case the very foundation of the 'Reasoning' would be unsound, the 'Reasoning' itself would come to be a mere semblance of itself—not a true Reasoning.

(433) In answer to this you might argue as follows:— "You cannot very well say what you have said: here is the 'Reasoning' that I put forward as proving the impossibility of any suspicion as regards the existence of *smoke* apart from *fire*:—'If *smoke* could exist without *fire*, it would either be without a cause, and as such, eternal, or not exist at all.' This 'Reasoning' is unanswerable, inasmuch as if you were to put forward a doubt as to its validity (you would do this by way of some other Reasoning whose validity you accept, and thus) you would be open to 'self-contradiction', or self-nullification. * It is a rule accepted by all men that one doubts or suspects only that, the doubting of which does not render him open to the faults of 'self-contradiction' or 'self-nullification.' Such unanswerable Reasonings then as we have just shown may be brought forward in all cases (of Inference)." This however is not right, we reply. For it is not necessary that the truth of the Reasoning you have put forward should be doubted in such a way as to deny the relation of Cause and Effect between the Fire and Smoke (and it would be only if this were doubted that your deduction with regard to Smoke being uncaused and eternal

* In seeking to set aside the validity of Reasoning, you accept the validity of Reasoning.

would be true) ; but certainly the doubt might be raised as to the possibility of Smoke arising from other causes also (which possibility would viviate your 'invariable concomitance').

(434) In answer to this it would not be right to argue that—"if Smoke proceeded from other causes, there would be no possibility of any such *one* genus as 'Smoke'." As such a single class or genus as 'Smoke' would be possible in that case also ; just as you have the single genus 'Cognition,' even though some Cognitions are brought about by the Senses, and others by 'Inference' and other means of knowledge. "But in the case of Cognitions what makes them sub-classed, as 'Direct Perception' f.i. is the contact of the Sense-organs ; they are classed as 'Direct Perception' &c., *not because they are 'cognition,'* but because they are due to the particular agencies of the Sense-organ &c." This also is not right ; as with a view to avoid the undesirable contingency of the general character, or conception, 'Cognition' being something merely accidental (and not a conception based upon a uniform characteristic), it is necessary for you to point out some cause 'or origin' that might be common to all cognitions ; and just as doubts might be raised as to any particular cognition proceeding from that source, so, in the same manner, in the case of a *particular smoke* also doubts might very well arise as to its originating from *fire*. Nor may it be argued that in the smoke produced by fire no particular feature is ever perceived (as in the particular kinds of cognitions produced by the Senses, by Inference and so forth,) (all smoke being equally produced by fire). Because this non-perception of the particular feature can be explained by the fact that it is only natural that we do not perceive it, inasmuch as, (in a hurry, without due reflection), any such particular feature is not capable of being perceived, on account of the non-perception, at that time,

of those other kinds of smoke that proceed from other sources (than fire). [And thus, the non-perception of what is not perceptible at the time cannot prove its non-existence; as according to the Logician also, we are justified in believing that a certain thing does not exist at the time, only when we make sure of the fact that if it had existed it would have been perceived]. And further you cannot stop the possibility of such surmises as—‘when the particular kind of smoke produced by other causes will be perceived, then it may be possible for us to perceive particular features in the smoke produced by fire also.’

(435) “In the case of cognitions we find a common source (or cause) in the shape of *the contact of the Mind and the Self*.” This is not right. For, if anything that proceeds from the contact of the Mind and Self were ‘Cognition,’ then Desire, Effort &c. would also have to be regarded as ‘Cognition’! If then, as the cause common to all cognitions, you were to assume—either (1) some peculiar Unseen Agency, or (2) a certain peculiar force, or (3) the universal class ‘Cognition,’ or (4) the previous Negation or non-existence of Cognition,—then, some such (unseen) cause could also be assumed as pertaining in common to *all* smokes, even such as are not produced by fire. It might be argued that a single class can be assumed on the basis of an *Unseen Cause*, only in a case where the *seen* cause is found to fail (to apply to all the individuals concerned) (while in the case in question the Causality of fire is not found to fail in regard to any smoke). This also cannot be right. As, even granting that it can be assumed only in a case where the seen cause is found to fail,—what guarantee have you that in any given case (of fire and smoke for instance) (even though you may not have found it to fail in the past,) that it will not fail in the future?

(436) The following argument may be brought forward by the Opponent:—“For you who would thus be casting suspicion on all inferential processes, no inference would

be possible; inasmuch as, without admitting the existence of the inferences with regard to the nature of the Self held by your adversary, it would not be possible for you to engage in any discussion (as to the nature of the Self); and as these inferences that you yourself would accept (in this discussion) would be open to the same suspicions (that you put forward against our inferences), you would (in putting forward such inferences) become open to the charge of 'self-contradiction'."

This is not right, we reply. For (if you do not admit the possibility of such suspicions), just as you accept as valid the inference of *fire*, on the ground of its being the cause of *smoke*,—so in the same manner, you would have to accept as valid the inference, from the presence of *fire*, of the presence of a certain source of fire (from which you might have seen fire being produced in certain cases) [and you would have no justification for suspecting and enquiring into the character of the relationship between fire and that particular cause]; specially, as all attendant circumstances being similar in the two cases, there can be no ground for regarding one as valid and the other as invalid. And further, if you hold that no suspicion can arise (with regard to the smoke being due to causes other than fire) even when we actually perceive properties (*i.e.*, those to which the production of smoke is due) common to the two (sources of smoke), then it comes to this that even when the *Cause* is present in full force, the effect may not appear; and under the circumstances, when for the purpose of bringing about the effect, in the shape of the conviction of other people, you would attempt to put forth such causes as Verbal Assertion, Inferential Reasonings, and so forth,—you also would be open to the charge of 'self-contradiction.' "But our case is different: the 'self-contradiction' that we have shown in your case, would itself be one of the 'peculiar features' (proving the fact of Smoke issuing from no other cause save fire); and when this 'peculiar feature'

will have been duly cognised, there would be no 'non-cognition of peculiar features' which is the necessary condition for the appearance of suspicion; and thus no suspicion being possible, how could there be any similar *self-contradiction* in our case?" This cannot be, we reply. As the cognition of this 'self-contradiction' cannot be held to be due to mere fancy or conjecture and such other causes; because inasmuch as such fancy &c. would always pertain to things that have no real existence, if the 'self-contradiction' due to such causes were to be effective, their operation would extend too far—(i. e. such fanciful 'self-contradictions' could be put forward in all cases). Nor can it be urged that it is the 'self-contradiction' that pertains to things other than those having no real existence, which would prove the rightly cognised (absence of failure in the premiss put forward). This we shall refute later on, when dealing with 'Tarka' or Reasoning [page 369].

(437) Thus then (the 'self-contradiction' not being merely 'fanciful'), we ask—the 'cognition of peculiarity' in the shape 'self-contradiction' that you put forward as the bar to any suspicion (with regard to the validity of your premiss)—this 'cognition' must be held to proceed either from some Means of right Knowledge, or from mere Reasoning; if it proceeds from some Means of right Knowledge, then the presence of the suspicion also would be cognised by that same means of knowledge; as it is only when a certain suspicion is present that any 'self-contradiction' can be noticed in it; if there can be 'self-contradiction' even without the 'suspicion', then it is evident that the 'self-contradiction' is equally possible in both cases of likely suspicion (the one that you put forward against us, and the other brought forward by us against you).

(438) "We grant that the Means of right Knowledge that would afford the cognition of 'self-contradiction', would

Kh. 293.

also bring about the cognition of suspicion. What does this matter? The 'self-contradiction' would come about on the basis of the 'suspicion' appearing in the first instance; and when this 'self-contradiction', which would be a 'peculiar feature' in the case, is cognised, it will not allow any further suspicion to appear." It is not so, we reply. For (this 'self-contradiction' cannot prove the absence of failure in your premiss,—either while the 'Contradiction' exists, or after it has itself ceased; as) at the time that the 'self-contradiction' exists, the 'failure' (or discrepancy) of that which is *suspected* is proved by the very suspicion that forms the basis of that suspicion; and after that 'suspicion' has ceased, the 'self-contradiction' based thereupon, which is the 'peculiar feature' you rely upon, also ceases; and thus what would be there to bar further suspicion?

(439) "Granted that the 'peculiar feature' of the 'Self-contradiction' is not present at that time;—there is certainly present the *Cognition* of that Contradiction, or the *Impression* left by its Cognition; and in all cases it is the *Cognition* of the 'peculiar feature', as well as the *Impression* left by that cognition, that are obstacles to further suspicion; and in no case is suspicion barred by the actual presence of the 'peculiar feature' itself." This is not right, we reply. For when the 'peculiar feature' is such as is not coeval with its substrate (being only temporary) (as for instance, the dark colour of the unbaked jar),—if the mere fact of this feature having been once perceived, or that of its impression being left on the mind, were to put a stop to all suspicion with regard to the future appearance of all similar 'peculiar features' in that same substrate,—then, in the case of the unbaked jar, as the *dark colour* will have been perceived, either in the *jar as a whole* (according to the view that the *baking* applies to the jar as one composite whole), or in its component atoms (in accordance with the view that the *baking* applies to the component particles of the thing), there

could be no suspicion in regard to the likelihood of there appearing in that jar, in the future, of the other peculiar feature (the red colour), through the *baking*.

(440) Then again, if the 'self-contradiction' appears only after the suspicion has arisen, then it may be that, by reason of the perception of this 'self-contradiction', which would be a 'peculiar feature' residing in suspicion, there can be no further suspicion with regard to that suspicion (but it could not stop the appearance of the previous suspicion itself). If, on the other hand, the 'self-contradiction' resided in (depended upon) the 'failure' (of your premiss, my suspicion with regard to which would, as you say, involve the 'self-contradiction'),—then, in that case, this 'failure' itself would be firmly established; inasmuch as in that case, the 'failure', being the substratum of the 'self-contradiction' (which, according to you, is *rightly* cognised), would be something that is *rightly* cognised. Nor may it be held that the Reasonings are based upon the invariable concomitances known from times immemorial. For, it cannot be said that those concomitances have been *rightly* cognised; specially as we find in many cases—*e. g.* in the case of the notion of 'Self' with regard to the body,—that even though the cognition has continued from time immemorial, it is wrong all the same; and as for the cognition having come down from times immemorial, this would be common to both (the cognition of your invariable concomitances, and the ordinary notion of *self* with regard to the body). Nor will it be right for you to make us open to 'self-contradiction' by means of the Reasoning that if we suspected 'failure' in your argument, we should be involved in 'self-contradiction.' As the very foundation of this Reasoning being unsound the Reasoning would be a false one; and if even a false Reasoning could succeed in making the opponent open to 'self-contradiction', then, the possibility of such 'self-contradiction' would be common to both parties; inasmuch as

it is quite possible to make you open to 'self-contradiction' by means of some sort of false Reasoning. If (in order to escapè from this difficulty) you were to hold that the Reasoning has its basis in Invariable Concomitance, there would be suspicion of 'failure' with regard to that concomitance also, and so on *ad infinitum*. If 'self-contradiction' were to be urged against that suspicion also, then too, there would be no end to these (Reasonings, Suspicions and Self-contradictions).

'And thus it will not be difficult for us to quote (against you) your own couplet with a few letters altered : ' (43).

* 'If there is *self-contradiction*, then there must be *suspicion* (on which that contradiction is based); if there is no *self-contradiction*, then the *suspicion* remains in force all the more; and thus how could the *suspicion* be put an end to by *self-contradiction*? and how too could any Reasoning stop the suspicion?' (44).

(441) It might be argued that (the †mere 'suspicion of failure' can not stop all Inference, as in all suspicion or doubt there are always two sides of the question, and) the 'absence of failure' (with regard to any Invariable Concomitance) consists in the abandoning of one side and accepting of the other (and on the basis of this *accepted* concomitance the Inference could rightly proceed). But against this some people might put forward the fact that in a case where we see a certain thing as appearing (*produced*) and disappearing (*destroyed*) simultaneously, it is not possible to perceive any such 'absence of failure', [either as to its appearance (*being born*) or to its disappearance (*being destroyed*) which are the only two factors in the doubt as to the thing being present or not present].

* This is a parody of one of Uḍayanāchārya's Kārikās.

† The suspicion is always in the form—is this (1) *true* or (2) *not true*? This is always followed by the rejecting of either (1) or (2) and the acceptance of the other. In a case where the *concomitance* would be accepted as true, the Inference could rightly proceed on the basis of that.

(442) Another definition of Invariable Concomitance is next tackled:—*Some people define 'Invariable Concomitance' as a *natural relation*. To these we put the question—*Whose 'natural relation' is it? Of the two members related? or of something else? It cannot be the latter; as in that case Invariable Concomitance would come to be something quite contrary to what it is intended to be [as by this hypothesis it would be a relationship between things not concomitant with each other]. Nor could it be the former; as in that case we would ask—What is the meaning of the word 'natural'? (1) Does it mean 'based upon, or subsisting in, the nature of the things related'?—(2) or, 'produced by the nature of the things related'?—(3) or, 'that which is not-different from the nature of the things intended to be related'?—(4) or, 'that which is invariably concomitant with the nature of the things related'?—(5) or, 'not due to anything other than the nature of the things related'?—(6) or something different from these five?*

(443) If it meant the (1)—*i.e.* 'subsisting in the related things'—then there would be 'invariable concomitance' between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron' (as there *is* such a relation subsisting in these two). Nor can it mean the (2); as that would make your definition 'too wide' as well as 'too narrow' ['too wide' as including the relation of the 'smoke' and the 'ass' that might be visible at the time; and 'too narrow' as not including the relation between 'Colour' and 'Taste,' in which no relation is *produced*]. For the same reasons, the *third* meaning also cannot be accepted. [The definition being 'too wide' as including the relation between the 'Earth-surface' and the 'absence of the jar'; where the relation is brought about by neither of the two relatives; and 'too narrow' as not including the relation between 'smoke' and 'fire,' where the relation is due to the

* See Vāchaspaṭi Mishra's *Nyāyavārtika-ṭātparya-tikā* (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares) pp. 109-110.

contact of wet fuel]. Nor can the *fourth* meaning be accepted; for until you have explained what 'invariable concomitance' is, it cannot be ascertained what is so *concomitant*; further, if the *relation* were so 'concomitant' then the *things related*, with which it would be concomitant, would, in virtue of this very fact, have a wider extension than the *relation*; and thus (there being no 'invariable concomitance' between the things themselves) the perception of one of these could not necessarily lead to the inference of the other. Nor can the *fifth* meaning be accepted; as if by 'being *due*' you mean 'being *produced*,' then the phrase 'to anything other than the things related' would be entirely superfluous, in case the relation in question be held to be *everlasting*; as in that case, by its very nature, the relation would be *not produced*, either by the nature of the things themselves (or by any other thing); and in the case of the *relation* being held to be non-eternal, something transient (produced by something),—then, in that case, there would be no possibility of any such *relation*; as (there can be no such relation as is produced by the two related things only), the causes available for the production of such relation being possible every where; in fact in the last resort, it cannot but be admitted that such relation as the one in question is brought about by such (universally efficient) causes as Time, Space, Unseen Agency, and so forth. Nor can the *sixth* meaning be accepted, for the simple reason that it cannot be explained what that 'something else' is; specially as in this case, this view can be refuted by putting forth all possible alternatives and showing each of them to be unacceptable; as any other procedure would show the weakness of the disputant.

(444) Others again define 'Invariable Concomitance' as *the relationship that is not due to any accidental circumstances*. To these people we put the following question—What is

the *upādhi* (accidental circumstance or condition) freedom from which constitutes your '*anupādhiḥ*' ?

(445) "*Upādhi*", says the Logician, "is that with which the *probandum* is *invariably concomitant*, but with which the *probans* is not so concomitant.* This definition is derived from the following verse† :—'When of two terms—not related to each other (by the relation of invariable concomitance)—one is found to be invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, if the other happens to be such as has its negation (or absence) invariably concomitant with the negation (or absence) of the *probandum*, this other is what is called *Upādhi*'; this verse being construed through negation as—'that is the *Upādhi* whose negation is concomitant with the negation of the *probandum*' (the affirmative form of which would be 'that which is concomitant with the *probandum*).' ‡ This has been called *Upādhi* (that which imposes) in view of the fact that one of its properties (*i. e.* its concomitance) appears (is imposed upon, is cognised) in that which is intended to be the *probans*,—in the same manner as the *redness* of the red *Japā* flower appears in the piece of rock-crystal. This is what has been thus declared (by Kumārila Bhatta)§ :—'Of an invariable concomitance that is perceived, there is only a certain character that can be regarded as the basis of (leading up to) that concomitance,—this character being one with regard to which

* This definition is the one given by Uḍayanāchārya in his *Kusumāñjali*, page 395 (Bibl. Ind).

† This quotation is spoken of by the Shaṅkari as a '*Vārṭika*'; and by the Viḍyā sāgari as '*Vāmana-shloka*'. 'That which has its negation concomitant with the negation of the *probandum*' is the same as 'that which is concomitant with the *probandum*' (of the above definition); and the qualification 'not related to each other' signifies 'that which is not concomitant with the *probans*'.

‡ The whole of this sentence, from here down to the end of the para. is from the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* pp. 412-13 (Bib. Ind.).

§ *Shloka-vārṭika*, Anumāna 13-15. According to the Shaṅkari this quotation contains only the second *shloka*. But the Viḍyā-sāgari reads two. We adopt the latter reading. The Bibl. Ind. edition of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* however contains only one *shloka* (the second).

it is ascertained that if it exists, the other must exist;* there are however many other characters which may lend support to invariable concomitances based upon entirely different characters,—but which even though perceived cannot rightly lead up to the notion of that with which the thing concerned may be concomitant'. This *Upādhi* may be one with regard to which we are quite certain (as to its being an '*upādhi*'), as also one which may be merely suspected (as being one) [*i. e.* the merest suspicion of the presence of such a character is enough to vitiate the validity of the inference.] With regard to this we have the following declaration †:—'So long as there is even an hundredth part of a suspicion as to the presence of the *probans* in a substratum where the *probandum* can never subsist,—how can such a *probans* ever have any inferential force (how can it ever lead to any inference)."

(446) The above definition of '*Upādhi*' cannot be accepted. As it would apply to the character of '*pakṣētaratva*' (the character of being something other than the *pakṣa*.) ‡

* That is to say, there may be some characters which even though belonging to the *Pakṣa*, for instance,—which *Pakṣa* may be the substratum of the concomitance of some other property,—cannot prove the presence of the other character.

† The *Viḍyāsagarī* speaks of this quotation as '*abhiyukṭa-vachana*, and the *Kusumāñjaliprakāśha* as '*viddhasanmāzī*' (page 395, Bilb. Indica.)

‡ In the inference—the 'Mountain is fiery, because there is smoke', the character of being other than the mountain (which is the *pakṣa*) is something that resides where ever fire exists. Though this may not be true with regard to the mountain itself,—yet as the presence of fire in the mountain is still doubtful (depending for ascertainment upon the inference itself), it cannot be taken into account. Thus then, the said character is one with whom fire (the *probandum*) is invariably concomitant. So this fulfills the first condition of '*upādhi*.' The second condition is that the *probans* should not be invariably concomitant with it; in the case in question we find that smoke (the *probans*) is not invariably concomitant with the character of being other than the mountain; as the two (smoke and this character) are not found together in the mountain itself. As the presence of smoke in the mountain is not doubtful, (like the presence of fire),—being actually perceived by the eye,—it has to be taken into account. Thus then we find a term—in the shape of the said character—which fulfills both conditions of the *upādhi*. Thus your definition of *upādhi* is one that vitiates even such valid inferences as 'The mountain has fire because it smokes.'

Nor will it be right for you to add a further qualification to your 'upādhi'—*viz.*, that of being 'something other than *pakṣeṭaraṭva*.' As in that case, the definition will cease to apply even to such '*pakṣeṭaraṭva*' as is indicated by the sublation or denial (of the inferential conclusion) *. In answer to this, it may be argued that in such cases, *Sublation* is not an *upādhi*; but only something indicating the invalidity of the cognition (and as such it is only right that this sublation is not included in the definition of 'Upādhi'). But in that case, if *Sublation* had no connection with 'Upādhi' or 'invalidating condition',—there would be no 'sublation' at all. [As there is real 'sublation' only where there is an invalidating condition]. It is in view of this fact that it has been declared (by Udayana) that, "whether the 'Upādhi' be indicated either by *sublation* or by something else,—it does not make any difference." In order to avoid this you will perhaps add a further qualification to your definition of 'Upādhi' (defining it as that which is other than '*pakṣeṭaraṭva*' and also other than that indicated by *sublation*). But this also will not help you; as (even though this may save you from the difficulty now pointed out by us), it does not save you from the difficulty that until you have ascertained what 'invariable concomitance' is, you cannot ascertain what it is with which the *probans* is not 'invariably concomitant'; nor can you ascertain with what the *probandum* is 'invariably concomitant.' And thus there is mutual inter-dependence between your '*vyāpti*' and *upādhi*.'

* For instance, in the invalid inference—'Fire is a not-hot substance,—because it has colour—like the jar,'—this reasoning is invalidated by '*pakṣeṭaraṭva*', which is a real *Upādhi*. As the character of being other than fire is such that *non-heat* is invariably concomitant with it, and *colour* is not so concomitant with it (as fire also has colour). That such is the fact is indicated by the sublation or denial of the conclusion by actual perception. If then '*pakṣeṭaraṭva*' were excluded from the definition of *upādhi* this definition would not include the '*pakṣeṭaraṭva*' in the case cited.

(447) You may explain that what you mean by the *probandum* being 'invariably concomitant' with a certain thing is that the *probandum* is never seen apart from that thing (and for recognising this it is not necessary to ascertain what 'invariable concomitance' is, and thus there is no mutual interdependence). But this also cannot be right ; for it may so happen that even though a particular *probandum* may actually be such as exists apart from the thing in question, yet, it may be seen (or conceived of) as being one that does not exist apart from it (i. e., in cases of mistaken conceptions) ; and your definition of 'Upādhi' would thus become applicable to such a thing also. Nor can it be ascertained that the *probandum* will never, at any future time, be found to be apart from the thing concerned [hence you cannot, with a view to escape from the difficulty just put forward, define the invariable concomitance of the *probandum* with a certain thing as lying in the fact that the *probandum* neither was, nor is, nor ever will be apart from that thing]. And further, at the time that the invariable concomitance itself is being cognised (and hence the Major premiss is still in the formation), the other (minor) term has not yet acquired the character of the true '*probandum*' (which it can acquire only after the conclusion has been arrived at and formulated*) ; and hence how can you ascertain (at the time of the cognition of invariable concomitance) the fact of any term being such as does not exist apart from the '*Sādhya*' or '*probandum*' ? It may be said in answer to this that " what is meant by the '*probandum*' is (not that which is proved, but) that with which the other term is invariably concomitant. But this also will be not right ; until you have ascertained the 'invariable concomitance', you cannot ascertain the meaning of that with which something else is invariably concomitant (thus the ascertainment of this latter character depending upon that of 'invariable concomitance,' which in its turn is dependent

* A term becomes a *probandum*, *sādhya* only after it has been proved or सिद्ध

upon the former, there results a mutual inter-dependence). You will perhaps say that what you mean by your '*vyāpaka*' (that with which another thing is invariably concomitant) is that which is known to have the possibility of such a character (and it is not necessary for it to be recognised as actually possessed of that character). But this also will not help you ; as until you have ascertained what the '*vyāpaka*' really is, of what character would you cognise the 'possibility' ? You will perhaps find it better now to declare that what you mean is that the *Upādhi* is to be *such that the probandum in invariably concomitant with it*,—and that even though what you intend to be the 'probandum' may not actually have the character of the true 'probandum', yet all that is meant is that it should be *capable of being the probandum*. This also is not right, we reply. For how is it to be known that *this is capable of being the probandum* and *that is not* ; specially as it cannot yet be asserted that this can be ascertained by the fact of its being found to be such that something is 'invariably concomitant' with it.

(448) Having thus shown that it cannot be explained what is meant by the *Upādhi* being such that the *probandum* is invariably concomitant with it, we now proceed to show that in all cases of *Upādhi* it is impossible to ascertain that the *Upādhi* is such that the *probans* is *not* invariably concomitant with it (this latter being the second differentium of the *Upādhi* according to the Logician). For in the stock-example of the *Inference with Upādhi* or the *Vitiated Inference*—'he is dark because he is the son of Maitra' (where *the character of being due to the eating of leaves and herbs* is said to be the *Upādhi* or 'Vitiating Condition'),—it is extremely difficult to make sure that *the action of the eating of leaves and herbs* is not present in the particular son of Maitra (and yet it is only when this is ascertained that the said character can be held to be such that the probans, *the being Maitra's son*, is not invariably concomitant with it).

(449) In answer to the above the Opponent says :—“ We have a case of *certain* Upāḍhi when we have valid means of ascertaining the aforesaid character ; while in cases where no such means is available, the *Upāḍhi* is regarded as only *doubtful*. (And the case of Maitra’s son comes within this latter category) inasmuch as there is nothing to show that it is absolutely necessary that there should be in every case that *effect of herb-eating* with which *the being Maitra’s son* is invariably concomitant.” This is not right, we reply. As the fact of the case being one of the result of herb-eating can also be proved by means of the same *probans*—*viz.*, *that of being Maitra’s son* ; and hence it is quite possible, on the strength of this, to cast off all *doubt* even as to its being an *Upāḍhi* (inasmuch it would be shown to be one with which the probans is invariably concomitant). If, in order to meet this difficulty, you were to argue that, in the case of the inference (‘ this is a case of the result of herb-eating, because it is a case of Maitra’s son’) also, there would be an *Upāḍhi* in the shape of the *accessory circumstances attendant upon the herb-eating* (and thus that inference itself being vitiated, the doubtful character of the original *upāḍhi* remains intact),—then the actual presence of each of these accessory circumstances also could be inferred from the same *probans*, that of its being a case of Maitra’s child (and thus there would be no *Upāḍhi* in any of these cases). “ But in this manner there would be an infinite regress of *Upāḍhis* and Inferences.” But, we ask, wherefore could not there be the same *infinite regress* in the putting forward of one *upāḍhi* after the other ? Then again, if ‘ accessory circumstances’ were to be regarded as a vitiating *upāḍhi*, then, such *upāḍhis* would be present even in the case of correct inferences, as that of the presence of fire from smoke—(And as this would vitiate all inferences), it will be necessary for you to add to your definition of *upāḍhi* some such qualifying clause as would exclude the said ‘ accessory circumstances.’

(450) The Opponent puts the following question—“When you would be proving the *darkness* of the child by the fact of its being Maitra’s child, there would be the possibility of an *upādhi* in the shape of the *result of herb-eating*; and when you would proceed to prove this latter fact of its being a case of herb-eating by the same reasoning (that of the child being Maitra’s), there again would be the possibility of an *upādhi* in the shape of ‘darkness’, and thus as in all such cases there would be a possibility of *Upādhi*, how could you ever succeed in proving with absolute certainty the presence of that which we put forward as the *upādhi* (setting aside by this proof its character of ‘*Upādhi*’)?” This is not right, we reply. For, inasmuch as we could prove with absolute certainty each of the two (‘darkness’ and ‘being a case of herb-eating’) by the same *probans*, of ‘being Maitra’s child’,—there would be no possibility even of suspecting any of the two to be such that the *probans* is not invariably concomitant with it. [And thus neither would have the character of your ‘*Upādhi*’]. If what we say is not right, and if in such cases, any of the two were a true *upādhi*, then you would have many undesirable contingencies, like the following, which would strike at the root of all inferential reasoning :—(1) When you would prove the fact of the World having a Creator, you would have an *upādhi* in the character of *being produced by the Unseen Force* (of Destiny); and when you would seek to prove the fact of Earth being produced by the Unseen Force, you would have an *Upādhi* in the shape of *the character of having a creator*;—(2) similarly when proving the World to be the creation of an intelligent person, you would have an *Upādhi* in the shape of *the character of being produced by effort*; and when proving this latter you would have *the character of being produced by an intelligent person* as the *Upādhi*;—(3) so also, when proving the presence of something possessing the general character of ‘fire’, you would have for the *Upādhi*,

the character of containing heat or brightness produced by fuel ; and when proving this latter, there would be an *Upādhi* in the shape of the presence of something possessed of the generic character of fire.

(451) [Page 377] Some Logicians have held that in the definition of '*Upādhi*' what is meant by the *Upādhi* 'being such that the *probandum* is invariably concomitant with it' is, that the relation holding between the *probans* and the *probandum* is so concomitant. The reasonings we have put forward above serve to demolish this view also [as even this character cannot be ascertained until it is known what is meant by the character of the '*probandum*' and by that of '*having something as invariable concomitant*']. [Having thus shown that these two characters cannot be ascertained in the case of the *doubtful Upādhi*] we now proceed to show that in the case of the *certain Upādhi* also, if the *Upādhi* happens to be one that is not perceptible by the senses, the negation of this *Upādhi* also (a knowledge whereof will be necessary for ascertaining that the *probans* is not invariably concomitant with this *Upādhi*) will be one that cannot be perceived by the senses ; hence in any case it will have to be *inferred*; and this inference of the negation or absence of the *upādhi* could very well be met by the counter-inference of its *presence*,—this inference being based upon the *probans* having for its *probandum* that same *upādhi*.* You will perhaps retort that—"even so, this shall be a case of *doubtful upādhi*." True ; by saying so you have won a victory certainly, but only over *shame* ; as the position that you had taken up was that the case cited by you was one of

* In the case of the inference 'he is Maitra's son' the character of being due to eating is brought forward as the *upādhi*. This *upādhi* cannot be known by the senses ; hence its absence also can be only inferred the inference, being in the form—"There is no effect of herb-eating in his case, because he is of fair complexion". This inference can be met by the counter-inference—"This is a case of the effect of herb-eating (the original *upādhi* being the *probandum* here),—because he is Maitra's son' (the same *probans* as the one in the original inference).

certain upādhi, and yet when it has been shown to you that it is at best only a case of *doubtful upādhi*, you rejoice at it and consider it quite favourable to yourself; well, who could do so except one who had completely conquered all idea of shame!

(452) [We have brought forward the above objections after having taken it for granted that there is some suspicion as to the presence of the *upādhi*]. As matter of fact, however, when no *certain upādhi* is accepted, there can be no suspicion even, with regard to its presence (as it is only when a thing is known to exist that there can be any suspicion as to its presence). The Opponent will perhaps say in answer to this that—there would be a case of the due perception of a *certain upādhi*, where the presence of the *upādhi* is distinctly and surely cognised by Sense-perception [for instance, such *upādhis* as the *contact of wet fuel*, as vitiating the inference 'it is smoking, because there is fire'—in which case it is clearly perceived that the *probandum*, 'smoke', is invariably concomitant with the *wet-fuel-contact*, but the *probans* 'fire', is not so]. This also is not right, we reply; as in such cases, the denial of the presence of the *upādhi* (*wet-fuel-contact*) being based upon the Senses, the super-sensuous presence of that same *upādhi* (*contact of wet fuel* in the *red-hot iron*) could be inferred or proved by means of the same *probans* (*presence of fire*) which had been sought (by means of the *upādhi*) to be rendered incapable (of proving the *probandum*) * [and thus the *upādhi* would cease to be an *upādhi*; at any rate its character would become open to doubt]. Specially because as a matter of fact, we find that even though a certain thing

* That is to say, all that the sense-perception of the absence of wet-fuel-contact proves is the absence of such contact as could be perceived by the senses; it cannot prove anything as to the presence or absence of such wet-fuel-contact as may be imperceptible by the senses; and it would be possible to prove the presence of this supersensuous contact by means of the following inference:—'In this red-hot iron there is contact of wet fuel,—because it contains fire—like the culinary hearth.'

(fire f.i.) may in one place (in the culinary hearth f.ī.), be perceptible by the senses, yet, in another place, there is nothing to prevent its having its existence proved in the imperceptible form by means of the same *probans*; e.g. the digestive fire in the stomach (though imperceptible) is proved by the fact of digestion. [That is to say, though in the case of the culinary hearth, on finding that cooking is done we infer the presence of fire which is perceptible,—yet finding the same ‘cooking’, digesting, being done to the food in the stomach, we infer the presence of fire in the stomach, where it is *not* perceptible].

(453) Then again, your definition of ‘*upādhi*’—as that which, while being such that the *probans* is *not* invariably concomitant with it, is yet one with which the *probandum* is so concomitant’—is open to another objection:—the *being the effect of the eating of herbs and such other things* (which the Logician cites as the stock-example of his *upādhi*) is *not* one with which the *probandum* (*being of dark complexion*) is invariably concomitant; for as a matter of fact, there is no such single substance as ‘*Shūkāḍiṭva*’ (*i.e.* the term ‘herbs and such other things’ being indefinite, it cannot give rise to any one definite conception); and as such the *probandum* could not be invariably concomitant with it.* But even granting the possibility of concomitance with such an indefinite term; we find that the *dark complexion* is not invariably concomitant with the said *eating of herbs, &c.*; as for instance, the *darkness* of such substances as the blue stone is not the effect of any *eating* at all. You will perhaps say that your *probandum* is the ‘darkness of the human body,’ and this certainly is invariably concomitant with the *eating of herbs &c.* This also is not right, we reply. As the ‘*upādhi*’ is put forward as against the invariable concomitance (as expressed in the

* The *dark complexion* may be concomitant with the eating of herbs, or of the eating of some definite substance; it could not be held to be concomitant with ‘the eating of herbs and *such other things*.’

premiss) upon which the inferences (ought to be vitiated by the *upādhi* is based): and the concomitance that we find to be expressed in the inference in question is not with 'the darkness of the human body' (the basic major premiss being in the form 'darkness is invariably concomitant with the eating of herbs &c. '); specially as the 'darkness' mentioned in the premiss formulating the invariable concomitance is 'darkness' in its most general form, and not that particular form of it which is found in human beings; because that *the darkness* referred to herein is that which resides in a human being (the particular child in question) is proved, not indeed by the aforesaid premiss, but by that other premiss wherein the *probans* is spoken of as residing in the Minor term (this child). [Hence 'the darkness of human beings' cannot be accepted as figuring in the premiss formulating the invariable concomitance]. For if the general statement in the premiss referred to the 'darkness of a human being', then (the conclusion would be in the form 'the human child of Maitra is dark', where) the word 'human' would be absolutely incapable of precluding anything (more than what is already precluded by the word 'Maitra's child'); and as such it would lose its qualifying character. If the word 'human' were regarded as serving the useful purpose of excluding the darkness acquired indirectly through the besmearing of soot and such other causes,—then whereby would you have an exclusion of that *darkness* which belongs to a *human being* darkened (by the besmearing of soot) who may be in contact with Maitra's son,—where also the darkness of Maitra's son comes to him indirectly (and is yet belonging to a human body, and as such not capable of being excluded by the qualification 'human')?

(454) Nor will it be right for you to declare that what you mean by the *upādhi* being such that the *probandum* is invariably concomitant with it is that it never fails to be present wherever the *probans* and the *probandum* are found

to be related (that is to say, the *being the result of the eating of herbs &c.* never fails to be present wherever *darkness* is found to be related with *the child of Maitra*). This will not be right, we say; as if such were the character of 'Upādhi', then, in the case of the inference that 'a certain organ (of vision) is of the nature of *tējas* (light) because it is the organ which affords the perception of colour' (which is valid, and as such ought to be free from *upādhi*), you would have such an *Upādhi* in the shape of '*uḍbhūtarūpaiva*' (the character of manifested colour) [which would be something which never fails to be present wherever 'the nature of *tējas*' is found to be related to 'the perception of colour'; as there can be no perception of colour except when it is *manifested*]. Similarly if you were to insert the *probans* as a qualification to the 'probandum' (*i. e.*, if you were to declare your *upādhi* to be *Sāḍhanāvachchhinnaśāḍhyavyūpaka*, 'that with which the *probandum*, as determined or qualified by the *probans*, is invariably concomitant'],—then, there should be something for the exclusion of which you add this qualification; now if what you intend to exclude is that with which the *unqualified probandum* is invariably concomitant,—then this character of *upādhi* could not belong to that which is capable of giving rise to a doubt as to the truth of the invariable concomitance on which the inference is based.* If, on the other hand, the qualification you add (*sāḍhanāvachchhinna*) is not intended to exclude anything,—then it fails to be a true qualification for certainly a qualification does not become useful (and hence a true qualification) simply because there is necessity for it; it becomes so only when it serves the purpose of

* Where the *Upādhi* is *साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक* there the logician has the *निश्चितउपाधि*. But at the same time he accepts that also as the *उपाधि* (though only *यद्विस्त*) that which is only *साध्यव्यापक*. Hence if the definition of the *Upādhi* were restricted to the *साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक* it would not include the aforesaid *यद्विस्त उपाधि*.

excluding something (which could not be otherwise excluded). And thus your 'qualification' being altogether useless, your definition would be open to the fallacy of '*asiddhi*' (i. e., the *asiddhi*, or non-accomplishment, of the *vishēṣana*) ; just as we have in the case of the argument—'the world is without a creator, because it is not produced by a *bodied* being'—(where we have the *Vishēṣanāsiddhi* in view of the utter uselessness of the qualification 'bodied').

(455) *Then again, how could you make your definition of *upādhi* applicable to such cases as that of a negative inference which is invalid (and as such must have a vitiating *upādhi*), specially where the *probans* is really present (as a qualification) in the *Subject* (Minor Term),—e. g., in the inference—'the living body is made up of more than one substance, all of which are other than Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ākāsha, Time, Space and Soul, because it is endowed with breathing &c.'—(where though breathing &c. are actually present in the living body, yet the inference is not valid) ? Because, as a matter of fact, we find that in the invalid negative inference, that which is the *probandum* is not invariably concomitant with the *upādhi* ; for (if it were so) that which is intended by the opponent to be the *probandum* would be present somewhere (and totally non-existent, as the *probandum* of the universal negative inference should be). Then again, if there were an *upādhi* in the negative premiss, then that term in the negation which is the *invariable* concomitant (*viz.* the absence or negation of the *probandum*) would have to be such that the *upādhi* is invariably concomitant with it * (and thus the *probandum* could not be invariably

* Having shown the impossibility of the definition of *Upādhi* in regard to affirmative inferences, the author proceeds to show the same in regard to negative inferences.

† That is to say—it would be absolutely necessary that wherever the *Upādhi* exists, there cannot be anything made up of more than one substance, all of which are other than Earth and Water &c. If this were not so,—i. e., if the *Upādhi* were not so concomitant with the negation of the *probandum*,—then it would be possible for the *Upādhi* to be present even in cases where we have the negation of the negation of the *probandum* ; that is to say, where the *Upādhi* is, there the *probandum* also is.

concomitant with the *upādhi*; and yet this is a necessary qualification in your definition of *upādhi*. If it were not so then, wherever there is presence of the *upādhi* there would be the presence of the *probandum* also [and thus instead of disproving the *probandum* the *upādhi* would prove it]. Thus it is absolutely necessary for you (in order to escape from the aforesaid difficulty) to accept the fact that in such cases it is the *upādhi* which is invariably concomitant with the negative *probandum*; and from this it will follow that the negation of that with which the *upādhi* is concomitant must itself be regarded as concomitant with the negation of the *upādhi*; and this leads to a most undesirable contingency.* [Viz: inasmuch as it is the negation of the *probandum* with which the negation of the *upādhi* is concomitant, and not *vice versa*, this would only show that wherever we have the negation of the *probandum* there would be negation of *upādhi*,—and not *vice versa*; and from this it would follow that there may be cases where though the negation of the *probandum* is present, we cannot be sure of the presence of the negation of the *upādhi*]. [Though in the case of premisses where both terms are omnipresent or all-pervading, the relation of concomitance remains the same even if the negations of the terms are taken, yet] in cases of unequal concomitance (where one term is always more extensive than the other) it cannot be denied that the relation of concomitance becomes reversed when the terms are taken in their negative forms.†

* The translation follows the reading *यस्य व्यापत्तिः*; which appears to be the one favoured by the Vidyāsāgarī; the reading of the Pandit edition is not intelligible.

† That is, though in the case of the proposition 'all things are nameable', in the affirmative form 'things' are concomitant with 'nameability', so also in the negative form 'all non-things' are non-nameable, *non-thing* remains concomitant with *non-nameability*. But in the case of the ordinary proposition 'all men are mortal' we have 'man' concomitant with 'mortal', but when we take the terms 'non-man' and 'non-mortal', the relation becomes 'reversed,' as it is the circle 'non-mortal'. In the affirmative form the fact of one being 'man' would prove his 'mortality,' while in the latter it would be 'non-mortality' that would prove 'non-manly character.' This is what the text means by the *ए व्यापानभावेपरीत्य*.

(456) Nor will it be right for you to assert that, "in the case of negative inferences (if no *upāḍhi* is possible) other discrepancies would be pointed out." For [there are only two discrepancies possible in Inference—(1) Either the *probans* may be not present in the 'Subject' (Minor term), this condition vitiating the Minor premiss, (2) or there may be no invariable concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum*, this vitiating the Major premiss;] the presence of the *probans* in the 'subject' (minor term) being admitted, the only other discrepancy that you can assert is the absence of the invariable concomitance (on which the inference is based); and for the purpose of demolishing the invariable concomitance, it is absolutely necessary for you to show that there is an *upāḍhi* (which alone, by your theory, can vitiate the concomitance).

[Having refuted the *Upāḍhi*, the author resumes the thread of his refutation of 'Vyāpti', from para. 441, bottom of p. 371, 'Pandit' edition.]

(457) We shall accept, for the sake of argument, some sort of a definition of *Vyāpti*. Even then, the Inference would be possible only when the *Vyāpti* is present; and thus there would have to be a *Vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) between Inference and the *Vyāpti* (without which according to you, no Inference is possible). And thus there would be 'Self-dependence' of the *Vyāpti*, (i. e., a 'vicious circle'). If, in order to escape from this, the 'invariable concomitance' subsisting between the Inference and the 'invariable concomitance' upon which it is based, were held to be totally different from this latter 'Invariable Concomitance',—then there would be no possibility of any such single comprehensive conception as 'Invariable Concomitance' (every concomitance being distinct by itself); and further, there would be quite an endless series (of Concomitances) [and under the circumstances, it would not be possible for you to make any such comprehensive declaration as that 'all Inference is based upon *Invariable Concomitance*'].

[The author proceeds to refute the definition of the *Pakṣa-dharmaṭā* i. e., Minor Premiss, wherein the relation between the *probans* and the 'Subject' or Minor Term is asserted.—Having discarded this, he proceeds to refute the definitions of the *Pakṣa* itself.]

*(458) The Logicians declare that Inference is brought about by *vyūpti* and *pakṣa-dharmaṭā*. What, we ask,—do you mean by *pakṣa-dharmaṭā*,—i. e., by the *probans* being the *dharma* of the *pakṣa*? Does it mean that the *probans* subsists in the *pakṣa*? If so, then, we reply that this is not possible as in that case, for the Logician and his followers, such terms as 'Knowable' and the like (which denote characters that can be asserted of all things) could never serve as *probans*; as according to them the relationships between the Cognition and its object (called the *viśayaviśayibhāva-sambandha*) is not anything different from the very forms of the cognition and the object themselves; and hence it is not possible for these forms to *subsist* in the object of cognition; † (consequently by this view it is not possible for the relationship to subsist in the thing *cognised*, which would be the *pakṣa* in such inferences).

(459) Then again, what is that '*pakṣa*' the subsistence wherein of the *probans* would constitute your '*pakṣadharmaṭā*'? (A) "Well," says the Logician, "the *pakṣa*, or Minor Term, is that wherein the presence of the *sādhya* (Major Term) is intended to be proved (by means of the inference)."

* The whole of para. 458 according to the *विद्यावागी* should come after para. 461.

† In the inference—'the jar is predicable, because it is knowable',—the *knowability* of the jar, according to the Logician, is not anything different from the *svarūpa* of the jar and its cognition; thus 'knowability' is the same as the jar; and as a thing cannot subsist in itself the *knowability* (which is the *probans* in the inference) cannot subsist in the *jar* (which is the *pakṣa*). Thus there being no *pakṣa-dharmaṭā*, all such inferences will have to be regarded as invalid.

According to the other view on the other hand, the *knowability* of a thing consists in its being related to its own cognition by a peculiar relationship called the *विषयविषयिभावसम्बन्ध*; and this is something entirely different from the thing and its cognition.

This definition cannot be accepted, we reply. As this 'intention to prove the *sādhya*' must be either a desire to make it comprehensible (and acceptable) to others, or a desire to comprehend it for oneself. If it were the former, then, there would be no possibility of any inference for one's own sake. In the latter case also, there would be no possibility of any one inferring for himself the 'execrable taste' (of something, rotten meat, for instance), from the fact of its bad smell [as in this case there is no *desire to comprehend* the 'execrable taste' and consequent *inedibility*, the desire of the man himself being to eat the meat ; as it is this desire that urges him to take up the meat ; when he picks it up and finds it stinking, he *infers*, for himself, the fact that the meat must taste bad ; this inference being quite valid ; the definition of the *pakṣa* however fails to apply to this *piece of meat*]. (B) Nor may the *pakṣa* be defined as *that which has a certain dharma (character) which is not ascertained*. For, we ask in this case, would the presence of the *probans* also in the intended *pakṣa* be *not-ascertained* ? Or would it be *ascertained* ? If it were *not-ascertained*, then the resultant inferential cognition could not come about. If, on the other hand, it were *ascertained*, then, the *pakṣa* would cease to be *that which has its dharma not ascertained* (as the *probans* is a *dharma* of it, and it is ascertained). (C) Nor again, may the *pakṣa* be defined as one having that particular *dharma* not-ascertained *which is the object (viṣaya) of the probans*. * As in this connection we ask—by whom is the *dharma* not ascertained ? Clearly not by the person propounding the inference ; as what he himself does not know for certain, he cannot put forward for convincing other people. Nor can the non-ascertainment be held to be by the *Opponent* (to whom the

* Such a *dharma* is the *साम्य* or the Major Term. So this definition would mean that the *pakṣa* is that the presence in which of the major term is not ascertained.

inference is addressed); for we often find that even in connection with the views of the opponent, two persons enter into a discussion, not indeed as 'opponents' seeking victory over each other, but only for the purpose of showing off learning [and as in this case there is no *opponent*, there can be no 'non-ascertainment *by the opponent*', and so the definition of *pakṣa* would fail to apply in this case].

(460) Then again, we ask— is the 'non-ascertainment' of *any* such *dharma* as is the *viṣaya* of the *probans*? Or of only that *probans* which is to be propounded by the opponent? It cannot be the former, surely; as in that case, even when the presence of *fire* in the *mountain* is definitely known, the *mountain* would be regarded as the '*pakṣa*' with reference to the *smoke*, in virtue of the non-ascertainment of the presence therein of many other such *dharmas*. [While as a matter of fact, the *mountain* can be regarded as the '*pakṣa*,' when *smoke* is the *probans*, only so long as the presence of *fire*, with which *smoke* is invariably concomitant, is *not* known for certain, but is only suspected]. Nor can the second alternative be maintained; as in that case also, the same undesirable contingency would arise; inasmuch as those other *probanses* also would be such as could be propounded by the opponent. If, in order to escape from this difficulty, you restrict the 'non-ascertainment' to any one specific *probans*—the *smoke* for instance—then it would be impossible for you to form any comprehensive idea of the '*pakṣa*' (every definition suiting one specific case only). And further, your definitions involve a most objectionable mutual inter-dependence:—*viz.* your idea of the *probans* depending on the idea of the *pakṣa*, as, according to you, the *probans* is only that which, while being invariably concomitant (with the *probandum*), is present in the *pakṣa*;—and that of the *pakṣa* in its turn depending upon the idea of the *probans*! Then again, in the case

of Inference for one's own sake, where the *probans* is not propounded by any one else, there being no true '*pakṣa*' (according to your definition), all inference would be impossible. And lastly, in the case of the "Contradictory" *probans* (the fallacious *probans*, which in reality proves quite the contrary of the conclusion in support of which it is put forward), there would be no possibility of the *probans* being the '*pakṣadharmā*' (i.e., being present in the *pakṣa*); as in this case the *probandum* would not be one which is the *viśaya* of the *probans** (and this is what is necessary by your definition of '*pakṣa*'); and the fallaciousness pertains (not indeed to the *probandum*, but) only to the *probans*, on the ground of its being concomitant with the contradictory of the *probandum*.

(461) (D) The above reasons also serve to set aside the definition of the '*pakṣa*' as *that wherein the presence of the probandum is suspected*, and also the definition of the '*probandum*' as *that whose cognition is brought about*,—this definition being intended to apply to both kinds of Inference: that for the sake of one's own self, and that for the sake of another person.

(462) [Another definition of *Pakṣadharmatā* is now attacked]. '*Pakṣadharmatā*' may be defined as that character or capability of the *invariable concomitant* (i. e., the *probans*) by virtue of which it relegates to a particular case that conception or idea, which, as obtained through the major premiss, pertains, only in a general way, to that with which the *probans* is concomitant (i. e., the *probandum*).† This

* In the case of the fallacious inference—'Fire burns because it is cool,'—the burning is never known to be related to coolness; and hence the true character of the '*pakṣa*' would fail to apply to *Fire*.

It may be observed that if in such fallacious reasoning, the definition fails to apply, it only emphasises the fallaciousness. What the author means is that even though fallacious, the reasoning must be called 'Inference,' and as such must have a true *pakṣa*, without which there can be no Inference.

† That is to say, the Major premiss asserts the presence of *fire in general* only; and it is by the force of the Minor premiss (which expresses the *वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम्*) that we get at the conception of the *particular fire in the mountain*.

definition also cannot be accepted. As (even without the particularisation of the conception) there would be no incongruity in the general conception [and it is only if there were an incongruity that there could be a justification for the view that the general conception stands in need of, and must necessarily lead to, a particularisation of itself]; just in the same manner as there is no incongruity in the general conception of the invariable concomitance itself. If however, there were an incongruity (*i.e.*, if it were impossible to have the conception of the *probandum in general* without its *specific* form), then the idea of this specific form also would be included in the premiss expressing the invariable concomitance (of the *probans* with the *probandum*) [and thus there would be nothing left to be done by the *pakṣa-dharmaṭā* intended to be expressed by the Minor premiss]. If, in order to escape from this, it were held that the conception of the specified form has for its object something over and above (that of the general conception) (and as such must appear after this latter),—then this would either involve the absurdity of ‘intermittent operation’ (the notion of invariable concomitance affording the general conception at one time, and that of the particular form at another time, after some interval);—or make (of this *pakṣa-dharmaṭā*) a *means of knowledge* entirely different (from that of the general conception). If, on the other hand, it were held that there would be no possibility of the conception of the particular form [without the corresponding conception of those circumstances that go to specialise that form, the indication of which, for that reason, must be necessary, as to be done by the Minor premiss],—then (we reply) there would be a most unwarrantable extension of this reasoning (as there would be no end of such special forms or characters).

(463) Then again, if the *pakṣa-dharmaṭā* (*i.e.*, the Minor Premiss) were to afford the (inferential) knowledge of

the *particular individual probandum* (and not the *probandum* in general only), then in all cases of inference,—e.g., when we infer the existence of fire from smoke, and the presence of a man in the house from the voice heard inside,—when, after the inference, we come to perceive more than one individual of the kind inferred, there could be no possibility of any such doubt as to whether this or that particular individual had been inferred [and yet such doubts are actually found to arise.] In answer to this, it might be urged that such a doubt would certainly be possible *before* the actual perception of the particular individual. But this also cannot help you; as (even so) after the perception of the particular individuals, there should be no such doubts (while such doubts are actually found to arise even after the perception of individuals).

C.

[The defining of Perception and Inference having been found impossible, the Author proceeds to show that no adequate definition of *Upamāna*, Analogy, is possible.]

[Page 386] (464). What again is what you call 'Upamāna' (Analogy)? In answer to this, some people say—"Upamāna is Knowledge of Similarity." But this is not right: because this definition would include the *remembrance* also (of similarity). If, in order to avoid this, *Upamāna* were defined as 'the *direct apprehension, anubhava*, of similarity' [*remembrance* not being 'direct apprehension'],—then the definition would become applicable to the *sensuous* perception, that appears in the form 'these two things are alike' [where both things are perceived by the senses]; [because this perception also would be a 'direct apprehension of similarity'];—it would apply also to the *inferential* cognition—'that *gavaya* also must be similar to the cow, because it is a *gavaya* like other *gavayas*' [as here also there is 'direct apprehension of similarity'];—and lastly, it would apply

Kh. 319.

also to such 'direct apprehension of similarity' as is obtained from the *words* of reliable persons. [And thus what is put forward as *Upamāna* would come to be nothing, apart from the sensuous, inferential and verbal cognitions.]

(465) Then again, we ask—the definition that you have given above,—is that the definition of *Upamiti*, *i. e.* analogical cognition? or of *Upamiti—karaṇa*, *i. e.* the means of analogical cognition? — It cannot be the former; because in that case (*i. e.* analogical cognition being defined as the 'cognition of similarity') *Similarity* would become the *upamēya*, the 'object of analogical cognition' [which would be absurd]; as in ordinary experience, it is the *similar* object, and not *similarity*, that is regarded as the '*upamēya*;' as for instance, when we speak of the *face* as *similar to the moon*, we use the expression—'*chandropamēyam mukham*'. "But," it is argued, "as a matter of fact, the analogical cognition is in the form (this is) *similar*." This also, we reply, is not right; because this cognition of similarity [which you regard to be *analogical*] cannot be one that is brought about by such agencies as the sense-organs and the rest; and [all 'cognitions of similarity' that we have being, as a matter of fact, obtained either through sense-perception, or through inference, or through trustworthy assertion] you cannot point to any case of such cognition as an instance corroborating your view of 'Analogical Cognition.'* Nor secondly, can the definition put forward be accepted as the definition of the '*means* of analogical cognition': because, as a matter of fact, it is not possible to show that the 'cognition of similarity' (which would be the means of analogical cognition) has any such operation or object as is not already

* In ordinary experience, similarity is cognised either by the senses, or by inference, or by means of words spoken by others. That cognition of similarity, however, which the logician regards as 'analogical' must be something beyond the cognitions got at by the aforesaid means. This, as we have seen, is an impossibility: the conclusion therefore is, that the analogical cognition propounded by the logician is a non-entity.

covered by the other *means of cognition* [therefore the 'cognition of similarity' cannot be regarded as an independent 'means of cognition'].

(466) Then again, there is no such one comprehensive entity as 'similarity' [the cognition whereof would constitute the 'means' of *all* analogical cognitions]; because as a matter of fact, the 'similarity' of the *face* is found to be something entirely different from the 'similarity' of the *hand*, and so forth. Nor will it be right to argue that over all such diverse *similarities*, there pervades a certain common or generic character, by virtue of which they are all classed under the one community of 'similarity' [and it is this *community* that forms the basis of the definition of *Upamāna*]. Because this will involve the acceptance of a certain 'similarity' among the *similarities*, and also between these latter and the community 'similarity,'—this latter similarity consisting in some such character as that of *subsisting in more than one thing* (similarities subsisting between two or more things, and the community 'similarity' also subsisting between two or more similarities); and thus if the community of 'similarity' be regarded as based upon some such similarity, there results an objectionable mutual interdependence ['similarity' depending upon the community 'similarity', which in its turn depends upon another particular similarity]; if, in order to avoid this interdependence, the generic notion of 'similarity' be not regarded as based upon such similarity of character, then there would be no possibility of any such community as 'similarity'; and in the absence of this latter, it would not be possible to have any such comprehensive notion of 'similarity' (as the Logician needs for his definition of Analogy). If again, [even in the presence of the common character of subsisting in two or more things] you deny the similarity between the individual *similarities* on the one hand, and the community 'Similarity,' on the

other,—then the same might be done in other cases also;—all similarity, between similar things being totally denied in the same manner.

(467) Further (like the ‘cognition of similarity’) the ‘cognition of dissimilarity’ also might be regarded as an independent ‘*pramāṇa*’; because the case of both is parallel. If you admit this ‘cognition of dissimilarity’ also as a distinct ‘*pramāṇa*’, you exceed the number that you had fixed upon for your *Pramāṇas* [the ‘cognition of dissimilarity’ not being included in your original scheme]; and if, in order to escape from this, you seek to include this latter among your other *Pramāṇas*, then your ‘cognition of similarity’ also would be similarly included among those other *Pramāṇas* (the case of both being alike).

(468) Another definition of *Upamāna* that has been propounded is that it is “the cognition of the similarity of a thing not perceived at the time to another which is perceived.” This also is not tenable; because such a cognition can be brought about by Trustworthy Assertion also. You will perhaps add that you give the name ‘*Upamāna*’ to those cases of the cognition of the above-specified similarity in which there are no trustworthy assertions available. But even thus your definition cannot be maintained; because it will apply to those cases also where the similarity, between the thing perceived now and that not perceived now but perceived at some past time, is actually perceived by the senses [and thus having the character of ‘Sense-perception’]; the cognition in such cases is in the form ‘this and that are similar’; and this cognition is as ‘sensuous’ as the cognition, ‘this and that are identical’ [which latter is regarded as ‘sensuous’ by the Logician also]. With a view to escape from this you will perhaps add the qualification that the similarity cognised is that of something *which is not in contact with any organs of perception, i. e. in which*

case there is no operation of the sense-organs at all). But even so, the definition can not be accepted ; because in this form it would be applicable to the following *inferential* cognition also—‘ *that* cow (not before me now) is similar to the *gavaya*, because it is a cow, like this cow (before me)’ [as in this case neither of the two *similar* things is perceived by the senses]. If then (in order to exclude inferential cognitions) you add the further qualification that the cognition intended is *one* that is not brought about by means of the inferential *probans*,—then, in that case, all your subsequent qualifications taken together would amount to this, that ‘the cognition is one that is not brought about by Sense-perception, Inference or Trustworthy Assertion’; and (as the only other form of cognition that you accept is the *Analogical*) this qualification alone would suffice for a definition (of *Analogical Cognition*, for which you cannot have a more precise definition than that it is a cognition *that is neither perceptual nor inferential, nor verbal*); and all the rest of your original definition (that it is a cognition *of similarity of a thing not perceived at the time to another thing which is perceived*) would become entirely superfluous. “Well, in that case, we need not have these superfluous words.” Even then, we reply, all that is wanted would be fulfilled by *Presumption* (*Arthāpañi*) (and there would be no necessity for postulating *Analogy* or *Upamāna*); because where we see a certain thing (the *gavaya f. i.*) to be ‘similar’ to another thing which is not seen at the time (the *cow f. i.*), we find that unless the latter thing were also similar to the former, no such similarity, as we perceive, of the former to the latter, would be possible; [and by this we are naturally led to ‘*presume*’ the similarity of the *cow* to the *gavaya*; and it is this same similarity of the *unseen* to the *seen* object that is held by the Logician to be the object of *Analogical Cognition*; thus this being got at by means of *Presumption*, there is nothing left to

be done by *Analogy*]. If these be not admitted [*i. e.* if the cognition of similarity of the *unseen* to the *seen* object be not accepted to be got at, directly through Presumption, from the cognition of the similarity of the *seen* to the *unseen*,—and if, for the sake of the former cognition, a distinct *pramāṇa* be held to be necessary, then], it would be equally necessary to postulate a distinct *pramāṇa* for the cognition of the *dissimilarity* of the *unseen* object to the *seen* object. Similarly, we find that the cognition of something that we see as being *shorter* than another thing that we do not see, leads to the further cognition of the *unseen* thing being *longer* than the *seen* thing;—now what *pramāṇa* would you postulate for this latter cognition? [Similarly with all those cognitions that come under the category of Presumptive Cognition]. Even if you may not accept Presumption as a distinct *pramāṇa*, you cannot deny the possibility of the cognitions we have put forward; you may either seek to include them under *Inference*, or accept a distinct *pramāṇa* [in the shape of *Arthāpatti* or Presumption].

[Page 390.] (469) The above reasoning also sets aside the view that—“the cognition of the similarity of the cow, not seen at the time, to the *gavaya* before the eyes, must be regarded as ‘analogical’;—for this reason that it cannot be got at by Inference, on account of there being no ‘corroborative instance’ available, specially in the case of a person who has never observed the similarity between other cows and other *gavayas* [and without a corroborative instance no valid Inference is possible].” This reasoning we hold is rejected by what we have said above; as the cognition in question is, as shown above, obtained by *Presumption* based upon the fact that the similarity of what is before our eyes to that which is away from us cannot be possible without the corresponding similarity of the latter to the former.

(470) [A *third* definition of *Upamāna* is put forward]—
 “When we know a certain name (*‘gavaya’* for instance) but the object to which it belongs has never been known to us,—and we are cognisant also of a judgment or proposition containing that name (*e.g.* the judgment *‘the gavaya is like the cow’*)—if we happen to see an object to which the said judgment is found to be applicable,—we are naturally led to apply the name to that object (in the form this ‘object is what is named *‘gavaya’*); and it is this application of the name and judgment to the object that constitutes Analogy.” Such is the definition offered by some Logicians. But this also cannot be maintained; because it fails to include those cases where such application of the name is made by a person who [*knows* the object to which it belongs, but at the time] has forgotten it; (because this will not satisfy the condition of the definition, that *‘the object to which the name belongs has never been known’*; as in the case put forward, the object *has been known*, but has been forgotten). “In order to meet this contingency, we shall add the qualification *not remembered*.”* Even this will not help you, we reply; because in this form the definition will not apply to the case where the object to which the name belongs has been *known* and also *remembered* at some other time, but is forgotten only at the time of the cognition. [Because in this case, the object, cannot be said to be *‘not remembered’*, it having been actually *remembered* at some other time.] In order to avoid this you will perhaps substitute the *present participial* adjective *‘asmāyamāṇā’*,—meaning thereby that the object to which the name belongs *is not remembered*—in place of the *past participle*, *‘asmṛitā’* (which means *has not been remembered*). But even thus the case

* In a note in the ‘Pandit’ edition this sentence is taken to mean ‘we shall substitute *not remembered* in place of *not known*’; this interpretation however does not seem to be borne out by what follows: if it were the entire dropping out of *‘not known’* that was intended, what would be the use of having both *‘anubhāṣā’* (*‘known’*) and *‘smṛitā’* (*‘remembered’*) in the reply.

just cited by us remains unaffected; because in this case also the qualification 'asmaryamāṇā' (*is not remembered*) must have belonged to the object at some time or other; and it is not possible for anything to be 'asmaryamāṇā' at all times (*i. e.* there is nothing to which the epithet 'is not remembered' can be applicable at all times). "Well, we shall specify the time at which the object *is not remembered*, as the point of time immediately preceding the analogical cognition." This would be right enough, if (before the adding of this qualification) you had succeeded in ascertaining and defining what 'Analogical Cognition' is; while as a matter of fact, it is for the sake of the ascertaining and defining of that Cognition that you are raising all this outcry.

(471) Then again, (reverting to your original definition), when you lay it down as a necessary condition that 'the object to which the name belongs has not been known', you must admit that there is no case in which the object is such as 'has not been known' by all men. And as for its not having been known by some one (without reference to any particular person), this condition is present in the case of *verbal cognition* also. If you add that the object should 'not have been known by the person having the analogical cognition',—this we shall refute as before (pointing out that this qualification is meaningless until you have defined what *analogical cognition* is). And further, if in the defining of cognitions, you were to specify the particular *cognition* and the particular *cogniser*, then each such definition would apply to *individual* cognitions only; and would fail to be *comprehensive* (including all *individuals*, which is the only useful purpose served by definitions).

[Page 391] (472) There is a further objection bearing upon the introduction of the element of 'name' in your definitions:—We shall take the case of a man who has heard the declaration that 'the *gavaya*, which is like the cow, is to

be seen in most forests'; he does not know, we will take it, the object to which the name 'forest' belongs, but knows that to which the name '*gavaya*' belongs; when this man happens to see the forest, the conviction dawns upon him that 'this is the *forest*'; and inasmuch as this conviction also consists in the cognition of the relation between a *name* and the *object bearing that name*, and is obtained by a person to whom the relation was not known—it fulfills the conditions of your definition, which thereby becomes 'too wide' [as certainly you do not intend to apply the name of 'analogy' to such cognitions, as these.]* Even when the word '*most*' is not found (in the original assertion heard by the man), when all that the man has heard is that 'the *gavaya*, which is like the cow, is found in forests', when the man knows what the *gavaya* is, when he meets with one, he recalls to mind the assertion he has heard, and by virtue of the proximity, in that assertion, of the word 'forest' to the word '*gavaya*' (whose denotation he is fully cognisant of) he comes to recognise the denotation of the word 'forest' also (as pertaining to the place where he sees the *gavaya*)†; and as this cognition also is one of the relation of a *name* with that which bears that name, and is obtained by a man to whom it has not been known,—this also comes under your definition; though in reality the cognition of the 'name-and-named' relation between the word 'forest' and the

* The cognition in question is purely inferential, its actual form being—'this is a forest,—because it contains the *gavaya*; and I have heard that in *most* forests *gavayas* are to be found'; this premiss being got at by virtue of the expression 'in most forests', as contained in the declaration that the man has heard. The author next proceeds to show that even in cases where no such word is found to indicate the 'invariable concomitance' (as between the '*forest*' and the 'presence of the *gavaya*'), it is possible to have a conviction of the relation of a *name* to the *named*.

† According to the Logician, the denotation of an unknown word can be known by its proximity to a known word; hence the proximity of the word '*gavaya*' brings the knowledge of that of the word 'forest', also.

forest is got at by means of 'Presumption' based upon the proximity of that word to another word; exactly as in the other case (of the cognition of the name 'gavaya' as applying to the object perceived). [Hence as a matter of fact, either neither of the two cases, of 'gavaya' and 'forest' come under 'Analogy', both being got at by means 'Presumption'; or both of them become equally 'analogical'; which cannot be admitted by the Logician]. If, in order to avoid the above contingencies, you were to add that the 'name', the 'object' of whose connotation is spoken of (in your definition) as 'not known', is meant to be the 'name of the *upamēya* (the object of *analogical cognition*)',—then this would be open to the same objection that we had urged before; *i. e.*, this definition would remain unintelligible until you have successfully defined '*upamāna*' or Analogical Cognition; as without this it cannot be known what the '*upamēya*' or 'object' of analogical cognition is].

(478) Further, the mention of the expression '*vākyaṛtha*' ('judgment' or 'proposition' in your definition, propounded in para. 470) is also open to the above objections: for instance, with this expression the definition would fail to apply to the case where the original 'judgment' was in the form '*gosaḍ-ṛisho gavayaḥ kūnanē ḍrishyatē*', ['the gavaya, which is like the cow, is seen in the forest'], while at the time that the animal is actually seen and cognised as the 'gavaya' what is *remembered* and found applicable to the animal seen is only a part of that judgment—'the gavaya is like the cow' without any idea of the forest': [and thus in this case what is 'applicable' to the object seen is not the 'judgment', as laid down in the definition, which therefore cannot include the cognition in this case, which according to the logician, is 'analogy' pure and simple.] If, by the word 'judgment' in your definition, you intend to include a *part* of the judgment also, then it would become applicable to any cognition

of the *gavaya* that may be got at by the recollection of only the words 'the *gavaya* is like' (which also would be a *part* of the original judgment]. "What we mean by the 'judgment' is that much of it which may be effective in bringing about the cognition." Even so your definition would remain open to objection: it would fail to apply to that case in which the original 'judgment' was in the form 'the *gavaya*, which is like the cow, is to be found in the forest'; while the resultant cognition of the *gavaya* is got at by the remembrance of only the words 'the *gavaya* is like the cow'; because in this case the *object of cognition* is the '*gavaya of the forest*'; and for the bringing about of this cognition what is 'effective' is the whole judgment 'the *gavaya*, like the cow, is to be found in the forest'; [and as the cognition in question would have been brought about by the remembrance of only the words 'the *gavaya* is like the cow,' it would not come under the definition as now explained by you.] If then, you were to assert that the 'judgment' meant is that much of it which is effective in bringing about the *analogical* cognition, — this would be open to the objections pointed out above. [*i. e.* the definition would remain unintelligible until you had clearly defined 'analogical cognition'.] "We will restate our position thus:—" says the Logician:—"the judgment remembered should be such as is effective in bringing about the cognition of the relation of *the name and the named*." This also will not be right, we reply; because with this explanation, your definition will apply to the case where we have the cognition of the name of a certain thing on recalling a definition of that thing, when this definition contains the name of the thing [*e. g.* having heard the definition of Earth in the form 'the earth is that substance which has odour', if, we after some time see a piece of earth, we have the cognition 'this that I see is *Earth*',—and this involves the cognition of the relation of the *name 'Earth'* and the *named*; and

as this has been brought by the remembrance of a judgment that is effective in bringing about the cognition of such a relation,—this should be ‘analogy’ by your definition.]

[Page 393] (474) Further, in the case of a man who is not endowed with the faculty of reasoning, it may so happen that, after having cognised the applicability of the name ‘*gavaya*’ to the real *gavaya*, in the manner indicated in your definition (given in para. 470),—he comes to the conclusion that it is *similarity* that forms the basis of the denotation of the word ‘*gavaya*’; and in this case, inasmuch as this cognition will have been brought about by what you have defined as the true *Upamāna*, this latter will have to be accepted by you to be a ‘*pramāṇa*,’—‘*valid means of cognition*,’—even though the resultant cognition brought about by it is admittedly *invalid* [as certainly, the word ‘*gavaya*’ does not denote *similarity*]*. If, for avoiding this difficulty, you should add to your definition a further qualification, to the effect that the process therein specified should be such as leads to a valid cognition,—then, the definition would become applicable to

* One who is endowed with the powers of reasoning is in a position to judge that even though it is the *similarity of the cow* that helps us to ascertain the nature of the object denoted by the word ‘*gavaya*’, yet that similarity cannot constitute the basis of the denotation of the word ‘*gavaya*’; what constitutes such basis being the class or genus ‘*gavaya*’; and what should be regarded as real ‘*upamāna*’ or Analogy is that which is the means of bringing about the analogical cognition of the animal denoted by the word ‘*gavaya*’—this animal forming a member of the class that forms the basis of the denotation of that word; and this cognition can appear only when the observer can comprehend that the real meaning of the ‘judgment’ ‘the *gavaya* is similar to the cow’ is that ‘the class or genus denoted by the word *gavaya* has for its distinctive feature *similarity to the cow*,’—and then seeing the animal he perceives that the animal he sees is *similar to the cow*; after which, recalling the aforesaid judgment, he comes to the conclusion ‘the animal I see before me is one member of the class denoted by the word *gavaya*’. When the man however has not discrimination enough to go through all these steps of reasoning, the final conclusion he arrives at is that the word ‘*gavaya*’ denotes *similarity to the cow*; this is *invalid*; and yet the process by which the observer gets at it is exactly what the definition lays down for the valid *upamāna*. So in this case a valid *upamāna*,—a means of *right knowledge*—is found to be the means of *wrong knowledge*.

those cases of the recalling of the judgment ['the gavaya is similar to the cow'] in which this recalling brings about [not a cognition in the form of the logician's 'analogical cognition,' but] only the *inferential cognition* that a certain thing should be treated as *gavaya*,—because it belongs to the class *gavaya* denoted by the word '*gavaya*'. [As this inferential cognition is *valid*, the recalling of the judgment leading to it fulfills the conditions imposed by your qualified definition.] "We shall add the further qualification that the valid cognition brought about should be one that does not pertain to a thing that forms the object of an 'invariable concomitance' (leading to inference)." This also will not be right; because, in reality of 'analogical cognition' also, there can be no object which does not also form the *object of some 'invariable concomitance'*; [and thus there would be no cognition to which your definition with the last qualification could apply.] "Well, we shall state the qualification in a somewhat altered form: 'the valid cognition should not pertain to a thing that *is cognised at the time* as the object of an 'invariable concomitance'; [even though the object of analogical cognition be such as must form the object of some invariable concomitance, it is not-necessary that this concomitance should be recognised at the time that the analogical cognition appears.]" In this case the definition will not apply to those cases of Analogical Cognition in which the Analogy (the means of analogical cognition) is actually recognised as concomitant with something else; [that is to say, in many cases of Analogical Cognition, the means of cognition, while leading to the cognition, is also recognised as concomitant with something else]. If then, you should add the qualification that the Analogy should not be recognised as concomitant *with the object of analogical cognition*, then the definition remains applicable to inferential cognitions [as in these the concomitance recognised is not *with the object of analogical cognition*]. If (in order to exclude

inferential cognitions) you assert the concomitance to be *with the object of inferential cognition*,—then the definition would not apply to Analogical Cognitions.

(475) Nor can we accept the definition that ‘*Upamāna* is the means of the right cognition of the relation of the *name and the named*.’ Because it cannot be established that *Upamāna* is the means of such cognitions,—all these being got at by means either of *Ahāpatti* (Presumption) or *Anumāna* (Inference). “We shall define *Upamāna* to be such application of the *name* to the *named* object (in the manner described in para. 470) *as does not bring about an inferential cognition*.” This also cannot be accepted; because *the application of the name to the named*, in general,—*i. e.* taken in its generic form—cannot but be regarded as *bringing about inferential cognition* [inasmuch as many such cognitions are actually found to be brought about by such application of the name to the object that bears the name]; and if what are meant by you are those *particular cases* of such ‘application’ that are not productive of inferential cognitions,—then, your definition becomes open to the following objections:—

(1) The causal efficiency that has been recognised to subsist in a certain thing *in its generic form*, is not always recognised as belonging to every individual of that general class; [so that, even though we recognise the fact that the ‘application of the name to the named’ is, *in general*, the cause of certain cognitions, yet it does not follow from this that every *particular case* of such application must bring about a cognition; consequently, if what constitutes your definition is only a particular case of such application, it may be that that individual case is not known to be productive of any cognition at all]. ;—(2) If the definition contains the mention of certain (unspecified) *particular cases*, it cannot be comprehensive [and thus it fails in its chief purpose, which

consists in the providing of the means of forming a comprehensive notion of the thing defined.]

(476), In the case of those cognitions that are regarded by him as 'analogical'—*e. g.* the cognition of the animal, found to be similar to the cow, bearing the name 'gavaya,'—the Logician holds that what forms the real object of cognition in this case, is not the *similarity of the cow*, but the *fact of the animal bearing the name 'gavaya'*; and the only reasoning that he can put forward in support of this preference of the latter to the former consists in the comparative simplicity of assumptions in the case preferred.* And thus the admission of this reasoning being absolutely necessary in either case, why should you not regard the 'right cognition of the fact of the animal bearing the name *gavaya*' as purely *inferential*? † For certainly, in regard to the cognition in question we can have the following Inference:—'The object under discussion [*i. e.* *gavayaṭva*, the class *gavaya*] forms the denotation of the word *gavaya*,—because, when it is regarded as the denotation, its contrary character [*i. e.* its not being the denotation]

* This 'simplicity of assumptions' may be thus explained:—The form that the cognition in question actually takes is—'this animal that I see before me is similar to the cow; and as such this must be the animal that I have been told bears the name *gavaya*.' Now, the recognition of the applicability of the name must come in, in any case; if, then, the 'similarity of the cow' also were to form an integral factor in the 'object of the cognition,' there would be two objects: the *similarity* and the *applicability of the name*; it is therefore much 'simpler' to regard the latter alone as constituting the 'object,' the cognition of *similarity* being regarded as a mere auxiliary agency. And further, the class '*gavayaṭva*' is one only, while *similarity* is diverse.

† In assuming the independent character of Analogical Cognition, the Logician has to take his stand upon a reasoning based purely upon the 'simplicity of assumptions' as shown above. It is now urged that, inasmuch as the cognitions that the Logician regards as 'analogical' can be got at by means of Inference,—why add one more '*pramāna*,' when all that is necessary is found accomplished by the *pramāna* that has already been admitted? So long as all your purposes are served by Perception and Inference, the reasoning based on 'Simplicity of Assumptions' should prevent you from postulating any more *pramānas*.

is made impossible by reasoning, *because as a rule, that which does have its contrary character made impossible by reasoning, does not form the denotation of a word,—e.g. *goḥva* [which, having its contrary character made possible by reasoning, is not accepted as the denotation of the word *gavaya*];—and as a matter of fact, we find in the case in question, that the *gavayaḥva* has its contrary character made impossible by reasoning,—and therefore the conclusion is that *gavayaḥva* forms the denotation of the word ‘*gavaya*’. As a matter of fact, when a thing has its contrary character indicated (as impossible) by a thoroughly valid reasoning, entirely free from all vitiating circumstances,—e.g. the invalidity of the premisses and so forth,—it is not possible for it to be not accepted as the denotation. Or, the cognition of what is denoted by the word ‘*gavaya*’ may be explained as being obtained by means of ‘Presumption’, in the following manner:—Inasmuch as the word ‘*gavaya*’ is a word, it cannot be that it has no denotation;—this is the first step of the Presumptive Reasoning;—then again, it has been found that it cannot have any other denotation, as this would go against what we have been told by trustworthy persons as regards the word ‘*gavaya*’ denoting that which is coextensive with ‘that which is similar to the cow’;—thirdly, the animal seen is found to answer to this last description, being ‘similar to the cow’; and this leads to the conclusion that the class of animals to which the seen animal belongs is what forms the denotation of the word ‘*gavaya*’;—and this conclusion, as we have seen, is led up to by the Presumption based upon the impossibility (*anupapatti*) of what we have been told by trustworthy persons with regard to the character of the denotation

*The class *gavayaḥva* being a single impartite whole, so long as that can form the denotation, the regarding of anything else as the denotation is opposed to all reasoning based upon ‘simplicity’; it being simpler to accept a single impartite whole as the denotation than anything else. The reading adopted by the Viḍyāsāgri is *ḥarkeṇa viḥayi* &c. &c. and is explained as—‘the negation of other possible denotations is corroborated by reasoning.’

of the word. And thus, all cases of what the Logician regards to be 'Analogical Cognition' may be explained as falling under the head of 'Presumptive Cognition'; which obviates the necessity of postulating 'Analogy' as a distinct 'means of cognition,' *Pramāṇa*. [Nor will it be right for him to urge that he would include all cases of Presumptive Cognition under 'Analogy'; because] he will have to accept 'Presumption' as a *Pramāṇa* distinct at any rate from 'Analogy'; even though he may include it under Negative Inference; while others (the *Mīmāṃsakas*, for instance) actually accept it as a distinct *Pramāṇa* by itself.)*

D.

[The fourth Instrument of Cognition—Word—is next taken up. It is shown that the Logician cannot provide an adequate account of this *Pramāṇa*, as no correct explanation can be given of 'trustworthy assertion', or of 'sentence,' or of 'assertion.']

(477) What also is the 'Word' which is asserted by the Logician to be the fourth *Means of Cognition*? It will not be right to define the *Pramāṇa* 'Word' as consisting in the assertion of trustworthy persons. Because none of the available alternative explanations (of the several factors of this definition) are acceptable. For instance, what do you mean by the 'trustworthy person'? "*The trustworthy person is one who speaks in strict accordance with what is seen.*" This will not be right; because with this explanation of the 'trustworthy person' your definition of the *pramāṇa* in question will become applicable to the words of a man who asserts *what is seen* by him under a misconception.†

If you add the qualification 'known by means of *pramāṇa*' [*i.e.*, by valid means of knowledge; the definition being that

* The Logician might include Presumption under Inference. But even so, he cannot include it under 'Analogy'; specially those forms of it which appear in the negative form.

† When the man *sees* the shell before him, and takes it to be silver; he *sees* silver, even though the perception is mistaken; and in this case if the man says 'here is a piece of silver,' he is speaking 'in strict accordance with what is seen by him.'

'the man who asserts what he knows by means of valid means of Cognition, is the *trustworthy person*'], then the definition would apply to the man who, though knowing the thing rightly (by means of valid means of cognition), speaks of it as otherwise [*i.e.*, when the man really perceives silver, but says there is *shell*, he does speak of the silver, which he has seen by means of the valid means of cognition, though he speaks of it as something else]. If then, it should be held that the 'trustworthy person' is one who speaks of things as cognised by means of valid means of cognition,—then, it would apply to the man who perceives a thing and makes an assertion with regard to it which is only partly in accordance with what has been cognised by means of valid means of cognition [*e.g.*, when a man sees two pieces of silver before him, and says 'here are silver and tin-pieces', he speaks in accordance with what he has seen, so far as the silver is concerned, and thereby his assertion would have to be accepted as that of a 'trustworthy person.'] If the definition is stated in the form 'the man who speaks of a thing only so far and in the same form as he cognises by means of valid means of knowledge, is *trustworthy*',—then it becomes too narrow; because it does not apply to the 'things defined' (trustworthy persons), which do not fulfil the conditions of the definition; as a matter of fact, *trustworthy persons* do not, as a rule, speak of the entire aspect of things cognised by them [and as such they cannot be said to speak of things so far as they see &c., because while it is the entire aspect of the thing that they see, what they speak of is only a part of that aspect.]*

If the definition of *Word* as 'the assertion of trustworthy persons' were interpreted as 'the assertion of one who speaks in strict accordance with what is rightly cognised

* For example when one looks into the kitchen, and sees the entire room with all its accessories, the oven, the fire, the fuel, the utensils, the articles cooked, and so forth and yet he simply says 'there is fire in the kitchen'.

by him',—then it would fail to include the assertions of such persons as Yudhiṣṭhira for instance, who are well-known as 'trustworthy', and yet are known to have not always spoken in strict accordance with what they knew rightly.*

If you add the further qualification 'in so far as the particular object is concerned'—[the definition being explained as—'when a man speaks of a thing in strict accordance with what he knows of it rightly, he is to be regarded as *trustworthy in so far as that thing is concerned*']—then, inasmuch as the definition would be restricted to an individual object, it could not apply to *all* trustworthy persons or Words.

[*Refutation of the Second Definition.*]

(478) If *Word* be defined as "the assertion of a person free from defects (such as deficient organs, ignorance, wrong knowledge, undue attachment, aversion and so forth)",—then it would not apply to the case where a man with defects though wishing to say 'the jar is not here', by chance blurts out the truth 'the jar is here' [as this last assertion would not be of a man free from defects, and yet it cannot be denied that it is true]. "But in reality such an assertion is not accepted as *Pramāṇa* (valid or trustworthy)." This is not right, we reply; firstly because we have already answered this argument of yours above (paras. 233 *et. seq*) †;—secondly, because the validity of the assertion in question being easily ascertained by reason of its capability of leading to activity ‡.

* For example, when appealed to by Droṇa as to whether or not Ashvaṭṭhāman had really been killed, he prevaricated by saying 'Ashvaṭṭhāman has been killed—either the elephant or the person bearing that name', though he had seen with his own eyes that what had been killed was Ashvaṭṭhāman the *elephant*, and not the *man*.

† Where it is shown that a cognition may be quite right, even though brought about by defective means.

‡ The aforesaid assertion of the defective person is perfectly capable of giving rise to reasonable activity; i. e., on hearing that, a man may proceed to pick up the jar, and when he actually finds it there, he must accept the assertion as *valid*, notwithstanding the fact of its proceeding from a defective person.

the real validity of the assertion cannot be affected by the mere fact of its being doubted for some little time (prior to its resultant activity being found to be in keeping with the reality of things). Then again, if by the man being "free from defects" is meant *freedom from all defects*, then the qualification would not apply to even such a trustworthy person as Bhīma's elder brother, Yudhiṣṭhira; and if, (in order to meet this difficulty) the defects are specified, then the definition becomes too limited in its scope, and thus fails to be comprehensive.

[*Refutation of the Third Definition.*]

(479) "The *pramāṇa* Word has also been defined as consisting in a sentence in strict consonance with the real state of things; what objection could there be to this definition?" In the first place, this definition is open to all the objections that have been urged above (under the definition of *Right Cognition*) against "the character of being in strict consonance with the real state of things;"—*Secondly* whether or not the qualification 'in strict consonance with the real state of things' be regarded as serving the purpose of precluding (certain assertions), in either case there are incongruities, as has been shown above;—*thirdly* this definition is open to the serious objection that it is not possible for you to correctly explain what constitutes a 'sentence.' *

(480) What is it that you call 'sentence'?

"It is a collection of such words as are characterised by one complete idea." In criticising this definition of

*The sense of the first objection is that, no correct explanation of the character of 'being in consonance with the real state of things' is possible; as has been already shown above;—the second objection means that—(a) if the qualification is meant to preclude all assertions that are not *in strict consonance with the real state of things*, then, as a matter of fact, it fails to preclude those assertions that are only partially consonant with the real state of things; if it is not meant to preclude such other assertions, then the qualification becomes superfluous;—the third objection is explained in what follows.

Sentence we shall let alone for the present the objections that we have to put forward against the notions of 'one' and 'object' and 'characterisation' (that are involved in your definition); for the present we shall consider the meaning of the word 'word' (contained in your definition).

(481) (a) Some people define a 'word' as *that which ends in declensional and conjugational terminations* (Pān. 1-4-14) (b) Others define it as *letters ending in terminations*. The first of these definitions is untenable; because whether we take the two terminations collectively or severally, in either case, the definition becomes too narrow. [If the 'word' be defined as that which ends in declensional terminations, then it does not include words with conjugational endings; and *vice versa*; and if it be defined as that ending in *both* declensional and conjugational terminations, it becomes an impossible 'definition'; there being no such word as ends in both declensional and conjugational terminations]. If, in order to escape from this difficulty it be held that the denotation of the word 'word' is different in each of the two cases [in the case of the word with the declensional ending, it stands for 'that which ends in *declensional terminations*'; while in that of the word with the conjugation ending, it denotes that which ends in *conjugational terminations*], then this would vitiate the aforesaid definition of 'sentence'.*

(482) Nor can the second definition of 'Word' mentioned above be accepted; because it is not possible for us to form any comprehensive notion of 'termination'; inasmuch as while Pāṇini's *Sūtra* (1-4-10½) applies the name 'termination' to the *declensional and conjugational endings*, another *Sūtra* (5-3-1) applies the same name to an entirely

*The denotation of the word 'word' being diverse, we could have no definite comprehensive notion of the 'word'; and the indefiniteness of the principal word in the definition of 'Sentence' would make this definition also indefinite and incomprehensive.

different set of endings, such as '*ṭasil*' and the rest ;—[and there being no definiteness in the things denoted by the word 'termination'] the sameness of the mere verbal form of the name 'termination' cannot justify its being included in a *definition* (which remains indefinite so long as every word contained in it is not found to have a well-defined denotation).^{*} Then again, when the 'Word' is defined as '*letters ending in terminations*',—if stress is laid upon the plurality (expressed by the plural ending in the word 'letters'), then such words as '*aham*' (I) and the rest cease to be 'words' (inasmuch as they contain only *two* letters, and not *three*, which is the least number expressible by the plural ending); if on the other hand, no significance is attached to the plurality, the final *a* in the expression '*dēvadattaḥ*' will have to be regarded as a 'word'; because this final '*a*' ends in (is followed by) the termination (nominative-singular). "But in order to be a *word*, the letter or letters ending in a termination should have a meaning (and the letter *a* in question is meaningless)." But even so, in the case of such words '*bhavaṭi*' and the rest, which take the augment '*shap*', which augment again is replaced by its substitute '*a*', these augments will have to be regarded as 'words'; because the augment '*shap*' has a definite meaning (being laid down as signifying the sense of the *active*). "But we accept as *word* only such letter or letters as (while fulfilling the said conditions) are laid down as *taking the terminations* (the augments in question do not take any terminations, and as such they cannot be treated as

^{*}When the word 'termination' has a number of distinct denotations : and it has been shown that the definition remains open to objection when any one particular denotation of the word 'termination' is accepted, as well as when all its denotations are accepted,—in the former case the definition becomes 'too narrow' and in the latter case 'impossible' ; such being the case,—it being absolutely impossible for the word to be taken in any of its denotations, it is not right to employ such a word in a definition ; simply because a number of these denotations falls under the common name of that word.

'words').” This also cannot be right; as in that case you would have to regard as a ‘word’ that much of the expression ‘*bhavati*’ as would be left after removing from it the augment, [*i.e.* the expression ‘*bhū-ṭip*’ will have to be regarded as a ‘word’, ‘*bhū*’ being a ‘letter with meaning,’ ending in the termination *ṭip*, and being one which is laid down as taking terminations.] “The augment *shap* is included in the word because it falls between the root *bhū* and the termination ‘*ṭip*.’”* In that case, we should ask you—does your definition mean that the name ‘word’ is given to *the letters which are laid down as taking terminations*, as well as to *that which falls between letters and the terminations* (*i.e.* to both of these, or to ‘the letters which are laid down as taking terminations, along with ‘that which falls between the two’? If the former is meant, then the augment ‘*shap*’ also would be a distinct ‘word’ by itself; and the definition itself would become too narrow? [Because if ‘falling between the two’ were a necessary condition of the definition, then the *root* or *base* would not be ‘words’; and if the *being a root* or *base* were a necessary condition, then that which falls between the two would not be included; lastly, if both were made necessary conditions, such a definition would not be applicable to any word at all]. If on the other hand, the latter alternative is the one that you accept,—the expression ‘*dēvaḍaṭṭaḥ*’ would fail to be a ‘word’; because in this case there being nothing that falls between the base (‘*dēvaḍaṭṭa*’) and the termination (‘*su*’), it does not fulfil the condition that it should be *along with* that which falls between the two.’ “What is meant is that in some cases the letters are to be taken as *along with* ‘that which falls between the two’; while in others

*In the case of *praṭyīhīras* we find that though only two letters are pronounced they imply all the letters that fall between those two. In the same manner, when we speak of the word as consisting of the *letter* (*bhū* for instance) and the *termination* all that comes between these two (in the form of *augments &c.*) become included in the same.

they are to be taken by themselves; just according to the circumstances of each case." This also is not right, we reply; because so long as you cannot present a well-defined and comprehensive idea (corresponding to the word 'word') it is impossible to save your definition from the charge of being 'too narrow.' Then again [the definition of 'word' as 'letters ending in terminations' is open to a further objection]—in accordance with your (second) definition, even such expressions as 'dēvaḍaḍḍa-su' ('dēvaḍaḍḍa' with the singular nominative termination) would have to be regarded as a 'word'. "But in the first place, this would be a corrupt form of the word; because if it were a true word, it would certainly undergo the transformations that are laid down as necessary under the circumstances;—such for instance, as the change of *su* into *ru*, and of this again into the *visarga*, and so forth." This does not help you; as it is *because* the expression is a corrupt one that its inclusion in your definition (of 'word') vitiates the definition, which is thus shown to be applicable to such expressions as are known to be corrupt; (and your answer does not show that the form does not fulfil the conditions of the definition).

(483) For these reasons it must be admitted that when the great teacher Pāṇini propounded the definition of 'paḍa' (Word) in Sūtra I. 4. 14, he coined this word as a technicality for the purpose of such transformations as those into *ru* and the like [which are laid down as taking effect in the case of 'paḍas', and which therefore have effect in the case of such expressions as 'dēvaḍaḍḍa-sū', which though only corrupt forms of what a 'word' is in the ordinary acceptance of the term, are yet 'paḍa' in the sense attached to the term by the said, Sūtra]; and this term 'paḍa' being a grammatical technicality, just like such other technicalities as 'naḍi' &c. ['naḍi' not standing for the *river*, which forms the ordinary denotation of the term, but for all feminine bases ending in long *ū* and *ī*]; and he never meant his definition of the term 'naḍis' to apply

to the ordinary correct forms of words current in common parlance. Consequently for this latter kind of 'word' (which is what composes sentences), some other definition has to be propounded. Otherwise, desiring water, you would seek for it in the forest (*kānanasṭhali*), mistaking this latter for a 'river'—*nadī*, in accordance with Pāṇini's definition of '*nadī*' (as a 'feminine bases ending in long *ū* and *ī*) [because the word '*kānanasṭhali*' being a feminine base ending in long *ī*, would be '*nadī*' by Pāṇini's definition].

(484) [Another definition of 'Word' is now put forward]—'The *Word* of ordinary parlance may be defined as that which ends in a termination, and is duly equipped with all the features or changes indicated by the sūtras of Pāṇini*.

This definition also cannot be accepted; as it is not possible for any word to contain *all* the changes laid down by Pāṇini in *all* his Sūtras. "We may add the qualification—'duly equipped with all the *possible* features indicated by the Sūtras' [and as all the changes enjoined by Pāṇini are not possible in any single word, the definition escapes from the objection just urged against it]." Not so, we reply; do you mean that the changes or features would be *possible* at the particular time? or at some other time? If the former, then the form '*dēvaḍaṭṭa—ru*' would have to be regarded as a *word*; because *at the particular point of time* when the expression *Dēvaḍaṭṭa—su*' presents itself, the only *possible* change is that of the '*su*' into the '*ru*'; as the subsequent change into the *visarga* does not pertain to the point of time when the '*su*' is changed into '*ru*'. If, on the other hand, you mean that the changes should be *possible* at

* The form '*dēvaḍaṭṭa—si*' does not come within this definition as it contains the base and the termination in their crude forms, without the subsequent changes laid down by Pāṇini;—even the form '*dēvaḍaṭṭa—ru*' does not fulfil the conditions of the definition; because even though it contains one of the changes, that of the '*su*' into '*ru*', it still falls short of the other necessary changes; it is only when the '*ru*' is changed into the *visarga* that all the enjoined changes become accomplished; and it is for this reason that the form '*dēvaḍaṭṭaḥ*' comes to be regarded as a *word*.

that time, *as well as at* other times,—then, the expression ‘*dēvadaṭṭah*’ also could not be regarded as a ‘word’; because ven that form is devoid of such further changes as that of the transformation of the ‘ru’ into ‘ya’ (by Pān. 8. 3. 17) and the deletion of this ‘ya’ (by Pān. 8. 3. 19),—all these changes coming in (being possible, as affecting the ‘ru’) before the appearance of such words beginning with vowels as ‘*iṭi*’ and the like.*

“What we mean is that the ‘changes’ should be such as are ‘possible’ (in the word itself) independently of the proximity of other words [and thus the last objection is avoided, as that refers to the changes necessitated by the following of certain other words].” This also is not right, we reply; because in certain cases we find that in expressing the idea signified by the expression *jīvikākṛīṭya vyāchastē* (‘he does the explaining or teaching as a livelihood’), people make use of the expression ‘*jīvikām kṛīṭvā vyāchastē*’; and in this case the expression ‘*jīvikām kṛīṭvā*’ will have to be regarded as a *sentence* (and not as a word), according to your definition; because the expression ‘*jīvikām kṛīṭvā*’ would be a collection of words expressive of, and hence characterised by, a single idea (*by way of livelihood*) (and thus would exactly fulfil the conditions of your definition of ‘sentence’),—specially because the word ‘*jīvikām*’, as related to the word ‘*kṛīṭvā*’ fulfills the conditions of your definition of ‘word’ (whereby you have two words, expressive of a single idea)†.

(485) “We shall restate our definition in another form—The *Word* is that which is fully equipped with all those possible changes that are laid down as coming in under those specific

*When the word ‘*dēvadaṭṭah*’ is followed by words beginning with vowels, it undergoes the two changes mentioned in the text; and according to the definition, until such time as these changes have come about, the form ‘*dēvadaṭṭah*’ would not be a *word*.

† And yet, as a matter of fact, no such *sentence* is possible, the form ‘*jīvikām kṛīṭvā*’ being grammatically incorrect; because by Pān. 1. 4. 79, taken along with 2. 2. 17, 6. 1. 71, 7. 1. 37, the correct form should be ‘*jīvikākṛīṭya*.’

conditions that shall be present in each particular case [and thus in the case in question, though the specific conditions in the shape of the *possibility of being compounded* is present in the case of the expression '*jivikām kṛitvā*', yet all those changes that are possible under that condition—viz., those laid down under Sūtras 1. 4. 79, 2. 2. 17, 6. 1. 71, and 7. 1. 37—are not present; and hence that expression cannot be regarded as a 'word'].” This cannot be accepted; because by this definition, we could not accept as 'words' those expressions in which there are no 'specific conditions' present (because you make the presence of such conditions a necessary factor in the 'word'). “We shall, then, define *Word* as that which ends in terminations and is equipped with all those characteristics that are laid down as coming in under the circumstances present in each case*.’

This also will not be right, we reply; because if by 'circumstances' you mean the endless diverse conditions attending upon different words, then the definition fails to be a comprehensive one, and hence becomes too narrow. Then as regards any *single* circumstance, no such can be intended by you; and even if such were actually intended, we know as a matter of fact that no such single circumstance is possible; and lastly, if even any such circumstance were possible (as attending upon words)—such circumstance consisting either of *similarity of form*, or *similarity of denotation*, or *similarity of termination*, or *similarity of base*,—the changes laid down by Pāṇini would affect equally at all times all the words under whatever circumstance they might

* The difference between this and the former definition is that therein mention was made of 'specific conditions', by which were meant the *possibility of compounding*, the *implication of similarity*, and so forth; and as these conditions are not found to be present in the case of every word, the definition is rejected as being too narrow. In the present definition we have 'circumstances' instead of 'specific conditions', and certainly, in *all* words there are certain 'circumstances' under which the changes are laid down by Pāṇini.

be (provided that they fell under the one particular circumstance referred to); for instance—(1) [if *similarity of form* were the 'one circumstance' intended, then] in the case of the expression '*bhavaṭi*' [which is a verb, and also the vocative singular form of the feminine pronoun '*bhavaṭi*', you would have all the characteristics that have been laid down in connection with such a *verb* and vocative forms]; (2) [if the *similarity of denotation* were the 'one circumstance' intended, then] in the case of the expression '*bhavaṭi*' and '*astī*' [as both words have the same meaning, 'is', you would have the same characteristics]; 3) [if the 'one circumstance' consisted in the *similarity of termination*], in the case of the words '*patāḥ*' and '*patāu*' [both of which, having the nominative termination, would have the same characteristics]; 3) [if the 'one circumstance' consisted in *similarity of base*] in the case of the words '*patam*' and '*patāḥ*' [both of which have the common base '*pata*', would have the same characteristics]; and thus your definition would become 'too wide' [i.e., '*bhavaṭi*' and '*astī*', &c. &c., would have to be regarded as one 'word' under your definition; and so on, with the other pairs of words cited].

[*Refutation of the fourth definition of Shabdā-pramāṇa*,]

(Page 402) (486) For reasons explained above (i.e., the impossibility of propounding a right definition of 'sentence') we must reject the *Mīmāṃsaka's* definition of *Shabdā-pramāṇa* as consisting in 'such sentences as do not proceed from any persons' (but belong to the Veda).

E

[The fifth Instrument of Right Cognition—*arthāpti*, Presumptive Reasoning—cannot be maintained; as no adequate explanation can be provided of the inconsistency upon which the Presumption is sought to be based; in fact most of the explanations given are impossible.]

(487)* What again, we ask, is 'Arthāpti' or Presumption? "By *Arthāpti* is meant the apparent inconsistency or incongruity of a certain fact in the absence of a certain other fact [the said incongruity leading to the presumption of this latter fact]. † This is not right, we reply; because the 'inconsistency' is not manifest until the 'other fact' is known to be duly established. ‡ "The *inconsistency* is with what is already definitely known as duly established [that is, with the fact of the man *being alive*, which in a general way, may be known before the idea of his being away from home;--so that this latter idea need not necessarily precede the recognition of the inconsistency]." This also is not right, we reply; because that which is meant to be excluded by the adding of the qualifying word ('definitely known &c.') must be *that which is not known*; and as this, by its very nature, would be *unknown*

* Though the Logician, against whom the main attack is aimed, does not admit of Presumption as a distinct *Pramāṇa*, yet he does not deny the validity of the cognitions resulting therefrom; it is merely a question of names: what the *Mināmsaka* regards as a distinct *Pramāṇa*, calling it 'Presumption', the Logician considers to be only a particular form of Inference.

† For instance, we know that *Dēvaḍaṭṭa* is living, he is not dead,—we go to his house, but do not find him there,—his not being at home is apparently inconsistent with our conviction of his being alive;—this inconsistency however continues only so long as we do not get at the idea of his having gone out;—thus then, in this case the fact of his not being at home is inconsistent in the absence of the fact of his having gone out;—consequently the said inconsistency leads us to presume that he must have gone out.

‡ That is to say, the notion that *Dēvaḍaṭṭa* is *alive and yet not at home* is not possible until we are sure of the fact of his being somewhere else; consequently before we are sure of the 'inconsistency' of his being not at home, it is necessary for us to be sure of his being away from the house; so that if the notion of this latter fact were to be derived from the inconsistency; there would be a most objectionable interdependence.

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(and as such, for all intents and purposes, *non est*), it could not be a fit object for exclusion; and thus the qualifying word added for the purpose of excluding it would be entirely superfluous;—and if, in order to escape from this predicament, you omit the qualifying words ‘definitely known’ then, in that case the ‘inconsistency’ would be—(a) either entire and absolute, or (b) only partial; (a) if it be the *absolute* ‘inconsistency’ that is meant (to be the basis of Presumption) then, that would be contrary to, and strike at the very root of, the result that you seek to obtain from that ‘inconsistency’. [That is to say, that which is *absolutely inconsistent*, or incongruous, cannot become possible under any circumstances; it being impossible for an absolute inconsistency to be removed; and as the ‘inconsistency’ upon which presumptive cognition is sought to be based is held to be removed by that cognition, which fact alone constitutes the validity of the cognition, the absolute character of that ‘inconsistency’ would remove the sole justification for the *presumption*; and the presumption being precluded, there would be nothing to lead to the resultant valid cognition];—(b) secondly and lastly, if it be only *partial* ‘inconsistency’ that is meant, then, in that case, [the ‘inconsistency’ would be of an indefinite kind, one that may be due to the absence of, and hence removable by, any and every circumstance, and *not only* by the fact sought to be cognised by the presumption based upon such an ‘inconsistency’; and so] the ‘inconsistency’ could not lead to that which is sought to be accomplished by its means.

(488) The Opponent offers another explanation of the ‘inconsistency’:—“The ‘inconsistency’ lies in the contradiction apparent between two valid cognitions.”* This, we

* That *Dvādaśa* is *alive* is a fact cognised by means of the declaration of a trustworthy person,—and that *he is not in the house* is cognised by actual perception;—thus there is a contradiction between the verbal cognition of his existence and the perceptual cognition of his absence, both of which are equally valid; this discrepancy can be removed only if we recognise the fact of his being outside the house; which fact reconciles the two valid cognitions.

reply, is an absolute impossibility [as a matter of fact, there can be no contradiction between any two *valid* cognitions bearing upon the same object]. The Opponent explains—“What we mean is the contradiction between two cognitions *which are believed to be valid.*” * This also is not right, we reply : [A *belief* can be of the nature of, (a) either misconception, being entirely wrong, or (b) of right cognition, or (c) doubtful]. (a) If the *belief* (in the validity of your two cognitions) be of the nature of a misconception—*i. e.*, if it be entirely wrong,—then your definition of *Presumption* becomes too wide ; †—(b) if the *belief* be of the nature of right cognition—*i. e.*, if it be a correct belief—then also the aforesaid objections remain in force ‡ ;—(c) lastly [if the belief be of the nature of *doubtful cognition*, that is] if the *contradiction* intended be held to lie between such cognitions as have not had their validity or invalidity duly ascertained,—then, in that case also, the definition becomes open to the same objection ; for instance, in the case of the fallacious reasoning where an equally seemingly valid reasoning is available to the contrary,—inasmuch as you will have both these cognitions of doubtful validity, they could, by your definition, lead to a valid *presumption*, which would (under the terms of your definition) reconcile the two contradictory cognitions ; [and this also will be absurd, as, even according to you, in the case of such

* The Opponent admits that when two cognitions are mutually contradictory both cannot be valid ; but it is possible for them to be believed to be valid, even though they may not be so actually.

† As in that case the definition would apply to a case of two distinctly wrong cognitions, where also you may have a right *presumption*, by your definition ; for instance, with regard to a *rope*, there may be two cognitions—one regarding it as a *serpent* and another as a *stick* ; it is quite possible for both of these to be *believed to be valid* ; and as there would be a contradiction between these, they should by your definition, lead to a valid *Presumption*, which is an absurdity.

‡ That is, if the right cognitions, which constitute the *belief*, are valid, then no contradiction is possible between two valid cognitions ; and if they are invalid, then the definition becomes too wide.

fallacious reasonings, no valid cognition can follow from them]. The Opponent further explains—"In the case of such reasonings, as a matter of fact, the invalidity of one of the reasonings (and the cognition resulting therefrom) is at once definitely ascertained ; while what our definition refers to are those cases of two contradictory cognitions, where such is not the case [where we cannot, at once, reject the validity of either of the two cognitions.]" This also, we reply, does not meet the case ; because, as in the case of two mutually contradictory reasonings (mentioned above), so, in all other cases (of contradictory cognitions), one or the other of the cognitions would have to be regarded as invalid, on the simple ground of their being mutually contradictory [as of two contradictory prepositions, one must be false]*. "The contradiction meant", says the Opponent, "is between two reasonings."† This also, we reply, is not right ; because when two reasonings contradict each other, they must be wrong (and as such cannot afford the basis for any *valid* presumption).

(489) The Opponent offers another explanation of the 'contradiction':—"The *contradiction* that we hold to be the basis of *Presumption* is in the form of a *doubt* with regard to the sublating or rejection of (the object of) a particular or limited valid cognition,—this doubt constituting the *contradiction* of (being inconsistent with) the general or wider valid cognition contrary to the aforesaid (particular) cognition.‡"

* And thus *Presumption*, such as you define, would be an impossibility.

† In the instance cited above, we have the following two reasonings, contradicting each other:—(1) 'Because *Dēvaḍaṭṭa* is alive he must exist' and (2) 'Because he is not found here he cannot exist.'

‡ When *Dēvaḍaṭṭa* is not found in the house, we have a particular cognition—that of his non-existence at a *particular* place ; and when this cognition of his non-existence is taken along with the former general cognition of his *existence*, of his being alive, there arises a *doubt* as to whether or not this *existence in general* should apply to the house also ; if it does, then the particular cognition of his *non-existence at home* would be rejected ; and yet being cognised by direct Perception,

This also is not quite right, we reply; because the contrary of the general cognition (of *existence in general*) having been made known by the particular cognition (of *non-existence at home*), mere *doubt*,—which is always weaker than definite cognition—can never make the object of the particular valid cognition fall within the province of the general cognition.*

(490) A slightly different explanation of the 'contradiction' is next added:—"What we mean is that, when the *general* valid cognition (of Dēvadatta's *existence in general*, which includes his *existence in the house* also) is followed by a particular valid cognition to the contrary (*i.e.*, the cognition of his *not being in the house*),—the idea that we have of this latter particular cognition being contrary to the former general one constitutes the 'contradiction' or 'inconsistency' that leads to another particular cognition (of his *existence outside the house*)."¹ This explanation also does not help you, we reply. Because as a matter of fact, the idea that there is a mutual contradiction of the general cognition (of *existence e.g.*) and the particular cognition (of *non-existence*) is obtained only after we have recognised the fact that the

this would seem to be irrefutable; hence the *doubt*; and as this *doubt* vitiates the validity of the former general cognition of his *existence in general*—which latter would not in ordinary course, be true if the non-existence in the house were true—this *doubt* would constitute the 'contradiction' of that general cognition; and this *doubt* is the means of getting at, or presuming, the idea of his *existence outside the house*,—which idea alone can reconcile the apparent 'contradiction' or inconsistency of the two cognitions. This statement of the position of the opponent is intended to meet the objections urged above. The cognitions become invalidated only when the 'contradiction' between them is absolute; so that they mutually reject each other; when, however, the 'contradiction' is only in the form of a *doubt*, their validity is not rejected; it is only vitiated to a slight extent; and this vitiation is removed by the *presumption*; which *Presumption*, therefore, is not based upon cognitions whose validity has been entirely rejected.

* When once the man's *non-existence at home* has been cognised by Perception, there is no room left for any doubt as to this being rejected by any general cognition (of *existence in general*); and thus no doubt being possible, the alleged basis of the *Presumption* disappears.

objects of those cognitions (*viz.*, *existence* and *non-existence*) are contradictory [the 'contradiction' of the *cognitions* thus including the contradiction of their *objects* also];—and what the 'contradiction' of the 'objects' implies is that the two objects (*existence* and *non-existence*) are endowed with such contradictory properties that they cannot co-exist in any one place (Dēvaḍaṭṭa's house for instance); this means that the two must exist in two different places; thus we find that the idea that,—while we have the *non-existence* (of Dēvaḍaṭṭa) *in the house*, his *existence* must be somewhere *outside the house*,—is obtained either along with the idea of the 'contradiction' itself, or by being invariably concomitant with this latter idea, through *inference* (from that idea); and thus the requisite valid idea (*pramā*) being got at, as in the case of other cognitions, by an entirely different means, [there is no occasion for the postulating of any such 'means of cognition' (*pramāṇa*) as Presumption].

(491) Then again, we ask—What do you mean by the *general cognition* being followed by the *particular cognition*? Does it mean—(a) that the same cognition which appeared, in the first instance, in a general form, becomes subsequently recognised as pertaining to a particular object?—(b) or that the cognition, though appearing in a general form, yet actually pertains to the particular object also, on the principle that the *particular* is inseparable from the *general*,—and all that happens is that this particular signification of the cognition, not recognised in the first instance, becomes cognised subsequently?—(c) or that it is only a particular form of the object of the general cognition (that becomes cognised by the subsequent particular cognition)?—(d) or that what is cognised by the particular cognition is only a particular property or character of that particular object which already forms the object of the general cognition? *

* In the rock example of Presumption—the general cognition 'Dēvaḍaṭṭa is alive' is made to yield the presumption that 'Dēvaḍaṭṭa is out of his house,'—this

(a) The *first* of these would not be right; as in that case Presumption would be the means of wrong cognition also (and as such could not be regarded as a *means of valid cognition, pramāṇa*). * (b) Nor is the *second* explanation acceptable; because the *particular* being inseparable from the *general*, the idea of the former would always enter into the representative cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) of the general cognition itself; and as such there would not be left anything unknown (in the general or particular form) which could be known by means of Presumption (which would thus be entirely superfluous). (c) The *third* explanation also is not tenable; because any cognition of the *general* is not possible without its including within itself the cognition of all its particular forms; and thus the particular also would become cognised long before the Presumption could be operative. (d) Nor can the *fourth* alternative be maintained; because, we ask—is that 'other property or character' something totally different from that (*general existence*) where contradiction is perceived (in the shape of *non-existence in the house*)? or is it something else (in the shape of some peculiarity of size, form and so forth, of that whose contradiction is perceived)? It cannot be the

latter being a particular cognition—the cognition of the man's presence at a particular place—as compared with the former cognition of his *existence in general*, his being alive. The author puts forward four different alternatives as to what may be meant by this: (1) The meaning the *first* explanation would be that the general valid cognition that 'the man is alive' becomes restricted to his existence at a particular place, outside his house;—(2) the *second* would mean that the idea of the man's existence outside is already included in the general idea of his being alive; but this inclusion is not recognised until the presumption has operated; i. e., this particular idea becomes cognised only after we have noticed that the man is not in the house, which leads to the *Presumption* of his existence outside;—(3) by the *third* it is the particular form—'external existence'—of 'existence in general' that is cognised by Presumption;—(4) by the *fourth*, it is the particular character of *pertaining to outside*, externality, as belonging to *existence in general* which was the object of the general cognition.

° If a *general* cognition is known as a *particular* cognition, such knowledge cannot but be *wrong*,—the cognition being recognised as what it is not.

latter; because as a matter of fact, any presumption based upon the inconsistency of the cognition of one thing can have no power to bring about the cognition of something entirely different; and in case such power were conceded, utter confusion would be the result (the inconsistency of the cognition of anything might bring about the cognition of any and everything; and thus there would be no fixity in the cognitions produced by Presumption). Nor is the former alternative possible [that the cognition derived from the inconsistency is that of some peculiar form of the object of the former cognition]; because those who admit of *Presumption* as a distinct means of valid cognition (*i. e.* the *Mimāmsakas*) belong to two parties; according to one of these, connateness or co-existence is possible between such things as (1) the class and the individual—even though they are possessed of such contradictory properties as *comprehensiveness* and *non-comprehensiveness* respectively,—and (2) the individual *jar* and its *odour*—even though they are possessed of the contradictory properties of *visibility* and *invisibility*, respectively; and by this view it is possible for the cognition of both contradictories to be true at one and the same time; and until this possibility and the aforesaid connateness are denied, there can be no real contradiction between the two cognitions (*of existence in general and non-existence in the house*); and as such the inconsistency sought to be based upon that contradiction could have no force in the bringing about of the presumptive cognition. * And as for those other *Mimāmsakas* who do not admit of such connateness,—even in their case, the contradiction between the objects of the two cognitions could be noticed only after those objects themselves (*i. e. existence in general and*

* According to one set of *Mimāmsakas*, the class and the individuals constituting it are connate, co-extensive; so are the jar, which is visible, and its odour which is invisible; hence by this view there is nothing incongruous in our cognising at one and the same time of two such contradictory things as *existence and non-existence*; and there being no incongruity, the contradiction could not justify any *presumption* at all.

non-existence in the house) have been cognised; and in this case also, as we have pointed out above, what is sought to be cognised by means Presumption (*i. e. existence* outside) will have been already cognised (*existence outside* being included in *existence in general*); and thus the Presumptive Cognition, even when appearing, would be a mere repetition (of a previous cognition) [and this would deprive *Presumption* of the character of *pramāna*].

F

[*Abhāva*, Non-apprehension, is the Sixth *Pramāna* admitted by the *Mīmāṃsaka*. The Logician accepts its validity, but includes it under Perception. This the author rejects on the ground that no logical explanation is possible of the manner in which *abhāva* can serve as a means of cognition.]

[P. 409] (492) Nor is it right to hold (with the *Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka* that the *Non-apprehension* of a thing which is capable of being apprehended is the means of the valid cognition of the absence or negation (of that thing). For what is the precise character of this 'Non-apprehension'? Is it the 'absence of *valid* or *right* apprehension'? or the 'absence of any sort of apprehension'? If it be the former, then no *wrong cognition* would ever arise [as every case of wrong cognition, where one thing is cognised as something else, would be a case of *absence of right apprehension* of the former thing, ; and this, *ex-hypothesi*, would be the means of getting at the *valid cognition* of the negation of that thing; and so there would be no *wrong cognition* of all]. If, on the other hand, by *non-apprehension* you mean the 'absence of any sort of apprehension', then, in that case, if a man happens to *know* the general fact that conches are white (which implies the *absence of some sort of apprehension* of yellowness), he could never have the *wrong cognition* of the *yellowness* of the conch (which he would be bound to have when his eyes would be affected by excess of bile) [because as there would be the *absence of some sort of apprehension* of yellowness, this would,

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ex hypothesi, lead to the *right* cognition of the absence or negation of that yellowness]. “But” the Opponent explains, “inasmuch as the two (the recalling of the fact of the conch being white and the wrong cognition of its yellowness) appear at different points of time, there can be no such impossibility (of the wrong cognition appearing)”.* This will not help you, we reply. As even so (though this explanation may save you from the incongruity we have pointed out), it will not be possible for you to apprehend the mutual negation between two objects, both of which are in contact with the sense-organ concerned. [As in this case there would be no ‘non-apprehension of that which is capable of being perceived’, both the things being equally apprehended by the sense-organ]. As for the *identity* between the two things (which *identity*, and not the things themselves, may be held to be that which is negated by the ‘mutual negation’),—this ‘identity’ is nothing apart from the things themselves; and it is absolutely certain that the identity (and hence the things themselves) will be apprehended when the mutual negation is apprehended (so that our original argument remains unshaken).†

(493) Then again, a certain thing (whose absence is to be cognised) can be held to be ‘capable of being apprehended’ only when there are present, in their complete and perfect form, all those elements (the Sense-organ, the

*It is true that the idea of whiteness is not compatible with the notion of yellowness; but all that this proves is that the cognition of yellowness could not appear at the same time as the idea of whiteness is present in the mind. It is, however, quite possible that at the time that the bilious man perceives the yellowness, he may not have recalled the fact of the conch being white; in fact no two ideas can be present in the mind at the same time; so there is no incongruity in the man perceiving yellowness even though he may know that the conch is white.

†Whatever kind of negation is apprehended, such apprehension must contain some idea of that which is negated;—some idea of the jar must enter into any conception of the jar being absent; and thus, in no case is it possible to have the ‘non-apprehension’ which has been held to be the cause of the apprehension of negation.—Shāṅkari.

undisturbed mind and so forth) that conduce to the right preception of that thing,—these elements being other than the thing itself as well as than that (sense-contact) which can never exist apart from that thing* And such being the case, it would be possible to have the right cognition of the absence of a thing even where we have the right cognition of its presence; because unless its cause (in the shape of the aforesaid *capability*) is present, the right cognition of presence does not appear; nor does it appear when it is itself already actually present; which means that in regard to a particular place, the moment before we are going to apprehend the jar's presence, there would be present the cause of such apprehension (in the shape of the aforesaid *capability*) and also the Non-apprehension (at that previous moment) of the jar;—and thereby there being the 'capability' and also the 'non-apprehension of the capable thing', which are the only two conditions necessary for the right cognition of absence, there would be nothing to prevent this latter right cognition of its absence appearing at that moment; and this would be followed immediately by the right cognition of the jar's presence;—thus in regard to one and the same place we would have the right cognition of the *presence* as well as the *absence* of the jar.† With a view to escape from the difficulty, the Opponent qualifies his statement of the definition:—
 “The *non-apprehension* of the capable thing leading to the right cognition of the absence of that thing must be *accompanied by the absence of that thing, and also by the absence of*

*The jar can be regarded as capable of being perceived, not only when the jar itself is present and in contact with the eye, —but when there are present, the mind and the sense-organ, both in efficient condition.

†The reading adopted by the Śhāṅkarī is भावप्रमोक्षप्रदे, and by the the Viḍyāsā-garī तदभावप्रमोक्षप्रदे. The general sense of the passage comes to be the same in both cases; though the latter reading makes the construction of the passage more involved. For this reason it is the Śhāṅkarī reading that has been adopted in the translation.

that which can never exist apart from that thing (viz., the sense-contact of that thing).” This also, we maintain, cannot be right. Because there is no evidence for regarding, as the cause (of cognition of absence), the ‘absence of that which can never exist apart from the thing’; specially as this absence would be already implied in the absence of the thing itself [that is to say, when the thing is not present, its contact with a sense-organ cannot be present; hence when the *absence of the thing* has been mentioned, it is absolutely useless to mention the *absence of its contact with a sense-organ*; and a condition that is already implied in some other condition cannot, from the very definition of *Cause*, be regarded as *Cause*];—it is for a similar reason that in the perception of light, the presence of another light is not regarded as the cause; that is to say, in the perception of the light as one entire whole, the presence (in the eye) of the constituent parts of that light is not regarded as the cause; and *vice versa*; and this is simply because the light of the parts is already implied in the *whole* light, and so in the apprehension of the absence of light, the presence of that other light (the parts, *i.e.*, which cannot exist apart from the whole) is not regarded as the Cause. Then again, in your definition you refer to the ‘sense-contact of the object’ as the ‘invariable concomitant’ of the thing; but this is far from right; as the object itself being one member of the ‘contact’, there can be no such relationship between them*.

(494) “In that case,” says the Opponent, “we may hold that non-apprehension should be accompanied only by the absence of the thing (and we shall drop from our definition the expression ‘*ṭaḍavinābhūṭa*’ which refers to the sense-

* The relation of ‘*vyāpti*,’ ‘invariable concomitance,’ is held by the Logician to subsist between two things that are entirely distinct; the *sense-object contact* cannot be regarded as distinct from the ‘*object*,’—which forms a part of the said *contact*.

contact of the thing).” This also will not help you, we reply. Because you do admit (*Mīmā-Sū.* I-i-5) that *contact of the sense-organ* is the cause of the sense-perception of the thing whose absence would be cognised (by means of ‘non-apprehension’);—now with regard to this we ask—is it, or is it not, necessary for you to seek for an instance that would show that the effect (in the shape of the apprehension of the thing) does not appear, when the *sense-contact* is absent (even though all other circumstances favourable to such apprehension be present)? If it is not necessary, then wherefore should you regard the *sense-contact* to be the ‘cause’ of that apprehension? The appearance of the effect (apprehension) might be explained as being due to something else. If, on the other hand, it is necessary to find such an instance, this instance could be found only in a case where, all other favourable circumstances being present, there would be present some such thing as would intercept the contact of the thing with the sense-organ [*e.g.*, when in broad daylight, there would be a wall intervening between the observer and thing to be perceived]; and as in this case the sense-contact would be absent, there could, *ex hypothesi*, be no valid apprehension of the thing; and hence to that extent, the thing would, in reality, be non-existent or absent; and as in this manner the only condition that you make necessary for the appearance of the valid cognition of absence (*viz.* that “there should be non-apprehension accompanied by the absence of the thing”) would be fulfilled, it would be possible to have the valid cognition of the absence of the thing [which is not true; as when the thing is hidden from our view, we can have only a *doubt* as to its presence or absence; and no valid cognition of either its presence or absence]. “But”, the Opponent adds, “the absence of intercepting things is necessary in the apprehension of every object; [and as in the case in question, an interceptor would be present, the object would not be

'capable' of being apprehended, which is a necessary condition in all valid cognition of absence].” But this also does not help your case, we reply. For, if such be the case, then the instance would not be one that would support the idea that it is only *sense-contact* in whose absence no valid apprehension of the object is possible [as 'absence of interceptors' would by your last assertion, be another condition necessary for the apprehension ;—and yet the instance was sought for the sole purpose of showing that *sense-contact* was the only condition whose absence must lead to the absence of valid apprehension]. “But”, the Opponent explains, “the interceptor is regarded as preventive of the apprehension, only by reason of its preventing the sense-contact [hence it is, after all, only the sense-contact that is the necessary condition for apprehension].” Then, in that case, the 'absence of interceptors' becomes the cause of the appearance of the sense-contact, and not of the appearance of a particular valid cognition of the absence of things; and thus our original objection (of the possibility of the valid cognition of the absence of the intercepted object) [for the meeting of which objection you had put forward 'the absence of interceptors' as necessary for the apprehension of every object'] remains in force.

(495) It will not be right to assert that in the case of interception, what prevents the appearance of the valid cognition of the absence of the intercepted object, is the *absence of its sense-contact*; and it is this latter absence that constitutes the deficiency in the causal conditions leading to the valid cognition of absence.* Because if the sense-contact of the object be a necessary condition for the valid

* This would mean that the 'presence of sense-contact' is a necessary element in the valid cognition of absence. Though this view has been already refuted in para. 493, yet it is brought forward again; because in the former case the *presence of sense-contact* had been put forward only as a concomitant of the *object*; while now it is put forward independently.

cognition of the absence of that object,—then it would never be possible to have the *valid* cognition of the absence of any thing at all, [as the object would be in contact with the sense-organ *only when it would be present*; and when it is *present*, the cognition of its *absence* cannot be *valid*].

(495) For the same reason (*i.e.*, the reason that has made us reject the ‘absence of an interceptor’ as a condition) the ‘absence of interception’ cannot be accepted as a further causal condition bringing about the apprehension of absence; because such absence would be the cause only of ‘sense-contact’ (which has already been regarded as a necessary condition in that apprehension)*. [and thus *absence* would be apprehended by means of Perception by the Senses, and not by *Non-apprehension* as a distinct means of cognition]. No again will it be right to regard the *direct apprehension of the receptacle or place* (wherein the ‘capable thing’ would have been apprehended) as the further cause of the apprehension of absence; because there is no such ‘direct apprehension of the receptacle’ in the case of the apprehension of previous absence [*e.g.*, when one seeks for a person in his house and does not find him, he has the notion of the man’s absence from his house, even when he has gone away from the house, and the house is no longer before his eyes;—how could this notion of absence be possible, when there is no apprehension of the house, which is the receptacle?].

(496) The Opponent rejoins—“In a case where there is an interceptor, if the absence of the thing is really there, this absence would certainly be apprehended by the force of

*The Chaukhambha Series text reads ‘वदुपपत्तेः’ with the *Shā.*, though the reading adopted by the *Vidyāsāgarī* is ‘वदनुपपत्तेः’; the sentence in this latter case would mean—‘because when there is sense-contact, absence of interception would be impossible’; the sense being that in this case absence of interception may be the cause of sense-contact, but not of the apprehension of absence.

the very circumstances which we have mentioned above as the cause of the apprehension of absence;—and where would there be any incongruity in this? From this it does not follow (as you have argued above) that those circumstances would give rise to the apprehension of the thing's absence, even where the thing is actually present [and the reason for this would lie in the fact that in this case, we would not have *the absence of the thing*, which has been declared by us to be the first condition in the cause of the apprehension of absence].” Our reply is that, in that case, you should accept merely *non-apprehension accompanied by the absence of the thing* to be the sole cause or means of the valid cognition of absence; and please give up your persistence in introducing the qualifying word ‘capable’ (that the thing should be ‘capable of being apprehended’).* The Opponent explains—“As a matter of fact, we find that in many cases even when the thing is absent, mere non-apprehension of it does not bring about the firm conviction (certain cognition) of its being really absent; in many cases it gives rise to only a doubt as to the thing being absent or present;† under the circumstances, how can we accept the view that mere *non-apprehension* is the sole condition necessary for the cognition of absence?” Our reply is that even if you have the qualifying word ‘capable’, you would, have in the case of interception also [as the thing would be ‘capable of being apprehended’]

* The qualification is added simply with a view to make possible the apprehension of the thing's absence, even when its direct sense-contact is intercepted; if, as the opponent urges, the mere absence of the thing would be sufficient for bringing about that apprehension, even when there is interception,—where is the use of inserting the qualifying word?

† In dense darkness, when we cannot see what there is in a place, even though the jar is absent, yet, when we do not see it, all the idea that we have is the doubt as to whether or not the jar is present; and there is no firm conviction as to its absence; and it is with a view to cover such cases that the qualifying word ‘capable’ becomes necessary; in darkness, the jar is not ‘capable of being apprehended’; and hence the full condition of the apprehension of its absence being wanting, it is only natural that no firm conviction should be forth-coming.

hended,] the valid cognition of the thing's absence,—and not a mere doubt as to its presence or absence [while as a matter of fact, in many cases where the object concerned is hidden from view, we have only a *doubt*, and not any firm conviction, as to its presence or absence];—and thus even the insertion of the qualifying word 'capable' does not save you from the anomaly (for escaping from which you justify its insertion).

(497) Then again, [as regards your definition containing the qualification that the non-apprehension of the thing should be accompanied by the actual absence of that thing], we beg to point out that from the very nature of things, the actual existence or presence of the thing to be cognised cannot enter as a constituent factor into the means of cognising it [and yet, you make the 'absence', which is the object to be cognised by Non-apprehension, an integral part of your definition of the means of cognising it]; and it is for the sole purpose of ascertaining the existence or non-existence of things that all intelligent enquirers take the trouble of discriminating the *valid* from the *invalid* means of cognition. Otherwise, in the case of Inferences, it would be absolutely futile to try to remove all adventitious adjuncts vitiating the notion of the invariable concomitance upon which the inference is based; because the inference would, according to you, be perfectly sound by your regarding, as the cause of inference, the notion of the presence in the Subject of one of the factors of the said concomitance (*i.e.*, the Minor Premiss).*

[Page 414] (498) Then again, if you accept 'Non-apprehension' to be the cause of the valid cognition of 'previous

* By the Opponent's hypothesis, the cause of the cognition includes within itself the actual existence of the thing cognised; hence the cause of inference would already imply the existence of invariable concomitance; and hence the notion of this concomitance being already got at, what would be the use of removing the vitiating adjuncts? The sole end of this removal being the obtaining of a firm conviction of concomitance; and this is already implied.

non-existence' also, *—then our contention is that this is not possible; because in some cases it may so happen that at the time that the previous non-existence is being actually cognised, the thing might have come into existence [during the time, howsoever short, taken by the functioning of the Non-apprehension towards the bringing about of the cognition of non-existence];—which would mean that the non-existence has ceased [and thus the cognition of such non-existence could not be *valid*]. Nor would it make any difference if you were to introduce, into your statement of the cause of the cognition of absence, the qualifying clause that the receptacle must be characterised by the absence of the thing *at the time that the resultant cognition of absence actually appears*. If it be urged that the said characterisation itself would constitute the required difference,—then this would lead to most undesirable anomalies. † “Though we may not be able to state exactly the peculiar character of the difference, yet it cannot be denied that there is some sort of difference.” This also cannot help you out of your difficulty; because as soon as you admit of such a difference, it becomes incumbent upon you to explain what that difference is [and this you cannot do].

* Just before the time at which the thing actually comes into existence, the non-existence of that thing is called the ‘previous non-existence’.

† *Being characterised by absence* is the distinguishing character of the Receptacle; which means that the *character of being so characterised* is a character of it; and so on and on, there would be an endless series of characters and characterisations.

END OF THE

Refutation of Pramāṇas.

Section 19.

[Having refuted the definition of the real Pramāṇas themselves, the author proceeds to refute the definition of what have been called 'Pramāṇabhāsa' or false pramāṇas; and from among these, as it is the 'Fallacious Reason' that is likely to be most used by the Logician against his opponents, the Vedāntin and the rest, the Author takes up the demolishing of the entire fabric of "Fallacious Reasons" Hēṭhvābhāsas. Specially as of all false Pramāṇas, it is the 'Fallacious Inference or Reason' that has been singled out by the writers on Nyāya for special treatment.

1. Of all fallacious reasons, the most important is the *Asiddha* 'Unrecognised or Untrue Reason'; which is therefore taken up first; and it is shown that no adequate definition of the 'Unrecognised' Reason is possible.]

(499) [Page 415] What again we ask, is the 'unrecognised' or 'untrue' Reason or Probans? It has been defined as that Reason or Probans which is not rightly cognised as invariably concomitant with what is predicated in the conclusion, and as subsisting in the Subject of the conclusion. But this definition cannot be accepted as correct; as by this definition all the other 'fallacious reasons' would become included in this 'unrecognised or untrue Reason'; because no reason can ever be regarded as 'fallacious' unless it militates against one of the three conditions mentioned in the above definition: that is to say, a Reason, to be *fallacious*, must fail—(a) either to be invariably concomitant with the predicate of the conclusion, (b) or to subsist in its subject, (c) or to be rightly cognised;—and all these three are found mentioned in the above definition, which, therefore, must apply to all Fallacious Reasons, and not only to one of them (the *unrecognised or untrue reason*).

[The Logician enters a strong protest against the above, and proceeds to explain in detail,—up to Para. 509,—how the 'Unrecognised or Untrue' Reason cannot include every other kind of Fallacious Reason.]

(500) "It is not as you say; (*i. e.*, all the fallacious reasons cannot be included in the 'unrecognised or untrue Reason') because the many fallacies, or defects, (attaching to the Probans), may be classed under three distinct heads:—
(A) Some are of such nature that the Probans turns out

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to be one that is not invariably concomitant with the predicate, or one that does not subsist in the Subject, or one that is not rightly cognised at all (which are the three conditions mentioned in the above-mentioned definition of the 'untrue' Reason) [the Probans affected by this fallacy is called *Assiḍḍha*, 'unrecognised or untrue'];—(B) there are others which only serve to indicate the aforesaid failure of 'invariable concomitance' and the rest [the Probans affected by this class of defect have been grouped under three heads, called '*Viruḍḍha*' 'Contradictory', '*Anaikāntika*', 'Inconclusive', '*Kālātyayāpaḍiṣṭa*', 'Neutralised'];—(C) there are yet others which are regarded as 'fallacies' or 'defects' because they are obstacles to the proper functioning of the Probans, and thereby become obstacles in the valid inferential cognition based upon that Probans [this refers to the fallacious Reason, called '*Bādhita*', 'Annulled'].

(501) "[A] From among these, the first group are really included within the circle of the 'untrue' Reason. For instance, the first kind of 'untrue Reason'—the *Vjāpyaṭvāsiḍḍha*, that which has its invariable concomitance not recognised or established—is that which is tainted by the presence of a 'vitiating adjunct' (*Upāḍhi*); because one thing is regarded as 'invariably concomitant' with another only when the relation between them is such as is not due to any merely adventitious circumstance [this adventitious circumstance being the adjunct that vitiates the relation of concomitance between the two]; and the relation is said to be so vitiated when it is not free from such vitiating adjuncts [which shows that the Probans or reason can be said to have its 'invariable concomitance not established' when its relationship is not natural, but due to, and tainted by, some such adventitious circumstance]. Similarly that Reason also which has its substratum not known—i. e., in regard to which it is not known what that is wherein the

Reason resides ; *i. e.*, whose 'subject' or 'minor term' is unknown,—becomes included in the 'Untrue Reason'; because the 'substratum' of the *Probans* is that which is spoken of as the '*pakṣa*', 'subject'; or 'minor term' (of the syllogism); and it is the absence of this 'Subject' that constitutes this particular fallacy [and as when the 'substratum', or the place in which the *Probans* subsists, is not known, the *Probans* itself could not be fully known' this fallacy is rightly included in the 'Untrue Reason']. In the same manner, the fallacy of '*Siddhasādhana*' the 'Redundant *Probans*,' 'proving what is already proved', is also included in this second kind of 'Untrue Reason'; because that is regarded as the 'subject' of the syllogism which is actually qualified by, or contains, that property which is sought to be proved by the reasoning; and that property which is already known to be present, with regard to that there can be no *desire to prove*; so in this case also the true Subject, possessing the necessary qualifications, is absent. Against this our opponent (says the Logician) will argue as follows:—“Just as in the case of the '*Savyabhichāra*' or 'Fallible *Probans*,'—what the defect of 'fallibility' does is only to vitiate the required invariable concomitance of the *Probans* with the *Probandum*; and for this reason [*i. e.*, because it only vitiates and does not demolish the concomitance] it has been regarded as a distinct fallacy [and is not included within the first kind of the 'Untrue Reason' which has its invariable concomitance not established],—so in the same manner in the case of the fallacy of the '*Siddhasādhana*' also, inasmuch as the fact of the *Probandum* being already known serves simply to remove the necessary element of the 'desire to prove' it [and as such it affects only a slight detail in the character of the 'Subject', which must be possessed of such a *Probandum* as is *desired to be proved*, and does not do away with the 'Subject' altogether], it should be

regarded as a distinct fallacy [and not included in the second form of the 'Untrue Reason', which has been defined as that *which has its 'subject' unknown*];—specially as this fallacy can be regarded as a form of the 'Untrue Reason', not directly by itself (as by itself it vitiates the character of the *Subject* only), but only indirectly through the *Probans* [the fallacy vitiating the *Subject*, and hence the *Probans* of which that is the 'subject']. If some such line of demarcation be not admitted, then, inasmuch as all kinds of fallacies only tend ultimately to the absence or vitiating of either invariable concomitance or of some other necessary factor in the inferential process—[every one of which is closely related to the *Probans*],—they would all come to be classed under the '*Untrue Reason or Probans?*'

This form of argumentation will not be quite right, the Logician replies. Because as a matter of fact, the 'absence of the desire to prove the *Probandum*' is not inferred by the observer from the fact of its being already proved; being of the nature of *negation*, it is (according to us Logicians) apprehended by Sense-perception;—and into our conception of the fallacy of '*Siddhaśūlha*', we introduce the idea of its being *known*, simply because this latter is one of the main causes for the absence of 'desire to prove'; and not because we wish to infer, from that, the absence of that desire. Lastly, as regards that form of the 'Untrue *Probans*' the '*Svarūpāsīdha*,' wherein the very form of the *Probans* is untrue, this means nothing more than that the *Probans* does not subsist in the *Subject*.'*

[The Logician has explained what fallacies can be included under the '*Asiddha*' or 'Untrue' *Probans*. He next proceeds to show that no other fallacy can be so included.]

(502) "Those Fallacies, however, which are merely indicative of the fact that there is no invariable concomi-

* 'Man is mortal because he has four legs' would be an example of the fallacy of '*Svarūpāsīdha*', the four-leggedness of man being something that is absolutely unknown; all that this means is that 'four-leggedness' does not subsist in 'Man'.

tance (between the *Probans* and the *Probandum*),—or of the fact that the *Probans* does not subsist in the *Subject* [which two facts constitute the ‘untrue’ Probans]—all these are entirely distinct from the fallacy of ‘untrue’ Probans? (A) For instance the ‘*Viruddha*’ or ‘Contradictory’ Probans is that which is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum; and this ‘concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum’ does not mean merely that the Probans is not concomitant with the Probandum;—it means something entirely different from this: it means that between the Probans and the contrary or negation of the Probandum, there subsists a relation of concomitance which is entirely free from all adventitious vitiating conditions. Thus also ‘concomitance with the contrary of the Probandum’ being of the nature of such relation, it cannot be that the Probans does not subsist in the Subject; because the fallaciousness of the Contradictory Probans lies in this that, from the fact of the Probans bearing to the contrary of the Probandum the relation of concomitance free from all vitiating conditions, we infer that ‘there is no concomitance between such a Probans and the required Probandum’; and thus the Contradictory Probans, being found to be indicative of, and leading to the inference of, *the absence of concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum*—[which absence constitutes the fallaciousness of the ‘untrue’ Probans]—cannot but be regarded as a fallacy distinct from this last. [Because *that which is inferred* cannot be the same as *that from which it is inferred*].

(503) (B) “In the same manner the *Anaikāntika* or ‘Inconclusive’ Probans is not the same as that ‘there is no concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum’; in fact it only leads to the inference of this absence of concomitance. For instance [the Probans is ‘inconclusive’ only when there is some discrepancy or failing attaching

to its character as a true Probans ;—and] this *failure* or *fallibility* of the Probans is not the same as the *absence of its concomitance with the Probandum* ; in fact what the ‘failure’ does is to indicate the defect in the required concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum, by means of the following reasoning :—There can be no fallibility or failing in the Probans until it be found to be non-concomitant with the Probandum ;—for certainly, if the concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum were perfect and free from vitiating conditions, how could such a Probans fail to establish the conclusion ? Thus it is clear that the ‘failure’ or ‘discrepancy’ is only indicative of the ‘absence of concomitance,’ and is not identical with it [and as it is only the ‘absence of concomitance’ that constitutes the ‘Untrue Probans’, the ‘Inconclusive’ Probans cannot be the same as this latter]. As for the Inconclusiveness or Fallibility of the Probans being the same as *the absence of the Probans in the Subject* (which constitutes another form of the ‘Untrue Probans),—that is absolutely impossible, [as in every instance of the Inconclusive Probans—*e.g.* ‘Sound is eternal because it exists’—the Probans is always one that actually subsists in the Subject—‘existence’ subsisting in Sound.] [Thus the Inconclusive Probans cannot be included in the ‘Untrue Probans’].

(504) [C.] “As regards the ‘*Satprātipakṣa*’ or ‘Neutralised’ Probans,—what happens is that the Probans, being opposed by a contrary Probans,—between which and itself, no distinction as to validity is perceived,—becomes unable to lead to any definite or certain cognition of the Probandum ; and this incapability of bringing about its effect, under the influence of obstacles, is what is quite usual with all causes ; and so in this case, there is no vitiating of the concomitance, or any such conditions peculiar to the inferential process ;

which shows that this 'Neutralised' Probans does not fall within any form of the 'Untrue' Probans. And thus (there being in this condition of things, nothing that is peculiar to the inferential process) it is not possible for the 'Neutralised' Probans to be regarded as identical with either of the two forms of the 'Untrue' Probans—*viz*: that which consists in the absence of the desired concomitance, and that which is in the form that makes its subsistence in the Subject impossible.

(Page 420) (505) [D]“ Lastly, as regards the 'Bāḍha', 'Annulled' Proban,—it is true that it leads to the cognition of the absence of the Probandum in the Subject, wherein the Probans subsists ; but this is not quite the same as the absence of the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum (which constitutes the Untrue Probans). Because 'invariable concomitance' is only a particular form of relation which, in a general way, is free from,—and not due to—any mere adventitious circumstances; and as a matter of fact, the 'absence of the Probandum in the Subject wherein the Probans subsists' [which constitutes 'annulment' of the Probans] does not form any 'adventitious circumstance', to which the concomitance may be due ; because, as a rule, this 'adventitious circumstance' is always one that is not incompatible with the Probandum [by its very nature it must be one with which the Probandum is invariably concomitant ;—while it is the absence of the Probandum that is cognised by means of the Probans in question]. Nor also does 'the absence of the Probandum in the Subject wherein the Probans subsists' lead to the cognition of the absence of the relation of concomitance subsisting, *in a general way*, between the Probans and the Probandum; because even when there is 'annulment' of the Probans, there is no doing away with some sort of a concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum, which is actually present (and is not denied) in the corroborative Ins-

tance that is cited *;—while the ‘annulment’ is restricted to some particular case of that concomitance; and it is quite possible for the concomitance, that is recognised in a general way, to be explained, or justified, with reference to some particular case other than the one to which the ‘Annulment’ refers. Thus then, what the ‘annulment’ in regard to a particular case does is to *lead to the inference* of the fact of the presence, in the concomitance recognised in a general way, of vitiating adventitious circumstances,—this inference being based on the fact that no ‘annulment’ is possible until there is some such circumstance vitiating the concomitance; that the presence of vitiating circumstances is inferred from ‘annulment’ is supported by the assertion of old writers also, who have declared—that ‘whether *the vitiating circumstance is inferred from annulment*, or from other causes, it does not make any difference’. [Thus then the ‘annulment’ only leads to the inference of conditions that vitiate the invariable concomitance, and it is, in no way, identical with the actual *absence of such concomitance*, which latter constitutes an ‘Untrue’ Probans]. Another great authority on Nyāya (Vāchaspaṭi Mishra) holds that all that the ‘Annulment’ does is to obstruct, like ‘Neutralisation’, the operation of the Probans leading to the desired conclusion; and hence, even when there is ‘annulment’, all that happens is that being thus obstructed, the Probans is unable to lead to a certain definite conclusion; and thus the ‘annulment’ becomes a fallacy or defect, which is entirely independent of the vitiation of the invariable concomitance, as well as of the notion of the absence of the Probans in the Subject, (both of which latter constitute the ‘Untrue’ Probans).

* As for example in the case of the reasoning ‘Fire is cold because it is a caused effect, like Water’,—though there is a cognition of the absence of cold in the Fire, wherein the *character of the effect*, is present, yet this does not mean the absolute rejection of the concomitance between ‘presence of cold’ and ‘the character of an effect’, as ‘his concomitance is still recognised as present in the case of *Water*, which is cited as the corroborative instance.

(P. 422) (506) " Thus then we come to the conclusion that we have the fallacy of the 'Untrue' Probans only in three cases—(1) when the Probans is not recognised as concomitant with the Probandum, (2) when the Probans is not recognised as subsisting in the Subject, and (3) when the Probans is not known at all; and in all other cases—where there is put forward, either some such fact as leads to the inference of the presence of deficiencies in the concomitance, or a neutralising Probans to the contrary,—we have fallacies which are entirely different from that of the 'Untrue Probans' [and hence it is not right, as the *Siddhāntin* has asserted in para. 499, that all fallacies are included in the 'Untrue' Probans].

(507) " Against the above explanation of the Logician the following objection may be raised:—You admit that *Inconclusiveness*, *Fallibility*, *Neutralisation* and *Annulment* are distinct from the fallacy of the 'Untrue' Probans (simply because these are indicative of such discrepancies as the absence of concomitance and the rest, which latter constitute the 'Untrue' Probans);—why cannot you, for similar reasons, regard, as distinct fallacies, all those circumstances which are indicative of,—and lead to the recognition of,—the presence of adventitious adjuncts (vitiating the invariable concomitance) and so forth? The Logician's reply to this would be that as regards *Inconclusiveness* and the rest, it is found that they invariably lead to the inference of (and hence they are sure indications of) the absence of concomitance; and as such they have been regarded as distinct;—as regards the presence of adventitious adjuncts and similar discrepancies, these are often found to be apprehended by means of Perception also*: and hence they are not recognisable by means of Inference only; nor is there

*E. g. In the Reasoning 'Water is odorous because it is solid'—where the absence of solidity is known by Perception.

anything that is found to invariably lead to their being *inferred*. In answer to this the Opponent will argue as follows:—In the case of such subjects as are not amenable to Perception, the *presence of adventitious adjuncts &c.* would certainly be cognised by means of inference only; and those conditions or circumstances that would lead to such inference will, by your hypothesis, have to be accepted as distinct fallacies (even though these conditions may not lead to the inference of the presence of adventitious adjuncts, in all cases of such presence); because as a matter of fact *Inconclusiveness* and the rest also do not lead to the inference of the absence of invariable concomitance in all cases of such absence (because according to the Logician himself in some cases the absence is inferred from the *inconclusiveness* of the Probans, in some cases from the *neutralisation* of the Probans, and so on) [and yet each of these has been accepted as a distinct fallacy]. And thus the number of fallacies comes to be more than five (accepted by the Logician). It is not right to argue thus, the Logician replies; because in the case of *inconclusiveness* and the rest, we find that each of them is capable of being expressed by means of one comprehensive word (which takes in all the diverse circumstances that constitute that particular defect); while in the case of the circumstances that would lead to the inference of the adventitious adjunct &c., they are not found capable of being thus comprehensively expressed; it would therefore be necessary to mention each of these diverse circumstances separately; and as these circumstances would be innumerable, no such distinct mention would be possible. Later on (para. 509) we shall point out further reasons why these circumstances have not been mentioned as distinct fallacies.

(508) “The following objection may be raised against the main position of the Logician:—You assert that *Inconclusiveness* and the rest are regarded as distinct fallacies because they lead to the inference of *the absence of concomitance*;—but this is not

quite right; because what would actually prevent the valid inference of the Probandum from the valid cognition of the Probans, which is invariably concomitant with the Probandum and resides in the Subject, is the absence of these two conditions (of the Probans being concomitant with the Probandum, and subsisting in the Subject); and when an inference is made impossible by a certain condition, it is this condition that should be represented as the fallacy attaching to the reasoning,—the expression being in the form ‘in this case we do not find such and such conditions which are necessary for the inference’. And as a matter of fact, apart from the two conditions—of the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum and its subsistence in the Subject—there is no other cause for the appearance of Inference, with regard to which a negative concomitance could be shown.* Hence all that can be said with regard to Inconclusiveness and the rest is that they are the causes that lead to the apprehension of the real defects or fallacies in Inference [these real defects being the two conditions mentioned above]; and they cannot themselves be regarded as ‘defects’. And even though they are indicative of the main defects, they can never be spoken of as ‘defects’, except as dependent upon (and indicative of) the main defects;—and under the circumstances, it would be correct to put forward as the real defects in the inference, only those main defects,—and not such other indirect defects as ‘inconclusiveness’, ‘fallibility’ and the rest. And thus the Sūtra of Gauṭama, wherein he has enunciated the five fallacies, turns out to be absolutely meaningless.

*If we regard *absence of Inconclusiveness* as such a cause of Inference, although we might be able to say ‘where there is absence of inconclusiveness, we have Inference’; we could not assert its obverse—‘where the absence of inconclusiveness is not—i.e. where the Probans is inconclusive—we have no inference’; because what actually obstructs the inference is not the inconclusiveness of the Probans, but the absence of its concomitance, &c.; and hence it is these latter, and not anything else, that could be rightly regarded as a ‘fallacy’.

(509) "To the above objection the Logician makes the following reply:—It is quite true that it is only what actually obstructs the free operation of the inferential process, or the absence of concomitance, which form the real direct defects of Inference,—and 'contradiction', 'neutralisation', 'inconclusiveness', &c., are regarded as *defects* only as leading to the apprehension of the main defects;—yet in those cases with reference to which 'contradiction' and the rest have been mentioned as indicating the main defects,—if, for the sake of brevity, we mentioned as defects, only the absence of *concomitance* and of *subsistence in the Subject*, as the defects of the inference,—we could never know the reason (why they invalidate the inference);* whereas when 'inconclusiveness' and the rest are pointed out, the *absence of concomitance, &c.*, become implied thereby as a matter of course; as it is known full well that unless there is some such defect as the *absence of real concomitance, &c.*, the Probans cannot be regarded as 'inconclusive' and so on;—just as when we say 'such and such a man is taller than this man', it is implied, as a matter of course, that 'this man is shorter than that other man'; and for the purpose of comprehending this latter fact, it is not necessary to mention anything else;—exactly in the same manner, if we say 'smoke is present even when fire is absent' [thereby pointing out the *vyabhichāra* or 'failing' in the Probans], we imply, as a matter of course, that 'smoke is *not invariably concomitant* with fire'; because it is not possible that the smoke should be invariably concomitant with fire, and yet be present where fire is not. This also is the further reason for not mentioning, as distinct fallacies, all those endless circumstances that are

*For instance in the inference, 'Sound is eternal, because it is cognisable', it does not satisfy us only to be told that there is no invariable concomitance between *cognisability* and *eternality*, until we are told further that there are many cognisable things that are *not* eternal: which latter points out the *vyabhichāra* or failing in the desired concomitance.

merely indicative of the presence of adventitious vitiating conditions in the case of imperceptible objects &c.;—whose not being mentioned we pointed out (in para. 507) as being due to their endless number, (and for which we promised to point out another reason also). That is to say, those circumstances which are indicative of the vitiating, do not, by themselves, suffice to indicate these conditions; because to a person who is not already cognisant of the concomitance between those circumstances and the vitiating conditions, until this concomitance is pointed out to him, it is quite possible that the said circumstances may not indicate the vitiating conditions at all [and hence it is that these cannot by themselves be regarded as distinct fallacies]. In the case of the apprehension of *Inconclusiveness*, &c., on the other hand, for the purpose of indicating *the absence of invariable concomitance*; it is not necessary, in the case of any thoughtful person, to point out anything else.”

Such in brief is the statement of the *Pūrvapakṣa*, by the Logician (begun in para. 500).

[To the above *Pūrvapakṣa* of the Logician, taking objection to the inclusion of all Fallacies under the *Untrue Probans*, and the consequent rejection of all these, by the rejection of this one fallacy,—the *Veḍāntin* offers the following answer.]

(510) To the above defence of the definition of the fallacy of the ‘Untrue Probans’, we make the following rejoinder:—By the above disquisition what sort of definition of the ‘Untrue Probans’ do you seek to establish? If you mean to define it as ‘that which is not rightly known as invariably concomitant with the Probandum, or as subsisting in the Subject’,—then we ask whether or not this definition applies to the ‘Contradictory’ and other fallacious Probans also. If it does not apply to these,—that is to say, if the characteristic mentioned in the definition does not reside in them,—then it comes to this that these other fallacious Probans are really such as *are* ‘rightly known as invariably

concomitant with the Probandum and as subsisting in the Subject,' [which is absurd ; as a matter of fact, no fallacious Probans can have this character, which, as a rule, belongs only to the right sort of Probans]. If, on the other hand, the characteristic mentioned in the definition does reside in these other Fallacious Probans, then all these become included in the 'Untrue Probans'. If, even on their answering to its definition, they be not included in the 'Untrue Probans',—then in that case the definition must be regarded as 'too wide' (applying to what is not meant to be included in it).

(511) In order to meet this difficulty, the Logician restates the definition in a somewhat different form :—“That Probans is called 'Untrue' against which one could urge directly, the three facts that it is not rightly known, that it is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum and that it does not subsist in the Subject [the Contradictory and other kinds of Fallacious Probans being mere indicators of this latter character, which, therefore, cannot be attributed to them *directly*; and thus the definition will not apply to those other kinds of Fallacious Probans]”. This, in the first place, would be a definition entirely different from that originally propounded; [and this involves a *Pratijñā-hāni*, 'abandoning of position', on your part]; and secondly, in reality even this definition is not quite correct, because when with regard to an 'Untrue Probans', the only objection brought forward is the want or absence of its invariable concomitance with the Probandum,—we find that, in this case, there are not brought, against it, collectively the three discrepancies—(a) the absence of its invariable concomitance, (b) its non-subsistence in the Subject, and (c) its being not rightly cognised; and as such this particular Untrue Probans would not be an 'Untrue Probans' at all because the definition speaks of all the three facts being urged against the Probans]. In the same manner, by taking each of

the three factors of the definition, we can show that the definition is objectionable. [That is to say, that Probans against which would be urged the single fact of its not subsisting in the Subject, could not be spoken of as 'Untrue', because all the three facts would not be urged against it ; and so forth].* The Logician, with a view to escape from this predicament, explains his definition further :— "What we mean is that each of the factors mentioned in the definition constitutes, by itself, the definition of the 'Untrue Probans'; so that we would define the 'Untrue' Probans as that against which we would directly urge the fact of its not being rightly known as invariably concomitant ;—and also as that against which the fact of its not subsisting in the Subject could be directly urged." [The two forming distinct definitions.] In that case, we reply, the former definition would not include that 'Untrue' Probans which would answer to the second definition ; nor would the second definition include that which could answer to the first definition ; and thus neither of the two definitions including *all* cases of the 'Untrue' Probans, both definitions should have to be rejected as 'too narrow'. You will perhaps urge, in answer to this, that, each of the two definitions is meant only to apply to particular cases

*For instance, (1)—in the reasoning—'he is dark because he is Miṭrā's child'—the only fallacy that is urged against is that the concomitance between 'being Miṭrā's child' and 'being dark' is not invariable, being due, in some cases, to the adventitious circumstance of Miṭrā having fed upon certain vegetables. This is an instance of the 'Untrue Probans'; but it could no longer be so, under the proposed definition ; because the two factors are not urged against the reasoning ;—(2) similarly in the case of another instance of the 'Untrue Probans'—'the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus'—the only defect pointed out is that there being no such thing as the 'sky-lotus', there is no Subject in which the Probans ('being lotus') can subsist ; and the other two defects are not urged ;—(3) lastly, with regard to the reasoning 'sound is eternal because it is visible'—the only defect urged is that 'visibility of Sound' is something that can never be rightly known.

of 'Untrue Probans'; and as neither is intended to apply to *all* cases, there is nothing wrong if the definitions fail to include one another. But this will not be quite right; because so long as you have not been able to supply a general definition applying to all cases of 'Untrue Probans' how can any particular definition be possible?*

(512) The Logician, in answer to the above, proposes the required 'general definition';—"The general definition required would be that the Untrue Probans is that against which we can bring the charge of its being wanting in that essential factor which is the distinctive cause of the Inference [this essential factor consisting of the aforesaid concomitance with the Probandum, presence in the Subject and being rightly cognised]." This definition will not be correct; because the said charge can be brought against the 'Neutralised Probans' also, against which the presence of a neutralising Probans can be urged. [Because the absence of a neutralising Probans to the contrary is also an essential factor in the cause of inference]; and thus the definition becomes 'two wide', being applicable to the 'Neutralised' Probans also. In order to escape from this difficulty, you will perhaps qualify your definition by adding that what is urged against it should be the want or deficiency in the essential *positive* cause of the Inference [hereby excluding the Neutralised Probans, against which is urged the fact that a neutralising Probans is available; that is there is no fulfilment of the condition that *there should be no neutralising Probans*; and this is a *negative* element in what brings about the Inference, while *concomitance with the Probandum, &c.*, are all *positive* elements]. But in that case the definition would fail to include that form of the Untrue Probans against which can be urged the fact that it is

* It is only after we have formed some general idea of a thing that there is any occasion for seeking after information as to details.

not free from adventitious vitiating conditions ;—that is the Probans is wanting in that essential feature which consists in its *being free from such conditions* ; and this *freedom from such conditions* means that such conditions are *not present* ; and as this would be a *negative* element in what leads to the Inference, the definition cannot apply to this Probans [and yet this is one of the kinds of Probans which the Logician particularly classes under the ‘Untrue Probans’]. And further this definition would fail also to include the *Svarūpāsiddha* Probans,—that Probans whose very form is not rightly known ; because the fact that *that very thing which brings about the cognition should itself be rightly known* is a positive feature essential in the bringing about of *all kinds of cognition* (and not in that of *Inferential* cognition only) ; consequently the absence of the right cognition of what leads to the cognition would be a defect common to all cognitions ; and hence that against which this circumstance would be urged would not be included under your definition [because the definition insists upon the absence of what forms the *distinctive* cause of *Inference* only]. In order to meet this, the definition is re-stated in another form :—“ The *untrue Probans* is that against which *directly* there is urged the fact of its not being rightly known as being concomitant with the Probandum and as subsisting in the Subject. [So that it is not that the Probans is simply not known, which would apply to all kinds of defective cognitions, but it is not known, *as concomitant &c., &c.*, which can apply to defective *inferential* cognitions only ;].” But even so the definition is not a true one, being ‘ too narrow ’ ; because the case of a Probans against which is urged the absence of the right cognition of only its concomitance with the Probandum, or of the right cognition of only its presence in the Subject [and not of both conditions *combined*, as the proposed definition lays down], would not be included in your definition ; because even though in reality the absence of the right cognition of concomitance may

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of 'Untrue Probans'; and as neither is intended to apply to *all* cases, there is nothing wrong if the definitions fail to include one another. But this will not be quite right; because so long as you have not been able to supply a general definition applying to all cases of 'Untrue Probans' how can any particular definition be possible?*

(512) The Logician, in answer to the above, proposes the required 'general definition';—"The general definition required would be that the Untrue Probans is that against which we can bring the charge of its being wanting in that essential factor which is the distinctive cause of the Inference [this essential factor consisting of the aforesaid concomitance with the Probandum, presence in the Subject and being rightly cognised]." This definition will not be correct; because the said charge can be brought against the 'Neutralised Probans' also, against which the presence of a neutralising Probans can be urged. [Because the absence of a neutralising Probans to the contrary is also an essential factor in the cause of inference]; and thus the definition becomes 'two wide', being applicable to the 'Neutralised' Probans also. In order to escape from this difficulty, you will perhaps qualify your definition by adding that what is urged against it should be the want or deficiency in the essential *positive* cause of the Inference [hereby excluding the Neutralised Probans, against which is urged the fact that a neutralising Probans is available; that is there is no fulfilment of the condition that *there should be no neutralising Probans*; and this is a *negative* element in what brings about the Inference, while *concomitance with the Probandum, &c.*, are all *positive* elements]. But in that case the definition would fail to include that form of the Untrue Probans against which can be urged the fact that it is

* It is only after we have formed some general idea of a thing that there is any occasion for seeking after information as to details.

not free from adventitious vitiating conditions ;—that is the Probans is wanting in that essential feature which consists in its *being free from such conditions* ; and this *freedom from such conditions* means that such conditions are *not present* ; and as this would be a *negative* element in what leads to the Inference, the definition cannot apply to this Probans [and yet this is one of the kinds of Probans which the Logician particularly classes under the ‘Untrue Probans’]. And further this definition would fail also to include the *Svarūpāsiddha* Probans,—that Probans whose very form is not rightly known ; because the fact that *that very thing which brings about the cognition should itself be rightly known* is a positive feature essential in the bringing about of *all kinds* of cognition (and not in that of *Inferential* cognition only) ; consequently the absence of the right cognition of what leads to the cognition would be a defect common to all cognitions ; and hence that against which this circumstance would be urged would not be included under your definition [because the definition insists upon the absence of what forms the *distinctive* cause of *Inference* only]. In order to meet this, the definition is re-stated in another form :—“ The *untrue Probans* is that against which *directly* there is urged the fact of its not being rightly known as being concomitant with the Probandum and as subsisting in the Subject. [So that it is not that the Probans is simply not known, which would apply to all kinds of defective cognitions, but it is not known, *as concomitant &c., &c.*, which can apply to defective *inferential* cognitions only ;].” But even so the definition is not a true one, being ‘ too narrow ’ ; because the case of a Probans against which is urged the absence of the right cognition of only its concomitance with the Probandum, or of the right cognition of only its presence in the Subject [and not of both conditions *combined*, as the proposed definition lays down], would not be included in your definition ; because even though in reality the absence of the right cognition of concomitance may

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be there, yet this absence may not be actually *urged*, in view of there being no need for its being urged ; because for the purpose of indicating the fallaciousness of the inferential process in the shape of the defectiveness of its essential factors, it would be enough to indicate and urge *the fact of there being no concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum (i. e., the absence of concomitance only)*; and hence there would be no need for the urging of the further absence of the *right cognition* of the Probans as concomitant &c. ; hence this case would not come under your definition (which lays down the urging of the *absence of the right cognition of concomitance*, and not of the *absence of concomitance only*) ; and the definition thus becomes 'too narrow.

" As a matter of fact, the absence of the *qualification* means the absence of the *qualified* also ; and hence the said objection does not apply. [That is to say, *the absence of concomitance* is a qualifying factor in the *absence of right cognition of concomitance* ; consequently wherever there is a notion of the former, it naturally implies the latter also ; as when there is actually no concomitance, there can not be a *right cognition* of such a concomitance]". This is not right, we reply ; because if the *qualified* contains any thing over and above the *qualification*—if there is difference between the two—then there must be a difference between the absence of the two also. [And in that case, the 'absence of concomitance' would not necessarily imply the 'absence of the right cognition of concomitance' ; and this would make the definition 'too narrow'] ;—if, on the other hand, the *qualified* is nothing more than the *qualification*,—if the two are absolutely identical,—then the *absence of the qualified* also would be nothing more than the *absence of the qualification* [*i. e., the absence of the cognition of the concomitance* would be the same as the absence of concomitance ;—hence, the definition would

come to be taken as laying down the *absence of concomitance* only; and as such would not apply to those cases where the *cognition* is absent; so that the fallacy would be regarded as in force even when the absence of concomitance is not actually known or detected]; and if, in order to avoid this, the *unqualified* (cognition, pure and simple) were regarded, on the same grounds as above, as identical with the *qualified*; then, in that case, 'the absence of the qualified, (*i. e.*, the absence of the cognition of concomitance) would come to mean both (the absence of concomitance, as well as the absence of cognition pure and simple); and thus there would be no comprehensiveness in the definition (it being unable to include some and exclude the rest). A further objection to which such a definition would be open would be that it would not apply to the 'Unknown Probans' in the case of inferences put forward for one's own benefit (and not for bringing conviction to another person); as in this case there is no actual *urging* of the absence of concomitance, &c. [The enquirer detects the defect and is satisfied as to the fallaciousness; and he does not proceed to urge it] [and yet the definition insists upon this being *urged* or brought forward].

(Page 429) (513). The Logician proposes his definition in another form:—"The *Untrus Probans* is that directly against which *it is possible* to urge the objection that there is no knowledge of its being concomitant with the Probandum residing in the Subject; so that this definition would include all those cases where, even though the objection is not actually urged, there is a possibility of its being urged; and with this the definition would cease to be too narrow." This definition also will not be right, we reply. Because what do you mean by saying that *it is possible* to urge the fallacy? (a) Does it mean that it is possible merely to indicate the actual form of the fallacy? (b) or that it

is possible for the fallacy to have its truth recognised through a valid means of knowledge ? (a) If it mean the former, then, even in the case of the Inconclusive and other kinds of Fallacious Reason, *it is possible* for us to indicate or assert the fact of there being no concomitance (between the Probans and the Probandum) [and as such these other fallacies would become included under the definition of the 'Untrue Probans']. (b) If it mean the latter, then,—if by 'directly' be meant 'by Perception'—then, even in the case of the 'Contradictory Probans', it would be possible,—according to the Logician's theory that the absence of a perceptible thing is cognisable by Perception—to recognise, or made to be recognised, by means of Perception, the absence of the right cognition of the absence of concomitance* ; so that the definition would include the *Contradictory Probans*, and thus become 'too wide' ; and according to the Bhāṭṭa view that the absence of things is cognisable by a distinct means of cognition, the conditions laid down by the definition would not be fulfilled by any fallacy (not even by the *Untrue Probans* ; as even in this case the *absence* of concomitance could not be recognised, or made to be recognised, by means of Perception) ; and thus the definition would become absolutely too narrow ; in fact 'impossible'—not applying to any fallacy at all. In order to escape from this last predicament, the Logician explains that what is meant by the definition is that the *absence of concomitance* with the Probandum, as well as the *absence of subsistence in the Subject* (and not only the absence of the cognition of these) should be cognisable by means of Perception [and thus in the case of the Inconclusive, Contradictory and other fallacious Reasons, even though 'the absence of the cognition of concomitance and subsistence in the Subject' would be amenable to Perception by the mind,

* Cognition, according to the Logician, being perceptible by the mind, the *absence of cognition* would also be amenable to mental Perception.

the actual absence of *the concomitance &c.*, is not perceptible ; and hence these fallacies do not become included in the definition]. This explanation cannot be accepted ; because the actual words of the definition do not speak of the *absence of concomitance and of subsistence in the Subject* (as it only mentions the absence of *the cognition* of concomitance &c.); and if even in the absence of such words, we were to accept the view that such is the *intention* of the words,—then [the definition coming to mean ‘that with regard to which can be recognised by Perception the absence (1) of concomitance with the Probandum, (2) of subsistence in the Subject and (3) of the right cognition of these],—if each of these three conditions were accepted as a complete definition by itself, then it would not include all cases of the ‘Untrue Probans’ [as in *everyone* of these, we cannot recognise *the absence of concomitance*, for instance] ; while if all the three conditions were taken collectively,—then, as there is no case of the Untrue Probans in which the absence of all three is cognisable,—the definition becomes an ‘impossible’ one, not applying to any case of the ‘Untrue Probans.’ And further, the definition making it necessary for the absence of concomitance &c. to be cognised by Perception, it would not apply at all to those cases where the Subject of the reasoning is not perceptible ; in which case *the absence of the Probans in the Subject* could never be recognised by means of Perception.* If, in order to avoid this difficulty, the word ‘directly’ of the definition be taken to mean ‘independently of the inferential probans’ [and not necessarily ‘by Perception’ ; the sense being that the absence of concomitance &c. should be such as is recognisable without the help of inference],—then, in that case also, the same

* In the case of the arguments in regard to *atoms*, as these are not perceptible, the absence of any Probans in these would never be perceptible ; and hence in the case of arguments bearing upon such imperceptible things, the fallacy of the ‘Untrue Probans’ would never be possible.

objection would apply. [Because most of the imperceptible things, the Atom and the like, are such as are known by means of Inference only; and also because *absence* is not held either by the Logician or by the Bhāṭṭa to be cognised by means of Inference].

[Page 431] (514). With a view to escape from the above difficulties, the Logician states the definition in another form;—“That Probans is called ‘Untrue’ with regard to which there can be urged the absence of the right cognition of its concomitance with the Probandum and subsistence in the Subject;—this urging being done without the putting forward, as proving that absence, of any such character or fact as is not connected with the proving of anything else.”* Even this will not be right, we reply; as even so the definition becomes too wide. For instance, in the case of the *Contradictory Probans* also, it is possible to detect the presence of adventitious conditions vitiating the concomitance, even in the absence of arguments or facts being put forward in proof of the presence of the *Probans* in substrates where the *Probandum* is entirely absent [which arguments are meant to prove, in the case of the *Contradictory Probans*, the absence of concomitance; and the *not putting forward* of which arguments is intended by the Logician to distinguish the ‘Untrue’ from the ‘Contradictory’ *Probans*.] That the absence of such arguments is regarded by the Logician as indicative of the absence of true concomitance, just as well as of the ‘Contradictory’ character of the *Probans*, is proved by the following declaration of Uḍayanāchārya—‘That *Probans*, in whose support (*i. e.*, in support of whose presence in well-recognised substrates of the *Probandum*, and absence in those substrates where the

* So that this definition would not apply to the *Contradictory* or *Inconclusive Probans*: as in the case of all these, it is necessary to put forward the fact of contradiction which, not connected with the proving of any thing else, is meant to prove the mistaken character of the concomitance.

Probandum never subsists) no arguments are available, is absolutely no use (*i. e.*, is entirely devoid of that invariable concomitance with the Probandum which leads to the inference). And all such *Probans*—the *Contradictory*, the *Inconclusive* and the rest—would thus come to be included in your definition of the *Untrue Probans*. The Logician objects to the above—"The fact of the *Probans not being amenable to such arguments* is also a reason which proves the absence of the right cognition of concomitance and subsistence in the Subject, without having anything to do with the proving of anything else [and as the *not putting forward* of such a reason is a necessary condition in our definition of the *Untrue Probans*, how can this include the *Contradictory* and *Inconclusive Probans*, in whose case it is necessary to indicate the *absence of such arguments* ?]." This is not right, we reply; as in that case, like the *Contradictory Character* and *Inconclusiveness*, the *being not amenable to the aforesaid arguments* will have to be regarded as a distinct fallacy by itself.

(515) In answer to the above objections, the Logician offers the following explanation:—"It may be that the fallacy put forward in the form you suggest would be the same as the '*Untrue Probans*'; but when it is put forward in a form in which the defect of the *Probans* indicated is that of its being *concomitant with the contradictory of the Probandum* (and not as being *not concomitant with the Probandum*), it becomes the fallacy of '*Contradictory Probans*'. And as a matter of fact, all that determines a distinction among fallacies is the way in which they are put forward; and there is no absolute difference among them, as there is between the 'cow' and the 'horse'; all that is meant by regarding one fallacy as different from another is that the way in which one is put forward is not the same as that in which the other is indicated; just as between the character of the

'means' and that of the 'object' of cognition, there is no absolute distinction (one and the same thing, *e.g.* the sense-organ, being both);—the only distinction lying in the fact that the form in which it is the 'means' is not the same in which it is the 'object' of cognition. [That is, it is as leading to the cognition of colour that the Eye is regarded as the 'means of cognition', and it is as being known itself, being seen by others for instance, that it is the 'object of cognition'].” This explanation also, we reply, is not right. Because in any case it is necessary for you to explain in what form the fallacy becomes one of 'Untrue Probans'. Certainly not in the form mentioned in the definition offered by you; as it is just possible that the 'absence of the right cognition of the invariable concomitance', in the case of what you intend to be the *Untrue Probans*, may be urged in a form that is exactly suited to the indicating of the *Contradictory Probans*. *—nor is it ever possible to indicate the 'Untrue Probans' except in some form or other (which would be identical with the other Fallacies);—nor lastly, will it be right to introduce into the definition of the *Untrue Probans* a qualification to the effect that the fallacy should be capable of being indicated in one of those forms (that would be the same as urging the fact of the Probans being 'contradictory' &c.), and thereupon base the distinction of the 'Untrue' from the other kinds of fallacious Probans [so that that which would be urged in one of those forms would be called the 'Untrue', and that which, even though present in one of those same forms, is not indicated in that form, would be called the 'Contradictory', and so forth];—[this would not be right, because, such a definition of the 'Untrue Probans' would not apply to the *Probans* in the case of inferences for the benefit of one's own satisfaction; for

* Whenever a probans is pointed out to be 'Untrue', it must be pointed out in a way which would come to the same thing as to say that it is either 'Contradictory' or 'Fallible' or 'Neutralised' or 'Annulled'.

in the case of such inferences, the fallacies are only felt and noticed by the reasoner, and are not actually urged or indicated in any form]. You will not be able to escape from these difficulties by substituting, in your definition of the 'Untrue Probans', the clause 'which is actually urged' in place of 'which is capable of being urged'. For, we have already pointed out that in cases where one brings forward the fallacy in the form of the *concomitance* being due to some adventitious circumstance, the fact of 'the absence of the right cognition of the absence of concomitance' is not urged; for the simple reason that it is not at all necessary to do so; and as in all such cases the said 'absence' would not *be actually urged* (even though it is quite *capable of being urged*), your definition would not include these cases.

(516) The above arguments also serve to set aside the definition (implied in Nyāya-Sūtra 1, 2, 49) of the 'Untrue Probans' as 'that which is similar to the Probandum'*. As this 'similarity to the *Probandum*' may be either one on some definite specified point, or only similarity in a vague indefinite form; if it be the latter, anything and everything,—all kinds of Probans, fallacious and non-fallacious alike—would have some sort of a 'similarity to the Probandum' [*e. g.* the Probans will always be 'similar to the Probandum' in that it is cognisable, in that it exists, and so forth] [and thus in this case, the definition would become 'too wide'];—then as for any definite specified point of 'similarity to the Probandum' the indication of every such point would only be in one or the other of the several forms (of the statement of the 'Untrue' character of the Probans) already noticed (and rejected above).

(517) In the case of all other attempted definitions of the 'Untrue Probans', one or the other of the above-mentioned discrepancies will be found to be present, and may

* The sense of the definition is that the *Probans* is held to be 'Untrue' only when it is as uncertain and doubtful as the *Probandum* itself.

be urged; and there is no need of entering into further details.

[B. Having shown the impossibility of explaining the 'untrue' Probans, the Author proceeds to show that no adequate definition of the 'Contradictory Probans' is available].

(518) Then again, from among the qualifications that you have introduced into the definition of the 'Untrue Probans', one (*i. e.* the qualification that 'the *Probans* is not invariably concomitant with the *Probandum*, and that it does not subsist in the Subject') serves the purpose of excluding all those *Probans* which lead to right conclusions; but what is it that is meant to be excluded by the other qualifications? "Some qualifications exclude the Contradictory, and some the other kinds of the fallacious Probans"—answers the Logician. What, we ask, do you mean by the 'Contradictory Probans'? Some people (Uḍayanāchārya, among others) have declared that that *Probans* is called 'Contradictory' which is found to be invariably concomitant with the *viparīta*, or contradictory, of the *Probandum*. Now, by saying that the *Probans* is 'concomitant with the contradictory of the *Probandum*,' all that is meant is that there is some sort of a concomitance or companionship between the two,—this concomitance being defined by the Logician as a relationship which is either absolutely universal, or is not due to adventitious circumstances, or is natural;—and such being the case, your definition of the 'Contradictory Probans' would come to this, that the *Probans* coexists with the absence of the *Probandum*,—this 'coexistence' qualified as above, [*i. e.* being regarded as a relationship which is either absolute or not due to adventitious circumstances, or natural];—and in that case, inasmuch as the mere fact of the *Probans* being consistent with the absence of the *Probandum* would suffice to vitiate the capacity of the former to lead to a valid conclusion, it would be enough to mention this much alone as constituting the definition of the 'Contradictory Probans'; and the

introducing of any further qualifications would be absolutely useless. And in that case this Contradictory Probans would be the same as the 'Inconclusive or Fallible' Probans (which latter also is coexistent with the absence of the *Probandum*).

(519) The Logician explains—"Even though the 'Contradictory' and the 'Inconclusive' Probans, are both related to (*i. e.* coexistent with) the absence of the *Probandum*, yet, as a matter of fact, it is only the relationship of the 'Contradictory Probans' that is natural, and not adventitious [*i. e.* while the 'inconclusive' Probans is merely found to be consistent through some adventitious co-existence, in certain cases, with the absence of the *Probandum*, the co-existence of the 'Contradictory Probans' with this absence is constant, natural; and this is what is meant by introducing the qualification that the concomitance of these is 'invariable', 'universal', 'not due to adventitious circumstances', and so forth; and thus the qualifications are not superfluous];—and it is with a view to this fact that the 'Contradictory' Probans has been put forward as distinct from the 'Inconclusive' Probans."

*This is not right, we reply: as we have already refuted this by pointing out that, even though, as a matter of fact, this difference between the two (kinds of fallacious Probans) exists, yet it would not be right to put this forward in the definition of the fallacy [as even without this distinguishing feature the Probans would be fallacious]; and that as such, it is as well that it should not be mentioned at all. For instance, when with regard to the 'Contradic-

"Sound is eternal, because it is an effect' is an example of the 'contradictory' probans; *being an effect* being contrary to *eternality*. What is the meaning of this *being an effect* being contradictory to *eternality*? It only means that the *character of effect* is not concomitant with *eternality*,—it is concomitant with its opposite, 'non-eternality'. So the *contradiction* lies only in the *absence of concomitance*, which is exactly the condition that vitiates the 'Inconclusive' probans. So in reality, there is no difference between 'the contradictory' and the 'inconclusive' probans.

tory *Probans* ', it is asserted that 'this *Probans* cannot establish this conclusion, because it is contradictory to the *Probandum* ',—if we come to consider what is the meaning of the *Probans* being 'contradictory', it will become clear that the distinction is absolutely uncalled for.

(520) On similar grounds, there would be no room for any such distinction being drawn between the two, as that—while the 'Inconclusive *Probans* ' is vitiated by the fact of its rendering the *Probandum* (*i.e.* the conclusion) only *doubtful*, the 'Contradictory *Probans* ' is regarded as fallacious because it establishes, and brings about the definite *certain* cognition of, *the absence of the Probandum* (*i.e.* the contrary of the conclusion). There is no room for this distinction, we say, because the only defect that there can be in a *Probans* is that it is wanting in that which establishes the conclusion; and 'invariable concomitance' (of the *Probans* and the *Probandum*) alone is 'that which establishes the conclusion' consequently, in regard to every defective or fallacious *Probans*, all that need be pointed out is that it is wanting in invariable concomitance, (with the desired *Probandum*); and that it is so wanting is indicated by pointing out that it is present where the *Probandum* is definitely known to be absent. Because for the purpose of showing a *Probans* to be fallacious we have to show either that there is no invariable concomitance which would lead to the conclusion, or that (even though there may be such a concomitance) it is not known; and in showing this it is to be pointed out either that there is a *doubt* as to the concomitance, or that there is a *definite and certain recognition* of concomitance to the contrary; and when this *doubt* and *certain recognition* are put forward, if the question arises as to whence these two arise, the only explanation available is that the *doubt* with regard to the concomitance arises from the perception of the presence of the *Probans* in some place or

places where the *Probandum* is known to be absent,— and the certain cognition of concomitance to the contrary arises from the perception of the fact that whenever the *Probans* is present it is only when the *Probandum* is absent; and such being the case, it would be much simpler to put forward the mere fact of *the Probans being present where the Probandum is absent* (which is found to be the factor that is common to both the aforesaid Doubt and Certain Cognition); because it is this fact alone which serves to indicate *the absence of concomitance* as well as *the absence of the right cognition of this concomitance* (which two forms of absence are what constitute the sole defect in the *Probans*), and there is no need of putting forward any thing else. It might be argued that—“ Even though what is actually put forward is merely *the presence of the Probans where the Probandum is absent*, yet this would necessarily imply the constancy or otherwise of its presence (*i. e.*, as to whether the *Probans* is present *only* in places where the *Probandum* is absent, or *in some cases* it is present when this latter is absent);—just as, for instance (1) where the various conjugational forms are used, though what is actually denoted is merely the relation of the action with a definite point of time, past present or future, yet there is an implication of the particular points of time also,—or (2) when the declensional forms are used, though what is actually expressed is only the character of the Nominative and the rest, yet there is an implication of gender and number also,—or (3) when we pronounce the judgment ‘the hill is fiery,’ though what is meant to be expressed is the mere relationship between the hill and the fire, yet there is an implication of the fact of the hill being the *object* qualified and the *fire* the qualifying adjunct; and so forth”. But no such implication is possible in the case in question; as in all the cases just cited, it so happens that even though what is implied is not actually meant to be expressed by the words,

yet there is an implication of them,—in the first two cases, because they are necessary adjuncts of all words (whenever a word is used, if it is a noun, it must imply a certain gender and number, and if it is a verb, it must imply a definite point of time),—and in the last case, because the notion of the object and its qualification is a necessary adjunct of all relationships (whenever any relation between two things is expressed, it must carry with it the notion of one thing being the object qualified, and of the other being what qualifies the former);—in the case in question on the other hand, if the ‘invariability’ or ‘constancy’ (of the presence of the Probans where the Probandum is absent) is *not* actually meant to be denoted, then this would not in any way differ from the Inconclusive Probans;—and if the ‘constancy’ *is* actually meant to be denoted, then there is no escape from the objections already urged above (para 518).

(Page 441) (521) Then again, unless one points out and recognises the *inconclusiveness* of the Probans, he can not point out and recognise its *contradictory* character : and thus depending as the *contradiction* does upon the *inconclusiveness*, it is not right to regard it as a distinct *defect* ; specially as it is exactly analogous to the case of the qualification and the object qualified ; where unless the object qualified is indicated and recognised, there can be no indication or recognition of it as *qualified* by a certain qualification. [That is to say, we can have no idea of the aforesaid ‘constancy’ unless we have an idea of the ‘presence of the Probans &c.’; and this latter idea being enough to stamp the reasoning as defective, because *inconclusive*, anything further in the same direction, would be entirely superfluous].

(522) To all similar cases we may apply this same principle, that where the simple thing by itself is sufficiently effective, any additional qualification is superfluous. For

instance, (1) when against a certain Probans the fallacy is indicated as consisting in its being 'too wide'—and hence 'inconclusive', and it comes to be explained as 'because the Probans is present in places where the Probandum is known to be present, and also where it is known to be absent'; and here the indicating of its *presence where the probandum is absent* being enough to establish the defective character of the reasoning, it is entirely superfluous to add the fact of its *presence where the Probandum is present*, which is what is included in the qualifying phrase 'too wide';—(2) similarly, when the Probans is stigmatised as 'too narrow'—and hence 'inconclusive';—(3) and lastly, when in such reasoning as 'everything is a non-entity; because it is knowable' the probans is stigmatised as being 'futile', if we enquire what 'futility' means we are told that 'it embodies an argument that involves self-contradiction'; and in this statement we find that it would be enough, for proving the defectiveness of the Probans, to state that *it involves self-contradiction*,—a circumstance which is common to futile as well as non-futile arguments; and it is entirely superfluous to add the clause 'it embodies an argument'.

(523) To revert to your definition of the 'Contradictory Probans';—it has been defined (para. 518) as 'that which is invariably concomitant with the *viparīta*, contradictory, of the *Probandum*';—now what do you mean by this 'contradictory of the Probandum'? If it means the '*abhāva*, negation, of the Probandum', then the definition fails to apply to that case where the Probandum itself is in the negative form, —in which case the 'negation of the Probandum' would be in the form of an *affirmation* (the *negation of the negative* being an *affirmation*) [and thus what the Probans would be concomitant with would be the *affirmation*, and not the *negation*, of the Probandum]. "What the word '*viparīta*', 'contradictory,' means is

anything that is contrary (to the Probandum); and both negation and affirmation can be 'contrary' to the Probandum (according as the Probandum is in the affirmative or the negative form respectively) [and thus the definition would cover all cases of the Contradictory Probans].” This is not possible, we reply because what is meant by 'affirmation' (presence) and 'negation' (absence) being 'contrary' to each other is that the two cannot exist together;—that is, the two can never be present at the same time and place; and this would mean that where the one exists the other does not exist; so that where there is 'affirmation' there can be no 'negation', and *vice versa*; and the reason for this lies in the fact that one consists in the denial of the other;—and such being the case, the definition would no longer consist in the form of *negation* or *affirmation* (absence or presence) (but in the 'aforesaid *non-existence*, or *absence*, of these); and if the definition is made to consist in the non-existence or absence of each of the two *severally*, then it becomes too narrow [as it fails to apply to *all kinds* of Probandum, negative as well as affirmative];—if on the other hand, the definition is made to consist in the non-existence of both *collectively*, then it becomes an impossible definition (as Negation and Affirmation being mutually contradictory, it is never possible for both of these to be absent). Lastly, we shall show later on how it is absolutely impossible for the Logician to supply any adequate explanation for the 'Contradiction' or 'Contrariness,' between Negation and Affirmation.

(C.) [From the refutation of the 'Contradictory' Probans the Author leads on to the refutation of the 'Inconclusive' Probans; of which also no adequate explanation is possible].

(524) You have introduced into your definition of the 'Contradictory Probans,' the word *vyāpṛā*, 'invariably concomitant';—what is it that is meant to be excluded by means of this qualification? If it is the 'Inconclusive Probans'

that is meant to be so excluded,—we ask, what is this ‘Inconclusive Probans’? What we mean by putting this question is that no adequate definition of this is available. For instance, it will not be right to define the ‘Inconclusive Probans’ as that which is *savyabhichāra*, ‘with failing,’ ‘fallible’; for if by this *fallibility* of the Probans is meant the fact that it subsists where the Probandum is absent, then, in the first place, inasmuch as this is the case with the ‘Contradictory Probans’ also, that definition would apply to this latter also (and thus become *too wide*);—and secondly, it would fail to apply to that Probans which is ‘*asāḍhāraṇa anaikāntika*,’ i.e., ‘inconclusive because too specific’ [because this Probans by its very specific character resides only in the *Subject*, and so cannot subsist in a place *where the Probandum is absent*]. If, on the other hand, it means that it does not subsist either where the Probandum is present or where it is absent,—then it would not include those cases where the Probans is ‘common’ or ‘too wide’ [in which the Probans subsists *both* where the Probandum is present and where it is absent].

(525) The Logician offers the following explanation:—“What is meant by the ‘fallibility’ of the Probans is that it is common to both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent; this will include both kinds of the ‘Inconclusive Probans’—that which is ‘too wide or common’ as well as that which is ‘too narrow or specific’; the former, because it subsists in both in its *positive* form, and the latter because it subsists therein in its *negative* form [the ‘too wide Probans is actually present in both cases, where the Probandum is present and where it is absent; and the ‘too narrow’ Probans is actually absent in both cases; yet both kinds may, in a way, be said to subsist in both; the only difference being in the form in which they subsist, one subsisting in its *positive* and the other in its *negative*, form];—and we do not mean

to specify either that the subsistence of both in both should be in the positive form only, or that it should be in the negative form only; and thus both kinds of 'Inconclusive Probans' become included in this definition. As for the third kind of 'Inconclusive Probans'—where there is no possibility of a corroborative instance,—e. g. in the reasoning 'the thing in question is momentary, because it is an entity' [where no corroborative instance is possible, as there is no *entity* which is accepted by *both parties* to be *momentary*],—in this case there can be neither a '*sapakṣa*' (where the Probandum is known by *both parties* as present) nor a '*vipakṣa*' (where the Probandum is known by *both parties* to be absent); and as such this *Probans* can very well be regarded as *not subsisting in either the sapakṣa or the vipakṣa*, and thus falling within the definition, by being found to *subsist in both in its negative form* [resembling, in this the 'too specific' Probans]. [Thus the explanation provided makes all the three kinds of 'inconclusive' Probans fall within the definition."]

(526) This explanation has to be pondered over. Let us admit the explanation off-hand. But even so, the definition becomes too wide; as it includes the *valid* Probans—'smoke' for instance,—which though present in a place where the Probandum, fire, is present, is not present in *all* such places; because this also, being not present in all places where the Probandum is present, and also being not present in places where the Probandum is absent, can be said to 'subsist', *in its negative form*, 'in both, *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*' [and thus it falls within your definition]. If, in order to avoid this incongruity, you define the 'Inconclusive Probans' as that which subsists in *all sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas*—*i.e.* subsists in *all cases* where the Probandum is present, as well as in *all cases* where it is absent;—then, you will certainly succeed in excluding the case of the inferences from 'smoke', which, being present in some *sapakṣas* (*i.e.* being present in some places

where fire is present), cannot be said to subsist, in its negative form *in all sapakṣas*; but you will make your definition *too narrow* in that case; as it will fail to apply to the case of the fallacious inference—‘Sound is not eternal, because it is perceptible’—where the Probans, ‘perceptibility’ is found to be one that subsists, *in its positive form*, in only some *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas*, and not in *all*. [For instance ‘perceptibility’, though present in the non-eternal *jar*, is not present in the non-eternal *gravity*, which latter is only inferable; and though present in the *ākasha* which is *not non-eternal*, it is not present in Space and Time which also are *not non-eternal*]. Thus in seeking to repair one part of your edifice, you make another part of it crumble to pieces! Then again, as a matter of fact, even with your explanation, the definition does remain applicable to the *valid* Probans,—in the case of inferences from *smoke* for instance; as the smoke also may be said to ‘*subsist in all sapakṣas and vipakṣas*’; because in those where it is present, it can be said to subsist *in its positive form*, while in those in which it is absent, it can be said to subsist *in its negative form*; and you have distinctly declared that you do not mean to specify whether this *subsistence* is to be in the *negative* or in the *positive* form.*

(527) Then again, we ask—in the phrase ‘subsisting in all *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas*’, is ‘all’ meant to qualify only the *sapakṣas*, or both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa*? If both,—*i.e.* if it is meant to qualify the *vipakṣa* also—then, the definition becomes too narrow, failing to apply to the ‘too-wide in-

* In the inference ‘there is fire because there is smoke,’ the kitchen and the red-hot iron are ‘*sapakṣas*’—where the Probandum, fire, is known to be present; smoke is present in the kitchen, where, therefore, it subsists in its *positive* form; it is not present in the red-hot iron; in this it subsists in its *negative* form. In the *vipakṣa*—the water-tank, where the Probandum, fire, is known to be absent—the smoke is never present; and so also in all *vipakṣas*; thus in all these, it subsists in its *negative* form. Thus it is found to subsist, in one form or another in all *sapakṣas* and *vipakṣas*.

conclusive Probans' in the reasoning 'the triad is made of such constituent parts as are themselves only gross products, because it is possessed of gross or large dimensions, like the piece of cloth';—because though this Probans, 'gross or large dimensions,' is present in all *sapakṣas* (being present in all cases of gross constituent particles, the jar and the like), yet it is also present in *some vipakṣas* (for instance, in Time and Space, which are large in their dimensions, but are not constituted by gross particles) (though it is also absent in *some other vipakṣas*; for instance in the *atom*, which is neither large in its dimension, nor made up of gross constituent particles). [Thus the Probans cannot be said to subsist, in its negative form, in all *vipakṣas*]. If, on the other hand, you do not mean the 'all' to qualify the *vipakṣa*,—then your definition of the Inconclusive Probans comes to be 'that which subsists in the *vipakṣa* and in all *sapakṣas*'; and this becomes *too wide*, inasmuch as it includes the Contradictory Probans as found in the reasoning—'the Earth is eternal, because it is made up constituent parts'; as this Probans is found to be present in *some vipakṣas* [being present in the jar which is not eternal, though absent in *Buddhi* which also is not eternal; and thus fulfills the conditions of the definition, being present, in its positive as well as negative form, in *some vipakṣas*, and also present, in its negative form, in all *sapakṣas*, no eternal substance being made up of constituent parts].

(528) Then again, what sort of assertion is this of yours that,—'When it is said that the Inconclusive is that which is common to both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent, this explanation includes all kinds of Inconclusive Probans, the subsistence of the Probans being either in its positive or negative form'? For in what manner could the *Anupasamhārī* Probans (which is the name given to the third kind of the Inconclusive Probans)—in whose case there is no *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*—be

said to subsist in both these, either in its negative or positive form? For the simple reason that the Probans is called 'anupasamhāri' only when there is no *sapakṣa* or *vipakṣa*.^{*} Then again, what do you mean by the Probans being *common* to both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent? (a) If it means that it subsists in both places, in its own form,—then, the definition fails to include that *Probans* which is 'inconclusive, because too specific' [because this, by its very nature, subsists only in the Probandum, and never where the Probandum is absent]. (b) If it means that the Probans is *not present*, both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent,—then the definition fails to include any Probans at all,—for non-subsistence in both of these places is not a feature of the Probans [*i. e.* that which does subsist in neither of these places cannot be called a *Probans* at all]. (c) If it means that the Probans is the counter-entity of negation in both,—*i. e.* the presence of the Probans is denied in both places, where the Probandum is present and where it is absent,—or (d) that it is the substratum of the negation or absence of all relationship with both these places (*i. e.* it has no sort of connection with both),—then, in either case, the definition fails to apply to any instance of that Probans which is 'inconclusive, because too wide or common'. You will perhaps explain as follows:—"What is meant by the Probans being *common to both* is that it is present in both places in the same form,—*i. e.* if it is present where the Probandum is present, it is present also where the Probandum is absent,—and if it is absent where the Probandum is present, it is absent also where the Pro-

^{*} The example of the *Anupasamhāri* fallacy is given in the reasoning—'All things are knowable, because they are nameable'; where the *probandum* is one which is never absent in any place; hence in this case, there can be no place other than the subject—'all things'—where the *probandum* is present or absent. And as such the definition in question cannot apply to the *probans*, which the Logician regards as a kind of the *Inconclusive* probans.

bandum is absent ; and in this manner the definition does not fail to apply to any case of the 'inconclusive' Probans." This will not be right, we reply. For your present statement cannot be true in its literal sense : the literal meaning of your statement could only be—(a) either that both places (where the Probandum is present and where it is absent) are the receptacle or substratum of the uniformity of the Probans,—(b) or that they are the receptacle or substratum of the Probans itself in the same form ;—and in either case the definition would fail to apply to that Probans which is 'inconclusive, because too specific' ; for the simple reason that such a Probans does not subsist either where the Probandum is present or where it is absent ; whence these places can never be the 'receptacle for substratum' either of the 'uniformity of the Probans' or of 'the Probans' itself. For these reasons we conclude that the definition of the Inconclusive Probans, as 'that which is common to both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent', can never be acceptable ;—because, firstly, if this has reference to the *non-existence* of the Probans, (*i. e.* if it means that there is absence of the Probans in both places), then it is impossible for these places to be spoken of as the 'receptacle or substratum of the Probans' ; and in that case, the locative ending in 'sapakṣē' and 'vipakṣē' (that is, the assertion that it subsists in the place where the Probandum is present and in the place where it is absent) would be absolutely meaningless. These places would certainly be the 'receptacle or substratum' of the negation or absence of the Probans ; but in what way would this help them to become the 'receptacle' of the Probans itself ? And even if it did help in some way towards this (for instance, by making the Probans the counter-entity of that negation which subsists in both places),—yet in the case of the 'too common Inconclusive' Probans (which is *present* in both

places), the Locative ending could not have reference to the *absence* or *negation* of the Probans (*i. e.* it could never mean that the Probans is *absent* in both places); in fact in this case it must refer to the *presence* of the Probans;—and thus the words of your statement would come to have more than one meaning; and as such it has either to be taken in its indirect or figurative sense (which is not right for a definition) or to be discarded as open to the charge of being ‘too narrow’, ‘not applying to all cases of the *inconclusive* Probans’.

(Page 451) (529) Then again, if you define the Inconclusive Probans simply as that which is common to (subsists in) where the Probandum is present and where it is absent’, [without adding any further qualifications as to the manner of the subsistence],—with a view to make the definition applicable to both kinds of ‘inconclusive Probans’, the *too common* as well as the *too specific*,—then your definition becomes too wide; for in the case of other kinds of Probans also, it is found that in more than one point, they are ‘common to both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent’; *e. g.*, every Probans is something distinct from both these places, and so, in point of this *distinctness*, each and every Probans can be spoken of as ‘common to both’; (each being *equally distinct* from both); and so on, in many other points.) In order to avoid this undue extension of the definition you may seek to qualify it, defining the Inconclusive Probans as ‘that which *in its positive and negative forms—i. e., by reason of its presence and absence—is common to (i. e., subsists in) both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent*’. But in that case the definition becomes too narrow; as firstly if the *subsistence of the Probans in both* is meant to be through its *presence* only (the meaning being that the Probans should be *present* in both) then it will not apply to the ‘too

specific Probans'; secondly if the *subsistence* meant is through *absence* (the meaning being that the Probans should be *absent* in both), then the 'too common Probans' becomes excluded; and lastly, if the *subsistence* intended is through both *presence and absence* (the meaning being that the Probans should be both *present* and *absent* in both), then the definition becomes absurd, not being applicable to anything at all.

(530) The Logician may state his definition in a further qualified form:—"What we mean by the Probans being *common to both where the Probandum is present and where it is absent* is that both these places contain the receptacle of the contrary of the Probans as well as the receptacle of the contrary of the negation or absence of the Probans. In thus stating our definition, we make it neither too wide nor too narrow. [No such *contraries* being contained in the case of any *valid* probans]." This is not right, we reply; as in the first place, this will be open to all those objections which we have shown above (para. 528), as applying to the definition, both when the word 'all' is admitted as qualifying '*sapakṣa-vīpakṣa*,' as well as when this word is not admitted;—and also if you admit the qualification 'all,' then the definition becomes applicable to the case of even such *valid* inferences as that of fire from smoke; [as smoke subsists in its positive form in all places where fire is present, and in its negative form in all those where it is absent]. Then again, the definition also becomes open to the objection of being too diffuse, not comprehensive (hence impossible); as it is not possible for the expression 'the contraries of the Probans itself and its negation' to have any *one* all-comprehensive denotation; for the simple reason that 'the probans itself' and 'its negation' are mutually contradictory terms (and as such there can be no *one* thing which will be the 'contrary' of both); as what is meant by the two being 'contradictory' is that they can never co-exist

(at the same time and place);—this ‘non-co-existence’ also is nothing other than the *absence of existence*;—and this ‘absence of existence’ of an entity (the Probans for instance) is none other than its *negation*; similarly the ‘absence of existence’ of the *negation* is none other than the *entity* itself; hence the ‘contrary of the Probans’ being the *negation of the Probans*, and the ‘contrary of the negation of the Probans’ being the *Probans* itself, it is not possible, however much you may search, to get at any *one* thing that could be denoted by the expression ‘the contraries of the Probans and of its negation.’

(531) [It is not only that your expression cannot signify anything] the expression itself—‘the receptacle of the contrary of the Probans and of its negation’—deserves further scrutiny: If ‘*sva*’ (Probans itself) and ‘*svābhāva*’ (the negation of the probans) are meant to be inseparable *qualifications* (*vishēṣaṇī*) of the ‘*viroḍha*’ (contrary), then they cannot be the substratum or receptacle of this *viroḍha*; as being inseparable from the *viroḍha*, which is to be *contained* in that substratum, they form a part of that which is *contained*, and as such, cannot be the *container* at the same time; specially because in the case of every *qualified thing*, the qualification is regarded as forming one of its constituent ingredients. [Hence if the *viroḍha*, qualified by, and hence inseparable from, the *sva* and the *svābhāva*, were to be contained in the *sva* and *svābhāva*, then these latter would, to a certain extent, be contained within themselves, being their own container or substratum, which is absurd]. And for this reason the definition also would become too wide: it would become applicable to the *valid* Probans also, which subsists, in its positive form, in the *sapakṣa*, and in its negative form, in the *vipakṣa* [and hence both the *sapakṣa* and the *vipakṣa* would contain the receptacle of the contrary of the Probans and its negation]. If, in order to avoid these difficulties, the

'receptacle' be held to be of the '*viroḍha*' by itself, not qualified by the '*sva*' and '*svābhāva*,' then, in that case, your definition of the 'Inconclusive Probans' would include *all* inferences (valid and invalid alike) [as in every inference, irrespective of the character of the *Probans*, which, *exhypothesi*, does not specify the '*viroḍha*,' the *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* are bound to contain the receptacle of the contrary of something or other; and this is all that the definition requires].

The Logician explains—"What we mean is that the *viroḍha* is only marked (*upalakṣiṭa*) by the '*sva*' and '*svābhāva*' (these latter being mere adventitious marks or indications, *upalakṣaṇa*, and not inseparable attributes, *viśēṣaṇa*); and thus the objections that have been urged on the assumption that they are *inseparable qualifications* cannot apply to the definition [and of course, when the *viroḍha* is meant to be marked by '*sva*' and '*svābhāva*,' it cannot mean the *viroḍha* of something or other]." This cannot be, we reply. As, what is it that is *marked* by the *sva* and the *svābhāva*? Is it mere *viroḍha* in general, or some particular *viroḍha*? In the former case, the *viroḍha* that is 'marked by the *sva* and *svābhāva*' would be the same that is found elsewhere also [*i.e.* in all inferences]; and thus the objections urged above remain in force, and the introduction of the words '*sva*' and '*svābhāva*' becomes entirely futile;—and in the latter case (*i.e.* if some particular *viroḍha* only be held to be marked by the *sva* and the *svābhāva*), the definition would fail to be a comprehensive one; as the particular *viroḍha*, so marked in one place, cannot be the same that may be marked elsewhere (so the definition could apply to some one case only, and for each individual case, a fresh definition would have to be supplied). If, in order to avoid these difficulties, it be held that all those *particular viroḍhas* are meant to be marked by the *sva* and *svābhāva* which would be required to be so marked (*i.e.* all those that figure in the

well-known examples of the Inconclusive Probans);—then our answer would be—Certainly, why should not all those individual *virodhas* be so marked? But what we should like to know is—is it in some comprehensive form that all these are marked? Or only in the particular isolated form in which each individual *virodha* appears? If the former, then let us know that comprehensive form; why should you undertake the trouble to put forward all these roundabout explanations based upon subtle distinctions of *upalakṣaṇa* and *vishēṣaṇa*? As a matter of fact however, you cannot point out any such comprehensive form; as any such form could only be in the shape of *virodha* in general, or in some such shape; and each of these would make the definition too wide, (as already pointed out above). If, then, the individuals are marked, in the particular isolated form in which each appears, then in the definition also these would appear only in these isolated forms; and so, if the definition includes all these individuals in these isolated forms, then it would not be applicable to any particular case of the Inconclusive Probans (as there would be no example in which *all the isolated forms* of *Virodha* would be present); and if, on the other hand, the definition be meant to include each isolated individual *severally*, then the definition that would apply to one would not apply to another.

[Page 456] (532). The Logician offers another definition of the Inconclusive Probans:—“We may define the Inconclusive Probans as that which resides neither *only* in those places where the Probandum is known to be present, nor *only* in those where it is known to be absent; and certainly this definition will include all instances of the two kinds of the Inconclusive Probans: the too Specific, and the too Common, [and it would exclude the *Valid* Probans which resides *only* where the Probandum is known to be present, and also the *Contradictory* Probans which resides *only* where the Probandum is known to be absent].”

This definition also cannot be

accepted; as it is applicable to the *Smoke* and such other valid Probans also: the *valid* Probans also can be said to be not resident *only where the Probandum is known to be absent*, for the simple reason that it never resides in any such place at all (if it did, it would not be valid); nor does it reside *only* where the Probandum is known to be present; as it resides also in the 'Subject' (the *Mountain*, in the case of smoke); otherwise, if not resident in the Subject, it would not be a Probans at all; and the Subject being that where the existence of the Probandum is *doubtful*, it is neither that *where the Probandum is known to be present*, nor that *where it is known to be absent*). If, in order to escape from this predicament, you add the qualification that the Inconclusive Probans should (over and above what is said above) reside in the Subject also,—then too, the definition does not exclude the *valid* Probans; as it is only because it resides in the Subject also that the Valid Probans cannot be said to reside *only where the Probandum is known to be present*; and further, your definition, thus qualified, would fail to include that invalid Probans which combines in itself the two characters of being 'unknown' and 'inconclusive'. * In order to avoid this you will perhaps throw in the further qualification 'apart from the Subject,' [the Inconclusive Probans being that which resides neither only in such places, *apart from the Subject*, where the Probandum is known to be present, nor only in such places, *apart from the Subject*, where the Probandum is known to be absent]. In thus presenting your definition you fall into the absurdity of adding a qualification for excluding what would never fall within the definition (and as such whose exclusion would be altogether uncalled for); as it is never possible to have any

* In the reasoning 'Colour and Taste are transient because they are not visible to the eye', we have the Probans which is both 'unknown' and 'inconclusive'; and the definition would not apply to this, as *invisibility*, not residing in *colour*, cannot be said to reside in the Subject.

place where the Probandum is present, or where the Probandum is known to be absent, which is not always 'apart from the Subject'; and hence this last qualification could not serve to exclude those places from anything at all; and as such, in what way could it be a *qualification* of those places? If you add the further qualification—'residing apart from the Subject' [the Inconclusive Probans being that which, while residing apart from the Subject, does not reside either only where the Probandum is known to be present, or only where the Probandum is known to be absent', so that this definition would not apply to the *valid* Probans which resides in the Subject],—then the definition would fail to include the 'Too Specific Inconclusive Probans', which never resides anywhere except in the Subject. In order to avoid this you may add another qualification to the Probans,—that it is one which, *when* residing apart from the Subject, should reside, neither only where the Probandum is known to be present, nor only where it is known to be absent (so that this may not include the Valid Probans, which resides in the Subject, and when apart from the Subject, only where the Probandum is known to be present). Even so, we would ask—is this 'existence apart from the Subject' intended to be the *characteristic feature* or the *cause* of the Probans? In either case, it would not be applicable to the 'Too Specific' Inconclusive Probans, which resides in the Subject *only*; and hence there is no possibility of any *existence apart from the Subject*. You may intend 'existence apart from the Subject' to be a qualification of that which is to be precluded (and not of that which is to be included in the definition) [that is to say, it qualifies the 'existence in the *sapakṣa* only and in the *vipakṣa* only'; so that what the definition means is that the Inconclusive Probans is that which does not exist only where the Probans is known to be present, nor does it exist only where the Probandum is known to be absent, the existence

in both these cases being qualified by existence elsewhere than in the Subject; that is to say, it is that which is not what, while existing elsewhere than in the Subject, exists only where the Probandum is known to be present, and which is not what, while existing elsewhere than in the Subject, exists only where the Probandum is known to be present]* But even then, the definition would include the *valid* Probans. [as even though existing apart from the Subject, the valid Probans exists in the Subject also; and hence *is* what does not exist *only* where the Probandum is known to be present]. These same arguments serve to set aside all those definitions that may be attempted by merely affecting such purely verbal alterations as the change of the word '*pakṣavyatīrēkṣṇa*' into such phrases as '*pakṣam vinā*', '*pakṣam anṭarēṇa*' and the like.

(533) The Logician explains the last definition propounded by him—"What we mean is that the Inconclusive Probans is that which, *if it resides apart from the Subject*, it does not reside either only where the Probandum is known to be present, or only where the Probandum is known to be absent; thus this would include the 'Too Specific' Probans, and exclude the *valid* Probans.'† You are doubly mistaken in this, we reply; as, thus stated, the definition does not include either the 'Too Specific' or the 'Too Common' Inconclusive Probans : as regards the Too Specific Probans, the possibility implied in the conditional clause 'if it resides apart from the Subject' can never be applicable, because by its

* The *valid* Probans is that which, while existing elsewhere than in the Subject exists only in the *sapakṣa*, hence the first half of the definition precludes the valid Probans ;—and the *contradictory* Probans is that which while existing elsewhere than in the Subject, exists only in the *vipakṣa*; hence the second half of the definition serves to preclude the Contradictory Probans.

† The only hindrance to the inclusion of the 'Too Specific' Probans by the definition lay in the fact that it never resides apart from the Subject; the definition as now stated does not make this a necessary condition. Nor does it include the valid Probans, because the valid Probans, *if it ever resides anywhere apart from the Subject*, resides *only* where the Probandum is known to be present.

very nature, it resides *in the Subject only*; and hence it is purely absurd to hint at the remotest possibility of its ever residing *apart from the Subject*;—secondly, as regards the ‘Too Common’ Probans, it is known for certain that by its very nature, it *always resides in the Subject* as well as in a place where the Probandum is known to be absent; this place being something other than the Subject; and hence in its case also, we see no ground for the mentioning of the condition ‘if it resides apart from the Subject’; even in ordinary life, when with regard to the *Shimshapā*, we know for certain that it is a tree, we never make use of the conditional clause if the *Shimshapā* were a tree’;—and what is the reason why this is not used? The reason is simply this: As a rule, the conditional ‘if’ (which denotes doubt) is never used with regard to what is known for certain; it is always used when there is a doubt, and when out of the two factors of the doubt, one is (conditionally) imposed upon the thing under consideration, for the purpose of indicating a certain property of that thing (such conditional imposing not being possible or called for when the real character of the thing is known for certain). Thus then, you find that while you introduce the conditional clause ‘if &c.’ for the purpose of including both the ‘Too Specific’ and the ‘Too Common’ Probans, it fails to include even the ‘Too Common’ Probans alone (which latter your previous definitions, without the conditional clause, had always included).

(534) The Logician re-states the definition:—“The Inconclusive Probans is that *fallacious* Probans which does not reside, either only where the Probandum is known to be present, or only where the Probandum is known to be absent. [The addition of the adjective ‘fallacious’ serving to preclude the *valid* Probans, and the rest of the definition including both kinds of the Inconclusive Probans.] This also is not right, we reply. If the *fallaciousness* of the Probans

is known before its *inconclusiveness*, then that fact alone having established the incapability of the Probans to lead to the desired conclusion, there is no further need for the mention of its *inconclusiveness*, which by your definition, would be dependent upon (and hence implied in) the *fallaciousness*. If, on the other hand, the *fallaciousness* is not already known beforehand, then it would not be possible to know if your definition is applicable, as the presence of the qualification, 'fallaciousness' would not be known for certain.

(535) An entirely new definition is put forward—"That Fallacious Probans is called *Inconclusive* which is other than (different from) the 'Unknown', the 'Contradictory', the 'Neutralised' and the 'Annulled' Probans". In the first place, this definition also (introducing the qualification of 'fallaciousness') is open to the objection just urged (at the end of the preceding paragraph):—and secondly, it fails to include those instances of the *Inconclusive Probans* which also possess the character of the 'Unknown' and the rest. Against this it will be argued that all those will be regarded as *wrong Probans*, simply because of their being 'Unknown' and the rest (and it is not necessary that they should be included in and known as 'inconclusive' also). But it is just possible that, as in the case of the purely *Inconclusive Probans*, so in the case of the Probans which has the mixed character of the 'Unknown' and the 'Inconclusive', it may happen that the fact that is urged against it is that it *resides where the Probandum is known to be absent* (a condition which is present in the *Inconclusive Probans*) [and the fact of its being *Unknown* is not urged at all]; and in such cases, by your definition, the Probans would not be fallacious at all [as the fact of its being *Unknown* not having been put forward, it will not be the 'Unknown' Probans; and because the

character of being 'unknown' is present in it, it will not be the 'Inconclusive' Probans, which, by the definition, is *different from the Unknown*, which the Probans in question is not]. In order to escape from this difficulty, the definition is stated in a somewhat different form, calculated to include both the 'too specific' and the 'too common' kinds of the Inconclusive Probans—"It is that Probans which is distinct from all that is qualified by difference from the 'too specific' and the 'too common' Probans. [*i. e.* that which is distinct from all those several kinds of Probans, which are neither 'too specific' nor 'too common']." This again cannot be accepted; because in the first place if the distinction (of the Inconclusive Probans) is meant to be from that which is qualified by both differences (*i. e.* if difference from the 'too specific' as well as that from the 'too common' is held to be the *vishēṣana* or necessary qualification of that from which the Inconclusive Probans is held to be distinct) [that is the Inconclusive Probans is that which is distinct from all that is different from both],—then, this condition would be fulfilled by both factors of this qualified entity—*viz.*: that which is qualified as well as that which qualifies it [that is to say, the *difference* that qualifies the Probans is 'distinct from that what is qualified by the difference', and the *Probans* also, by itself, is something distinct from the 'Probans qualified by difference'];—and thus both those fulfilling the conditions of your definition, the definition becomes too wide. Secondly, if 'difference from both' (the 'too specific' and the 'too common') is held to be only an *upalakṣaṇa* or adventitious adjunct (of that from which the Inconclusive Probans is regarded as distinct) [in which case the condition will not be fulfilled, as in the preceding case, by that which has that adventitious adjunct,* then, in that case, if the

* In the case of the *vishēṣaṇa*, *necessary character*, it is found that neither the character by itself nor the thing possessed of that character by itself can, severally, be regarded as 'that which has the character'; as neither can be conceived of

several forms of those (fallacious Probans) that are possessed of that adventitious adjunct (*difference from the 'too specific' and the 'too common'*) are held to be possessed of that adjunct as different from it, then the 'distinction' (spoken of in the definition) is present in each of those forms, as distinct from the adjunct; for certainly the thing by itself is not exactly the same as that thing qualified by an adjunct. This last argument would also set aside the view that there is no difference between the adjunct and that which is qualified by the adjunct (this view being held with a view to escape from the objection as to the deference between the two). "What we hold is that there is both difference and non-difference between the adjunct and that which has the adjunct (so that we are not open to any of the objections urged above)". This will not help you, we reply; because after all, a difference between the two is admitted; and so the objections urged would remain in force.

[PAGE 462] (536) "What we mean by the definition is that there should be *absolute distinction* [*i. e.* the Probans in order to be *inconclusive*, should be *absolutely* distinct from that which is qualified by difference from the Too Specific and from the Too Common;—the distinction between the thing by itself and the same thing as qualified is not absolute, there being some sort of a sameness also]."

This also will not be right; as in the first place, this will not include those instances of the Inconclusive Probans which combine in themselves the character of the 'Unknown' and other fallacious Probans. [In these cases the distinction cannot be *absolute*]; —*secondly* the number of those 'qualified by the difference, &c,' being endless, that also which is distinct from these will be endless in number;

without the other; hence both may be held to be distinct from it; on the other hand, in the case of the *upalakṣaṇa*, *adventitious adjunct*, it is not so; as it is quite possible for us to conceive of the thing having the adjunct, by itself, as that which has the adjunct; hence it cannot be regarded as distinct from that which has the adjunct.

and hence it would be absolutely impossible to form any adequate conception of 'what is distinct from that which is qualified by the difference &c.' Lastly, if, in order to escape from this difficulty, it be held that 'what is meant is distinction from (not *all*, but) *only a few* of those that are qualified by difference &c.',—then, inasmuch as other individuals (besides those *few*) from among 'those that are qualified by difference' &c. would themselves also be 'distinct from those few', the objections urged before would remain in force [*i. e.* the definition would become too wide; at least, some of those 'that are qualified by difference' being 'distinct from a few of those that are qualified by difference.'] Further, in case 'difference from the two (the Too specific and the Too Common)' is a mere *upalaksana*, an adventitious adjunct, [which may be held to form the basis of that comprehensive notion of all 'that is qualified by the difference' for want of which comprehensive notion, the definition has been found fault with],—then too, the said two *differences* will not be included in the category of 'that from which the Probans is held to be distinct', (of which the said *difference* is the adventitious adjunct, and which, therefore must be something different from that adjunct itself); and thus the 'difference' becomes included in the category of 'that which is distinct from that of which the difference is an adventitious adjunct'; and thus falls within the definition. Then again, under your present definition, it would be quite reasonable for one who has never seen the *arrow* and such other things (which all, along with the *cow*, are named 'go' in Sanskrit), to argue that 'the arrow has horns, because it is a *go*, like the cow'; as the *Probans* in this case is not *Too Specific*, residing in the cow; nor is it *Too Common*, not residing in the Horse and such other things; thus it is all ready 'qualified by these two differences', and hence it is *not* 'distinct from that which is different from the To

Common, and the Too Specific', which is your definition of the *Inconclusive* Probans. Lastly, you are asked to consider the question why you do not include the other kinds of Fallacious Probans in this single definition of yours? [by adding to it the expression '*asiddhādi*', so that your definition of the *Inconclusive* Probans would be in the form 'that which is distinct from what is qualified by difference from, the *Too Specific*, the *Too Common*, the *Unknown*, the *Contradictory*, and so forth'; and thus you will have the advantage of having a single definition applying to all the various kinds of Fallacious Probans, which would all come within the single class of the *Inconclusive Probans*]. In answer to this you will perhaps urge that there is some peculiarity in the *Too Common* and the *Too Specific* Probans, in view of which you mention in your definition these two only, and not the other kinds of Fallacious Reason;—in that case it would be better for you to put forward this *peculiarity* itself as the characteristic feature (and hence the definition) of your *Inconclusive* Probans (rather than attempt a complicated definition like the one that you have propounded).

(537) "The *Inconclusive* Probans may be defined as that which is *fallacious* in a manner distinct from the '*Unknown*' and other kinds of Fallacious Probans."

In that case it will be necessary for you to point out that 'manner'; as unless you do this, how is one to know what is distinct from the several other kinds of fallacious Probans? And further, if you defined the *Inconclusive* Probans simply as 'that which is distinct from the *Unknown*'; you could have included in that same category the *Contradictory* as well as all other kinds of Fallacious Probans (except the *Unknown*); why then do you put forward a definition that includes only the '*Too Specific*' and the '*Too Common*' Probans?—specially as the exact specific character of these

two is as difficult to ascertain as that of the *Contradictory* &c. has been shown by us to be;—and certainly in this procedure that you have adopted, you seem to have been guided solely by your whim. Lastly, when you define the *Inconclusive* Probans as that which is distinct from the *Unknown*, &c., it is found impossible to ascertain what is distinct from these latter, until we know what is the exact character of these themselves;— and in order to make this clear, if you proceed to explain the character of the *Unknown*, &c., you are met by those same objections that we have already urged above against your definitions of these other kinds of Fallacious Probans. This definition of the *Inconclusive* Probans as ‘that which is distinct from the *Unknown* &c.’ is also open to all those objections that have been urged against the definition of Direct Apprehension as *what is other than Remembrance* (see above Section 14 D—Indian Thought; Vol. I, p. 337).

(538) A fresh definition of the *Inconclusive* Probans is proposed:—“The *Inconclusive* Probans is that which is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum, nor invariably concomitant with the absence of the Probandum;—that is, it is not that it is present only where the Probandum is present, and not present in all places where the Probandum is present,—nor is it that it is present only where the Probandum is absent, and not present in all places where the Probandum is absent (the former qualification differentiates the *Inconclusive* Probans from the *Valid*, and the latter from the *Contradictory*, Probans)”. This definition also cannot be accepted; (1) because it applies to that Probans which may be identical with the Probandum * (as, even though this will be ‘present only where the Probandum is present,’ yet it will also be *present* in all places where the Probandum is present). (2) And also because in the ascertaining of the character men-

* Eg. in the reasoning—‘Sound is transient, because it is transient.’

tioned in the definition, the first qualification to be recognised would be the fact of the Probans being *not invariably concomitant with the Probandum*; and as this is exactly the definition that the Logician gives of the principal kind of the 'Unknown' Probans—which also is not invariably concomitant with the Probandum—this would be sufficient to show up the Probans as *invalid*; and inasmuch as this qualification of the Probans would be sufficient to show that it is not capable of leading to the desired conclusion (which is all that you want in the Fallacious Probans), the addition of the second clause in the definition—which is put forward as qualified by the first clause—would be entirely superfluous;—(3) and lastly because the definition fails to include the 'Too Specific' Inconclusive Probans, in the case of such reasonings as—(a) "Sound is non-eternal, because it is a quality of the Ear," (or 'Ākāsha is non-eternal, because it is Ākāsha'),—where we find that though it may be found by the way that the Probans happens to subsist in a Subject that is concomitant with the Probandum [as in (a) the *character of being a quality of the ear* does subsist in Sound which is actually non-eternal], or which, by the way may be found to be present in a Subject which contains the absence of the Probandum [as in (b) the *character of being Ākāsha* resides in *Ākāsha* which, is never non-eternal],—yet, with regard to which, it is *doubtful*, at the time that the reasoning is actually put forward, whether it is concomitant with the Probandum, or with its absence [and hence with regard to which we cannot be sure whether or not it falls within the definition proposed];—(4) lastly, because as a matter of fact, the definition is found applicable to the 'Neutralised' Probans, where, even though the Probans is one that is actually concomitant with the Probandum; yet at the time of the reasoning being put forward, we are not certain as to its being concomitant with the Probandum, by reason of there being an equally convincing reasoning to the contrary, [and

-hence this Neutralised Probans can be regarded as one that is not known at the time as concomitant with the Probandum, and which is also not known as concomitant with the absence of the Probandum, and thus falls within the definition under consideration].

(539). The arguments put forward above serve also to demolish the definition of the Inconclusive Probans as that which is fallible—that in whose concomitance there are discrepancies,—for the simple reason that it is not possible for the Opponent to provide any explanation of ‘fallibility’ apart from those that have already been found untenable.

(D) [Refutation of the definition of another kind of fallacious Probans—the *Satpratīpakṣa* or ‘Neutralised’.]

(540) Then again,—into your definition of the Inconclusive Probans you have introduced differentias other than those that would differentiate it from right cognition;—now what is it that you mean to exclude by means of these differentias? You will perhaps readily answer—“By one of them we mean to exclude the *Neutralised* Probans and by others some other kinds of fallacious Probans.” Now then we ask you—What is this *Neutralised* Probans? Being thus questioned as to the definition of the *Neutralised* Probans, the Logician may offer the following definition.—“That Probans is called *Neutralised* in regard to which it is found that the contradictory of what is sought to be proved by it is proved by another Probans of equal strength.” This definition cannot be accepted; for what do you mean by ‘strength’ in this connection? If it mean *capability* (as held by the *Mīmāṃsaka*) then we ask—*capability* for doing what (*i. e.*, for affording what cognition)? (a) It cannot be the capability for doing everything (for affording all cognitions); because by their very nature, both the *Neutralised* Probans are such that they afford the cognitions of two entirely different things; and as such both of them could never have an equal capability for all cognitions;

—(b) nor could it mean the capability for something, for affording some particular cognition ; as in that case every *Probans* (valid and invalid alike) would become liable to be regarded as 'Neutralised;' as in every case that a *Probans* is brought forward, it will be possible to put against it some other *Probans* which, even though clearly recognised as 'Unknown,' and as such incapable of proving anything in regard to the *Probandum* in whose proof the former *Probans* has been brought forward, would be certainly *capable* of proving something else;—for instance, the presence of some such universal character as *cognisability* and the like (which can be proved by any *Probans*).* (c) Thirdly, the 'capability' cannot be meant to be that for the bringing about of the cognition of something contradictory to the *Probandum* of the former *Probans* ; as in this case, the latter *Probans* would not be 'neutralised' (the said definition of 'neutralisation' being applicable to only the *Probans* originally put forward) ; and as such it would have to be regarded as really (and validly) proving its *Probandum*. [While as a matter of fact, in a case of true *neutralisation*, both the *Probans* should be incapacitated to prove their respective conclusions].—(d) With a view to escape from the above difficulties, it may be urged that the 'capability' meant is that which brings about the cognition of something contradictory to the *Probandum* of the *other Probans* [in (c) we had the expression 'of the former *Probans*,' hence the definition

* For instance, even in the case of the valid reasoning 'the mountain contains fire, because there is smoke', against this may be put the reasoning—'the mountain does not contain fire, because it is *audible*' ; now this *audibility* of the mountain is something entirely Unknown ; and thus the *Probans* falls within the category of the 'Unknown' *Probans*, and as such is not capable of proving anything in regard to the presence or absence of fire ; but it is quite capable of proving *cognisability* ; as all that is audible is certainly *cognisable* ; and thus the *Probans* is possessed of capability for proving something ; and thus the original reasoning put forward becomes fallacious, the *Probans* being 'neutralised' by your definition.

could not apply to the *latter* Probans; by the word 'other' both become included, as it is a relative term];—but this also cannot be accepted; as in this manner, the 'other Probans' (having the contradictory of its Probandum proved by a *capable* Probans) would, by that very fact, become incapacitated (to prove its conclusion); and thus the two *Probans* would not be of 'equal strength'.—(e) For this same reason also we cannot accept the *capability* to be that which brings about the cognition of a Probandum contradictory to that of the *Probans* (without any such qualification as 'former' or 'other').

(541) The above explanation of 'strength', as proposed by the Mimānsaka having been found to be unsatisfactory, the Logician supplies another explanation of the epithet 'of equal strength':—"Each of the two Neutralised Probans has this *capability* with regard to its respective Probandum that—(a) each resides in the 'Subject', and also in places where its Probandum is known to be present, (b) that each is absent in places where its Probandum is known to be absent, and (c) that each is equally not annulled; and it is with a view to these common factors that they are spoken of in the definition as 'of equal strength'; thus then, what the definition means is this—the *Neutralised* Probans is that which has the contradictory of its Probandum proved by another Probans which is equal to itself in fulfilling the conditions that—(a) it resides in its 'Subject' as also in places where its Probandum is known to be present, (b) it is absent in places where its Probandum is known to be absent, and (c) it is not annulled". Even this is not tenable, we reply. As by this definition a Probans would be 'Neutralised' even by such a Probans as would be found to be 'partly unknown' (*i. e.* which would not be recognised as being present in the whole of its Subject); because in virtue of its presence in a part of the Subject, such a Probans could be regarded as 'residing in the

Subject' (and thus fulfilling the conditions of the definition). Nor can it be desirable for the Logician to accept the fact of a Probans being 'Neutralised' by a 'partly unknown' Probans; as in that case, he would have to accept similar 'Neutralisation' by a Probans which is found to be vitiated by other defects (or grounds of fallacy;—and in that case the 'Neutralised' Probans would be in no way different from these other kinds of fallacious Probans. You cannot very well say, in answer to this, that " what is meant is that the Probans (the Neutralised as well as the Neutralising) should reside in all parts of the 'Subject' (*sarva-pakṣa*); and thus the definition is not open to the objection just urged." Because, with this explanation the definition would not apply to that case of 'Neutralisation' where the 'Subject' of the Neutralising Probans is a single indivisible entity (without parts, *e. g.* *ākāśha* or *ātman*),—by reason of which the epithet '*sarva*' in all 'parts' could not be applied to it; and hence the Probans would fail to satisfy the condition of its residing in '*all parts* of the Subject'. The same objection would also apply if the epithet 'entire' were added to the 'Subject' [as the word 'entire' also connotes the presence of constituent parts that go to make up the *entire* whole].

(542) Then again, your definition will not apply to those cases of 'Neutralisation' where a Probans, which is both 'positively' and 'negatively' concomitant (*i. e.* which is present where the Probandum is present and absent where it is absent), is opposed by another Probans which is purely 'negative',—or *vica versa*;—as in such cases it is not possible for both the Probans to have that point of similarity which consists in their being present in places where the Probandum is known to be present (as a purely negative Probans is never so present). "With a view to such cases, we shall expunge from our definition, the condition that the two Probans should be present where their respective *Probandum* are

present." This will not be right; as with the definition thus expurgated, it would be possible to have a Probans *neutralised* by such other Probans as is distinctly recognised as being 'Inconclusive because too Specific' (and thus falling within the category of the 'Inconclusive' Probans). Nor, with a view to escape from these difficulties, will it be right to lay down any such restriction as that—"the *neutralisation* of a 'positive-negative' Probans must be by a Probans that is itself 'positive-negative', and that of the purely 'negative' Probans must be by one that also is purely 'negative', and not in any other mixed fashion." Because even as between a 'positive-negative' and a 'purely negative' Probans, so long as any specific defect is not noticed in either of the two—it being certain that one of the two must be fallacious,—it is difficult to ascertain which is more capable than the other to bring to the mind of the reasoner a firm conviction as to the incapability of the other to lead to a certain definite conclusion,—this difficulty being due to the uncertainty in his mind as to his being mistaken with regard to the idea that he has formed in connection with both the Probans as to their subsisting in their 'Subject' and being concomitant (with the Probandum) [thus, on account of this uncertainty, there is found to be *Neutralisation* even between the 'purely negative' and the 'positive-negative' Probans also]. And the only ground for regarding the 'Neutralised' Probans as fallacious lies in the fact that in regard to it we cannot have any definite valid cognition either as to its subsisting in the 'Subject' or as to its being concomitant (with the Probandum).

(543) Another definition of the 'Neutralised' Probans is proposed:—"That Probans is called 'Neutralised' which has the contrary of its Probandum indicated by another Probans which is found to fulfill the conditions—(a) of subsisting in the 'Subject' as also in all places where the Probandum is known to be present, (b) of never subsisting in places where

the Probandum is known to be absent, and (c) of not being annulled (by a more convincing means of knowledge)." This definition also cannot be accepted; as this has been already almost entirely refuted; being, as it is, open to the two objections already mentioned before :—viz: (a) if you mean the 'Subject' in this definition to mean the Subject *in only some part of it*, then there would be 'Neutralisation' in the case of a Probans which is 'Partly Unknown', and if you mean it to be *in all its parts*, then it would not include that case where there is a single impartite 'Subject';—and (b) it fails to include the case where there is 'Neutralisation' between the 'purely negative' and the 'positive-negative' Probans. And further, according to the view of those Logicians who regard that Probans which is vitiated by having an adventitious adjunct as a form of the 'Unknown' Probans, when a Probans is found to have such an adjunct, it will be found also to fulfill all the conditions laid down in the definition; and thus there would be 'Neutralisation' by such a Probans also (so that the 'Neutralised' would overlap the 'Unknown').

(544) In order to escape from these overlappings, another definition is put forward :—"That Probans is called 'Neutralised' which has the negation of its Probandum indicated by another Probans, which is neither 'Unknown', nor 'Contradictory', nor 'Inconclusive', nor 'Annulled'." This also is not well-conceived, we reply; as it fails to apply to that Probans which, though really tainted by the defects of being 'Unknown' and the rest, may, by chance, not be recognised as thus tainted,—a case which the Logician regards to be one of 'neutralisation'. And further, between the two Probans neutralising each other, which indicate two contradictory conclusions, one or the other must be tainted by the said defects of being 'Unknown' &c.; as otherwise (if neither of the two were so defective), the 'Subject' would have to be regarded as possessed of contradictory properties. Lastly

* as it could not be ascertained which of the two (either the original Probans or the counter-probans put forward as 'neutralising' it) is tainted with the said defects, there would be a suspicion as to the counter-probans being so tainted,—and thus there would be no certainty as to this latter being 'neither Unknown, nor Contradictory &c., &c.'; and this important factor of the definition being unascertainable, the definition becomes one of whose application there can be no certainty. In answer to this you will perhaps argue as follows:—“Between two 'Neutralising' Probans, why should it be necessary to be certain of one or the other being tainted with the defects of being 'unknown' &c. ? It is sufficient that they are both tainted with the defect of being 'neutralised'; and thus there would be no such incongruity as the recognition of the 'Subject' as possessed of contradictory properties”. This reasoning is not tenable; for in the case of every Probans which is definitely known as fallacious or defective, it is absolutely necessary that there should be an absence, either of its concomitance (with the Probandum), or of its subsistence in the 'Subject'; otherwise, if these two (concomitance and subsistence) be recognised as present, then, the presence of the Probandum will have to be accepted as a matter of course [and thus unless the above-mentioned characters are definitely known to be absent, you cannot escape from the incongruity of regarding the Subject as endowed with contradictory properties]. In fact, in the case of the 'Annulled' and other kinds of fallacious Probans also, all that is meant by the indicating of the presence of adventitious adjuncts is to show that the 'concomitance' or 'subsistence in the Subject' is absent (or defective);—and in the case of

* In the case of 'Neutralisation', one Probans points to one character of the 'Subject', and the other to the contradictory of the same;—if then neither of the two Probans were defective, both would be valid; and as such the conclusions indicated by them would also be right; this would mean that the Subject is possessed of both the contradictory characters.

the two 'Neutralising' Probans, even though the absence of 'Concomitance' and 'Subsistence in the Subject' may be indicated by the 'Neutralisation', it would not be possible to ascertain which one of the two Probans is open to the defects of that absence &c. [and until this is certain, there can be no certainty as to which is 'Neutralised'; and thus the definition remains indefinite]; because there will be 'Neutralisation' all the same, whether one or the other of the two Probans is found to be tainted by the said 'absence' &c. [hence the mere fact of 'Neutralisation' cannot afford a definite cognition as to one or the other being wanting in 'Concomitance' &c.]. Thus then, the absence of Concomitance &c. being recognised without reference to one or the other (of the two Probans), if this recognition is direct (got at by Sense-perception), then in reality the Probans becomes 'Unknown'; while if the recognition is got at by means of Inference, then the Probans becomes either 'Inconclusive' or 'Contradictory' or 'Annulled'; and thus in any case of 'Neutralisation,' how is it ever possible not to recognise either the 'Unknown,' or the 'Contradictory,' or the 'Annulled' Probans? And thus there being no means of ascertaining which one of the two Probans is tainted by the defect, there may be a suspicion with regard to the counter-probans being so tainted; and there can be no certain cognition of the character of 'being free from the defects of being *Unknown* &c.;' and thus the main qualification of the definition becomes indefinite and unascertainable; and from this difficulty there is no escape.

(545) The Logician meets the above objections thus:—
 "What if there is an uncertainty as to the Probans fulfilling the condition of being 'free from the defects of being *Unknown* &c.?' The doubt (as to validity) is there all the same; and by reason of this doubt the Probans will be already tainted by the defects of being suspected of Neutralisation,

and thereby the inference will be incapacitated from establishing the conclusion ; just as in the case where the presence of adventitious adjuncts is only suspected, the inference is rendered incapacitated by reason of the Probans being suspected of being ' Unknown '. It will not be right to urge against this that, in all such cases the reasoning may be regarded as defective by reason of that same doubt upon which the suspicion of ' Neutralisation ' would be based [and hence there is no necessity for regarding ' Neutralisation ' as a distinct defect]. This will not be right ; because as a matter of fact, the suspicion as to the presence in the Probans of the defect of being ' Unknown ' &c. is itself due to our coming across the counter-probans of the character mentioned above ; and hence it is the suspicion that is dependent on, and hence subordinate to, the counter-probans [whereby the presence of the Neutralising counter-probans as an independent defect is fitter to be regarded as a defect than the suspicion based upon it ; so *being Neutralised* by such a counter-probans must be accepted as a distinct defect]."

(546) We cannot accept the above explanation ; as in that case, it would be possible to have ' Neutralisation ' by means of that ' Unknown ' Probans in regard to which there may be suspicion of the presence of adventitious adjuncts [and thus there would be an overlapping between the ' Neutralised ' and the ' Unknown ' Probans]. " Be it so ; what then ?"—the Logician may ask. Well, there would be nothing worse than the partial ' annulment ' of the counter-probans itself ; as being ' Unknown ', this would be far weaker than the original Probans which, *ex hypothesi*, is not ' Unknown ' &c. [and thus instead of the counter-probans *neutralising* the original Probans, it would be itself *annulled*. The Logician retorts "In such cases, there would be no *Neutralisation*, simply because of the counter-probans being *annulled*". Our rejoinder is that, under the circumstances,

how also can that neutralising counter-probans, with regard to which there is suspicion of being 'Unknown', be ever capable of establishing the fact of the other Probans being incapable of establishing its conclusion?—as both of them would be equally fallacious or defective. [That is, just as in the case of the counter-probans being actually *unknown*, the Logician admits the impossibility of 'Neutralisation' on account of the counter-probans being [weaker than the original Probans,—so the counter-probans would be weaker also, when it is only *suspected* of being 'Unknown'; and hence in this case also, being weaker, it could not 'Neutralise' the stronger original Probans]. "But" the Logician urges, "one of the two fallacious Probans in question does not lead to a mere doubt being aroused as to the defectiveness of the reasoning, [that is to say, *the original Probans which is vitiated by an adventitious adjunct* and as such regarded by you to be the weaker is one fallacious Probans, and the counter-probans is another; and between these too, the former is quite capable of establishing, to a certainty, its own defective character, and as such cannot be regarded as merely conducive to the rousing of a suspicion as to such defectiveness; on the other hand, in all cases of *Neutralisation* what the counter-probans does is to give rise to the feeling that one of the two *Probans* is defective; and all that this does is to arouse a mere suspicion in our mind as to its own defectiveness; and hence both cannot be regarded as 'equally fallacious'."] This we do not admit; as even so, that same adventitious adjunct, by reason of which the original Probans is regarded as *weaker* and hence *annulled* (and so *neutralised*), will also be quite capable of raising the aforesaid doubt as to its defectiveness [thus, on this ground also there would be no difference between the two]. And further, from what you say in regard to the character of the Neutralised Probans, it appears that

its exact character and presence is always a matter of doubt and suspicion; and under the circumstances, we would never have any *certain* cognition of the 'Neutralised' Probans; and with regard to that which has never been known with certainty, there can be no doubt [as in all cases of doubt, both of its factors are such as have been known for certain elsewhere: it is only when a man knows definitely what a horse is, and also what an ass is, that he can have the doubt with regard to any animal, as to whether it is a horse or an ass].

(547) Another definition of the 'Neutralised' Probans is proposed—"That Probans is called *neutralised*, the contrary of whose Probandum is indicated by another Probans which is recognised as free from the defects of being *unknown*, *contradictory*, *inconclusive* and *annulled*."* This also will not bear scrutiny. By whom is the Neutralising Probans to be 'recognised as free from the defects'? (a) By the man who puts forward the counter-inference (which contains the *Probans* intended to Neutralise the Probans contained in the original inference)? (b) or by the man who propounds the original inference? (c) or by both? (d) or by any person? The first of these alternatives is not possible; as we often find *Neutralisation* being attempted by persons who are quite cognisant of the counter-probans put forward by them being defective; e. g. (1) in course of a discussion between two persons, when one has propounded an argument in which the other man is unable to detect any other flaw, this latter thinks as follows—"if my opponent fails to detect the fallacy in my reasoning, then I get the victory that I desire; and if he does detect the fallacy and points it out, then the discussion will enter on a new phase, which will give me an opportunity for flying off at some other point; and this also is desirable for

* In the former definition the Neutralising Probans is said to be one that is actually free from the defects of being *unknown* &c.; by the definition now proposed it need not be actually free from them; it is enough for it to be recognised as so free.

me, inasmuch as, being unable to detect any other flaw in his reasoning, my defeat would be certain even if I did not put forward this counter-probans,'—and he forthwith puts forward his reasoning (with a view to neutralising the opponent's reasoning), even though fully conscious of the fact that the counter-probans he is putting forward is defective; and being deficient of understanding as he is, he does this with a view to show to the ordinary people that when he enters a discussion he can establish even an admittedly wrong position;—(2) and even in the case of men of keen intellect we find that, when questioned as to the validity of a reasoning that has been found put forward by a respectable author in his work, they feel called upon to answer the reasoning that may have been put forward by the questioner, and often seek to neutralise the reasoning thus put forward by means of a reasoning which they know to be fallacious; and it is not that such counter-probans is only put forward; it also secures victory for the Arguer in case the Opponent fails to detect the fallacy in it. [And the definition will not include these cases, as the counter-probans is not recognised, by the propounder, as free from defects], And further, if by being 'recognised as free from defects' is meant that the man putting it forward is *quite certain* as to its being free from defects, then the definition becomes an *impossible* one; as between the two contradictory Probans (the original Probans and the counter-probans), one must be defective, and as it cannot be ascertained at the time which one of the two is defective, there will always be a suspicion as to the counter-probans itself being defective (with regard to which therefore one cannot be certain as to its being free from defects). If then by its being 'recognised as free from defects' it be meant that it may be regarded possible for it to be so free,—then this would be open to those same objections which we shall urge (on p 487. 'Pandit' edition)

against the 'possibility of being put forward'. (b) (c) (d) Nor can the second, third and fourth alternatives be maintained; as it being difficult to be certain as to what may be in another person's mind, one can have no certain means of knowing that the other man, to whom he is addressing his counter-reasoning, will recognise the presence, in the *Probans*, of the defects of being 'Unknown' &c.; and as such how could he base his arguments on the declaration that the *Probans* put forward by his Opponent is 'Neutralised'. Further arguments in this connection we shall demolish later on (in para. 549).

(Page 479) (548) The above arguments also serve to demolish the definition that—"the *Neutralised Probans* is that the contrary of whose *Probandum* is indicated by another *Probans* which is not recognised either as being 'Unknown' or 'Contradictory' or 'Annulled' or 'Inconclusive', or as not concomitant (with the *Probandum*) and not subsisting in the Subject";—as in this case also it cannot be explained by whom the counter-*probans* is to be 'not recognised &c.'

(549) Further, all the last three definitions of the 'Neutralised' *Probans* are 'too wide'; inasmuch as they are applicable to those cases where the reasoning or *Probans* is held (by the Logician) to be 'annulled' (and not 'neutralised') by a reasoning which leads to the inference of that which forms the 'Subject' (or the '*Probans*') (of the original reasoning).*

* We have the reasoning 'God cannot be the creator of the world because he has no body';—this reasoning is opposed by another:—'the world has a creator in God, because it is an effect'; in this case, according to the Logician himself, the former reasoning is *annulled* by the latter; because it has for its object 'God the Creator' which is the 'Subject' of the former reasoning; and as such the latter reasoning is more powerful than the former; specially as it supplies us with the knowledge of that (Subject) without whose knowledge the former reasoning would be impossible: unless we have an idea of 'God', we cannot grasp any such argument as 'God is not the creator, &c.'; until we know the 'Subject', we cannot predicate any '*Probandum*' with regard to it. Thus then, one being more

This also makes it abundantly clear that 'Neutralisation' cannot be rightly regarded as a fallacy in those inferences that are propounded for one's own benefit (in which case the refutations, based upon the difficulty of ascertaining by which of the two parties the counter-probans is to be recognised as not 'Unknown' &c., may not apply, and which forms the 'further argument' mentioned at the end of para. 547 as to be demolished 'later on').

(550) In order to escape from the difficulty just pointed out another definition of the 'Neutralised' Probans is put forward:—"That Probans is 'Neutralised' which has the contrary of its Probandum indicated by another Probans which is not recognised as possessed of any peculiarity (in the point of strength or validity) distinguishing it from the original Probans [and in the case of 'Annulment', the counter-probans is always recognised as more powerful than the original Probans]."

Well, (thus you may escape from the difficulty just pointed, but) this definition will be open to all those objections that have been urged above, as to the difficulty of ascertaining by whom the counter-probans is to be 'not recognised as possessed of any peculiarity &c.' And further, if by the word 'peculiarity' in your definition, you mean any peculiarity (without specifying any one particularly), then, inasmuch as there could be no case in which some sort of peculiarity is not recognised, your definition would not apply to anything at all. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, the 'peculiarity' meant be held to be that in the form of a *defect in the Probans*, then the definition becomes applic-

powerful than the other, there is 'annulment' in this case, and not 'neutralisation'; in which latter, the two reasonings are said to be equally balanced. Such is the view of the Logician himself. Now, in accordance with the three definitions in question, we would have 'neutralisation' in all cases where the counter-probans is not recognised as 'Unknown' &c.; and as a matter of fact in the case of 'annulment' just cited, the Probans of the latter reasoning is also one which is not recognised as 'Unknown' &c., it would come under the definition; and thus there would be an overlapping between 'Annulment' and 'Neutralisation'.

able to those cases also where there is 'annulment' (of the original reasoning) by means of a reasoning that leads to the inference of that which forms the 'Subject' (of the original reasoning) (see note on para. 549):—as in this latter case also, the contrary of the Probandum is indicated by a Probans in which no peculiarity in the shape of a *defect of Probans* is recognised; for the simple reason that in this reasoning (which annuls the original reasoning) there is no defect in the Probans; and hence no such peculiarity could be recognised.

Nor would there be any escape from these difficulties by adding the qualification that there should be a non-recognition of that defect of Probans *which is really present* (this qualification being introduced with a view to exclude the case of the annulling reasoning);—as in that case, the definition will fail to include that 'neutralised' Probans where the 'neutralisation' is done by a valid counter-probans (as no defect could ever be *really present* in a *Valid Probans*);—and it certainly requires a mighty stretch of the intellect to perceive that the defect is present, and yet not to recognise it!

Nor would it save you to add the qualification that there should be non-recognition of the Probans as possessing any peculiarity in the shape of *defect* (invalidity) or *excellence* (validity);—as thus qualified, the definition would not apply to those cases where the 'purely negative' Probans is 'neutralised' by a 'positive-negative' counter-probans; because in this case, we are actually cognisant of the *excellence of the Probans* in the form that it subsists in places where the Probandum is known to be present.

[Page 481] (551) In order to escape from these difficulties, the definition will perhaps be stated in the form that the contrary of the Probandum should be indicated by a counter-probans which is not recognised as possessed of the peculiarity in the shape of the absence and presence of concomitance (with the Probandum) and subsistence in the Sub-

ject.” In answer to this we would ask—This ‘peculiarity is with reference to what (*i. e.* for distinguishing from what)? If it is with reference vaguely to something or other,—then, in a case where the counter-probans happens to be put forward in a valid inference, we would be actually cognisant of the fact of this counter-probans being possessed of the character of being *Valid*, which is its peculiarity with reference to (distinguishing it from) such fallacious Probans as are recognised by all to be ‘Unknown’ (or ‘contradictory’ &c.); and hence this case of actual ‘neutralisation’ would not be included in the definition. If, with a view to avoid this, it be held that the ‘peculiarity’ is with reference to the original Probans to which the counter-probans is contrary,—then the definition would take the following form:—“That Probans is called ‘neutralised’ the contrary of whose Probandum is indicated by that counter-probans of which there is not recognised any such peculiarity, with reference to (distinguishing from) the original Probans, as the absence or presence of concomitance (with the Probandum) and subsistence in the Subject.” And even this statement of the definition needs to be elucidated: Firstly, then, if the words ‘absence’ and ‘presence’ are meant to be taken with both ‘concomitance’ and ‘subsistence in the Subject’ conjointly, then the definition would become applicable to those cases where the ‘absence or presence’ of only one of these latter is not recognised [as in these cases also the absence of both would not be not recognised].* Secondly, if both ‘absence’ and ‘presence’ be

◦ When the reasoning—‘Sound is transient, because belonging to a genus it is visible’—is put forward against the reasoning in support of its eternity, this latter reasoning will, under the definition as now interpreted, have to be regarded as ‘neutralised’ by the former reasoning, even though it is distinctly recognised as fallacious, having its Probans ‘Unknown’; because the Probans ‘visibility’ in regard to Sound is one in which we recognise the absence only of ‘subsistence in the Subject’ (Sound not being visible); hence in regard to this also it can be said that we do not recognise the absence of *both*, ‘concomitance’ and ‘subsistence in the Subject’.

meant to be taken conjointly, then as this would be an absolutely impossible condition, (as it is not possible for the two contradictory things, 'presence' and 'absence' to be either recognised or not recognised at one and the same time),—the definition would not apply to any case at all. Thus then (as neither 'absence' and 'presence,' nor 'concomitance' and 'subsistence in the Subject' can be taken conjointly) the definition will have to be interpreted as follows—'that Probans is called *neutralised* which has the contrary of its Probandum indicated by a counter-probans, with regard to which we do not recognise any such peculiarity, distinguishing it from the original Probans, as the absence of its concomitance (with the Probandum), or the presence of its concomitance, or the absence of its subsistence in the Subject, or the presence of its subsistence in the Subject. And in this case, when we have the reasoning—(1) 'the atom has no parts, because all varying degrees of dimension cease in it, as in *Ākāsha*,'—and against this the Opponent urges the reasoning, (2) 'the atom has parts because it is material, and has a shape, like the jar,'—this latter reasoning will, under the definition, have to be regarded as *neutralising* the reasoning 'the varying degree of minute dimension must cease somewhere, because it is a varying degree of dimension, like the varying degree of large dimension (which ceases in *Ākāsha*);' even though this latter has for its object the *atom* which is the 'Subject' of the other reasoning (and as 'such is more powerful than that other reasoning), and it is also accepted by the Logician as a valid reasoning; this third valid reasoning would be *neutralised* by the second reasoning (that urged by the Opponent), because it also proves the fact of the atom being without parts, inasmuch as the character proved by it belongs to the atom which is the subject of the first reasoning, which was put forward to prove the absence of parts. As regards one (e. g. the *Bhātta*) who does not accept the

third reasoning as valid (not holding the atom to be without parts), there are many similar reasonings that could be cited to show the incongruity pointed out by us [e.g. the third reasoning would be as follows,—(1) ‘Ākāsha is all-pervading, because it is intangible,’ (2) ‘Ākāsha is not all-pervading, because it is possessed of specific qualities and is other than Self;’ and (3) ‘Sound is perceptible by a material organ, because it is an external Substance’]. Nor will it be right for you to say that in all such cases there actually is *neutralisation*. Because as a matter of fact, the third reasoning is more powerful, inasmuch as the other reasoning depends upon it in so far as the ‘Subject’ of this other reasoning is proved by that third reasoning.

(552) With a view to preclude the above contingency, the definition may be further qualified—‘that *original* Probans is regarded as *neutralised* which has the contrary of its Probandum, indicated &c. &c.’ (So that the ‘neutralisation’ will never apply to the reasonings brought forward in refutation). But even so the definition will not be free from incongruities : In the definition, we meet with the compound (para. 550) ‘*agrīyamānavishēṣēṇa*’ (‘with-peculiarity-unrecognised’); now if this compound is meant to be construed as ‘that whose peculiarity is not recognised,’ then it would mean ‘that to which the peculiarity is not recognised as related’; and this would make the definition *too narrow*;—as it would not apply to that case of *neutralisation* where in reality the *Probans* and the counter-probans are both equally vitiated by the fault of wanting in concomitance (with the Probandum), and yet the fact of both being thus vitiated is not recognised at the time that we have the notion of the one *neutralising* the other; this case of *neutralisation* does not fall within the definition, because what is ‘not recognised’—*viz.* the absence of concomitance—is not a ‘peculiarity’ of either of the two *Probans* in question;—being as it is common to the

original Probans as well as to the counter-probans. "In this case also" says the Opponent, "as the peculiarity," in the shape of 'the absence of concomitance' &c., is absolutely non-existent, there is naturally a non-recognition of peculiarity (as there can be no recognition of that which is non-existent);—and thus this case also will fall within the definition." If such be the case then, the definition would apply to the following case also:—The person who starts the discussion, though knowing that the fault of wanting in concomitance is common to the Probans that he puts forward as well as to the counter-probans, urges the fault against the latter only,—and his opponent is unable to refute it;—as in this case the original disputant does *not* recognise any 'peculiarity,' being cognisant, as he is, of the two Probans as having the fault in common. "But," the Logician rejoins, "the opponent, who puts forward the counter-probans, recognises it as having the 'peculiarity,' not being cognisant of the fact of the fault being common to both; and what is meant by 'recognition' in the definition is not necessarily *correct* recognition, but recognition in general, including both correct and incorrect cognition." This is not right, we reply; because as regards the view that 'the non-recognition of the peculiarity' mentioned in the definition, should be by the person who puts forward the counter-probans,—we have already refuted this above (para. 547). And further, if the person putting forward the counter-probans should happen, at that same time, to perceive that the defect (absence of concomitance) is one that is common to both (the original Probans and the counter-probans),—what means would you have to escape from the difficulty (of this case falling within your definition)? [As in this case no 'peculiarity' will have been recognised.] The Logician explains—"In fact in the case of his perceiving the defect as present in the original Probans put forward by the first party, he would urge this defect as

against the original reasoning; and this would bring the discussion itself to an end, irrespective of *neutralisation*.”*

This will not be right, we reply. It is quite possible that even though perceiving the defect in the original reasoning, the Opponent might argue in his mind as follows—‘I have urged against my Opponent that his Probans is neutralised,—now if, abandoning this position, I were to urge this other defect that I perceive, I would make myself open to the further charge of having renounced my position;—on the other hand, if I do not urge this other defect, then also, not being able to sustain my original position, that my opponent’s probans is *neutralised*, I become defeated;—so then my attempt at urging this other defect is absolutely futile;—and having reasoned thus in his mind, if the man keeps silent, how would you save this case from falling within your definitions ?

† (553) [It has been shown that the compound ‘*agrihyamānavishēṣa*’ cannot be taken to mean ‘that to which the peculiarity is not recognised as being related’]. If, then, the compound be taken to mean ‘that *whose* peculiarity is not recognised’,—then also the definition remains open to the objection just urged; and it becomes open to a further objection:—it is absolutely impossible that between two contradictory Probans, there be common any such character as *not wanting in concomitance* (or *wanting in concomitance*) and so on; and hence (as it would be only such common characters that could be excluded by the word ‘peculiarity’) the word ‘peculiarity’ can not serve the purpose of excluding anything:—it would

* The closing of the discussion by showing the original reasoning to be fallacious is all that the Opponent needs; and if he can do this by showing some defect in the original Probans, his end will be served; and it does not matter if there is no neutralisation of the original probans.

† The difference between the two cases appears to be that by the former interpretation, the ‘peculiarity’ may or may not be really present; it is sufficient that it be not recognised; while by the second interpretation, the peculiarity not recognised would be one that is really present.

thus not be possible for this 'peculiarity' to be taken as a qualification belonging to the Probans [as only that can be a *qualification* which serves to differentiate the *qualified* from something else] and the phrase 'whose peculiarity' must mean 'which is *qualified* by the peculiarity'].

(554) Another definition of the 'neutralised' Probans is suggested:—"That original Probans is called 'neutralised', the contrary of whose Probandum is indicated by another Probans which is *not pointed out* to be different from (having any peculiarity over) the original Probans on any such point as the presence or absence of concomitance (with the Probandum) and subsistence in the Subject." This definition also can not be maintained, we reply; as in the first place when the first party has adduced his reasoning and has been met with a counter-reasoning, if he meets the opponent with the declaration—"your counter-probans is in such and such a manner found to be wanting in concomitance with its Probandum",—and this being sufficient to show that his original Probans is not *neutralised* by the counter-probans, he does not proceed to make the further statement, 'your counter-probans *differs from* my probans in this respect';—even in this case, *neutralisation* will have to be admitted [as the counter-probans though evidently fallacious, is 'not *pointed out* to be different from the original Probans', which is the condition laid down by the definition]; and if 'neutralisation' be admitted even in such cases (where the counter-probans is distinctly fallacious, even though it may not be pointed out to be so), then there should be 'neutralisation' also by such counter-probans as is distinctly vitiated by such defects as being 'Unknown' and the like;—and in this manner the Logician will have really succeeded in supplying an explanation eminently favourable for all inferences! [If a fallacious counter-probans were to 'neutralise' a reasoning, then all inferential reasonings, valid and invalid alike, would be *neutralised*].—

Secondly, the definition speaks of the counter-probans being not pointed out' &c.;—now, at what time should it be 'not pointed out' ? If it is to be 'not pointed out' at the precise time when the Opponent refutes the reasoning of the first party by putting forward his counter-probans,—then, even though the first party may point out defects in the counter-probans, *after* this latter has been put forward, as this defect will not have been 'pointed out' *at the time* that the counter-probans is put forward, any subsequent pointing out of defects will not be effective ; and thus there would be real 'neutralisation' by all kinds of fallacious Probans ; and this would certainly put an end to all inferential reasoning ! "What is meant", the Logician explains, "is that it should be *not pointed out* at the time when the first party gets the opportunity of speaking again, after his opponent has had his say (and not at the same time)". If such be the case, then, how could the Opponent be certain, beforehand, as to the first party not subsequently pointing out particular defects in the counter-probans that he is putting forward ? [If vitiation were effective by subsequent indication of defects, then no opponent could ever be sure of his counter-probans being not so liable to being vitiated; and hence he could never make up his mind to put forward any counter-probans at all]. "The man himself will know that his counter-probans is free from defects, and will therefore be in a position to put it forward quite confidently." In the first place, we have already shown that it is quite possible for the opponent to seek real 'neutralisation' of the reasoning of the first party, even by means of such counter-probans as he himself knows to be defective ; and it is not only that he seeks it ; but he actually obtains his victory in case the first party fails to detect the defect in his counter-probans [This shows that the Opponent's counter-probans need not be really 'free from defects', which fact the Logician has just put forward as inspiring confidence in the man putting forward the

counter-probans]. Then again, how could he be sure as to his own Probans being free from any particular defects? It is true that of two mutually contradictory Probans one must be defective; but just as he does not perceive any defect in his own Probans, so he may also not perceive any in that of the first party also; specially because, if he did perceive any such particular defect in the original Probans put forward by the first party, he would naturally urge against him this defect (rather than put forward a counter-probans); for what man, who has any spark of intelligence, would disregard (and not mention) a defect that is distinctly perceptible, and put forward against a reasoning, which is thus distinctly defective, another reasoning, which proves the contrary of the Probandum of the former reasoning?—specially as all that this would show would be that the original reasoning is similar (in point of validity) to another reasoning which is free from defects. For these reasons it must be admitted that, inasmuch as the opponent fails to perceive defects even in defective reasonings (as is proved by his incapability to detect the defect in the original reasoning), the mere fact of his not perceiving any defects (in the counter-probans put forward by himself) cannot be urged as a ground for this counter-probans being free from defects.

(555) Another definition of the *Neutralised* Probans is proposed—“That original Probans is ‘neutralised’ which has the contrary of its Probandum indicated by a counter-probans *which is expected to be such* that it cannot be pointed out to be different from the original Probans on any such point as the presence or absence of concomitance (with the Probandum) and subsistence in the Subject.” This definition also is not tenable, we reply. If the ‘expectation’ is meant to be before the ‘pointing out,’ then the definition becomes open to the second objection that we have urged against the preceding definition, in the case of the ‘not pointing out’ being meant

to be simultaneous with the putting forward of the counter-probans. If, on the other hand, the 'expectation' should refer to that time at which there may be an opportunity for the 'pointing out,'—then, at the time that the 'neutralisation' is actually urged, the 'expectation' will not be present (as the 'neutralisation' of the Probans is urged *after* the 'not pointing out,' and the 'expectation' is meant to be present at the time of this latter); and thus the intended 'neutralisation' being wanting in this character, the definition would not apply to this 'neutralisation.' In answer to this, the Logician urges—"The *neutralisation* will be there so long as the *expectation* will persist,—why should there be any question as to the precise time of the 'expectation'?" This will not help you, we reply. Even so, as soon as the defect in the counter-probans will be not pointed out,—and thus in reality it will be accepted as free from defects,—all expectation of the defects being 'pointed out' will have ceased; and thus the 'expectation' no longer persisting there could be no 'neutralisation' (which has been said to last only as long as the expectation persists). And thus this would supply a sufficient handle to the first party whereby to set aside the 'neutralisation' of his Probans: and thus rather than trouble himself about refuting the counter-probans urged against him, it would be far better for him to accept the 'neutralisation' (of his Probans by this counter-probans) and then overthrow it (as no longer applicable to his reasoning, having ceased with the ceasing of the 'expectation'). Nor would the mere acceptance of the counter-probans (as valid) involve his defeat. As the acceptance will have been made only as a means to the demolishing of the 'neutralisation:' the acceptance of the validity putting an end to the 'expectation,' and the cessation of 'expectation' putting an end to the 'neutralisation:'—and thus the acceptance also only serves the purpose of bringing

about a result undesirable for the Opponent; and thus this method, successful in this, is more beneficial than harmful to the party who accepts the validity; exactly as in the case where a reasoning put forward is met by the objection that it is 'superfluous', proving what is already proved,—in which case though the putting forward of this objection involves the acceptance of the conclusion as proved, yet, inasmuch as this acceptance serves the purpose of vitiating the original reasoning as superfluous and hence invalid, it is regarded (by the Logician himself) as more beneficial than harmful to the objector.

(556) (As regards 'neutralisation' in general) if 'neutralisation' is meant to arouse in the mind of the disputants a suspicion with regard to the reasonings being fallacious—this suspicion arising from the perception of equally strong reasons to the contrary,—then, there can be no 'neutralisation' in any case; as each disputant is naturally so partial to his own reasoning that even when confronted by a contrary reasoning, apparently as strong as his own,—he would think that this contrary reasoning must have some fallacy, which he fails to detect [and with such feelings he would never suspect his own reasoning to be fallacious]; specially as it has been held that—"it is only when two persons are fully convinced as to the truth of their own views that they engage in a discussion." It may be urged that—"even though the man may be convinced of the truth of his own view, yet it is only right and natural that, on being confronted by an equally strong reasoning to the contrary, he should have a lurking suspicion as to his reasoning being fallacious (and thus would the purpose of *neutralisation* be fulfilled)." But if such be the case, then such neutralisation would be inevitable in the case of all inferential reasonings. For instance, as a matter of fact, we find that while on the one hand, clever disputants, holding Sound to be non-

eternal, have hundreds of times defeated by their reasonings a disputant who holds Sound to be eternal,—and conversely many intelligent disputants holding Sound to be eternal have, as many times, defeated a disputant who holds Sound to be non-eternal;—and under the circumstances, it is inevitable that there should arise in our minds a doubt as to which of the two sets of reasonings is really valid and sound (and this doubt would, *ex-hypothesi*, suffice to neutralise both).

(E).

[Refutation of 'Annulment'—the last kind of Fallacy.]

(557) Inasmuch as the 'Annulled' Probans has nothing to distinguish it from the 'Neutralised' Probans, Annulment cannot be regarded as a distinct fallacy. For instance, the 'Annulled' Probans cannot be defined (and thus distinguished from the 'Neutralised' probans) as that which has its subject-matter sublated or confuted. For what do you mean by its Probandum being confuted? It cannot mean that the contrary of its subject-matter is proved by a strong Probans (or cognition); as in that case this qualification as it stands, would make the definition applicable to the 'neutralised' Probans also; as in the case of this latter also, the counter-probans that proves the contrary of the Probandum of the first Probans is 'strong', being possessed of such 'strength' as consists in its 'subsisting in the subject' ('concomitance with the Probandum') and so forth.

(558) If by 'strong' you mean '*stronger*' (than the first Probans),—even then, in the first place, the definition would be too wide, being applicable to that case of 'neutralisation' in which a purely negative Probans is neutralised by a positive-negative Probans; as the positive-negative Probans is possessed of an additional 'strength' in the shape of its subsisting in that where the Probandum is known to be present (which is not possessed by the purely negative

Probans);—secondly, with this explanation of the definition, there would be no ‘annulment’ of a fallacious Inference by Perception; as the only element of ‘strength’ possessed by Perception consists, (1) in its being produced by the contact of the object with the sense-organ, and (2) in its being the means of non-mistaken or right cognition, — while Inference is possessed of additional and greater elements of ‘strength,’ in the shape of its ‘subsistence in the Subject’ and so forth (none of which is present in Perception). Lastly, if you explain the ‘strength’ to consist in not being known as anything else (than a valid cognition), so that that will be regarded as ‘Annulled’ the contrary or negation of whose subject-matter is proved by a cognition not known as anything else [thus all such inferences as are opposed to direct Sense-perception will be opposed, and their contraries proved, by this Perception, with regard to which there would be no doubts as to its being a valid cognition];—this also cannot be accepted; as even so the definition would be too wide, being applicable to the ‘Neutralised’ Probans, which also has its contrary proved by a counter-probans which, for all practical purposes, is not known as anything else (except *valid*). Then again, what do you mean by *anyathāsiddha* (not known as anything else)? Does ‘as anything else’ mean ‘in another form’—so that ‘not as anything else’ would mean ‘by not another form’? If so, then the meaning comes to be ‘that same form in which it is known’; and in that case, why should you not state it in that form rather than in the round-about form ‘in a form other than that which is not that form’? “What we mean by *that form* is the form of *validity*”—if you say, then wonderful is this perversity of yours, whereby, instead of saying simply ‘that which is known as valid’, you say ‘that which is known or produced or recognised in that form which is not other than valid.’!

(559) “But we can certainly define the ‘Annulled’ Probans as ‘that the contrary of whose subject-matter is proved

by a valid means of cognition." Certainly not, we reply, as when we have the mistaken perception with regard to a piece of shell as that 'this is silver',—and this perception is confuted by the subsequent valid cognition in the form 'this is not silver',—the former perception would fulfil the conditions of that definition which you have put forward in connection with a particular form of fallacious Probans ; and this would make the definition too wide ! This definition would also apply to the *desire* that we may have had with regard to that (silver), which also is set aside by the subsequent valid cognition !

(560) The Logician states the definition in a somewhat different form :—"*That Probans* is called *annulled* the contrary of whose subject-matter is proved by a valid means of cognition (so that the definition will not apply to Perception &c.)" This also cannot be accepted ; for if in this definition the word 'Probans' is used in its real direct meaning (of that which is concomitant with the Probandum and subsists in the Subject), then there is an end to all notions of 'Fallacious Reason' (as a Probans fulfilling all the conditions of a *valid* Probans is, under the proposed definition, classed as *fallacious*). If, on the other hand, the word 'Probans', is used in an indirect or figurative sense, it becomes necessary for you to explain what that figurative sense is.

(561) With a view to avoid these difficulties, the Logician proposes another definition :—"*That fallacious Probans* is called 'annulled', the contrary of whose subject-matter is proved by a valid means of cognition." This also cannot be accepted ; as, if, before we know whether or not the Probans is 'annulled', there be an uncertainty as to its being *fallacious*, it will be impossible to ascertain if it fulfills the conditions of the definition (which makes *fallaciousness* a necessary condition) ;—and on the other hand, if, before we know the Probans to fulfill the conditions of being

'annulled', we are certain as to its being *fallacious*,—then the faultiness or invalidity of the Probans being already ascertained by this, there would be absolutely no need for putting forward the fact of its being 'annulled',—a fact which, under the definition proposed, can be ascertained only *after* the 'fallaciousness' has been known. Thus then, in your opinion the definition you proposed may or may not be a right one; but we have shown that this definition of 'Annulment' has turned out to be a preposterously wrong one, whereby it has made the 'Annulled' Probans fall off from its very title of 'Fallacious' Probans;—just as it is in the science of Palmistry, (by which science those marks that are held to indicate the definition of the man's very life, are not regarded as marks of the man's own character;—so here also the definition that deprives the Annulled Probans of its very name of 'Fallacious Probans,' cannot be accepted as its definition).

(562) You will perhaps reply that what you mean by the expression '*hēṭvābhāsa*' in your definition is not the 'faulty or fallacious Probans,' but a Probans which is believed to be a similar in character to the true Probans. But even this will not help you; as that a certain Probans is similar to the true Probans cannot be known unless it is *not* a true Probans; as 'similarity' is always perceived between two distinct things. If this were not so (if there were no such difference implied in similarity) the true Probans also would become a 'fallacious' Probans. For this reason, it is necessary that there should be a knowledge of some deficiency in the form of the Probans; and thus there is no escape from the objection urged above (in para. 561).

(563) A fresh definition is proposed:—"That is 'Annulled' which has the contrary of its *Subject* proved by a valid means of cognition." This definition also cannot be maintained; as it becomes applicable to that 'Unknown

Probans' which has its substrate unknown.* "We shall add the further qualification 'other than that Probans which has its substrate unknown' (which would differentiate the 'Annulled' from the 'Unknown' Probans)." Even this will not save you, we reply; as with this qualification the definition would not be applicable to those instances of the 'Annulled' Probans which also fall within, and fulfill the conditions of, that kind of 'Unknown' Probans which has its qualification 'Unknown,'†

(564) With a view to exclude the fallacy of the 'Unknown Substrate,' the Logician proposes another definition:—"That is regarded as 'Annulled,' the negation of *whose Probandum is proved by a valid means of cognition.*" This is not right, we reply; as it is applicable to the wrong Sense-perception also,—this also having the contrary of its 'Probandum'—that is to say, of 'the object made known by it'—proved or made known by a valid means of cognition (*i.e.*, another Perception). "What we mean is that, that is regarded as 'Annulled' which has the contrary of its *Probandum*—that is, that which is its invariable concomitant—made known or proved by a valid means of cognition. [And there is no such concomitance in the case of Perception]." This also is not right, we reply; [as, by this definition, there would be no 'annulment' in the case of the reasoning 'fire is not cold, because it is an effect,']; as in this case the Probandum—'not-hot'—whose contrary or negation is proved

* We have an instance of this latter kind of Probans in the reasoning—'The cool fire is pleasant, because it is fire,' where the 'substrate of the Probans,' the cool fire is an impossibility, an unknown factor; and the contrary of this 'cool fire,' which is the subject of the reasoning, has its contrary—that 'the fire is hot'—'proved' by Perception, which is 'a valid means of cognition.'

† For example, 'the black fire is cool' combines the two fallacies—(1) of having the substrate 'black fire' an unknown quantity, and (2) of being annulled by the perception of fire as hot; and as this would come under the 'Unknown' Probans, it would be excluded by the proposed definition,—even though it is 'annulled' also.

by the valid means of Cognition, Perception, is one with which the Probans—'being an effect'—is not invariably concomitant. "In that case, we may state the definition in the following form—'That is *annulled* which has the contrary of its *declared* Probandum proved by a valid means of cognition'." This also cannot be accepted; as by this definition there would be no 'annulment' in the case of inferences for one's own sake; as in the case of these there is no verbal *declaration* at all,—all verbal declarations being necessary only for the benefit of others. "We shall state the definition in an altered form—'That is *annulled* which has the contrary of its Probandum—*i.e.* of that which *subsists in the Subject*—proved by a valid means of cognition'." Even this cannot be accepted, we reply; because that in which a defective Probandum subsists is held by you to be a 'wrong Subject;' and hence the name 'Subject' could not be applied to it [thus your definition becomes an impossible one, the word 'subject' therein introduced being inapplicable to that for which it is intended]. If, in order to avoid this, you substitute the expression 'wrong Subject' for 'Subject,'—then we would put to you the question as to whether or not the 'wrongness' of the Subject is already known beforehand; and thus render your definition open to the objection that we have urged above (in para. 561), in connection with the question as to whether or not the '*fallaciousness*' of the Probans is known beforehand.

(565) If then you substitute the expression—'that which forms part of what is *intended* to be the Subject'—then, our question is—what do you mean by *being intended to be the Subject*? (a) Do you mean that it is *accepted* as the Subject? (b) Or that it is *rightly known* as the Subject? (c) Or that it is *simply known* as the Subject? (a) The first of these is not possible; as what is accepted as 'Subject' by one party need not be so accepted by his Opponent; on

the contrary, the Opponent, proceeding to 'annull' the Probandum, must accept the Subject of the inference to be a *wrong one*;—it can never be 'accepted as the Subject' by him. In reality, even as regards the party propounding the reasoning, it is not necessary that what is put forward as the Subject must be one that is *accepted* by him as such; as it may so happen that the man, really stupid, regards himself as clever, and, not able to put forward a correct reasoning, puts forward a reasoning which he knows to be wrong (the Subject whereof is not accepted by him to be a true Subject), under the impression that when a clever man like him propounds a reasoning, no one would be able to detect the mistake, even though it be quite manifest! And as in this case the Subject would not be 'accepted as the Subject' by the propounder of the reasoning, the definition proposed would not apply to the 'annulment' of such a reasoning. Nor can 'being accepted as the Subject' be held to mean 'being *put forward* as the Subject;' as in that case the definition would not apply to the 'annulment' of inferences for one's own sake (in which case there is no *putting forward at all*).

(566) (b) The second alternative propounded above cannot be accepted; because there is no room or possibility of 'annulment' with regard to that which is '*rightly* known as the Subject.'

(567) (c) Nor is the third alternative acceptable; as in that case, the definition would assume the following form:—“That is *annulled* which has the contrary of its Probandum—which forms part of that which is *known* as the Subject—proved by a valid means of cognition;”—and what is signified by this sentence we find to be an absolute impossibility: For instance, at the time that the contrary of the Probandum is known by a valid means of cognition, there is no chance for the Subject to be known; as the particular valid cognition

to the contrary being there, there is no room for the Knowledge of the Subject. * And thus there being no 'Knowledge of the Subject', there could be nothing that is 'known as the Subject'; hence to speak of 'a part of what is known as the Subject' would be an absurdity; and this would render absurd that definition which contains this clause as a qualification. On the other hand, if the contrary of the Probandum is not proved by a valid means of cognition, then the absence of this very fact, which forms an integral part of the definition, would render it impossible. Thus then; your definition having been found to be an impossible one in every case, if you seek to establish your object by means of such a definition, your philosophic insight is truly commendable! It may be argued that, according to the theory of the *Vaishēśikas*, the 'Knowledge of the Subject' may be regarded as present, in the condition of being destroyed, at the time that the contrary of the Probandum is known.† This will not be right; as the cognition of the Subject can be destroyed or rejected only by the cognition of the contrary of the Probandum,—while the cognition of the contrary of the Probandum will have to be regarded as appearing before 'the cognition of the Subject'; as otherwise, how could one recognise the fact of the contrary of the Probans being *rightly cognised*? (This recognition being necessary for the urging of the 'annulment') [Thus the necessary simultaneity of the two cognitions is not possible]. The Logician offers another explanation:—
 "What we mean by the Subject being 'known' is not that

* When the cognition to the contrary is valid, the previous cognition must be wrong; and as such not possible when the contrary valid cognition has appeared; also because two cognitions cannot be simultaneous.

† The *Vaishēśika* theory is that cognitions always kill or destroy one another; hence at the time that the knowledge of the contrary of the Probandum appears, it is true that it destroys the knowledge of the Subject; but the former would appear immediately after the latter; and hence at the time that the former appears the latter will be present, though only in that condition in which it is undergoing destruction:—this would be sufficient for the purposes of the definition.

it should be actually known at the time; 'being known' is not an inseparable qualification of the Subject; it is only an adventitious mark; what we mean is that it is one *that is known* (at sometime or other); and even by means of adventitious marks, we do, in ordinary life, recognise objects that bear the mark; for instance, having at one time seen a host of crows seated on the house of Dēvaḍaṭṭa, when we come, at some future time, to indicate the house as 'one with a host of crows', we actually recognise the house, even though the crows may not be present there at the time." This explanation is not tenable, we reply. Because even in the case cited, the house of Dēvaḍaṭṭa has a certain specific inseparable qualification, which also, along with the house itself, is what is indicated by the adventitious mark; and it is through that specific qualification that the house is recognised; and the recognition is *not* due to the *absent* adventitious mark. Then again, in the case in question, what are meant to be indicated by the adventitious mark are individual Subjects (as each Subject can be known only separately); and this makes it impossible for the definition to afford any comprehensive notion of all that is meant to be included in it; specially as you do not find any such adventitious mark as would belong to all the individuals concerned. Hence we conclude that the definition must mean what we have pointed out above (in para. 567); and when we come to look at the definition in that light, we cannot get over the difficulty that it contains an impossible qualification.

(568) In para. 560 it was shown that the definition therein propounded was applicable to wrong Perception also; and in order to avoid this difficulty, the Logician introduced the word 'Probans'; to which also certain objections were taken;—now if in place of the word 'Probans', you were to substitute the expression 'that which is intended to be the Probans', your definition would be open to nearly all the objections that

have been urged by us (in paras 564-567). With a view to exclude wrong Perception, you may state your definition in the following form:—"That which, being other than wrong Perception, has the contrary of its Probandum made known by a valid means of cognition, is called 'annulled'". But this also is not tenable; as even so the definition would apply to wrong *verbal* and *analogical* cognitions. If you add further exceptions to your definition, excluding these cognitions also,—then you will please ponder over this question:—What do you mean by being 'other than wrong Perception, wrong Verbal Cognition and wrong Analogical Cognition?' (a) Do you mean that it is *different in character* from these? (b) Or that it is different from these in form? (c) Or that there is only ordinary mutual negation between the Probans on the one hand and the Cognitions on the other? (a) The first of these is not possible; as you cannot explain what that distinguishing character is. (b) Nor is the second right; as the two being entirely different in form, the definition (containing such an exception) would be absolutely useless. [So far as the indicating of the character of the thing defined is concerned;—as the definition presupposes the fact of wrong Sense-perception &c., being different in form from what is defined; and a knowledge of this implies the knowledge of the form of the thing defined; and if this is already known, there is no need for the definition]. (c) Nor can the third alternative be accepted; as if 'being other than' or 'difference' consists of *mutual negation*, this should subsist in both members of the negation, and as such should belong to the wrong Perception just as well as to the thing defined; which latter therefore, could not be differentiated from the former by that qualification. The Logician argues—"It is not mere 'difference' in general that we have explained as *mutual negation*, but 'difference from Wrong Perception &c.;" and certainly these latter are not 'different from Perception. &c.;" how then can there be any room for the objection just

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urged by you ?” We knew full well that you would argue thus ; but what we have to consider is this—Do you mean that Wrong Perception and the rest form an inseparable qualification for the ‘mutual negation’ ? Or that they form only an adventitious mark for that ‘mutual negation’ which you think, does not apply to, or exclude, the Wrong Perception, &c. The former is not possible ; because nowhere is there any such negation as is *qualified* by its counter-entity (hence Wrong Perception &c. cannot be the qualification of the ‘mutual negation’); and thus the definition, (of which such a ‘mutual negation’ forms an important factor) cannot apply to anything at all.—If the latter alternative is accepted, then that particular form of ‘mutual negation’ which is marked by Wrong Perception &c. would apply, in common, to Wrong Perception &c. as well as to the ‘annulled’ inference ; and thus how do you escape from the objection we have urged above ?

(569) The Logician meets the above objections in the following manner:—“ There may be some other really existing entity that may serve as the inseparable qualification of the mutual negation [so it need not matter if the wrong Perception can not form such a qualification];—then as regards that which forms the counter-entity of the ‘mutual negation’ (*i.e.*, that which is negated by it), it may be regarded as a ‘qualification’ of the negation, by reason of its producing, in regard to the negation that it qualifies, the idea of its being something distinct from itself ; and there is nothing incongruous in this. [And thus, even though the Wrong Perception &c. may not be present in the Annulled Reasoning, there could be a mutual negation qualified by the Wrong Perception].” This is highly improbable, we reply. You have put forward the ‘mutual negation’ *as qualified* ; and it is not possible for this *qualified* negation to be regarded as identical with its own unqualified form ! If this were possible, then you should put forward that unqualified form ;

and it is absolutely useless to insert a qualifying word! But if the qualifying word is omitted, then you would have the mere 'mutual negation;' and this (without the qualifying of 'Wrong Perception' &c.) would include all that you intended to exclude by the mention of the Wrong Perception &c.; (*i.e.* the Wrong Perception &c. themselves). In order to avoid this contingency, it will be necessary for you to mention something more than the mere unqualified 'mutual negation;' in a qualified form. And as regards this view, if the counter-entity of the negation is regarded as the necessary qualification of that negation, then, inasmuch as at the time of the negation the counter-entity could not be present, the *qualified* form of the negation would be an impossibility; and there would be pure negation in its *unqualified* form; and this, as we have already shown, makes the definition too wide. For these reasons, it must be admitted that at the time that we speak of the *qualified thing*, it is not possible to speak of the thing merely by itself, without admitting an additional qualifying factor; hence we conclude that the counter-entity cannot be a *qualification* of the negation. It may however be an adventitious mark of the negation; and this contingency we have already refuted (at the end of para. 568). In order to escape from this difficulty, you will perhaps urge as follows.—“*Mutual Negation* is not one only,—in fact every mutual negation contains two negations with two distinct counter-entities (*i.e.*, the mutual negation of the Wrong Perception and Annulled Probans contains the negation of Wrong Perception and also the negation of the Annulled Probans, and these two negations are quite distinct); and hence the form of the negation as qualified by one counter-entity would be quite distinct from the other counter-entity (so that the Wrong Perception could not be necessarily included in the 'mutual negation of Wrong Perception').” But this will not be quite in keeping with your own view of things; nor will it be right to argue thus. Because though it is true

that in the case of 'mutual negation' there are *two* counter-entities, yet the two are regarded as identical [it is the *identity* of two things that is denied by their mutual negation]; and *identity* is always opposed to *difference*; consequently there is no possibility of a difference in that form in which the two things can be regarded as counter-entities of the mutual negation; whence then can there be any possibility of the mutual negation having two distinct counter-entities? And as regards that form in which the two things might differ from each other,—it is not in that form that they form the counter-entity of the negation. "As a matter of fact however, the two things are entirely distinct; how then can the two things be taken as *one* when regarded as the 'counter-entity' of mutual negation?" Our answer to this is that this would be exactly in the same manner as even when the jar is *not* in contact with the point of the earth's surface, yet it is *as related to that point* that it is regarded as the counter-entity of the negation of contact with that surface. [The 'contact of the jar' being what is denied by the negation]. In this latter case, it is true that another jar may have been seen as being in contact with the point of the earth's surface; but in the same manner, in the case in question (of mutual negation) also, the two things, though different in certain respects, have been found to be in some respects identical (in so far as both are 'knowable,' 'predicable' and so forth). All this however, we are putting forward only on the basis of your own theories; hence it is no concern of ours to answer objections to what we are saying. We close further discussion on this subject.

(570) Then again, the conception of 'mutual negation' between the Jar and the Cloth, is possible only when these two are regarded as the two opposite poles, considered as entirely distinct, on account of their having distinct forms as well as distinct properties;—in the case under discussion,

it may be possible for the *Wrong Perception*, &c. to be conceived of as one pole, forming the single concept of 'Wrong Perception and the rest'; but in what manner could any such single concept—and idea of one pole—be formed of all that is to be comprehended as 'other than Wrong Perception and the rest'? This idea cannot be formed on the basis of the form that varies with each individual (that happens to be different from 'Wrong Perception and the rest'); as the number of such individuals being endless, it is absolutely impossible to conceive of all of them at any one time. Nor will it be right for you to urge that "the conception of mutual negation can be formed on the basis of that comprehensive form which is meant to be qualified by the qualification of 'being other than Wrong Perception and the rest'."—This will not be right; because, as already pointed out above—(i.e., inasmuch as no notion of the *qualified* is possible without that of the *qualification*), that form would include 'the Wrong Perception and the rest' also; so that there would not be *two poles* at all; and without the 'two poles,' no conception of 'mutual negation' would be possible. For these reasons, we find that it is impossible to form any idea of 'mutual negation', unless there is some idea of two opposite poles, formed on the basis of either difference of form or difference of properties;—and we have also found that any attempt to form such an idea on the basis of difference of form is beset with difficulties; hence it becomes necessary for you to point out some difference of properties. As a matter of fact, however, you cannot point out any such difference. Even if it were somehow possible, to point out this difference of properties, it would be far better to base your definition upon this difference, rather than have recourse to the objectionable subterfuge of the 'mutual negation.'

(571) Whenever the propounder of definitions is hard-pressed, the only weapon that he has recourse to is to add to his definition qualifying clauses for the exclusion of all those

cases that his adversary brings forward as falling under his definition and vitiating it ;—and the reasonings we have shown above will serve to demolish this sole refuge of the propounder of definitions. It is for this same reason, that all intelligent persons laugh at the *Vaishēṣika*'s idea of regarding 'being different from something else' as a qualification sufficient for purposes of a definition ;—the reason for this scoffing being that it is impossible to form an idea of anything being 'different' from another, unless there is some other differentiating factor (on the basis of which the differentiating could be made) ; and every definition put forward by the *Vaishēṣika* is met by these intelligent men by the counter-reasoning—'the thing you define cannot be as you define it, because being different from everything else to which the definition could apply, it is knowable.'

END OF CHAPTER I.

CHAPTER II.

SECTION (1).

*Ineffectiveness of the Naiyāyika's Nigrahasṭhānas or
'Clinchers' as against the Vedānta.*

A—[Having found that it is not possible to propound suitable definitions of the *Pramānas*, Perception, Inference and the rest, or of the *Pramāṇabhāsas*, the *Hēṭvābhāsa*, &c., whereby the validity of the Vedānta view could be vitiated,—the Logician now falls back upon his 'clinchers' or *Nigrahasṭhānas*, which afford to him the means of silencing his opponents in discussions. And he takes up *Pratijñāhāni*, which is the *first* to be mentioned among 'clinchers'.]

[PAGE 511] (1) Says the Logician—"If we cannot define the *hēṭvābhāsas*, then we have the 'clinchers'—'Recantation' and the rest (described in *Nyāya-Sūtra* 5. 2. 1.)—which would invalidate the philosophy of *non-duality*." This cannot be, we reply. For what is '*pratijñāhāni*', or 'Recantation' (which is the first of the twenty-two Clinchers mentioned by Gauṭama)? It will not be right to define it as the retracting or denying of what has been admitted and asserted; as this definition will apply to that case in which one makes a certain assertion and (himself finding it wrong) quickly retracts it; while as a matter of fact, this is not (according, to the Logician himself) a case of 'clinchier'. And in order to avoid this difficulty it will be necessary for you to add the further qualification that the *retracting* be done after the assertion has been found fault with *by the opponent*. [And in thus propounding, at the outset, on unqualified definition, and subsequently, adding a qualification, the Logician himself becomes open to the fifth 'clinchier', called '*hēṭvanṭara*'.]

(2) In the above definition, what do you mean by the something being '*svikṛita*', *admitted*? Does it mean only that the thing is *simply accepted*? or that it is *accepted as existing*, as a real entity? If the former, then, as a matter of fact, you will find that in every case, you have the *denial* of something, in one form, which is *desired* or *accepted* in

another form [even in the case of the perfectly true denial 'sound is not eternal', you have the *denial of sound*, which is desired or accepted,—though it is true that sound is accepted, in the form of *quality*, as being a quality, and it is denied, as eternal; yet the *denial of the accepted* is there all the same]; thus the definition would, in this case, become too wide.

“What is meant by the word ‘*tyāga*’ ‘retraction’ in the definition is that denying which comes after acceptance; and in the case you have cited the acceptance is not *in the form* in which the denial follows; and hence there being no real ‘retraction’ in this case, the definition, does not apply to this case”.

This will not be right, we reply; as by your explanation, the idea of *acceptance*, being implied by the word ‘retract’, the word ‘*svīkṛiṭa*’ ‘accepted’, ‘admitted’, in the definition would be superfluous. If in view of this superfluity, you omit the word ‘*svīkṛiṭa*’ from the definition,—even then, neither of the two alternatives put forward above (in connection with the meaning of the word ‘*svīkṛiṭa*’) would be admissible. As [the first alternative has already been shown to be inadmissible; and as regards the second alternative, that the word means *being accepted as a real entity*] with regard to *what is accepted as a real entity*, it is always possible to regard it is *not accepted*, in some other form. And [even if you urge that both the *acceptance* and the *denial* should pertain to one and the same form of the thing, and not to different forms of it], we shall urge against you the case of the Logician’s own theory that Conjunction and such qualities exist only in parts of their substratum, by which theory, (in the case of the conjunction of the jar and the all-pervading *ākāsha*) the Logician both *accepts* and *denies* the presence of Conjunction in *ākāsha* [in which case the acceptance and denial both pertain to the same conjunction and the same *ākāsha*]. Similarly also with the case of many things) whose existence is both accepted

and denied with reference to different points of time and place—the same thing being accepted as existent at one place and time, and denied to exist at another place and time.

“But what we mean is that the thing that is denied in a certain form at a certain time and place by a certain man should be the same thing that has been accepted in the same form by the same man at the same time and at the same place.” In that case there would be no ‘recantation’ when a man admits the existence of Time and then denies it; as with regard to Time the qualification ‘at the same time’ would be impossible; as any one point of time cannot subsist either in itself or in any other point of time [hence no ‘time’ can be predicated of any point of time, in the form ‘the time at the same time.’] If (in order to avoid this difficulty) you omit the qualification ‘at the same time’ in the definition as pertaining to *Time*, and insert it in the same as pertaining to other things, then you fail to provide a single definition for all kinds of ‘Recantation’. If, in view of this difficulty, ‘Recantation’ be not regarded as reprehensible, so far as assertions with reference to Time are concerned, then its reprehensibility could similarly be denied in all other cases also.

Nor again is it ever possible for the *denial* to come exactly *at the same time* as the *acceptance*.

“What is meant by *at the same time* is at the time of, during, that discussion (and not precisely at the same moment of time).”

This is not right; if by ‘that discussion’ is meant any particular discussion, then the definition would not be a comprehensive one (each definition applying to only a single discussion); if, on the other hand, all forms of all three kinds of discussion be meant, then this would lead to the absurd contingency that if a person once admits something [for the sake of mere disputation, in the course of a Wrangling discussion] he will be prevented (on pain of becoming open to the charge of *Recantation*) from ever making any

assertions to the contrary (in the course of any discussion that he may enter into, in the course of his life). Similar objections could be taken against the qualifications of the same form 'of the same thing' and so forth.

(3) The definition is open to yet another objection :— The word 'asserted' has been added for the purpose of differentiating 'Recantation' from '*Apasiddhānta*' or 'absence of any definite view' (which is another kind of 'clincher'). But even without being asserted, if a certain fact is merely admitted, and then denied, this should be enough to vitiate the man's position; consequently the addition of any further qualification would be entirely superfluous; and the definition containing such a qualification would be open [to the charge of 'superfluity'; just as in the case of the Contradictory Probans, the mere fact of its being related to 'that where the Probandum never subsists, being sufficient to mark it as 'fallacious', it has been considered (by the Logician himself) entirely superfluous to further qualify its definition by the specification that it should be present only in that where the Probandum never subsists.

B.—[The first Clincher '*Pratijñāhāni*' having been disposed of, the author takes up the second, '*Pratijñāntara*' or 'Shifting of Ground.'

[Page 514.] (4) In describing the 'Clinchers,' you speak of 'Recantation and the rest'; now what is it that is included in the phrase 'and the rest'? You cannot answer that it includes '*Pratijñāntara*' or 'Shifting of Ground' and the other Clinchers. For you cannot provide an adequate explanation of this 'Shifting of Ground.' For instance, one definition that has been proposed by you is as follows :—“In course of a discussion, on finding the statement of his case assailed and criticised by the opponent, if one states his case in another form, adding qualifications not mentioned before,—he becomes open to the charge of having *shifted his ground*.” This definition

cannot be accepted. As it would be too wide, being applicable in the following case of correct rejoinder:—the man states his case in a qualified form,—the Opponent not minding the qualification, assails the statement in its unqualified form, —the former party thereupon re-iterates his statement with the qualified form, adding the statement ‘this is the form in which I had stated my case, and not in the unqualified form criticised by you; thus you become subject to the *clincher* of assailing what should not be assailed.’ “How can our definition apply to this case of correct rejoinder, when there is no addition by the first party of any *qualification* not already present in the first statement?” This will not help you; as the *prāgabhāva*, ‘prior negation,’ of the qualification was certainly there before the qualification was re-iterated.* “But precisely *at the time* that there was ‘prior negation’ of the qualification, the statement with the qualification was also not there [so that there is no mention of what is not mentioned].”

True; but in what way does it meet the undesirable extension of the definition due to there being ‘non-mention to the qualification’?† “What is meant by the definition is that there should be non-mention of the qualification *at the time* that the qualified statement is made [so that it does not matter if there is non-mention before this latter statement.]”

* All that the definition makes necessary is that there should be subsequent mention of a qualification of which there was *no mention* before: *non-mention* means *absence or negation of mention*; according to the Logician there are three kinds of absence or negation, one of which is the *prāgabhāva* or prior negation; by which is meant the absence of a thing before it comes into existence; now in the case of a question, where the qualification is reiterated, there is the *prior negation* of the qualification; that is, there is the absence of mention of the qualification; thus the non-mention of the qualification being there, its subsequent mention involves the ‘mentioning of a qualification not-mentioned before’; and this satisfies the conditions of the definition

† It is enough for the application of the definition to the case in question that there was ‘non-mention,’ of some sort, of the qualification, which is mentioned subsequently; it makes no difference if this mention comes only subsequently, and is not present at the time of the non-mention.

This also will not help you ; as it being absolutely impossible for any two statements by one and the same person to be present at the same time,—in the case cited by us, as in all similar cases, this condition will always be present [as the mention of the qualification will never be present at the same time that the qualified statement is made].

“What is meant is, not that the non-mention of the qualification should be there precisely at the same moment as the qualified statement is there ; what is meant is that the non-mention should be there *after* the qualified statement.” This is not right, we reply ; as in that case, the definition will apply to the case of such compounds as ‘blue-lotus’, where the qualification ‘blue’ comes before the qualified ‘lotus’ [so that *after* the utterance of ‘blue lotus’ there is ‘non-mention of the qualification’ *blue*]. “What we mean is that it should come immediately *before* the qualified statement.” Then the definition will apply to the case of the expression ‘*uṭpalam nīlam*’, ‘the lotus blue’ (where the qualification comes *after* the qualified). “It need not be specified whether the non-mention should be *before* or *after* ; we say simply that it should be in *immediate proximity* to it.” But this will apply to that case where there are more than one qualification [in which case *immediate proximity* is impossible]. “Well, we shall say that the non-mention of the qualification shall be there *at the time when the qualification could be mentioned*.” This also will not help you ; for in a case where there are more than one qualification to a thing, when this qualified thing comes to be spoken of,—as the mention of a number of things must be in some order of sequence,—it is inevitable that the qualifications be mentioned one after the other ; now the time at which the *first* qualification is mentioned will be also *the time when the second qualification could be mentioned* (there being no hard and fast rule as to the exact order in which the qualifications of a certain thing should be mentioned) ; and thus in this case also there being non-mention of all those other qualifica-

tions at the time when they *could be mentioned*, the definition becomes applicable. "Well, in order to avoid all these difficulties, we shall say that it is necessary that the qualification be not mentioned *at any time which is proper for its mention.*" This will not be right; as if you regard the time after the statement of the criticism by the opponent to be the 'proper time', then the definition fails to apply to the real cases of 'ground-shifting'; [as in all these the qualification being mentioned *after* the criticism, there is no 'non-mention' at the time.] If, on the other hand, you regard the time *before* the criticism as the 'proper time',—then the definition will, as already shown before, become applicable to the case where the first statement is made with the qualification, but the opponent, not noticing the qualification, offers his criticism of the unqualified statement, whereupon the first party reiterates the qualification; as in this case the second mention of the qualification, which comes *after* the criticism, is not there *before the criticism* [so that there is 'non-mention' of the qualification *before the criticism*]. "What is meant is the 'non-mention of the qualification' as a class (and not any particular kind of 'non-mention') [So that in the last case cited, even though the 'non-mention of qualification' comes *after* the criticism, yet it is of the same class as the 'non-mention of qualification *before* the criticism']." This is not right, we reply; for as a matter of fact, it is absolutely impossible for persons of ordinary powers of cognition like ourselves, to form any conception, by any means of cognition, of all those endless individual 'mentions of qualification' which constitute the class whose absence is held to be meant by the 'non-mention'; and thus the absence of these also being incapable of being grasped, the definition (of which this absence of mention forms an integral part) becomes incomprehensible, and hence *impossible*. As for the Logician's theory that all individuals of a class appear to our mind by the 'contact of generalities', this has been already refuted by us in the section on *Inference*.

(5) These same arguments also serve to set aside the view that to the definition given at the opening of para. 4, we should add a further qualification 'that which has been stated at first in an unqualified form'; even with this qualification, the definition will apply to the case of such qualified statements as 'the lotus blue' [as we have shown how it is possible for a qualified object whose qualification is mentioned after itself, to be regarded as 'stated at first in the unqualified form'. Further, having at first stated your definition in one form, and then subsequently added to it further qualifications, you would yourself become subject to the clincher of '*hēṣvanṭara*'. [This clincher being defined in Gauṭama Sūtra 5. 2. 7 as that which 'a person incurs when, finding his unqualified statement refuted he adds to it further qualifications']. And if even in face of this the clincher of '*hēṣvanṭara*' does not attach to you because you find the subsequent addition of the further qualification necessary), then for me, your adversary, also against whom you would urge the clincher of '*praṭijñāṅṭara*' solely on the ground of the subsequent mention of qualifications) how could there be any '*praṭijñāṅṭara*'?

(6) If, then, in order to escape from the clincher of '*hēṣvanṭara*', you state your definition of '*praṭijñāṅṭara*', at the very outset, (not in the form in which you have stated it in the beginning of para. 4. but) along with the further qualification (mentioned at the beginning of para. 5),—then, firstly the definition will become too narrow: as it will not apply to the following case (which should be one of real '*Pratijñāṅṭara*):—The man makes a qualified statement at the outset,—then feeling that the qualification may be superfluous, he withdraws the qualification,—and on this unqualified statement being criticised by his opponent, he again puts forward the statement in the qualified form. [The definition would fail to apply to this, as in this case the first statement would not be in the unqualified form, a condition necessary

by the qualified definition now put forward]. Secondly [there is yet another objection to which your definition as stated now with a qualification, as well as in the unqualified form in which it was stated first is open] your definition becomes too narrow in another sense also: the definition contains the words 'sva' ('oneself'), 'para' ('opponent') 'sādhyā' ('case') and 'pūrva' ('before'); and when we come to ponder over the signification of these words, we find that they must refer to individuals ('sva' referring to a particular individual person, and so on); and thus the definition containing these words will not apply to any other case of 'Pratijñāntara' save the one in which those particular individuals would be concerned. *Thirdly*, the definition would apply to the following case of correct reasoning also: The first party makes a certain statement, omitting those qualifications that are already indicated by the context, the particular occasion &c. (and whose explicit mention, on that account, is thought uncalled for);—the Opponent, not understanding the reason of the omission, criticises the bare statement (on the absence of the qualifications);—the first party thereupon explains his position, supplementing his former statement by the direct mention of those qualifications that are indicated by the context &c. (and had on that account been omitted). [This case will fall within the definition, as the former statement is in the unqualified form, and qualifications, not mentioned before, are subsequently added.] Lastly, with a view to escape from this last difficulty, you may substitute, in your definition, the word 'apratipādita', 'not indicated or made known,' in place of the word 'anukṣā' 'not mentioned' [So that what is indicated by context &c. would not be 'apratipādita', and hence the case cited would not fall within the definition];——but in that case, the definition will be open to the objection that, inasmuch as the other party does not comprehend the qualification as indicated by the context, it

cannot be regarded as 'indicated' or 'made known' to him; [and from the fact that he criticises the statement on the ground of its being *unqualified*, it is clear that he does not comprehend the qualification]. And so on, many other objections could be multiplied.

C.—[The definition of the *third Clincher*, *Pratijñāvirodha*, 'Contradiction of one's own statement' is next taken up.]

(7.) What again do you mean by 'Pratijñāntara and the rest?' "We refer to the Contradictory Statement, *Pratijñāvirodha* and the other Clinchers." This is not right; as *Pratijñāvirodha*, has been defined as that contingency which arises when there is a contradiction between any two statements made by a person in the course of his observations during discussion,—this contradiction not necessarily involving the putting forward of any thing contravening the proposition that that person has undertaken to prove (as is found to be the case with the Fallacious Reason, called 'Contradictory');——and this definition cannot be accepted as a correct one; as it would apply to such assertions as '*iha bhūṭalē ghato nāsti*,' 'there is no jar in this place'; for two statements are said to be 'contradictory' when what one of them expresses is directly contrary to what the other expresses; and such a contradiction we find in the case of the statement *iha bhūṭalē ghataḥ na asti*; where the words '*ghataḥ asti*' expresses *affirmation*, the existence of the jar, while the word '*na*' expresses the denial of the same existence (and certainly the affirmation of one thing is contrary to its denial). "Your reasoning is most improper; the words of the sentence *ghataḥ nāsti* do not in reality express the affirmation and denial of the jar's existence; and it would be only if such were the case that there would be a contradiction; as a matter of fact, it is the jar that is denied; it is only the *denial* (or non-existence) of the jar that is expressed; how then can there be any contradiction in this?"

This argument is not sound, we reply. You must admit that the word '*ghataḥ*' of the sentence expresses the affirmation or presence of the jar, and the phrase '*na aṣṭi*' expresses its denial or absence. If you do not admit this, then, by your admission, there would be no contradiction (and consequent incongruity) between the meaning of '*ghataḥ*' and '*na aṣṭi*;' and the result of this would be that the sentence '*iha bhūṭalē ghataḥ na aṣṭi*' would have to be regarded as expressing the affirmation of the presence of both the jar and its relation at the same place (*bhūṭala*)! As this would be absurd, it must be admitted that the word '*ghataḥ*' affirms the presence of the jar, while '*na*' denies it. Under the circumstances, the statement '*iha bhūṭalē ghataḥ nāṣṭi*' fulfils every one of the conditions of your definition. For instance, firstly are not the two words ('*ghataḥ*' and '*na*') parts of the observation made by one and the same person? Secondly, do not they express meanings contrary to each other? How can your definition then not apply to this case? "Two statements are regarded as mutually 'contradictory', not simply when they express meanings contrary to each other, but only when one of them affirms the presence of something with regard to a certain time and place, and the other affirms with regard to that same time and place the presence of that which is contrary to the former thing; and in the case in question, the words '*na*' and '*aṣṭi*' do not affirm the presence and absence (of the jar) with regard to the same time and place". This will not help you, we reply; as we have already answered this [that is, what we have already said above meets this last argument of yours]; for all that you and I have been saying on this point presupposes that it is with regard to the same time and place; otherwise—unless two contradictory statements pertain to the same time and place—there can be no contradiction at all.

(8) Then again, we ask—You speak of the presence, at one and the same time and place, of mutually contradictory things ; now is this co-existence real, *rightly cognised* or not ? If you hold it to be real, *rightly cognised*, then your use of the word ‘contradictory’ must be in some extraordinary technical sense (and not in the sense that is attached to it in ordinary language)* ; as from the very fact of the two things co-existing at the same time and place being true or *rightly cognised*, all idea of ‘contradiction’ between them must cease forthwith.

If, on the other hand, you do not hold the co-existence to be real, *rightly cognised*,—then as a matter of fact, such ‘incongruity of co-existence as is *not rightly cognised*, i. e., unreal, would be present everywhere (as in the case of true co-existence also, there would be an unreal or false contradiction) ; and thus your definition (speaking of a contradiction that could be present everywhere) would become too wide.

“ What the contradiction or incongruity lies between are the two things as they are spoken of by the Opponent (and not as they actually exist) ; and certainly there are valid means of *rightly cognising* the contradiction between these.” †

This is not right ; it may be possible to show that the fact is somehow subject to the operation of some valid means of right cognition (verbal for instance) ; but even so, with the explanation that you provide of the ‘contradiction’ urged by you remains a mere conventional technicality [and has no meaning] ; for even the assertion that—‘ the matter (of co-existence) as stated by the Opponent involves a contradiction ’—cannot be made until one has

*The right cognition of the companionship or co-existence of two things implies that it is possible for them to co-exist and, on the ordinary notions of ‘contradiction’, the fact of two things being contradictories means that they can never co-exist.

†That is to say, ‘contradiction’ lies in the fact of the opponent speaking of two things as co-existent at the same time and place, when they are not so co-existent ; and this fact can certainly be true, and *rightly cognised*, by means of the word used by the opponent ; so long as the words actual^{ly} express what is in the mind of the speaker the cognition of what is thus expressed by ourselves, can be regarded as valid.

already got the right cognition of the contradiction [and if the 'contradiction' is rightly cognised it ceases to be a *contradiction* in the proper sense of the word; and under the circumstances, when you proceed to prove the conclusion 'the Opponent's assertion is one that involves contradiction', you make use of a meaningless epithet, and this makes your argument fallacious].

"But what we do is not to prove, or state an argument for, the presence of contradiction; all that we mean is to subject the Opponent to a hypothetical confutation by showing that by his own admission he is open to the charge of 'contradiction'".* But this also will not help you; as without having had some sort of a right cognition of 'contradiction,' you could not indicate it even by way of hypothetical confutation.†

(9) "There may be no *right* cognition of the co-existence involving contradiction; we could certainly speak of it (without having a right cognition of it) through the wrong cognition that we may have of it (as in cases where we deny wrong conceptions)".

This will not be right, we reply; for what case is there against which one can not put forward a 'contradiction' which is more apparent than real, and of which he has only a wrong idea? And as this could be urged against all cases, the definition (containing the word 'contradiction') becomes as improperly wide as we have pointed out above.

"The two things between which contradiction is pointed out are certainly such as have

*The difference between *sādhana*, *proving* and 'prasañjana' 'hypothetical confutation,' lies in this that in *proving* one has to have recourse to all the details of correct and accurate argumentation; which has been shown to be difficult in the case in question;—in the case of hypothetical confutation however much accuracy is not necessary; all that is necessary is to point out to the other party that in case he admits a certain thing he will make himself open to serious undesirable consequences.

†Even in this some sort of notion of invariable concomitance is necessary between the contradiction and what the opponent admits; and no concomitance can be cognised until we have right notions of the members concomitant.

been rightly cognised ; but they have been rightly cognised apart from one another, each by itself ; and what the contradiction is urged against is the bringing together of the two by forming a conception of them as co-existing at the same time and place. [That is, in urging the contradiction, it is not necessary to have the right cognition of the two factors *as co-existent*].”

This also will not be right, we reply ; as it is not the two things taken individually that involves anything undesirable for the Opponent ; but only the two taken together, as co-existent ; and the urging of this co-existence (in course of hypothetical confutation) depends upon that character (*f. i.* ‘being mutually contradictory’) which is concomitant with such co-existence ; thus if this character of the co-existence is definitely rightly cognised (as formerly declared by you) then there can be no incongruity in the co-existence ; and if the character (that is, the contradiction) is not rightly cognised (as you have held subsequently), then it is not possible for it to be urged (by way of hypothetical confutation).

“ It will be possible to urge the two things (that are concomitant with the contradiction), not collectively, but individually,—pointing out that one (which has been rightly cognised by itself) is contradictory to the other (which also has been rightly cognised by itself) (so that no right cognition of the two together is necessary).”

This will not be right ; as there is no contradiction between the two taken individually by themselves (the contradiction lying only in their co-existence at one time and place).

“ But even when we take the two individually, this would imply the two collectively (and the consequent contradiction, which is the concomitant of both collectively).”

This cannot be, we reply ; as this implication would mean that the co-existence of the two is rightly cognised by the valid instrumentality of Presumption ; and the fact of the co-existence being rightly cognised would remove all possibility of any idea of contradiction bet-

ween them being entertained. It will not be right to urge against this that implication is not proof, so that when the co-existence is merely *implied*, it does not mean that it is *proved*;—and this will not be right; nor, in the first place, the two things being mutually contradictory, if one were to urge a confutation on the basis of this contradiction, which could only be brought home by taking the two things collectively, and which contradiction, as such, would not be regarded as *proved*, such a confutation (being based upon something that is not proved, and being not based upon the man's own convictions) would not be a correct or true confutation;—and secondly [if, in order to avoid this, the contradiction were sought to be brought home by taking each of the two things individually, there would be no contradiction at all, as it is only the co-existence of the two that involves contradiction; and] this indirect indication of absence of contradiction would be quite acceptable to the Opponent (and the confutation would thus be a failure). “How can it be so (acceptable) when there is a distinct contradiction between the two things?” But the fact is that the contradiction is attendant upon the co-existence of the two things; and hence exists upon, and belongs to, both; consequently, the contradiction would cease to be nugatory; as it would be necessary to have right cognitions of the two things (as co-existent); and when there is right cognition of this, the contradiction cannot be regarded as a true contradiction, and it must fail to have any nugatory force in a confutation.

SECTION (2).

[The Opponent, being unable to answer the objections urged by the Vedantin, makes a last attempt to turn the tables on the latter, and seeks to silence him by arguing that in course of his reasonings against his antagonist, the Vedantin, with a view to obtain victory, has recourse to those same fallacies and clinchers that the Logician has adopted. Hence the objections that he urges against these as employed by the Logician are equally applicable to their employment by himself. The answer of the Vedantin is that he uses against the Logician the implements that the latter himself has forged ; and whose effectiveness he cannot deny, ; but as for the Vedantin himself, in so far he does not admit their effectiveness, they can have no force against him.]

(10) The Opponent retorts—"All these objections that

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you bring forward (against our use of such words as 'Contradiction' and the like) can be easily turned against yourself, when you put them forward in course of your 'refutation' [wherein also you make use of many such words and phrases, explanations whereof will be open to all these objections that you have urged against our use of them]."

Not so, we reply. For when you thus have recourse to the argument of retaliation, that you would urge the same arguments against me (that I have urged against you), what is your meaning? Do you mean simply to indicate the weakness in your opponent's reasoning? or do you do so with the ulterior motive that, in case I attempt to put forward an answer to the objections as urged against me, you would put forward that same answer to them as urged by me against you? In case the former is your meaning, that cannot be; as such finding fault with another before having met the arguments against oneself is highly objectionable and unreasonable; specially as by the rules of debate, if one party fails to answer the objections that have been urged against him by the other party, this either puts an end to the whole debate, which cannot proceed any further, in case the debate is in the form of *Wrangling*, where it is enough for one party to indicate blemishes in his Opponent's view, in order to obtain victory),—or puts an end to

one half of the debate [in case it is in the form of Controversy or Discussion, in which case the criticism of the Opponent's theory is only half of the debate, the other half consisting of establishing one's own view of the case]; as *Wrangling* has its end in the silencing of one party and Controversy and Discussion come to an end if either party fails to answer the objections urged against himself. [In any case there can be no further opportunity of speaking for the person who has failed to answer objections].

(11) If then, you accept the second alternative [*i.e.* you put forward the retaliatory argument in the hope that you will employ in support of yourself the answer that I may give to your retaliatory argument];—then, we put forward that same answer; what harm could that do me (who am prepared to carry my refutation further, as I have not exhausted my armour in putting forward the objections I have urged). “You please just mention how you will answer the objection as urged against you; after that I shall make my answer.” But, as a matter of fact, the present occasion is not the right time for me to put forward an explanation or answer; we did not begin the present discussion on the understanding that I was to establish my position and you were to demolish it by urging objections against it; in fact we began on the understanding that you were to establish your position and I was to find objections against it; and in course of a discussion started on this understanding, what right have you to urge me to offer arguments in support of my own position?

(12) The Opponent explains—“If you ask what special purpose I have in view in ascertaining what your answer to the objections will be, my reply is that any answer that there may be to the objections as urged against your view will certainly be accepted as valid and true, specially in reference to your own position (and it will then be easy for

me to retort and put forward the same answer with reference to my position)." This also is not right, we reply;

for from the mere fact that there is an answer to the objections as urged against my view, it does not follow that the same answer will be available in favour of your view also.

"The same answer will apply to both of us, for the simple reason that the objections are the same in both cases."

Certainly not; some difference in the objections urged against the two views is absolutely certain (for the simple reason that the two views are mutually contradictory, and as such cannot be open to the same set of objections). For instance, if a certain answer were available, in reference to my view,—either on the basis of a certain unique feature in that view, or on the basis of a certain theory which is accepted by a philosophical system allied to my particular philosophy, and which is not denied by us;—how could one be sure that such an answer would be available for your view also, simply on the ground of the similarity of the objections?—when the two factors, on the basis of which the answer has been propounded, cannot apply to your view [the 'unique feature' of my view not being present in your view, and the philosophical system allied to my system not being necessarily allied to yours also]. "What is that *unique feature* (in your view)?" I have already told you that the present is not the occasion for me to make any statement as to my views.

(13) "Inasmuch as the objections are the same in both cases, the answer also will be on similar lines (even though it may not be the same exactly)." This also will not be possible; there is every chance of there being differences in the answer in the two cases, in view of the exact form of the answer being dependent upon the presence or absence of certain peculiarities in the view against which are urged the objections sought to be met by the answer; and also upon other circumstances. As for example, what necessitates the

postulating of the genus 'Being' is the idea that we have, in ordinary experience, of things *being existent*; so far all are agreed; but when it comes to the asserting of the presence of this genus in certain substrates, one may hold that it subsists in a particular 'Being' itself (which also is something existing), while another may hold that it subsists only in Substance, Quality and Action (and not in *Being*); now in this case, if an objection is raised against the subsistence of 'Being' in *Being* as well as in Substance and the rest,—though the objection will be the same in both cases, yet the person who holds it to subsist in Substance &c., will be able to offer in answer the explanation that the postulating of 'Being' in Substance can be accepted as it does not involve any illogical contingency; while the upholder of the view that 'Being' subsists in *Being* will be unable to offer the same answer; as in his case the postulating of *Being* as the substrate of 'Being' will involve the illogical contingency of having to postulate an endless series of Beings. Similarly in many cases we find that even when the objections are similar the answer cannot be similar.

(14) Further, without answering these objections of your Opponent which urge against you the fallacies of 'Uncertainty' and the like, you rise against him with a retaliatory argument;—now what do you mean by this? (a) Do you mean by this that the objection that your opponent has urged is no objection at all, as it applies also to the view that is not objectionable (*i.e.* the Opponent's own view, which, for him, must be unobjectionable)? (b) Or that even though the objection is real, yet it should not have been urged by the Opponent, as the objection affects equally the views of both,—in accordance with the law that—when an objection is equally present in the views of both disputants,—and and when an explanation, if possible, is also available for both,—such an objection is not to be urged by either party against the other, in course of a discussion?

[PAGE 528] (15) (a) The former cannot be your meaning; for if the discrepancy that has been urged fulfils the conditions of the fallacy of 'uncertainty,' or any other fallacy that may have been urged,—then it is impossible either to deny that it is a serious discrepancy that vitiates the view, or to find an answer to it; and if a suitable answer is found possible, then the conditions laid down for the discrepancy or fallacy (which conditions are, *ex hypothesi*, fulfilled by the case in question) are not the true conditions of that fallacy. "If what is urged by the Opponent is a real discrepancy, then, how is it that it is found applicable to the view which my Opponent accepts as free from discrepancies and unobjectionable? And that the objection is applicable to this latter view is shown by our retaliatory argument."* But do please also pay your attention to this question—If it is not a real objection, how is it that it fulfils the conditions of the fallacy on which the objection is based? "Well, as there is nothing to decide which of these two views of the objection is the true one, this gives rise to an uncertainty as to the reality of the objection." Let there be a mere uncertainty; even the slightest doubt as to the presence of objectionable fallacies in your argument vitiates the efficiency of that argument; as in the case of that particular kind of 'fallacious reason' which has been called '*sandigd̥hāsidd̥ha*,' 'whose validity is doubtful.' And further, the fallacy that the Logician seeks to make doubtful in the present connection fulfils certain conditions; if even so it is doubtful, then in all other cases when it is found to fulfil exactly those conditions, the Logician will have to reject the invalidative efficiency of that fallacy;—and in so doing he will deny the efficacy

* The meaning is that if the objection is applicable to the disputant's own faultless view, then it cannot be a true objection; as for its fulfilling the conditions laid down for the fallacy that is urged,—well, if it is found to be so widely and improperly applicable, we should simply find out some other definition for that fallacy.

of the fallacy postulated and defined by himself! This retaliatory argument is difficult to be answered by the Logician who is himself over-fond of putting forward retaliatory arguments!

(16) Nor can the latter alternative (mentioned in para. 14) represent your meaning. For as a matter of fact, [one cannot desist from urging an objection simply for fear of its being urged against himself; *e.g.*] even though both disputants recognise the validity and unobjectionability of such inferences as that of fire from smoke and the like, yet if one party should urge objections against that valid inference, the other party could not, even with reference to other details of his opponent's view, bring forward, against his arguments, the fallacies of 'uncertainty' &c., for fear lest the same fallacies be applicable also to his own arguments;—such for instance, as his inference of fire from smoke.* This is a retaliatory argument that I can bring forward against my Opponent; and in this connection also I may quote in support of my own view, the law quoted above by my opponent—'When an objection is equally resent &c. &c.†

'We do not mean that no objections at all shall be put forward; what we mean is that one should not put forward only those particular phases of the objection on the presence whereof in his own views his opponent may bring forward the retaliatory argument against him.' This also will not be right; for the presence of this retaliatory argument itself would prove that the particular objectionable phase put forward by me is not really objectionable; and being thus deprived of its objectionable character, if the definition of 'objection' or 'fallacious reason' applies to

*One can never be sure that the objections he is putting forward may not be urged against himself also. And so, if one were to desist from bringing forward objections for fear of his own view being assailed by the same, then, no objections would ever be urged by anyone.

† That is, just as my opponent brings up a retaliatory argument against me, in the same manner I also bring up a retaliatory argument against him.

it, such a definition cannot be regarded as correct ; and, if, in order to escape from this difficulty, you were to restate your definition of the 'fallacious reason', with qualifications which would serve to exclude those objections that are deprived of their objectionable character by retaliatory arguments, then, in that case, it would be much more reasonable for you to show that the definition of 'fallacious reason' is not applicable to what has been urged against you, rather than go about propounding retaliatory arguments, which would be absolutely futile.

"When the other party bases his retaliatory argument upon something which is held to be flawless or unobjectionable according to my view of things, then he could very well retaliate by saying — 'You should not put forward any objections against this ; if you do, then, by the same reasoning, what has been accepted by you (as true) will be demolished'. [And herein lies the use of the retaliatory argument]." This explanation of yours is not right ; for it is quite possible for the retaliatory argument to be stated in a form inviting the statement of objections, in the following form :—' You should state your objections to this ; as in the case of your not stating them, the undesirable contingency, which your adversaries intend to bring home to you, will become established.'

"Well, be it so ; so much the better for us ; as this only shows that in both cases, whether an objection is stated or not stated, the possibility of the retaliatory argument cannot be denied by you." Not so, we reply. A confutation that admits of two mutually contradictory retaliatory arguments (one inviting and another preventing the statement of objections) cannot be regarded as a true confutation ; as contradiction vitiates all confutation,—the two retaliatory arguments stultifying, each other ; just as we found in the case of two 'neutralising inferences.'

(17) [As regards the dictum quoted by you that one party should not put forward such objections as are equally applicable to both parties, I have to point out that] Under

Nyāyasūtra 2. 1. 16—the Opponent having put forward an objection that the support of corroborative instances is equally wanting in both views (the Pūrvapakṣa as well as the Siddhānta), the Āchārya Udyotakara has met the objection in the following words :—‘That the objection is equally applicable to both views is no answer ; as such an answer involves the confession of one’s weakness : by this answer you have confessed that there is no corroborative instance in support of your view.’ (*Nyāyavārtika*, p. 197, ll. 15-19) ;—and your own Teacher, making this assertion, should be set up against Bhatta Kumārila, who has declared that an objection common to both parties should not be put forward by either.

SECTION (3).

[In not accepting the utility of the Retaliatory Argument the Vedāntin incurs the charge of ‘*Apasiḍḍhānta*,’ ‘Contradicting an admitted Fact’, which is the *twenty-first* ‘Clincher’ enumerated by Gauṭama in his Sūtra. And he proceeds to show the impossibility of an adequate explanation being provided of this Clincher also.]

[PAGE 532] (18) “Do you mean to say”, asks the Logician, “that Retaliatory Argument and such other reasonings do not serve the purpose of vitiating or refuting a statement? If you really mean this, then you make yourself open to the charge of *contradicting an admitted fact*.” Well, our reply is, in the first place please explain to us, in the present connection, what is it that constitutes ‘*Apasiḍḍhānta*,’ ‘contradiction of an admitted fact.’ If your mere assertion that there is such contradiction were sufficient, then what would prevent our making a similar assertion that you are open to the same charge?

(19) The Logician proceeds to explain how, in the present discussion, the Vedāntin has incurred the charge of contradicting an established fact :—“When one makes an assertion contrary to an admitted fact, he incurs *Apasiḍḍ-*

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dhāṅṭa; now, as a matter of fact you have, in course of the present discussion, admitted the fact of the Retaliatory Argument constituting a means of refutation (which fact you are now denying); we say you have admitted this fact, because at the very outset of our discussion you declared your intention of arguing in accordance with the tenets of a particular philosophical system, the *Nyāya*,—whereby you have accepted the tenets of that system: and as a philosophical system is nothing more than the acceptance of certain facts and things, and as the ‘Retaliatory Argument’ and such other Clinchers are things that are accepted by the *Nyāya* system, you are certainly contradicting an admitted fact when you deny the existence of any such thing as the Retaliatory Argument.” Our answer to this is that the very definition of ‘*Apasiddhāṅṭa*’ that you have put forward is an impossible one; for if you define it merely as ‘contradicting’ an admitted fact, then you yourself become open to the charge, on the ground of your denying facts that are ‘admitted’ in our philosophy.

(20) “What we mean is the contradicting of facts admitted by oneself.” This is not right; for you cannot extract this meaning from the definition as you have stated it, unless you add to it the further qualification (of ‘one’s own’). If it were permissible to make a definition mean what is not actually expressed by the words constituting it, then there would be no need for adding any qualification [anything that is desired may be taken as implied by the definition]. And if you hold that no qualifications are to be added to definitions, then the charge of ‘contradicting an admitted fact’ would rebound on yourself! As in the first place, qualifications by the hundred are found to be added to the statements of reasonings and conclusions made in your own philosophy; and secondly in your philosophy, you have often found fault with the reasonings propounded by

others, simply on the ground that they do not contain certain necessary qualifications and are hence rejected by you as inconclusive.

(21) Then again, in the present context also, you have stated your definition without the qualifying phrase 'one's own',—and subsequently, for fear of objection being raised against it, if you add that qualification, you render yourself open to the 'Clincher' of '*Hēṭvantara*'; as according to your own philosophy, 'one is said to fall within the Clincher of *Hēṭvantara* if, having originally stated his conclusion in the unqualified form, he re-states it subsequently, with the addition of fresh qualifications.'

(22) Further, you have stated your definition in the form—'when one makes an assertion contrary to an admitted fact, he incurs what has been called *Apasiddhānta*';—that is, you state the definition first, and the object to be defined last; and in this you incur the Clincher of 'Inopportune Statement' (the fifteenth Clincher mentioned in Gauṭama's *Sūtra*, 5-2-1),—which has been defined as consisting in the 'reversal of the natural order of constituent factors' (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, 5. 2. 11); and 'the natural order of constituent factors' of a definition is that the object defined is mentioned first, and then comes the statement of the definition; and this natural order you have reversed (by stating the definition first, and then the object to be defined). If, in order to escape from this difficulty, you insist upon this reversal of the natural order, then you become subject to '*Apasiddhānta*.' [As your own philosophy lays down that the several factors of a statement, for instance, of the statement of an inferential argument, should be mentioned in their natural order].

[PAGE 534] (23) He who introduces the qualification '*sva*', 'one's own', at the very outset, should be met with that same objection which we have urged above against the

definition as without the qualification; the facts admitted by me are certainly my *own* admitted facts [and thus by stating a view that is opposed to facts admitted by me you will be contradicting *one's own* admitted fact]*. "But our definition contains the word '*abhyupagama*', 'admitted fact'; this implies the person by whom the fact is admitted; thus that fact alone which is admitted by the person himself could be *his* 'own admitted fact' (and not what may be admitted by other persons)". This will not help you. I also am 'a person by whom facts are admitted', as certainly there are certain facts that are admitted by me. "What we mean is the person who admits facts to the contrary." But this also will apply equally to both parties (both being contrary to each other). "That person who admits facts contrary to well-established conclusions is one who is regarded as *admitting facts to the contrary*". Even so the name will apply to both parties equally; as I also admit facts contrary to your well-established conclusions (just as you admit facts contrary to my established conclusions). "What is meant is the person who admits facts contrary to his own well-established conclusions." You are certainly extremely clever: you began with qualifying the word '*sva*,' 'one's own' by the 'person by whom facts are admitted',—and you end with qualifying the 'person by whom facts are admitted' by the word '*sva*, 'one's own'! And in doing this you do not even fight shy of the vicious circle of interdependence into which you land yourself! And lastly you do not observe that the fact that the word '*sva*' (as a pronoun) is applicable to all (parties),—a fact that has been pointed out to you by your opponent—still remains in force!

* The word '*sva*' is a pronoun, it does not apply to the Logician alone; hence the *siddhānta* of the Vedāntin is as much entitled to the name '*svasiddhānta*' as the *siddhānta* of the Logician, until some other qualification is introduced. So that when making a statement against the tenets of the Vedānta the Logician will be open to the charge of '*svasiddhāntavirodha*'. Hence the definition proposed being applicable to a case where it should not apply, must be rejected as 'too wide.'

(24) Another definition of '*Apasiddhānta*' is put forward:—"When a person accepts a fact as a well-established conclusion, and then (in course of discussion) renounces or denies that conclusion,—this constitutes an '*Apasiddhānta*' for that person." This definition also cannot be accepted; as if the clause 'well-established conclusion accepted by a person' refers to a particular individual person, and to a particular conclusion, then the definition becomes singular (pertaining to one single case), and fails to be comprehensive (of all *Apasiddhāntas*). If again by 'the person accepting the conclusion' is meant the person connected with a well-established conclusion, and by the person 'renouncing the conclusion' is also meant the person connected with a conclusion,—then you yourself become open to the charge of *Apasiddhānta*; for I (the Vedāntin) am a person connected with a certain well-established conclusion, and you also are a person connected with a conclusion,—so when you renounce the conclusion accepted by us (as you often do), there is denial, by a person connected with a conclusion (*i. e.* by yourself), of a well-established conclusion accepted by a person connected with a conclusion (that is myself). "But in this case there is no *renouncing*; as one can renounce only that which he has accepted (and we have never accepted your conclusions; so that when we deny them, we do not *renounce* them)." This will not help you; as if what is meant by 'renouncing' is only *non-acceptance*, then it is not necessary for what is 'renounced' to have been previously accepted. "The 'renouncing' consists in the non-acceptance of what has been accepted." In that case, (in your case also) there is *non-acceptance*, by you, of *what has been accepted*, by me; and thus the explanation makes no difference as regards the objection urged by us. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you hold that the non-acceptance should be by the same person by whom there has been acceptance,—this also will not avail you; as if by 'the same

person' you mean the man accepting a conclusion, then I also am a man accepting a conclusion; you, by not accepting what has been accepted by me, 'incur *Apasiddhānta*. "It is '*Apasiddhānta*' only when there is non-acceptance by one individual person of that conclusion which has been accepted by that individual person." This will not be right; as what do you mean by 'one individual person'? If it means a person who is qualified by the number 'one', then, I am as good 'a person qualified by number one as yourself; and so the charge of '*Apasiddhānta*' urged against you remains in force as before. "What is meant by *one individual person* is the *person who is not different*". Even so, if this 'non-difference' be non-difference from one's own self, then this also applies equally to you and myself; while if it be 'non-difference from others,' this cannot apply either to you or to myself (as no person can ever be non-different from another person); and so *Apasiddhānta* as thus defined would be something impossible. "What is meant is that in a case of *Apasiddhānta* there is no difference between the person accepting and the person not-accepting (renouncing) a certain conclusion." Well in that case your definition would come to this—'*Apasiddhānta* is the non-acceptance, of what has been accepted by one person, by one who is not different from the acceptor'; and thus you still remain open to the same '*Apasiddhānta*'; as what is accepted by me is not accepted by you, who are 'not-different from the acceptor', inasmuch as you also accept something.

(25) The above reasoning also serves to reject the definition of '*Apasiddhānta*' as the acceptance and non-acceptance, by one person, of the opinion of one person; as, with this definition, between yourself and myself, there would be a distinct *Apasiddhānta* [each of us being 'one person']. "But what is meant by 'one person' is the non-difference of the person accepting, from the person not-accepting, that

conclusion ; [and this condition is not fulfilled when what is accepted by the Vedāntin is not accepted by the Logician].’ If by ‘that conclusion’ you mean to imply the non-difference of what is ‘not-accepted’ from what is ‘accepted’,—then you cannot escape from the charge of ‘*Apasiddhānta*’; inasmuch as you renounce what is accepted by me ; so that there is non-acceptance by you—who also accept something, and as such, are non-different from the accepting person—of what is accepted by another person ; and thus there is ‘non-’ difference of what is not-accepted from what is accepted.’ “But what is meant is that the *acceptance* and *non-acceptance* should be by one and the same, and not by different, agents.’ This also will not help you, we reply ; for when you come to examine what is meant by the ‘one and the same agent’, you again introduce the same qualification ‘one’, which has been already found to be faulty ; and thus, not succeeding to escape from the objections that have been urged against you, tell me if you do not experience the same tribulation as those of the tuft of grass which is whirled round and round in the widening whirlpools of a turbulent stream, in which there is an inrush of water at the outburst of the rainy season !

(26) “It is *Apasiddhānta* when there is non-acceptance after having accepted (a certain conclusion).” This also cannot be accepted ; for when you come to examine the import of the affix ‘*kṭvā*’ in ‘*svīkṛīya*’, ‘having accepted’,—you will find that this definition is open to the same objections as those urged above*. And further, by this definition, one could not incur ‘*Apasiddhānta*’ if, in course of discussion, he were to accept a conclusion which he did not

* The affix ‘*kṭvā*’ denotes *samānakarṭṭrikāṅga*, i. e. the fact of the participle sending in that affix having the *same nominative agent* as the principal verb of the sentence ; so that you again introduce ‘the same qualification of ‘the same agent’ against which objections have been raised.

accept at the outset. [While such a contingency does, according to the Logician, involve a real *Apasiddhānta*.]†

(27.) Then again, when you urge the Clincher of *Apasiddhānta* against one who renounces an admitted fact, is it against a disputant who accepts that philosophical system in which '*Apasiddhānta*' is regarded as a defect? or against one who does not accept such a system? If the former, then such a person is as capable of rebelling against the tenet of '*Apasiddhānta*' as against the philosophical conclusion [by reason of renouncing which you charge him with the Clincher of *Apasiddhānta*]; and under the circumstances, what can you say to such a person? It will not be right for you to reply to this that you will have nothing more to say to such a person—fully humbled as he will have already become by the Clincher of '*Apasiddhānta*' due to his renouncing his previously accepted conclusions. For, inasmuch as he has rejected the tenet of '*Apasiddhānta*,' this 'clincher,' when urged against him, will be one whose vitiating efficacy is not accepted by both parties [and which on that account ceases to be an efficient 'clincher']. If a 'clincher' which is not accepted by both parties were to be efficacious in closing the mouth of disputants, then any person putting forward a refutation from his own stand-point (irrespective of the other party admitting or not admitting the force of the refutation) could claim to have put an end to the disputation, and to have obtained victory over his opponent; and he would not wait to listen to the Opponent's answer to his refutation. And the result of this would be that even on urging a futile refutation, though there would be no refutation at all, he would have conquered his opponent, and would, without the slightest

† *E.g.* during the discussion between the Logician and the Vedāntin, the former does not, in the beginning, accept the conclusion that Word is unreal; but in course of argumentation, if he comes to accept it, he certainly incurs '*Apasiddhānta*;' but by the present definition, this would not be *Apasiddhānta*, as there is no 'having accepted' in this case.

obstacle, go back home fully satisfied! "When a man has been defeated, even if he may have something to say, we can certainly pay no regard to what he might say." This will not be right, when what he has to say is the answer to precisely the same Clincher by means of which you regard him as defeated.—this answer being in the form that the efficacy of the Clincher is not admitted by one of the two parties concerned (which circumstance weakens the efficacy of the Clincher). If, on this, you still insist on paying no regard to what he says, then, as we have already pointed out above, you yourself would be defeated; inasmuch as you will have put forward a refutation which is not a true refutation, and will have refused to listen to the Opponent's answer to that refutation!

"But it would be for the Umpire to determine if a refutation has been put forward that is not a true refutation, or if the Clincher of '*Apasiddhānṭa*' has been urged when there is no true '*Apasiddhānṭa*'; and having determined this he would apportion victory or defeat; in fact it is for this purpose that the Umpire is appointed."

If this be the correct procedure, then, when one party has put forward his reasonings, his opponent might simply say 'your reasoning is fallacious', and retire from further discussion; and it would be for the Umpire to determine if the reasoning is really fallacious or not, and thereby apportion victory and defeat; and by this stupid reasoning of yours the poor Umpire will undergo all this (to himself fruitless) trouble, in the same way as the crow undergoes all the trouble to feed the offspring left by the pair of Kokila birds, who are fully content after having brought forth the young ones [the two disputants, satisfied with putting forth one argument each, resembling the *kokila* pair, and the Umpire, having to perform all the sifting and examining of the reasonings, resembling the crow].

[Page 541] (28) The Logician argues—"It may be that at the time of the discussion our disputant may for the occasion, not accept our opinion in regard to '*Apasiddhānta*'; but what does that matter? As a matter of fact he has already previously signified his adherence to that philosophical system which accepts the vitiating efficacy of '*Apasiddhānta*'; and it will be quite right to urge '*Apāsiddhanta*' against him, on the basis of that previous adherence of his." Not so, we reply; if no regard is paid to his non-adherence to the philosophy at the time of the discussion,—and if even on his declaration of this non-adherence, the refutation is to be addressed to him on the basis of his previous adherence,—then, how could there be any room for the charge of '*Apasiddhānta*' against him? For the *Apasiddhānta* is urged against him only on the basis of the fact that he has expressed non-adherence to, or non-acceptance of, something to which he had previously signified adherence or acceptance; and on no other basis could the charge of '*Apasiddhānta*' be urged against him. Thus then, in the case of the disputant who has previously accepted the vitiating efficacy of the clincher of '*Apasiddhānta*',—it is incumbent on you to prove this efficacy as against him, even when he chooses to repudiate his former adherence; and the proving of this cannot be the business of any second person (in the shape of the Umpire). [This with reference to the man who has previously signified his adherence to your philosophy]. On the other hand, as for the *Bauddha* and the other philosophers who have never accepted the vitiating efficacy of '*Apasiddhānta*', it becomes doubly necessary for you to prove this efficacy.

(29) "The man who would raise objections against the well-established conclusions (of the philosophy that he has accepted) will be open to the charge of 'self-contradiction' [so that so far as his case is concerned, it is not necessary to

provide an explanation of ' *Apasiddhānta* '] : he has at the outset, signified his adherence to a particular philosophy, and hence to all that is included in that philosophy in the form of counter-arguments, fallacies and so forth; so when subsequently he comes to signify his non-acceptance of these, we find him accepting and not-accepting the same thing; and this certainly involves ' Self-contradiction. ' " If this ' Self-contradiction ' is of the same nature as ' *Apasiddhānta* ', then it can not be urged against the man who objects to the vitiating efficacy of ' *Apasiddhānta* ', until his objections have been set aside. If, on the other hand, ' Self-contradiction ' be a defect entirely distinct from ' *Apasiddhānta* ' and capable of being urged independently of ' *Apasiddhānta* ', —then all those cases that are cited as examples of ' *Apasiddhānta* ' may be regarded as cases of ' Self-contradiction what is the use of accepting a distinct defect in the shape of ' *Apasiddhānta* ' ? In fact the procedure adopted by you —wherein you first urge the Clincher of ' *Apasiddhānta* ', and then objections having been raised against it, you give up the ' *Apasiddhānta* ' and put forward an entirely distinct Clincher in the shape of ' Self-contradiction ' —makes you open to the Clincher of ' Recantation ' ; ' Recantation ' having been defined as the ' retracting of what has been admitted and asserted. ' And if this procedure—in which one propounds a Clincher, and then retracting it, propounds another —does not involve ' Recantation ', then there is an end to all such ' clinchers ' as ' Recantation ' and the like !

(20) " When we propound another Clincher (in the shape of ' Self-contradiction '), it is only for the purpose of lending support to that other Clincher (' *Apasiddhānta* ') which had been urged before ; and [as this does not mean a denial of this latter] this procedure is not open to the objection that you have urged. " Not so, we reply ; so long as you have not justified the putti. g forward of the former

Clincher '*Apasiddhānta*' (by showing that it is a real defect), you must be regarded as 'defeated'; and it is highly improper for one so 'defeated' to put forward another Clincher in the shape of 'Self-contradiction'. Nor will it be right for you to assert that for fear of these difficulties you will, at the very outset, urge the Clincher of 'Self-contradiction'; and not that of '*apasiddhānta*';—as in that case the '*apasiddhānta*' will become entirely useless and futile; for in every case of '*apasiddhānta*' you will find it more necessary to urge 'Self-contradiction' rather than '*apasiddhānta*'; as in no case will you be able to feel quite sure as to the other party not raising objections against the '*apasiddhānta*' that you might urge.

(31) The Logician says—"All right; we shall, then prove the vitiating efficacy of '*apasiddhānta*' against the person who accepts our philosophy but denies the efficacy of '*apasiddhānta*', [not indeed by urging the Clincher of '*apasiddhānta*' against this apostacy, but exactly in the same manner as we prove it as against our out-and-out opponents, the Bauddhas and the rest]." This also will not be possible, we reply. For you can make him accept the efficacy of '*apasiddhānta*' only by showing to him that without accepting it he will incur the penalty of other clinchers (such as 'self-contradiction' and the like); and it will be quite open to him to deny the efficacy of these other Clinchers also (which therefore will have no dread for him). The Bauddhas have declared as follows.—'Disputations are never carried on in strict accordance with any *shāstra* [they are carried on in accordance with what comes to the mind of the disputants; so that no amount of systematic treatment of the *Clinchers* will close the mouth of a recalcitrant disputant]. Thus the conclusion is that '*Apasiddhānta*' is not a *Clincher* at all.

‘Specially as when a man is born’ he is born entirely free, untrammelled by any established conclusions; nor does he at the time of his birth, perceive the good and bad point of the several philosophical tenets); how then can anyone be said to have acquired a proprietary right over any established conclusion (the denying of which might constitute ‘*apasiddhānta*’ for him)?’

(32) [In answer to the above assertion of the Baudḍha that ‘Disputations are never carried on in strict accordance with any *shāstra*’] Some people* argue as follows:—It is not possible to carry on discussion except on the basis of *shāstra*. For instance, when the Baudḍha, who upholds of the momentariness of all things, puts forward a reasoning [‘all that exists is momentary,—as for instance, the clouds floating in the sky’], and is met by a dull-headed logician, upholding the permanence of things, who is dull enough not to be able to perceive flaws in the reasoning and therefore simply says that the reasoning involves the fallacy of ‘*Siddhasādhana*’, ‘Redundancy’, ‘Proving what is already well known’,—what can the Baudḍha do [except to show that in urging this fallacy, the Logician accepts the momentariness of things, and thereby renders himself open to the charge of *apasiddhānta*’]? “He will simply show that the Logician contradicts the opinion (that things are permanent) that he had previously put forward against the Baudḍha’s conclusion.” If this procedure were admissible, then the Baudḍha might as well urge against him the contradiction of any other opinion that may be in keeping with the Logician’s former opinion; or else [if this were not considered right, then] he would ignore (and not urge) the contradiction of the

* This refers to Uḍayanāchārya, who makes the observation in his *Nyāyaparishīta* (according to the *Shānkari*), or in his *Tatparyaparishudḍhi* (according to the *Vidyāsagari*). The *Chitshuki* says ‘Uḍayanoktam arthataḥ upanyasyati dūṣayitum; by which it is implied that the text does not actually quote from Uḍayana.

former opinion either ; for certainly there is no difference between contradicting a certain opinion and contradicting that which is in keeping with that opinion. [Thus we find that it is necessary to base a discussion on *shāstra* ; for] '*shāstra*' is nothing more or less than what propounds facts and opinions—some of which are subordinate, and in keeping with others—that are conducive to the fulfilment of a certain purpose of man. So that if one admits the momentariness of things, this implies the admission of all those tenets that are in keeping with 'and favourable to' the theory of momentary existence,—such tenets, for instance, as that of 'Apoḥa' 'the exclusion of contraries', and such others held by the Baudḍha; and conversely, if even one of those correlated tenets is rejected, it implies the rejection of all that is in keeping with that rejected tenet. Even God himself cannot annul this palpable fact. Nor is it possible for one to describe, in his own words, all that may be in keeping with his philosophical tenet; for in the first place, this would mean the composing of a fresh philosophical treatise then and there; and secondly because the audience will not be interested in any such detailed statement. And for the purpose of urging against him the fact of his contradicting this philosophical tenet, one could not make a guess of all that may be in keeping with and implied by, the tenets of each of the *shāstras* concerned. And lastly, philosophical tenets and all that is implied by them continue to be contradicted; and if such contradiction is allowed to pass unnoticed, then there is no chance for either party getting at either the knowledge of truth or victory over his opponent. For these reasons, even though he may not wish it, one cannot but have recourse to the *Shāstras* bearing upon the matter under discussion.

(33) The above reasoning of Uḍayana is not very sound; what may the 'other tenet in keeping with the philosophical conclusion' be—on the non-acceptance of which, it is said, that one should urge 'contradiction'? There are two

things that can be accepted : (1) that, without the acceptance of which the discussion itself could not proceed ; e.g. the proofs admitted by all disputants ;—and (2) those tenets that are held by particular philosophical systems only ; e. g. the momentariness of things, the existence of God, and so forth. Now as one can enter into a discussion only after having accepted the former—i.e. the proofs—if he accepts them at the start, and then subsequently rejects them,—if this be regarded as ‘*Apasiddhānta*’ for him,—then this cannot be ; for the simple reason that this procedure involves ‘*Self-contradiction*’ ; and ‘*Self-contradiction*’ has been regarded by you, the Logician, yourself as a ‘*futile rejoinder*’ (and not as a ‘*Clincher*’) ; and you describe the ‘*futile rejoinder*’ as ‘*the urging of what should not be urged.*’

Nor can the ‘*apasiddhānta*’ refer to the second set of tenets (which are peculiar to the individual philosophical systems). If it be held that for the starting of a discussion it is necessary to accept the ‘*momentariness of things,*’ or some such doctrine as is peculiar to a particular philosophy,—we ask : is the acceptance of that particular doctrine, ‘*momentariness*’ for example, the *upāya* or means of the subject of discussion, for example the doctrine of ‘*apoha*’ and such other tenets of the Bauddha ? Or are the two invariably concomitant with each other [so that the one implies the other] ?

(34) It cannot be the former ; for in that case, when the Bauddha proceeds to prove the momentariness of things, if he renounces the doctrine of ‘*Apoha*’ and such other doctrines peculiar to the Bauddha philosophy,—then this would not involve, ‘*apasiddhānta*’ for him ; as the acceptance of ‘*apoha*’ and the other doctrines is not the means of ‘*momentariness*’ [as, it is the ‘*momentariness*’ whose acceptance, *ex hypothesi*, is the means of ‘*Apoha*’]. And if, in order to avoid this difficulty, the two (acceptance of momentariness

and 'Apoha') were held to be the means of one another, then no discussion or consideration of the two would be possible ; for it would involve a vicious circle : while on the one hand, only after discussion could the tenet be regarded as valid and consequently accepted, on the other hand, the discussion could proceed only on the acceptance of the doctrines.

"The '*apasiddhānta*' would lie only in the renouncing of the particular 'means' (viz : the momentariness of things) that had been previously admitted, and in nothing else."

This is not right, we reply ; for whence do you get at the law that whenever one thing is the 'means' of another, an *acceptance* of the former is necessary for the starting of any discussion in regard to the latter ? All that appears to be right to concede is that the discussion proceeds in regard to the latter as having the former for its means ; and as for the *acceptance* of the means, this acceptance need not form the said 'means' ; for, in the first place, no proofs can be adduced in support of the view that both what is regarded as the 'means' (*i. e.*, the momentariness of things) and the acceptance of this 'means' have the causal efficiency necessary to be regarded as the 'means' (of 'Apoha' and such other doctrines) ; and secondly, even if such proofs could be adduced, why should it be necessary for the *acceptance* to be in avowed terms that 'such and such I accept' ? [the 'acceptance' that may be the 'means' to the other doctrines could be only the *acceptance* by the original founder of the philosophy] ;—any such avowal of acceptance by every individual would be absolutely superfluous ; as the mere fact of the 'acceptance' (by the original founder) being the 'means' would be sufficient to make the parties cognisant of the fact. [And thus the individual entering into the discussion not having avowed his own acceptance of any doctrine, any subsequent disavowal of the same by him could not constitute '*Apasiddhānta*'].

"But when one proceeds to prove the effect (*e. g.*, the

doctrine of 'Apoha') by means of its cause (e. g., the doctrine of the 'momentariness of things') it is necessary that he should accept the existence of the latter; as that which is not accepted as really existing cannot be regarded as a cause;—such being the case, if there be any subsequent disavowal of the same, that would be a fit opportunity for the clincher of '*Apasiddhānta*' being urged against him." Well, if such be the case, the fact of the man putting forward the doctrine as the 'means' would lead to the presumption of his 'acceptance' of the same; and even though this acceptance is not directly avowed, yet it would be presumed on the strength of the fact that that which is regarded as non-existing can never be regarded and put forward as a 'means'; and on the basis of the contradiction of this presumed 'acceptance' by the subsequent *direct* disavowal you would urge the clincher of '*Apasiddhānta*' against the man;—under the circumstances, it will be infinitely simpler for you to urge against him the objection that in case he does not *accept* the existence of what he has put forward as the 'means', this latter could never be a 'means' at all; firstly because it is this objectionable feature upon which the '*Apasiddhānta*' rests; and secondly because until you have put forward this objectionable feature, you cannot prove that he actually *accepts* that whose acceptance he has not directly avowed; and this objectionable feature being sufficient for the demolishing of his position, there would be no necessity for the urging of the '*Apasiddhānta*', which after all, is entirely dependent upon, and comes after, the said objectionable feature.

(35) For the same reasons the second alternative (noted at the end of para. 33)—that is to say, the doctrines of 'momentariness' and of 'apoha' are invariable concomitants—cannot be accepted. The necessity of the acceptance of one invariable concomitant can be proved only by the

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argument that if its existence were not accepted, the other concomitant—which the man seeks to establish—would be an impossibility; and under the circumstances, it would be better to urge this same circumstance as an objection against the man's non-acceptance, rather than presume his acceptance, and then urge the clincher of '*Apasiḍḍhāṅṭa*', on the basis of this presumed acceptance being contradicted by his subsequent non-acceptance.

(36) From the above refutation of the clincher of '*Pratijñāṅṭara*'; '*Pratijñāhāni*' and '*Apasiḍḍhāṅṭa*', we can deduce the arguments against the other Clinchers also.

End of Chapter II.

CHAPTER III.

CRITICISMS AGAINST THE USE OF PRONOUNS.

[With a view to remove all chance of any reasonable objection being taken against the Vedānta Philosophy, the author has shown that it is impossible for the Logician to provide any adequate explanation either of 'Pramāṇā', the incompatibility whereof might be urged against the Vedānta, of 'fallacies', which might be detected against the Vedānta view of things, or of the 'clinchers' and such other details of disputation which might have been put forward to shut the mouth of the Vedāntin disputant. He now proceeds to show that it is not possible for the Logician to put any question—in a reasonable form—to the Vedāntin, in the course of any discussion; and in this connection he begins with showing that no adequate explanation can be given of the 'pronouns'—'what', 'who' and the like—with which all questioning begins].

(1) [Page 553]. Now, how are you going to explain the meaning of Pronouns, on whose basis most discussions proceed? For instance, take the question—'what is the proof of the existence of God?' A person who puts the question should be thus answered:—This word, 'what' with which you introduce your question—what does it mean? The word could mean either—(a) *ākṣēpa*, denial, or (b) *kuṭṣā* censure, or (c) *viṭarka*, doubt, or (d) *prashna*, question. (a) Now if it be taken to mean *denial*, the question would mean—'there is no proof of the existence of God'; and as this would be the mere statement of a proposition, which cannot establish anything, it should be necessary, for you, the questioner, to state certain reasons etc., in support of the proposition; and inasmuch as you have not stated any such reasons, you become open to the charge of 'deficiency.' (b) For the same reason, the word cannot mean *censure*; for in the first place in that case also the question would mean that 'the proof for God's existence is censurable'; and this also will be a bold statement without any reason;—and secondly, do you *censure* the proof because it does not prove what it is meant to prove? or because of some other reason? If the latter, then there is no need for your pointing it out to us; as, in that case, there is

no harm done to the proving of what the proof is meant to prove (and this is all that the propounder of the proof cares for). If it be the former—*i. e.*, if you censure the proof because it does not prove God's existence,—then this also can not be maintained; as to call it a 'proof', and then to say that it does *not prove*, would involve a self-contradiction. 'But the word 'proof' is here used in its metaphorical or figurative sense (and not in the strictly original sense of *that which proves*) [so that there is no self-contradiction]." This is not right; if the word 'proof' is used here with reference to what is actually possessed of the character of proof, *pramāṇatva*, then it cannot be regarded as used in a figurative sense; for the simple reason that the word is found, *ex hypothesi*, to be used in its strictly original sense. If, on the other hand, the word 'proof' is used with reference to what is not really possessed of the character of proof, but only appears to be so,—then there is no need of mentioning that it is 'censurable' [as, proof is censurable as unsound only when being not a proof, it is applied to what is proof; so when it is applied to what *ex hypothesi*, is *not proof*, there need be no censure of it]; for your statement, in this case would simply mean—'the false proof that there may be for God's existence is censurable'; and this be admitted by all parties, including your opponent. Further, in that case even the special mention of the word 'īshvarasadbhāvē' 'of God's existence' would be superfluous; as what is 'false proof' is censurable in other cases also,—being in its very nature, incapable of proving what it is meant to prove. (c) For similar reasons the third alternative cannot be accepted—that is, the word 'what' cannot mean 'doubt'. As, every case of doubt requires two alternative factors,—always appearing in the form 'this or that'; and thus in the proposition 'what is the proof' &c.

if it is to be a statement of doubt, it will be necessary to, state the other alternative factor also ; and the proposition will have to be stated in the form—‘ for God’s existence is this a proof or is it something else ? And as you have not made your statement in this form, you are open to the charge of ‘ deficiency ’. (d) Nor, lastly can the fourth alternative be accepted,—that is, the word ‘ what ’ cannot be regarded as denoting *question* ; for if the ‘ what ’ denoted question, this would imply that there is something with regard to which there is a desire to know, an inquisitiveness ; and owing to the presence of the word ‘ proof ’, this ‘ desire to know ’ would appear to be with regard to proofs ; and the rule is that the person answering the question must point out or indicate that with regard to which the question is put. Now, with regard to the question under consideration, we ask—Does the question refer to proof in general for God’s existence (meaning if there is any proof of God’s existence) ? Or does it refer to a particular proof (the meaning being, are there particular proofs for God’s existence) ? If it is the former, then the mere statement that ‘ there is proof of God’s existence ’ would suffice for the answer ; for all that is required of the answerer is to provide what the question requires ; and as the question requires the statement as to whether or not there is any proof for God’s existence, this statement is provided by the answerer stating that ‘ there is *proof*’. If the second alternative be meant—*i. e.*, if the question means ‘ What particular proofs are there for God’s existence ?—even then, the statement ‘ there is proof for God’s existence ’ would be sufficient answer ; the word ‘ proof ’ in this answer signifying *particular proofs* in the same manner as the same word does in the question. [So that ‘ there are particular proofs for God’s existence ’ would be a fitting answer to the question, ‘ are there particular proofs for God’s

existence ? '].

“ What the question means is—‘ what is that particular proof which proves God’s existence ? ’ ”.

This also does not help the matter ; as this form of the question also would be met by the same answer as before : the subject of this question also is *particular proof* ; the word ‘ what ’ being coordinate with the expression ‘ particular proof ’, the answer also would consist of the phrase ‘ there is particular proof.’

“ The expression ‘ particular proof ’ is not used in the vague sense of an undefined and unspecified particular proof ; but in the sense of a specific individual well-defined proof ; and it is in this sense that the expression ‘ particular proof ’ has been used ; so the meaning of the question is—‘ what is that particular specific proof which proves God’s existence ? ’—And the proper answer to this should consist of the indicating of such a specific proof, and not in the making of such senseless assertions as you have been making.”

What you say is not quite right ; for even with your interpretation of the question, the answer to it would again be in the form ‘ there is particular proof ’ ;—and if in the question, the expression ‘ particular proof ’ signifies a specific individual proof, it does the same in the answer also ; so that whatever meaning you may assign to the expression as appearing in the question, that same meaning would be expressed by the expression as occurring in the answer [and hence whatever your question may mean, the statement ‘ there is particular proof ’ would be a suitable answer in all cases].

(2) “ When one puts the question—‘ what is the proof of this or that ? ’—what he wishes to know is if the particular thing is proved by Inference or by something else.”

To this also our answer is—It is proved by Inference. “ What is that *inference* ? ”

With regard to this question also, we ask—does this question refer to Inference in general, or to any particular inference ?

And having put these questions, we shall offer to you the same answers that we did to your question 'What is the proof? And the following two verses depict the true state of things in this connection:—

'When the questioner explains his question as pertaining to a particular subject,—the same should be stated by the answerer, the same subject and in the same words.'

'It is a well-known rule that the answerer should state exactly that which forms the subject of the question; as the subject is best explained by those same words; in fact, this method of explaining by means of the same words has been adopted by you in the explanations that you have been putting forward of your question; [why then should not I, the answerer, adopt the same method?].'

[P. 553] (3) Then again, the fact of the word 'what' denoting *question* implies that the subject questioned about is an object of curiosity; and 'curiosity' is only the *desire* to know; and as a matter of fact, there can be no desire with regard to anything that is absolutely unknown; as if such desire were possible, then there would be the absurdity of desire arising with regard to everything in the world, known and unknown alike. Thus then, when you *desire* to know the proof with regard to God, you will have to point to the knowledge that you may have of God,—the knowledge whereupon your desire would be based. And with regard to this, your knowledge, we ask—is this knowledge that you have of God, true—*i. e.* in full accord with the object as it really exists? or is it false—*i. e.* not in accord with the object? If it is true, then that knowledge itself makes its object amenable to valid proof; as unless an object is amenable to valid proof, it is not possible to speak of its knowledge as 'true'; and this valid proof brings up or indicates the *existence* of God, which forms its objective; and thus, our desire to prove the existence of God becomes accomplished without any effort

on our part. If, on the other hand, your knowledge of the thing (God) is not true,—then, if it be your desire, when you put the question, that in regard to that object of your Wrong Knowledge, we should produce another Wrong Knowledge, then why should you seek this at the hands of another person when it is entirely within your own power? You are yourself an expert in producing Wrong Knowledge; and just as you have produced one Wrong Knowledge with regard to the thing, in the same manner you can produce another also. As for ourselves we, are the producers of only *true* knowledge and are entirely inexperienced in the production of wrong ones; why then should you employ us in this work? “What we ask you to do is to make that which is an object of my *Wrong* Knowledge, an object of my *True* Knowledge.” I that is what you desire, then our reply is that your very attempt at this is absurd, involving as it does a self-contradiction on your part: How can any intelligent person ever make an attempt at making *the shell that he perceives as silver* an object of his right cognition? For as a matter of fact, if the form in which an object is *wrongly* known were said to be the same in which it is *rightly* known,—this would be a clear case of self-contradiction. “What you have to produce is what may be right knowledge in accordance with *your* philosophical tenets (even though it may be wrong according to mine); that is why we are asking you to do so. This also will not be right: It is *not* a philosophical tenet of mine—I do not hold the view—that it is my duty to show that the invalid proof of God’s existence, which you have wrongly come to regard as valid proof, is really valid; on the contrary my duty should be to show that the valid proof of God’s existence, which you have wrongly come to regard as invalid is really valid.

(.) “When we ask you—what is the proof of God’s existence?—what we wish you to do is merely to make

known to us the proof that there may be for God's existence, and we do not wish anything further, as to whether this knowledge that you may produce in us be true or false,"

This is not right, we reply; as the mere *making known* would be possible also if the knowledge produced were entirely wrong; and we have already said that the producing of such knowledge is entirely in your own power; why should you seek, in this, the help of any other person? "The fact is that there has appeared in us a certain knowledge of the proof for God's existence; and with regard to this there arises a doubt in our mind as to whether this knowledge of ours is wrong or right;—thus there is no room for the objections that you have urged, which is based on the supposition that we definitely accept one of the two views as to the rightness or wrongness of the knowledge [while, as a matter of fact, we are entirely in doubt and do not accept the one or the other]". *

It is not so, we reply; for if you are only in doubt as to the truth or falsity of your knowledge, then this would mean that you are in doubt also as to the proof, of which you have the knowledge, and also as to God's existence, which is the object of that proof; and under the circumstances, your question would be one that comes from one who is in doubt on the point; and not that which comes from a decided opponent (who denies the point entirely).

Such being the case, please accept the position of a disciple, and propitiate us with a long course of attendance and service; and then we shall remove this doubt of yours!

(5) "We are certainly your decided Opponents; [as we deny the existence of God]; and the doubt that we have spoken of is one that has been purposely conjured up (for purposes of discussion)." This means that you have fully accepted one of the two alternatives of the doubt; and you

* The objections have been in the form—'if you regard your knowledge as true, then God's existence is proved; if the knowledge is false, it is for you to produce wrong knowledge' and so forth.

have set up the doubt only for a special purpose. Well, in that case, we put to you the question—is this definite cognition of the one alternative true or false?,—and thereby make you subject to the objections that we have already urged above [from which you sought to extricate yourself, in para. 4, by urging that you were entirely doubtful, and had not accepted any one of the two alternatives]. And further this uncertainty will also serve to reject any such assertion of yours as ‘ this is accepted by us ’ ;—as this assertion also will be open to the objections based upon the question as to whether this acceptance is true or false ; specially in view of the law that ‘ when there is contradiction between two things, one or the other must be *true*, no third alternative is possible ’ [by which an acceptance must be either true or false ; ‘ true ’ and ‘ false ’ being contradictory terms].

(6) All that we have urged in the *Ishvarābhisandhi* and other works against the use of pronouns is applicable in the present connection also.

END OF CHAPTER III.

CHAPTER IV.

REFUTATION OF OBJECTS OF COGNITION.

Section (1).

[Having dealt with the *Pramāṇas*, the Instruments of Cognition, the Author takes up the *Pramānyas*, the Objects of Cognition ; the character that is common to all *pramānyas* is that of *being an entity*. So before refuting the definitions of the individual entities, he proceeds to show that it is not possible to provide an adequate account of what constitutes an 'entity.' And with a view to keep up a connection with what has gone before, he turns the fresh discussion on to the subject of God who is one of the Logician's 'pramānyas'.]

(1) [Page 562] The Logician turns the discussion on the question of proofs for God's existence into a new channel:—
 "Notwithstanding all that you have said, as to the impossibility of putting a question as to the proofs of God's existence,—inasmuch as God is an entity, a positive being, it is incumbent on you to point out a *pramāṇa*, a proof, that affirms, or declares the existence of, that God." What do you mean by God 'being an entity'?—we ask. "Well, it means that He is a positive being." This will not be right ; for in thus answering my question, you simply supply me with a synonym (and you do not explain what constitutes an 'entity.')

"*Being an entity* means existing in its own form." This also cannot be accepted ; as firstly, a negative entity also is something that exists in its own form ; and *secondly*, in presenting such a definition, each definition that you will put forward will apply to only individual entities,—serving to distinguish each one from the rest ; and thus there would not be that comprehensiveness which is essential for all definitions. "A thing is called an 'entity' when with regard to it people have the notion that *it is* or *exists*." This will not be right ; as it is possible for us to have such a notion as 'the negation or absence of jar is here' ; and as in this we have the notion of 'it is' with regard to a negation, this negation will have

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to be regarded as an 'entity'; and further, even though with regard to the jar and such other substances, we often have the notion 'it does not exist', yet they do not cease to be 'entities' [and they would so cease if an entity were defined as proposed].

(2) [Page 563] Then again, when you speak of the notion of '*asṭi*' 'it exists' with regard to a thing,—do you mean that what is signified by the word '*asṭi*', 'exists', is capable of being predicated of the thing? or that the word '*asṭi*' is capable of being used in connection with the thing? It cannot be the former; as you do not explain what is signified by the words. "Why! the expression 'it exists' signifies *saṭtā*, the generality of 'being', 'existence'." This is not right; as, according to the Logician, there is no '*saṭtā*' in such things as Generality, Individuality, Inherence, &c.; and so *saṭtā*, signified by the phrase 'it exists' being incapable of being predicated of these, they could never be spoken of as 'it exists'; which would mean that they are mere negations, non-entities; specially as we have already rejected the idea of a thing 'existing in its own form.' Nor can the second alternative be accepted; as we have already pointed that there is such a notion as 'negation or absence exists' (where the word 'exists' is found to be used in connection with a negation); and further, if that alone were to be regarded as an *entity* in connection with which the word '*asṭi*' could be used, then all those things in connection with which we might use the word '*varṭatē*' (instead of '*asṭi*') will have to be regarded as non-entities! "But the word '*asṭi*' is synonymous with '*varṭatē*' (so it makes no difference whether you use the one or the other)". This is not right; it is not possible to show that the two words are synonymous except by pointing out the common denotation of the two words [and this is not possible, as

the word '*varṭaṭē*' does not signify exactly what is denoted by the word '*asṭi*'.]*

"That the two words are synonymous is comprehended, in a vague, general way, from the fact that one man is found to make use of the word '*varṭaṭē*' with regard to the same thing in connection with which another man makes use of the word '*asṭi*'". This is not right; as in the

case of many words—such, e. g. as '*pramēya*', '*abhidhēya*' and the like—we find that though one man uses one word exactly in connection with a thing in regard to which another man uses the other word, yet the words not regarded as synonymous.

"What is meant is that the denotation of the two words should be the same—that the words should be used in the same sense (and not that they should be made use of with regard to the same thing.)"

But in that case, firstly, it remains as difficult as ever for you to explain what this 'same sense' is [we having shown that it is not possible for the words to mean 'existence in one's own form' and so forth]; and secondly, even if it were possible for you to point out this common denotation, you should explain your '*bhāvātva*', 'entity', 'character of being', by means of that same common denotation; and where would be the need for seeking after the proper expression for your definition?

(3) [Another definition of 'entity' is put forward]—

"That is an *entity* which is not of the nature of the negation of another thing."

This also cannot be accepted; as in the first place, the word '*para*', 'another thing', is entirely superfluous,—it does not serve the purpose of excluding

This is the explanation given by the Shāṅkari; the Viḍyāsāgari and the Chītsukhi explain as follows:—"Entity" 'character of being' only can be this common denotation of the two words; and this forms the subject of our present enquiry; so that you are basing your definition of 'entity' upon the fact of the two words '*asṭi*' and '*varṭaṭē*' being synonymous, the comprehension of which is found to depend upon the due understanding of what 'Entity' is, thus involving an inextricable circle.

anything not excluded by the rest of the definition [as whatever is of the nature of negation, is always of the nature of the negation of another thing; nothing can be of the nature of the negation of itself; hence 'that which is not of the the nature of negation' would provide all that is necessary]; and secondly, the Logician recognises the fact that 'entity' and 'non-entity' are mutual contradictories—being of the nature of the negation of one another [so that 'entity' is just as much 'of the nature of the negation of another thing' in the shape of 'nonentity' as 'non-entity' is 'of the nature of the negation of entity'; so that the definition is an impossible one, not applying to what it is intended to define].

"As a matter of fact, we find that with regard to a 'non-entity' we always have the notion that it is *not an entity* (i. e. it is of the nature of the negation of entity): in regard to an *entity* we do not always have the notion (that it is *not a non-entity* i. e. it is of the nature of the negation of non-entity) [so the definition cannot be regarded as impossible]." In spite of this fact, the definition does not become any clearer [it may be that we do not always think of an Entity as the *negation of non-entity*; but the fact remains that the Entity is as much the *negation of non-entity* as the Non-entity is the *negation of entity*; and so long as this fact remains, the definition remains impossible].

"Then we shall define 'entity' as that which is not recognised, or thought of, as of the nature of the negation of another thing. [So that, even though Entity may be of the nature of the negation of another thing, yet, inasmuch as it is not always recognised as being so, the definition ceases to be impossible]."

This definition also cannot be accepted; as, in the first place, with such a definition, it would not be possible to apprehend an 'entity', or 'character of being', with the Eye and the other sense-organs; as the fact of a certain thing being recognised, or thought of, cannot be known by the senses [and Entity has been defined as consisting

of a particular form of 'recognition'];—and secondly, the conception 'this is not a non-entity' would, in this case, be entirely objectless or baseless; as, according to you, the object of this conception could not be an Entity; as what is conceived of is conceived of as being of the nature of the negation of something else; nor could negation or non-entity be the object of the conception; as what it does is to deny the non-entity (which, therefore, cannot be its object). "There could be no such conception at all (as 'this is not a non-entity')." Certainly, there can be nothing to prevent the possibility of such a sentence bringing about at least a verbal cognition; as the words contained in the sentence being endowed with all such requisites of verbal denotation as mutual dependency, proximity and the like,—the sentence does actually signify a certain relationship among the several words [and this is all that is necessary for verbal cognition]; the possibility of such verbal cognition in regard to non-entities has been thus declared:—'Word brings about cognitions even with regard to what is an absolute non-entity.' (*Shlokavārtika*, Sū. 2, Verse 6). "We shall regard that as 'entity' which is not cognised, *by perception*, to be of the nature of the negation of another thing; so that with this qualification the definition will not be open to the objections urged against it." Even this qualified definition cannot be accepted; as the Logician does not regard *all* 'entities' to be amenable to perception. "But according to the philosophy (like the Nyāya) which admits of God, every entity is certainly amenable to perception (by God)." But so far as God is concerned, there is nothing to prove that he perceives entities as 'not of the nature of the negation of another thing.' "But such things as are not perceived by God in this form, may yet be perceived by Him, as entities, in their positive form." Yes, but we are still in the dark as to the real character of 'entity' or 'positive form.'

(4) “ We do know for certain that ‘ positive form ’ is that which is expressed, by words also, as being not of the the nature of the negation of another thing [even though God may not perceive things in this form, yet His perception of such things may certainly be described, in words, to be of that form ; so that these also become included].” In this definition also, the word ‘ another ’ would be superfluous (as shown in the case of the former definition) ; and thus even if the word ‘ another ’ were omitted (and ‘ entity ’ were defined as that which is cognised by means of words as being not of the nature of negation), then, the definition would become open to the objection that, as thus defined, the ‘ Entity ’ would be imperceptible by the Eye, and such other objections (as have already been urged above).* “ On seeing a piece of sandalwood, the idea that we have is ‘ this is a fragrant piece of sandalwood ’, when, even though what is perceived is only the piece of wood, and not its sweet smell, yet fragrance enters into the perception as a factor that is merely presented to consciousness along with the wood ; in the same manner, in the case in question, we can have the perception of ‘ entity ’ ; and even though the factor of ‘ cognition ’ that enters into our conception of the ‘ entity ’ is not amenable to perception, yet it can form part of the perception, being presented to consciousness along with the entity.” This cannot be ; as this would mean—(1) either that the entity is the inseparable attribute of the cognition which is presented to consciousness as qualifying (entering into the conception of) the Entity ;—and this would involve a vicious circle, so far as the Entity is concerned ;—(2) or that the Entity is an adventitious adjunct of the cognition presented to consciousness, which latter also enters, only as an adventitious adjunct, into the conception of the ‘ entity ’ ; and in this latter case, the character of ‘ entity

* A cognition is not perceptible ; hence if cognition forms an integral factor in the definition of ‘ Entity ’, Entity also would not be perceptible ; and so forth.

thus defined would become applicable to that *negation* which is cognised along with an entity ! [For instance, when a certain place, an entity, is cognised along with the negation or absence of the jar,—in the cognition ‘there is no jar here,’—this *negation* has for its adventitious adjunct the cognition of the *place*, which place is cognised as not being of the nature of negation ; and hence this *negation*, fulfilling all the conditions of the definition of ‘entity’, will have to be regarded as an ‘entity’ ; and this would be absurd].*

(5) Then again, when you put forward a definition in the form ‘an entity is that which is so and so,’ it becomes necessary for you to explain what ‘entity’ is, apart from what you put forward as the definition [as without knowing what the word ‘entity’ means, it is not possible to comprehend the definition containing that word]. If, with a view to escape from this difficulty, it be held that there is absolute non-difference (or identity) between the two (*i. e.* between the Entity and the character put forward in the definition)—then in that case, it would not be possible for you to put forward your definition in the form of the proposition that ‘that which is endowed with such a *character* is *entity*’ [in which the character is the qualification, and the Entity is what is qualified by it ; and it is not possible for a thing to be qualified by what is non-different from it]. If, on the other hand, the character put forward is regarded (not as identical with the Entity, but) only as an adventitious adjunct of the Entity, then it behoves you to explain what is that which you seek to define (by means of this qualification). If then what is put forward as the definition be held to be what is

* This answer, along with the objection to which it is an answer,—*i. e.* the sentence beginning with ‘*surabhi chandanam*’—does not form part of the text, according to the *Chitsukhī* and the *Vidyāsāgarī* ; though the Chaukhamba Series edition contains the passages in the text, the Commentary takes no notice of them ; it is not possible that they should have been omitted as too easy ; for the *Vidyāsāgarī* never omits any passage ; and the passage in question is not easy either. The *Shāṅkarī* alone accepts the reading, and provides a satisfactory explanation.

meant by 'Entity,' so that the two are identical, then there is yet another difficulty (over and above what we have already pointed out): *viz.*—When we cognise an Entity in the form—'the negation or absence of such and such a thing is not', the Entity will have to be regarded as *not* an 'entity' at all [as in this case the Entity is cognised as not absent, which means that it is of the nature of the negation of absence, and this is not 'cognised as being *not* of the nature of the negation of another thing']. If, then, 'entity' be defined as something entirely different from the definitions hitherto given, then, in that case, it will have to be regarded as something not included in any of the six 'categories' (that the Vaishēṣikas postulate.)*

(6) Lastly, we ask,—this character of 'entity', does it subsist in itself or not? If it does, then there is the absurdity of a thing subsisting in itself. If it does not, then it itself becomes a non-entity, though it may be cognised as not being of the nature of the negation of another thing [and thus fulfilling the conditions of your definition of 'entity'].

Section (2).

[Having refuted the conception of 'entity,' the author next takes up the idea of 'non-entity or' negation; and he turns this also on to the subject of God's existence.]

(7) [Page 568] [Having been baffled in his questionings in regard to proofs for God's existence] the Logician turns upon the Vēdāntin with the following threat:—"Inasmuch as you do not provide any proofs for God's existence, the inevitable conclusion is that God is a non-entity—there is no God." What do you mean by 'non-entity'?—we ask. "A *non-entity* is that whose nature is that of negation."

*The *Chitsukhī* and the *Viḍyāsāgarī* interpret this last sentence differently. According to them, the translation would run thus:—'Is Entity something different from the six categories or not? If it is different, then you admit a seventh category, and thus contradict your tenet of six categories [and if it is included in the six then, if it is any one of the six categories, the other categories become *non-entities*.]

If this means that which is of the nature of contradictories, then this character belongs to the Entity also; as you yourself admit that Entity and Non-entity are mutual contradictories. "The nature or character of negation is just what constitutes a Non-entity." But you cannot thus escape from the objection by merely reversing the order of words: You started with defining 'non-entity' as that which is of the nature of negation, and now you define the 'nature of negation' as that which constitutes 'non-entity.' For the same reasons we cannot accept the definition of Non-entity as that which is cognised in the form of negation.

(8) "We shall define Non-entity as the contradictory of Entity." This also cannot be accepted. For, does this mean that it is the contradictory of *all* entities? or of only some *particular* entities? It cannot mean the former, for the simple reason that no such thing is possible; for instance, the negation of the jar, which is a non-entity, is not the contradictory of the earth's surface and such other things. Nor can it mean the latter, as there are many *entities* also which are 'contradictory to some particular entities'. "What is meant by contradiction is *incapability of association or co-existence*; and certainly there can be no such incapability between two *entities*." This is not right; as there certainly is such *incapability of co-existence* between the two entities *Goṭva*, (character of the cow) and *Ashvaṭva* (character of the horse). "When the two are so related that when on the affirmation of one there is denial of the other, then we have real contradiction." This also cannot be accepted; for if there is meant to be difference between the affirmation of one and the denial of the other, then, such a contradiction as is here described is found to exist between two particular *entities* also [*e.g.* when there is affirmation of the cow-character, there is denial of the horse-character]. "What we mean is that there is contradiction, when the affirmation of the one constitutes the denial of the

other (so that the affirmation of one and the denial of another are identical) [and certainly the affirmation of the cow is not identical with the denial of the horse].” This also cannot be accepted, as this denial itself can be either an entity or a non-entity ; and in either case it would be an unknown quantity ; if it is a non-entity, then, it is unknown in so far as it is still to be explained what it is ; and if it is an entity then also it is unknown, in so far as denial in the form of an entity is something impossible.

(9) Another definition of Non-entity is put forward:— “A Non-entity is that in connection with which people have the notion ‘it does not exist.’” This cannot be accepted, for people have such a notion as ‘the absence of jar is not’ ; and as this is a notion in connection with the jar, the jar will have to be regarded as a non-entity. And in addition to this, this definition will be open to all those objections that have been urged against the definition of ‘entity’ as ‘that in connection with which people have the notion *it exists*’ (see para. 1).

(10.) “A ‘non-entity’ or ‘negation’ is that the cognition of which is dependent upon the cognition of its counter-entity.”

This also cannot be accepted ; for (1) if by ‘counter-entity’ you mean simply *something other* (than the non-entity), then the definition becomes much too wide [as there are many things whose cognition is dependent on the cognition of things other than themselves ; *e. g.* the cognition of the relation of conjunction is dependent on the cognition of the things thus related] ; (2) and if by ‘counter-entity’ you mean that which is contradictory, you have still to explain what is meant by ‘contradictory’ ;—(3) if by ‘counter-entity’ is meant that which is non-existent, then, in the first place, the difficulty is that it is still not known what is the precise meaning of the negative element (in the word, ‘non-existent’) [and what we are still discussing is precisely what is meant by

negation]; and secondly, inasmuch as all cognitions of past and future things have their objects non-existent, the cognition of all these cognitions will be dependent on the cognition of what is existent [as without the cognition of the object we can have no cognition of the cognition of that object]; and these being thus included in the definition, it becomes too wide.

(11.) Whatever definition, or distinguishing feature, of 'non-entity' you may point out, with regard to that we ask—is that distinguishing feature an (A) 'entity' or a (B) 'non-entity'? (A) It cannot be an entity; as in the first place, an entity, a positive feature, can not subsist in a non-entity; and secondly, even though it may be argued that entity, in the shape of a positive feature, does appear as a qualification in the cognition of non-entities [the cognition of the Non-entity being regarded as a positive entity], and as such it might, in a way, be said to subsist in the Non-entity, yet in that case it behoves you to explain under which of the well-known qualifications of 'cognition' this 'entity,' or positive feature, will be included. "This qualification of the cognition will be something totally different from the well-known ones, though similar in character to these."

But even so your definition will not be free from objections; for instance, the non-entity that is qualified by this entity, or positive feature (which you put forward as its distinguishing feature),—is this qualified non-entity an 'entity' or a 'non-entity'?—we ask. If it is a non-entity, then this would mean that the non-entity subsists in itself—an absurdity; and if it is an 'entity' then there is self-contradiction [a 'non-entity' being an 'entity'.]

(B.) Nor can the second alternative (mentioned in the beginning of this paragraph) be accepted—that is, the distinguishing feature of 'non-entity' cannot be a 'non-entity.' As if it subsists in itself, there is the absurdity of something subsisting in itself; and

if it does not subsist in itself, the definition, consisting of that distinguishing feature, becomes too narrow (not subsisting in the very thing, 'non-entity', that it is meant to define).

(12) "A Non-entity or negation is that which always appears to consciousness as qualified by what is negated or denied [*e. g.*, when we cognise the 'negation of the jar,' what appears to consciousness is the negation qualified by the *jar*, which latter is what is negated or denied]." This definition also cannot be accepted; for in the first place so long as 'negation' itself has not been explained, we cannot understand what is meant by 'that which is *negated*'; and secondly, it will be necessary to explain what is meant by the word '*vishīṣṭa*' in your definition.

(13.) Is this '*vishīṣṭa*' something different from the '*vishēṣaṇa*' (qualification), the '*vishēṣga*' (the object possessing that qualification) and the relation between these two? Or is it not different from these three? It cannot be something different from these three; for as matter of fact, whenever we conceive of the *man with the stick* (where the man is the *vishīṣṭa* and the stick the *vishēṣaṇa*), we do not think of it as anything entirely different from the *stick*, the *man* and the relation between these two; and further, if it were something totally different from these, then, when a person would be asked to bring forward the 'man with the stick,' he would not bring the man, (but something totally different). "That is called '*vishīṣṭa*' which is temporarily characterised by the relation between the *vishēṣaṇa* and the *vishēṣya* [so that the *man with the stick* is the person who is temporarily characterised by the relation, of possession, between the stick and the man]." This will not be right; for, in what form is the *vishīṣṭa* 'temporarily characterised'? Is it as something not bearing the relation that it is 'characterised'? Or is it as something bearing that relation? In the former case, the definition would become too wide [as when one is asked

to bring the *man with the stick*, he would be justified in regarding the *man with the ear-ring* as the intended *vishīṣṭa*; as it is this latter which does not bear the relation between the man and the stick]. And in the latter case,—*i.e.*, if what is characterised is something that bears the relation, then,—that something must be different (from the *vishēṣaṇa* and the *vishēṣya* and the relation between the two) [so that the objection urged before remains in force;—*viz.*, when asked to bring the *man with the stick*, one would bring something which is neither the man nor the stick, nor the relation between these].

“But the *relation* itself is the cause or basis of the ‘characterisation’; and certainly this relation is contained in, and possessed by, both members of the relation, the *vishīṣṭa* as well as the *vishēṣaṇa* [so that when the *man with the stick* is wanted, the man as well as the stick will be brought in, as the relation by which the man is ‘characterised’ is contained by both of these].”

This is not right; as in this case, it will be necessary to regard the *relation contained by the vishīṣṭa and the vishēṣaṇa* as distinct from mere *relation in general*; and this will be far from right [as under the circumstances, there would be no bringing of the stick when the *man with the stick* is called in]. *

“But the operation will certainly bear upon that which has that relation [so that, even though the *vishīṣṭa* is something distinct, yet it is only that which has the relation of the *vishēṣaṇa and vishēṣya*; hence any operation upon the *vishīṣṭa* will certain-

° Is mere *relation in general* the basis of ‘characterisation’? Or is it that relation which is contained in the *vishīṣṭa* &c.? In the former case, when asked to bring in the *man with the stick*, one would be justified in bringing in a jar; as this also is ‘characterised’ by some sort of a ‘relation.’ In the latter case, that *relation which is contained by the vishīṣṭa and vishēṣaṇa* could not be regarded as subsisting in the *vishēṣaṇa*; as this would mean that a certain thing (in this case, the *vishēṣaṇa f. i.* which forms an integral factor of the relation) subsists in itself; which is absurd. And hence the *vishēṣaṇa* would not be included in any operation that bears upon the *vishīṣṭa*; so that the stick would not be brought when the *man with the stick* is brought in.

ly bear upon the *vishēṣaṇa* and the *vishēṣya*; and when the man with the stick is brought in, both the man and the stick will be brought in].” This also we deny; you admit that the ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ is something different from the ‘*vishēṣaṇa*’ &c.; so that the ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ in a particular case (*e. g.*, in the case of the man and the stick) will be a particular *vishīṣṭa*; that is a *vishīṣṭa* characterised by the relation of a particular *vishēṣaṇa* and *vishēṣya*; and thus this *vishīṣṭa* being, *ex-hypothesi*, different from what characterises or specialises it, you cannot point out any such particular circumstance in the case of the *vishīṣṭa* as would make the operations upon it bear upon the *vishēṣaṇa* [so that the absurdity of the stick being not brought in when the man with the stick is called remains in this case also]. And in order to escape from this, if you go on adding *vishīṣṭa* after *vishīṣṭa* (arguing that the *vishīṣṭa* includes the relation and the members related &c. &c.), you only land yourself on an endless series of assumptions; and yet you do not succeed in discovering anything peculiar in any case to justify the inclusion of the *vishēṣaṇa* in any operation bearing on the *vishīṣṭa*.

(14) [Nor can the second alternative, noted in the beginning of the last paragraph, be maintained: that is, the *vishīṣṭa* cannot be regarded as not different from the *vishēṣaṇa*, the *vishēṣya* and the relation between these; for] If the ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ were not-different from the *vishēṣaṇa*, the *vishēṣya* and the relation of these, then each of these will be liable to be called ‘*vishīṣṭa*’; ‘so that, in the case of the man with the stick, the man, the stick and their relation will each be capable of being regarded as ‘the man-with-the-stick’; as each of these is equally non-different from the *vishīṣṭa*, ‘the man with the stick’, and there would be nothing in any one of these by which it could be singled out as the ‘*vishīṣṭa*’. “What is denoted by the word ‘*ḍaṇḍin*’, ‘the man with the stick’, is, not each of the three factors

singly, but all the three collectively." What do you mean by 'collectively'?—we ask. Does it mean the three factors, and also that which *collects* or combines them? or does it mean the last only, as something entirely different from the three factors? In the former case, the same objection that we had urged before remains—*viz.* each of the three factors will be regarded as *vishīṣṭa*; and there will now be a fourth also—*viz.* the connective factor, that which combines the three—which will be so regarded. The latter view—that the connective factor is something entirely different from the three factors,—is opposed to our experience, as also to actual usage, and should therefore be rejected in the same manner as before (we have rejected the view that the '*vishīṣṭa*' is something totally different from the '*vishēṣana*' the '*vishēṣya*' and their relation).

(15) "What is meant by the word '*vishīṣṭa*' is that which, while comprising the relation, is multiform (or heterogeneous) in character and is comprehended either in a single conception or in several contiguous conceptions." * This cannot be, we reply. For in the single cognition or conception '*ghatapatau*', 'the jar and the cloth', are comprehended the jar, the cloth and certain relations; and by your definition the compound '*ghatapatau*', 'the jar and the cloth' would be a '*vishīṣṭa*'; it is admitted by you, the Logician, that the conception 'jar and cloth' includes the generic notion of 'jar' and the generic notion of 'cloth'; and when this is admitted, it must follow from this that the notion of 'relation' also is included in the said conception; or else, how could the said conception be held to denote 'the jar as related

* 'Comprising the relation' is added for excluding the *man* by himself;— "Multiform in character" means that it comprises not the *relation* only, but the relation as well as the *relatives*; 'comprehended by a single cognition' excludes such stray disconnected conceptions as 'the man', 'the dog', 'the relation of inherence' and so forth. And 'comprehended by several contiguous cognitions' serves to exclude such conceptions as appear after long intervals.

to, qualified by, the generic character of *jar*’, and ‘the cloth as related to, or qualified by, the generic character of *cloth*’? Nor will it be quite correct to regard ‘*ghatapatau*’ as ‘*vishīṣṭa*’. For in actual usage, the compound is applied to the *jar* and the *cloth*, each independently by itself and not as related to each other : we do not, for instance, speak of the ‘*ghatī pataḥ*’ (the cloth having the jar)’ or of the ‘*pātī ghaṭāḥ*’ (‘the jar having the cloth’), as we do of the ‘*ḍaṇḍī puruṣaḥ*’ (‘the man with stick’). It will not be right, on this account, to deny that the jar and the cloth are comprehended in the single conception of ‘*ghatapatau*’; for unless both were included in the conception, how could the compound give rise to the notion of duality? And we shall, in this connection, recall all those arguments that we have urged above in connection with *Recognition* (which has been proved to include within itself the two notions of ‘this’ and ‘that’, [See Chapter I, para. 184, *et. seq.*].

For these same reasons, we cannot accept the second definition that you have proposed of

“ Both the ‘Pandit’ and the ‘Chaukhambha S. S.’ editions read—‘*ghataṭva-pataṭvasambadḍhānām* &c.’ But the question of the ‘*sambandha*’ being included comes towards the end of the sentence ; in fact the exclusion of ‘*sambandha*’ is made to follow from the previous inclusion. The mention, therefore, of the ‘*sambandha*’ in the former clause has no meaning. The argument, as explained by the *Shāṅkarī*, the *Chīṭsukhī* and the *Viḍyāsāgarī*, is as follows :—‘ It may be urged by the Logician that the compound *ghatapatau* does not signify any relation between the jar and the cloth, the compound denoting only *ghataṭva* and *pataṭva* ; and thus the idea of ‘*sambandha*’ not entering into the conception, the case of the compound cannot come under the definition. The answer to this is that when it is admitted that the generic notions of ‘jar’ and ‘cloth’ (*ghataṭva* and *pataṭva*) are included in the conception, you cannot but admit that some sort of relation also is included in it : even though it may not be a relation between the jar and the cloth, yet the compound must signify that relation which, according to the Logician, subsists between the generic character of ‘jar’ and the individual jar, and also that between the generic character of ‘cloth’ and the particular cloth. The Logician holds that all words denote *individuals as qualified by the generic character*’.

Such being the sense of the argument, the text should read as ‘चटवपटवयोर्बुद्धा-
वास्तवोरेषु वननेन.’

'*vishīṣṭa*'—as 'that which is comprehended in several conceptions, [as by this definition also the jar and the cloth, each by itself, will have to be regarded as '*vishīṣṭa*'].

(16) "We shall define the '*vishīṣṭa*' as that which is heterogeneous in character, is comprehended in a single conception, and is one in which *absence of relation* does not appear at all;—and as in the compound '*ghatapatau*', the '*absence of relation*' is quite manifest, it does not fall within the definition; how then can the definition be open to the objections that have been urged against it?"

Your meaning then is that in the compound '*ghatapatau*' both the *ghata* and the *pata* appear by themselves, and have *no relation* manifested with regard to them; and if the *ghata* has *no relation* whatever of itself manifested,—and the *pata* also has *no relation* whatever manifested,—then this would imply the total absence of all kinds of relation that may be borne by the jar and the cloth,—including also that relation which the individual jar, or the individual cloth, bears to the class 'jar' or 'cloth'; and thus the notion of '*vishīṣṭa*' with regard to the jar and the cloth, based upon this latter relation, will also be demolished; as the relation of the individual to the class is as much a relation as any other relation [so that when *relation* is declared to be absent, it must include *all relations*].

(17) "We shall then define the '*vishīṣṭa*' as consisting of relations of *ḍharma* and *ḍharmin*—i. e. *those of character and that to which the character belongs*,—these relations being independent, and comprehended in a single conception. This definition could never apply to the *ghatapatau*, as the jar and the cloth do not stand in the relation of *ḍharma* and *ḍharmin*."

This also is not right, we reply; as for this definition it will be necessary for you to point out a single comprehensive entity in the shape of the class '*ḍharmaṭva*', which would include,

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not only the stick, but all such subordinate and qualifying factors. "That is precisely what we desire."

You may desire it ; but in reality (so long as you have not explained the precise character of ' *vishista* ') you will have to regard all the endless *dharmas* as distinct entities, each by itself, just like so many grains of sand [as even with the comprehensive class ' *dharmatva*,' which alone could include all *dharmas*, you cannot form any comprehensive notion of all *dharmas*, until you have explained what is meant by ' *vishista* '; for the only explanation of the comprehensive entity ' *dharma* ' that you can provide is that it is that which is ' *vishista* ', characterised, by ' *dharmatva* ']; and hence (the notion of ' *dharma* ' also involving the conception of the ' *vishista* ', for the explaining of which you bring in ' relation between *dharma* and *dharmin* '), wherefore could you not regard *dharmin* itself as *dharma* ? [' *Dharmin* ' is *vishista* by ' *dharma* ', and ' *dharma* ' also is *vishista* by ' *dharmatva* '].

" We cannot regard the *dharmin* as *dharma*, simply because we do not know it as such [our experience being that the *dharmin* is the predominant factor, and *dharma* the subordinate factor]. " This explanation is not satisfactory ; the character of ' being comprehended in a single conception ', which you put forward (as the necessary factor in the ' *vishista* '), is as present in the *dharmin* as in the *dharma* ; and under the circumstances, why could not the *dharmin* be actually known as ' *dharma* ' ?

(18) " Even if there is such a comprehensive homogeneous entity as *dharmatva*, including all *dharmas* ; we can take *dharma* as consisting of the diverse and heterogeneous features of individual things (the peculiar feature of a thing being regarded as its ' *dharma* '); and such a *dharma* along with the *dharmin* and the relation (between the two) would constitute what we call ' *vishista* ' ; which is nothing.

apart from those three.” This definition also cannot be accepted ; as all those particular features being distinct from one another, under this definition, we could not have any such comprehensive notion as ‘*vishīṣṭa*’, which would include all *vishīṣṭas* ; and secondly, you might as well do away with the relation (just as you do away with the comprehensive notion) ; and the notion of ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ might, as reasonably, be accounted for through the disconnected (heterogeneous) features themselves (without the intervention of a third factor in the shape of ‘relation’) * ;—these latter being regarded as possessed of the character necessary for the bringing about of the requisite conception of ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ in all cases, just as the diverse peculiarities have been regarded by you as possessed of the character necessary for the bringing about of the *vishīṣṭa* conception of ‘*ḍhārma*’]. “Why should not this be so?”—you will exclaim. But, in that case, you may do away with the poor ‘*ḍharmin*’ also ! And just as the conception of ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ will be provided by the sheer force of the nature of the diverse features of colour and the other qualities, even without the intervention of the factor of ‘relation’,—in the same manner that conception may be possible even without the factor of the ‘*ḍharmin*’ ! A great victory this for the *Bauddhas* (who posit nothing besides the ‘specific individuality’ of things and they do not admit anything as the substratum of that individuality].

(19) “We might do away with the *ḍharmin* only if our notions consisted of the quality only ;—we could do away with the ‘white object’ only if when we conceived of the

* Even without the intervention of a comprehensive notion of *ḍharma*ṭva the diverse disconnected features can account for the notion of ‘*ḍharma*’, which is also a ‘*vishīṣṭa*’. Why then cannot these features themselves account for the further ‘*vishīṣṭa*’ conception of the ‘*ḍharmin*’, without the intervening agency of any relation ? In both cases the ‘nature of things’ providing the adequate explanation the only necessary condition being that they should be comprehended in a single conception ; and this is present in both cases.

object, the only idea that we had were of 'white' only; as a matter of fact, however, the notion that we have is in the form 'white conch-shell',—where the object 'conch-shell' appears as co-ordinated with the quality 'white'; and thus this notion presents before us the *ḍharmin* also, (which therefore we cannot reject)." This is not right; for the specific individuality, either of the class '*śaṅkhaṭva*' or of the qualifying adjuncts of colour and the rest, appearing (in a single conception) in close juxtaposition with it, may be installed by you in the position of the '*ḍharmin*' [and it is not necessary to posit an independent *ḍharmin* apart from the class and the quality]; so that even without a substratum (in the shape of the *ḍharmin*), there may be a possibility of speaking of the two (the class '*śaṅkhaṭva*' and the quality '*śukla*') as co-ordinate (as is done in the expression 'the white conch-shell.')

(20) This (that you have to do away with the '*ḍharmin*') is not the only weak point in your position; it is also open to the following objections:—On the basis of the peculiar character of the conception that people form of the *vishista*, you have been forced to give up the *ḍharmin*; and similarly, on the basis of the peculiar character of conceptions, there will be a rejection of all the diversities that might be conceived of in connection with the objects of these conceptions; and under the circumstances, you should accept the conception or Cognition alone; and this alone, through its diverse causal efficiency, would appear in various forms, and thereby make possible the several operations of speech and action (that are met with in ordinary experience);—and as all operations may be explained on the basis of Cognition alone, you should give up your longing for the '*object*'! Thus then,—

'The only authority for the diversity in cognised objects consists in the words in which cognitions are expressed; and so

when the said verbal usage is explained, on the basis of the peculiar character of the Cognitions themselves, and thereby the diversity is done away with,—that same authority gives the quietus to those philosophers (who accept the reality of the external object)'. (1) *

(21) Some philosophers have denied *Negation*, and have posited in place of it, 'tanmātradhīḥ' 'the cognition of the substratum alone by itself' †; and this is quite in keeping with the character of these philosophers :

'It is only right that Guru (Prabhākara) has posited *cognition* in the place of *negation*; for *Prabhākara* (the sun) is well known as the 'friend of Buḍḍha' ‡ (2)

(22) Then again, if you accept the definition of *Vishiṣṭa* as that which is manifold, is a relation and is comprehended in a single conception,—then that which, endowed with this distinctive feature, would be called '*vishiṣṭa*', would always be conceived of as distinct in character from that which is *non-vishiṣṭa*; and thus every conception of '*vishiṣṭa*' would include this latter cognition (of its being distinct in character from the *non-vishiṣṭa*). [And thus the cognition of one distinctive feature always including the notion of distinction from something not possessed of that distinctive feature] the latter cognition (of the *vishiṣṭa* being different from the *non-vishiṣṭa*) also would involve a further cognition (of the *vishiṣṭa* being

* The discussion on the character of the '*vishiṣṭa*' has, in due course, ended in the rejection of the reality of the entire external word—of all things except 'cognition' or 'consciousness'; and thus the final result of the discussion is the defeat of the Logician on a much wider field.

† Those who do not accept *Negation* as a distinct *padārtha* hold that when we are supposed to perceive the negation or absence of the jar in a certain place, what we have is the *perception of the place by itself alone*.

‡ A play upon the name 'Prabhākara'; this was the name of the philosopher; and it is also one of the names of the 'sun'; among the names of Buḍḍha again we find 'Arkabandhu', the 'Friend of the Sun'. So that the philosopher Prabhākara being Buḍḍha's friend, it is only fit that he should hold a view that is in keeping with the tenets of the Bauḍḍha philosophy.

different from those that are not different from the *non-vishīṣṭa*); and in this manner the cognitions involved in a single conception of 'vishīṣṭa' would be infinite. And if, with a view to escape from this, at any stage, the cognition be not included, then all that would come next to that becoming 'non-vishīṣṭa', the entire series, from top to bottom, would become 'non-vishīṣṭa'!

"We shall simply say that the conception of 'vishīṣṭa' should be *capable* of involving the further cognition (and not that it should actually involve the further cognition; so that there can be no conception of cognitions *ad infinitum*)."

Then this 'capability' is a further qualification of the 'vishīṣṭa'; and as such would only lead to the further disintegration of the notion of 'vishīṣṭa' into disconnected individual *vishīṣṭas*—like so many grains of sand [and would not help you to form a comprehensive notion of all 'vishīṣṭas', to provide which should be the principal function of every definition]:—this we have already pointed out above.

The same may also be said with regard to the other qualifications figuring in the definition—such as 'single', 'conception', 'comprehended', and so forth (every qualification tending to disintegrate instead of congregating or centralising the notion of 'vishīṣṭa').

(23) Thus then,

'In case the idea of being different from *non-vishīṣṭa* enters into (or is involved in) the notion of 'vishīṣṭa',—then either there is an unceasing (never-ending) series of ideas (involved in every such notion); or there is no notion of 'vishīṣṭa' at all, even at the bottom.' (3)

Section (3).

[Having demolished the notions of 'negation' and of '*vishīṣṭa*', the author takes up the definition of such special categories as Substance, Quality and the rest; as the definition of every one of these involves the notion of '*vishīṣṭa*', which is inseparable from all definitions. As the function of definition consists in the pointing of the peculiar qualifications of a thing; and when a qualification is pointed out, it means that the thing defined is 'qualified', '*vishīṣṭa*,' by that qualification.]

(24) The above refutation of the notion of '*vishīṣṭa*' implies the refutation of all definitions—such definitions, for instance, as that 'Substance is the substratum of qualities.' [For this involves the notion that substance is qualified, '*vishīṣṭa*,' by the character of being the substratum of Qualities].

(25) The definition of Substance as 'the substratum of Qualities' is untenable for the following reasons also:—How can we be sure of the fact that the definition applies to Substances *only*—when we find Colour and other qualities also being possessed of the quality of *Number*, and thus being 'the substratum of quality'.

"This notion, of being the substratum of qualities, with regard to Colour and other Qualities, must be regarded as a mistake." You should, in that case, explain why the same notion should not be regarded as a mistake, in the case of Earth and other Substances also.

"In the case of the latter we do not find any subsequent cognitions subverting the said notion; so we cannot regard it as a mistake." The same may be said with regard to Colour and the other qualities also.

"We cannot but assert that the notion of qualities subsisting in Qualities is subverted; as it is our well-established tenet that Qualities are devoid of qualities." This will not help you; as it is impossible to determine that Colour &c., are 'qualities'.

(26) "But it is a demonstrated truth with us that that which has a genus and is devoid of qualities is Quality [and

* The refutation of the definition of Substance in the last paragraph is made to lead on to the definition of the Logician's second category, Quality.

this definition of Quality will enable us to determine that Colour &c., are qualities]. ” This definition of Quality will not help you ; the *absence of qualities* forms an essential element in this definition, and what this *absence of qualities* means cannot yet be determined (so long as you have not provided an adequate definition of Quality) ; specially as even you attribute the quality of ‘number’ to qualities (regarding them as 24 in number) ; [and in the face of this conviction, it is difficult to conceive of Quality as being devoid of qualities]. “ This conception of number with regard to Qualities must be regarded as erroneous.” This is not right ; as this leads you into the vicious circle of interdependence ; you base your definition of Quality on the erroneousness of the notion that number belongs to Qualities,—and again you base your idea of the erroneousness of the notion upon a sublation which you base upon the aforesaid definition ! Nor is it possible for you to determine, on the basis of some other reason, that Colour &c. are qualities,—and then to prove the sublation and erroneousness of the notion under discussion for the corroborative instance that you will bring forward in support of your reason will always be in the form of a certain well-known quality ; and as that also will be what is possessed of number, it will be a part of the object whose exact nature is under dispute ; so that the fact that it is itself a quality will be far from definitely ascertained [hence any corroboration by such an instance would be absolutely futile]. “ There is the quality of Number itself, which cannot be regarded as possessed of the quality of number ; as to attribute number to Number would lead us into a *regressus ad infinitum* ; thus having got a quality devoid of quality, we can cite this as the required corroborative instance.” This also will not be possible ; as number (even though without number) possesses the quality of Separateness ; and thus not being ‘devoid of qualities’, Number also forms part of the object under dis-

pute [and so cannot act as an efficient corroborative instance]. For the same reasons, *Separateness* also cannot serve as the required instance; as this also is endowed with Number.

(27) [Page 581] Nor will it be right for you to define Quality as 'that which is not the substratum of anything except Community and which is not of the nature of Action'; as this definition will include Community also (which is not the substratum of anything else except genus, i. e., it is the substratum of its own character) and it is also not of the nature of Action.

"What is meant is that Quality is the substratum of Community *only* [which cannot apply to *Community* which is the substratum of various individuals also]."

Such a definition will not apply to any Quality at all; as every quality is the substratum of the negation (of every other quality) [*Colour* contains the negation of *Touch*, and so forth, so that no quality is the substratum of *Community only*].

"What we mean is that Community is the only *positive entity* of which Quality is the substratum [and negation is not a positive entity]."

This also cannot be accepted; as Qualities are the substratum of many positive entities, in the shape of the *upādhis* or characters (in the form of *nameability*, *knowability* and the like, which subsist in all Qualities).

"Colour and the other qualities are not exactly the substratum of *Upādhis*; they are in some way *related* to these; and it is on the basis of this general relationship (between Colour &c. and the *Upādhis*) that Inference and the rest proceed (in connection with Colour &c.)." This is not right; as a matter of fact, the relation of the characters must be taken to be that between the container and the contained;

* Inference proceeds on the basis of a certain character subsisting in the subject; if no character subsists in qualities, how can there be any inference with regard to them? The answer is that for the purposes of inference it is not necessary that qualities should be the *substratum* of the characters; it is enough if they are in some way related to the character; this some sort of relation would afford the basis necessary for all inferential processes.

i. e. that to which the characters belong must be regarded as the *substratum* of these (and not only as related in some indefinite manner). Otherwise—i. e. if no positive character be held to subsist in qualities,—no universal or particular inferences could proceed in regard to them ; as unless the characters (that form the basis of inferences) *subsist in the same substratum*, they do not prove anything with regard to the subject of the Inference.* Thus then (if you insist upon the view that no positive character can subsist in qualities), the definition that you have provided cannot be in the form of a positive generic entity (as all definitions ought to be, being intended to include a number of things) [for if the definition were a positive generic entity, it could not, under your theory, subsist in qualities] ; and it would come to this, that if the definition (being a positive character) does not subsist in Colour and other qualities, then it subsists in them (*i.e.* then alone it is the true definition of these) ; and if it does subsist in them, then it does not subsist in them (*i.e.* then it is not a true definition) ;—this would be a wonderful riddle indeed ! —exactly resembling such riddles as —*laga ityuktē na lagati mā lagētyuktē lagati* [This riddle has not been explained either by the *Shāṅkarī* or by the *Vidyāsāgarī*]

* For instance, in regard to colour, we have the inference.—“ This that I perceive must be colour, because it is apprehended by only one external organ of the Eye ; and here the positive character of being apprehended &c. must subsist in colour and in the object before the eyes ; if the said character had not both of these as its substratum, and if it subsisted, not in colour, but in an entirely different thing, then it could not lead to the inference of colour ; and so on with regard to all inferences in connection with qualities. This is an instance of a universal inference ; in all inferences the probans and the probandum must subsist in the same substratum. As regards particular inferences, we infer the fact of a certain sound coming from a short distance from its loudness ; now if the positive character of loudness subsisted in the Sound, no such inference could be possible. The translation adopts the explanation of the *Shāṅkarī*. The *Vidyāsāgarī* offers a somewhat different interpretation. If no positive character subsisted in qualities then there could be no inferences in regard to some qualities being *general* and others *special*, as these latter are positive characters ; so if these be inferred to exist in qualities, the conclusion would be contrary to fact ; an impossible one. ’

(28) [Page 582] Then again, when you define Substance as the 'substratum of Qualities,' what does the word 'substratum' signify? "It signifies *inherence*". This cannot be; as in that case the Community of *guṇaḥ* would also become a Substance; as the inherence of qualities subsists in that Community (the relation between the individual *guṇa* and the Community *guṇaḥ* being that of *inherence*). "What is meant by the word *guṇāśhraya*, is *guṇasamavāyī*; which means *that in which quality inheres*." This also will not be right; as what you have got to determine is precisely the real meaning of *āśhraya*; and as this *āśhraya* is what is expressed by the Locative in the expression 'in which', it is not right for you to explain the meaning of *āśhraya* by means of such expressions as denote the same *āśhraya*; as this involves the incongruity of explaining a thing by itself [an undesirable 'circle']. "What is meant by *āśhraya* or *substratum* is that which forms the basis of the notion of 'in this'." We cannot accept this; as if this were the meaning of 'substratum,' then, in the case of the wrong notion 'there is yellowness *in this* conchshell', the conchshell will have to be accepted as the (real) substratum of the yellowness [while in reality it is not the substratum of yellowness; and yet as it forms the basis of the notion of 'in this', it must, under the definition, be regarded as the substratum of yellowness]. But the notion ('there is yellowness in this conchshell') is erroneous; and what is meant is that which forms the basis of the right notion of 'in this'." This will not be right; as we could never recognise the invalidity or erroneousness of the notion ('there is yellowness in this conchshell') until we had ascertained the fact of the object of that notion being non-existent; and as the precise signification of the notion of 'in this' is still to be determined, it will not be possible for you to ascertain the non-existence of the object *in that substratum* [and until this is done the erroneousness of the notion 'there is yellowness in this conchshell']

cannot be ascertained; and so long as this is not done, the conchshell will have to be accepted as the real substratum of the yellowness]. "As a matter of fact, it is yellowness that is the counter-entity of the non-existence,—i. e. whose non-existence is to be ascertained; and certainly this yellowness is known to be really existent somewhere (though not in the conchshell.)" That will not help you; as if the *existence* of yellowness is truly known, it will not be possible or right to assert its *non-existence*. "But even though its existence somewhere else may be quite real, yet as cognised in the conch-shell, its existence cannot be real [and it is in regard to the conchshell that the non-existence of yellowness is asserted]." This explanation will not serve your purpose; as you have still to define the precise meaning of the Locative—Substratum—that you make use of in your explanation, in the expression '*in the conchshell*'.

(29) The above reasonings also dispose of another definition of Substance, as 'that which is the material or constituent cause of things.' In the first place, how can it be ascertained what is, and what is not, a constituent cause. Secondly, we find that Colour and the other *qualities* are just as much the 'constituent cause' of Number, as the jar and the other *substances* are [and thus the definition is as applicable to Qualities as to Substances]. "But as a matter of fact, Number does not subsist in Colour and the other Qualities". How then does it subsist in the jar and the other Substances? If we appeal to actual experience and to popular ideas on the subject, we find that the idea of number belonging to Colour &c. is as common as that of its belonging to the jar &c.; and we may in this connection urge the same arguments that we made use of on a previous occasion. "If we regard number as belonging to Substances only; we can explain the popular ideas of number belonging to Qualities as based upon the Substances in which these Qualities inhere

(and not to the Qualities themselves); and this would be a much simpler method than to attribute Number to both Substances and Qualities: and under the circumstances, we should not accept the idea that Number subsists in Qualities." We cannot accept this view; why should we not accept the contrary to be the case? Why should we not attribute Number primarily to Qualities, and only through these to Substances? Then again, why should you accept the view that the Community of 'Being' and such other Communities subsist in Qualities? Certainly the popular conception of these subsisting in Qualities could also be explained as being based upon Substances in which the Qualities subsist [just as you have urged in regard to Number].

[The definition of the category of 'Community,' *Sāmānya*, is next taken up,—it becoming necessary in connection with the last argument, to determine the exact nature of the *Sāmānya*, which is held by the Logician to belong to Substance and Quality alike.

(30) What again is the meaning of 'Community'? It will not be correct to define it as *the cause of comprehensive conception*; as every effect is, in reality, produced by the entire causal apparatus (in general); consequently the definition will include not only the entire apparatus in general, but also the several parts of it. "We shall add to our definition the qualification 'peculiar' or 'special'; so that 'Community', being 'the special cause of comprehensive conception', would be that which does not produce any other kind of effect, (except comprehensive conception) [and this definition could not include the entire causal apparatus, which are productive of many kinds of effects]." This definition also cannot be accepted; for (even though with the further qualification, the definition will not apply to causal apparatus *in general*, yet) it will include the whole range of that causal apparatus (i. e. all the special circumstances) that produce that special effect [of comprehensive conception, which is brought about, not by 'Community' alone, but by the parti-

cular means of cognition by which the particular object is cognised, and many such factors besides]; and further as a matter of fact, we find that 'Community' also serves the purpose of bringing about several other cognitions besides the comprehensive cognition; for instance, it also brings about the cognition of difference among things (e. g. when one animal is cognised as being different from another on the ground that they are found to be possessed of different Communities) [so that the definition, 'that which does not produce any other kind of effect,' cannot apply to such Communities as bring about the cognition of difference and such other effects].

(31) "Community may be defined as that whose authority, (or rational basis) consists in this conception (i. e. comprehensive conception) [it is this comprehensive concept which leads to the *inference* of 'Community'." This also cannot be maintained; as the comprehensive conception forms the authority, or basis, of the inference of its entire causal apparatus [which apparatus will thus be included in the definition]. "But Community is that for which the comprehensive conception is the *sole* authority or means of inferring [the rest of the causal apparatus being known or inferred on the basis of many other things also; e.g. the eye, which is one important factor in the cognising of the Community belonging to the animal that is seen, is capable of being inferred on the basis of the perception of colour; and so on for every other factor; but the community can be inferred or known on the basis of the *comprehensive conception* only: Where there is no notion of comprehension or inclusion of many things under one category, there is no 'community'." This also is not tenable, we reply; as there are many other things that provide a valid basis for the cognition of 'community'; e.g. the different kinds of effective action [when a number of things are found to have one uniform effective action, they come to be included under one category; that is known as belonging to one 'community'; so that the proposed definition becomes too narrow].

(32) A third definition is proposed:—"Community is that of which the comprehensive conception is the only right cognition [this will not include the causal apparatus of the conception; as that apparatus is inferred from the said conception, which cannot be called the right cognition of the apparatus]." This also cannot be accepted; as this definition will apply to that (individual) which is qualified by that 'community.'* "What is meant is that which has for its right cognition that portion of it which appertains to the generic factor [so that the individual becomes excluded]."† This also cannot be accepted; as this definition, involving as it does the conception of Community itself, cannot be established (and comprehended and accepted) until the Community itself has been established and defined.

(33) "We shall then define 'Community' as that without which no comprehensive conception is possible." This also cannot be maintained; as there are many other causes also without which no comprehensive conception is possible [e. g. the contact of the Soul and Mind, and such other causes without which no cognition is possible; all of which will thus be included in the definition].

(34) Nor can we accept the definition of 'Community' as *that which is comprehensive*. For what do you mean by this 'comprehensiveness'? "It means subsistence of more than one". This cannot be; as *the composite whole* and such relationships as *conjunction and the like* are those in which more than one factor subsist. [The *composite whole* consisting of

* Even though the individual cow by itself is not apprehended by a comprehensive conception, yet when we recognise the animal as a "cow"—i. e. as belonging to the category of 'cow', i. e. as qualified by the community 'cow'—this involves that of which comprehensive conception is the only right cognition.

† In the case of the cognition of the animal as 'cow', there are two factors—the *individual* pertaining to the particular animal cognised, and the *generic*, pertaining to the Community 'cow' to which the animal belongs. Now 'community' will be that whose right cognition consists of the latter of these two factors which, not pertaining to the individual factor, this latter becomes excluded from the definition.

many component particles, and *conjunction* being the relation between *two* things]. "We shall add the further qualification of 'eternality'." Even so, the definition will apply to Inherence (which according to the Logician is an eternal relation, subsisting between more things than one). For the same reason 'comprehensiveness' cannot be defined as consisting in the *subsistence of many things*. "We can add the qualification, *that which is not of the nature of a relation* [so that Inherence will be excluded]." Even with this qualification, the definition will apply to atoms [which, according to the Logician, subsist in, i. e. in connection with, many points of space, with every one of which the atom is held to be in contact].

(35) "We shall then define 'Community' as that which is eternal and which inheres in many things [so that atoms will be excluded, which do not *inhere* in many things; their subsistence in regard to the points in space being in the form of *contact*, not *inherence*]." This also is untenable; as neither of the two alternatives possible with regard to it can be maintained: For instance, the definition can be either eternal or non-eternal. It cannot be eternal; as this will involve the incongruity of its operating by itself on itself [on the part of 'eternality', which forming an integral factor of the definition will be qualified by the eternality belonging to that definition]; even though in the definition 'eternality' appears only as a qualifying (and hence subordinate) factor, yet it is 'eternality' all the same. Nor will it be right to regard the definition as 'non-eternal'; as in that case, 'Community' itself, as well as 'Inherence' (which forms the essential factor of the definition), will both have to be regarded as *non-eternal* (which will not be in keeping with the Logician's tenets); and [even if, with a view to escape from the said difficulty, the non-eternality of the definition be attributed to the *individuals*, which also form

a factor of the definition, and not to the *Communities*] then also as regards the Self and such other entities (of which the *individuals* also are held to be eternal) there will be no possibility of that 'non-eternality' which would be attributed to the definition by virtue of the 'non-eternality' of the individuals that form an essential factor in the definition. Then again, the definition cannot be said to be non-eternal unless it is admitted that at some time or the other it does not exist; and if this be admitted, it would imply that the cognition or notion of the definition is, at times, false (i. e., at the time that it does not exist); and thus what is false at one time will become liable to be regarded as false at all times; as the character of the thing remains the same; and this would make the definition an absolute non-entity, not existing at any time at all! As if it's existence at any one time be admitted, and the definition be regarded as real, not false,—then, that character remaining the same, it will have to be regarded as real and no non-existence (and consequent non-eternality) will be possible!

“But when a certain thing happens to be related to, and hence characterised by, a certain definition, it should continue to be so characterised at other times also, the characterised thing remaining the same [so that even when the definition has ceased to exist, it can be regarded as characterising the thing defined, and it will be quite possible to regard the thing as characterised by that definition].” This cannot be; as in the case in question, no such (comprehensive) characterisation (by any definition) is possible; the number of individuals (and communities) being many and diverse. Thus we conclude that the definition cannot be regarded as *non-eternal*.

(36) The above reasonings serve to refute the notion of 'eternality' in regard to other things also. [So that we cannot accept any definition involving the idea of 'eternality']. *

* For instance, Ākāsha has been regarded as eternal; if this 'eternality' of Ākāsha is eternal, then there is a vicious circle; if it is not eternal, then the

[The definition of 'Community' is meant to exclude 'Individuality', hence the consideration of the former leads on to the consideration of the latter.]

(37) Then again, we ask—what is it that is excluded by the above definition of 'Community'? "Why, it excludes 'Specific Individuality' and the other categories (Substance, Quality &c.)." But what is it that you call 'Specific Individuality'? You will perhaps define it as 'that which necessarily subsists in Substances only, and of these also in those only that are eternal? But this definition cannot be accepted; as it is found to be too wide, being applicable to such entities as '*ātmatva*' and the like ['*ātmatva*' subsisting only in the eternal substance *Ātman*]. "But *ātmatva* does not subsist in any other eternal substance except the *Ātman*; while the Specific Individualities must subsist in all eternal substances; and this is what we mean by the qualification 'which necessarily subsists'." In that case the definition becomes untenable, by reason of its not applying to any one Specific Individuality (as no single Individuality ever subsists in *all* eternal substances). "What is meant is that the definition applies to that Community to which all Individualities belong." But you do not admit of 'Community' in regard to Individualities [according to the Logician, Substance, Quality and, Action are the only categories that can have Community]. "What we mean by the Individualities belonging to the 'Community' is that they are all distinguished by a certain common character (from all other things)". We cannot accept this explanation; for if this common character serves to distinguish the Individualities from all other things, then there is no need for any further definition based upon that common

Akāśha also becomes non-eternal. As the Vedāntin himself accepts the Self to be eternal, the above condemnation of the very notion of eternality has been interpreted by the *Shāṅkari* to mean only the condemnation of those definitions which involve the notion of eternality.

character ; as the only purpose for which a definition is required is the distinguishing of the thing defined from all other things ; and this purpose is served by the said character itself ; on the other hand, if the said common character does not serve to distinguish the Individualities from all other things, then the definition itself becomes incomprehensible ; as it cannot be determined what belongs to the same class or community as 'Individualities' [and without this the definition cannot apply to any single Individuality, as shown above]. "All right; we may accept that 'common character' itself as a definition of Individuality [serving as it does to distinguish all individualities from everything else]." This will not be right ; as you have not yet explained what you mean by 'common character' (*upādhi*).

(38) "We can define 'Specific Individuality' as that through which the Yogins have the cognition of eternal individual substances as distinct from the rest of the world." This definition also cannot be accepted ; as it will apply to all those specific forms and specific qualities (through which Yogins have the cognition of many individual things as distinct from the rest of the world, which things are not always eternal). Otherwise [i. e. if in order to escape from this, it be held that the specific forms or qualities do not serve to distinguish individual things, and that Specific Individualities alone are capable of affording such distinctive cognition], how could there be any distinctive cognition with regard to such individual substances as are products (and hence not eternal), or to individual qualities and the rest (which are not Substance)? And [if it be urged that the distinctive cognition of these could be got at through other distinctive properties possessed by them] just as these are endowed with other distinctive properties, so also are the eternal substances [so that in the case of these latter also the required distinctive cognition could be got at through these other distinctive

properties, and there would be no necessity for the postulating of 'Specific Individualities'.] Lastly 'Specific Individualities' themselves are not possessed of further such Individualities [and yet you are able to have distinctive cognition of the Specific Individualities,—so, in the same manner, even when the individual eternal Substances have no 'Specific Individuality', you could have distinctive cognition of those substances; which proves the utter futility of postulating any such thing as 'Specific Individuality']. Thus we find that everything that you wish to define comes to be wiped out of existence!

(39) Then again, in regard to all definitions of 'Specific Individuality' and other things², if the definition is different from the thing defined [as it must be], then, how is it possible that through such a definition, that thing alone, and nothing else, should be known by the particular name (occurring in the definition)? "It is the relation (borne by the definition to the particular thing) that would restrict the application of the name." That is not possible, we reply; firstly because the relationship between the relation and the things related will also need something whereby its connection could be restricted; and so on and on, there would be no end to the assumption of 'relations'; as without some such restrictive 'relation', there would be no restriction at all; and secondly because you have still got to define what 'relation' is.

[The refutation of the definitions of 'Relation' is next taken up].

(40) What, we ask, do you mean by the word '*sambandha*', 'relation'? "Inherence and the rest are what are meant by the word 'relation'." True; but what is meant by our question is—on what basis, for what reason, are Inherence and the rest known as 'relation'? That is to say, is it on the basis of '*samyogaḥva*', '*samavāyaḥva*' and the

like—the specific character of each kind of ‘Relation – taken each exclusively by itself? Or is it on the basis of something else? If the former, then any comprehensive conception of all kinds of relations would be an impossibility; and yet [the possibility of such comprehensive conception cannot be denied as] there are such comprehensive notions involved in the assertions—(a) ‘Perception is cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object’ (Nyāya-Sū. 1. 1. 5) [where ‘Contact’ stands for both kinds of relation, Inherence and Conjunction, which shows that the Sūtra involves a comprehensive notion of the two kinds of relation], —and (b) ‘Inherence is constant association’ [where also ‘association’ includes both Inherence and Conjunction; or else the qualification ‘constant’ would be superfluous]. Nor can Inherence &c. be known as ‘relation’ on the basis of something other than ‘*Samyogaṭva*’ &c. As it is impossible to form the comprehensive idea of any such determinant (that will serve as the basis for all kinds of relation).

(41) “Certainly, the idea of ‘*niyāmakatva*’, the generic notion of ‘determinant’ in the abstract, would serve as the necessary basis.” This is not possible; as you regard the nature of things also as determinant of the thing; and this nature is certainly not a ‘relation’ [consequently, the ‘determinant’ in the abstract could not serve as the basis for the comprehensive notion of ‘relation’]. “But when the nature serves as a determining basis it must be regarded as a ‘relation’.” That cannot be; it is absolutely necessary for you to regard the nature of all things as determinants (as it is only by means of its nature that anything can ever be determined); and under the circumstances, when you come to define the character of ‘determinant’ as ‘necessary existence before the determination’ (the ‘determinant’ being defined as that which must exist before the determining),—it would be enough for you

to define it merely by 'existence' (the 'determinant' being 'that which exists'), and the rest of your definition would be absolutely meaningless.

Then again [the determined and the determinant being regarded as identical], if what is sought to be determined is one that is never found to be unduly extensive (beyond its own well-defined limits), then the very name of the 'determinant' becomes a misnomer [as what by its very nature always keeps within well-defined limits does not need to be defined by any determining agency]. If, on the other hand, what is sought to be determined is one that is unduly extensive, then (the determined and the determinant being, *ex-hypothesi*, identical) the determinant also would be unduly extensive; and what is itself unduly extensive cannot serve the purpose of defining (or determining or keeping within well-defined limits) anything else.

(42) Then again [does the determinant do the determining after it has itself come into existence? or without coming into existence?—if the defining is done after the determinant has come into existence, then what is determined will have to be regarded as undetermined, undefined, before the coming into existence of the particular determinant [and the determined and the determinant being identical, what is undefined before coming into existence, could not become well-defined after coming into existence].

(43) Similarly with all cases of such determining as is brought about by other causes [and in which case the *determined* and the *determinant* are not identical, but distinct]. For instance, when the jar is 'determined,' by its cause, if the cause, before the production of the jar, is itself not determined in the form of, as pertaining to, the jar, and yet it produces the jar, then that same cause would produce the cloth and such other effects also [as there is nothing to restrict the operation of the cause to the *jar* only]. "When we speak of the *determining* of the jar by its cause, we do not mean that the

cause determines the jar; what we mean is that it determines its connection with the particular point of time." This cannot be, we reply. For [if what is determined by the cause is the connection of a particular point of time *with the jar*, then, as pointed out before, this determining will not be possible before the jar is produced; and] if what is determined is only the *connection of the point of time*, not necessarily *of the jar*,—then the same cause might as well determine the connection of time with the cloth and other things also! Thus then—

'If the cause were to determine, with reference to a particular time, a thing (the jar) which does not exist and which is not determined by any particular time,—then it could also similarly determine any other thing (the cloth also, which would be just as non-existent and as undetermined as the jar); or if it could not so determine it, then it would be entirely devoid of the determining power.' (4).

And further, if the cause be regarded as the determinant of the effect, on the basis of their existing at different points of time,—then, why could not there be a determining of what precedes (*i. e.*, the cause) by what follows; (*i. e.*, the effect)? There would be nothing to determine which of the two (Cause or Effect) determines the other [as the only basis for the assuming of determining consists in the two appearing at different points of time, without any idea as to what comes first and what afterwards]. And thus,—

'If it be held that what follows is determined by what precedes it,—then, why could not there be the determining of what precedes by what follows? Nor again could sequence or precedence be ascertained when the series (of Cause and Effect) are beginningless and endless.' (5).

(44) [P. 592] If (in order to escape from the above difficulties) it be held that the determining is done by the determinant before it comes into existence,—then this would involve a contradiction in terms.

(45) There is yet another objection to the view that 'the nature of a thing may be regarded as its relation':—As a matter of fact, the relative is the *container*, and the relation the *contained*; and so, if the nature of a thing itself were to constitute its relation, it would mean that the thing is its own container, which is absurd: even a well-trained dancing boy does not do the dancing by getting upon his own shoulders! Nor can the relation be held to be of something else (different from the relation itself); as you have yourself denied this (by declaring that relation consists in the nature of the thing related); for your position is that 'this (the relation) is based on the very nature of the thing'; and this view does not admit of any determining by the relation of anything different from itself; and under the circumstances, how could you, consistently with your view, regard the relative as something different from the relation?

(46) Then again, in whatsoever manner you may define the character of 'relation,' you must admit the presence of that character in Inherence (which is one form of relation postulated by you);—and [if this character is a positive entity, it must be included under one of the six categories, Substance and the rest, accepted by you; and under the circumstances that character could never subsist in Inherence; as] Inherence, always itself subsisting in substances can never be the substratum of any of the six categories [and the said character must be one of these categories]

"The character in question may be only of the nature of an *Upādhi* or adventitious attribute, for which it would be possible to subsist in Inherence."

This cannot be; as even this attribute could subsist in Inherence only by some sort of relation to it; but as a matter of fact, the relation between that attribute and Inherence could not be either one of Conjunction or Inherence; and the only third relation postulated by you

is the *natural relation*; and the possibility of this has already been refuted. Nor, with a view to escape from these difficulties, will it be right to regard the character in question as an '*abhāva*,' a negative entity (and as such not included in any of the six categories). As in that case it will be necessary for you to provide an adequate explanation of the exact nature of that 'entity' which is negated by the negative particle in the word '*abhāva*.' [And it will not be possible for you to provide this adequate explanation]. And according to you the entire world must be exhausted (contained) in the 'seven categories'; as six of these are 'entities' and the seventh 'non-entity'; and 'entity' and 'non-entity' being contradictory terms, must include all things. [And as the character in question cannot be an entity, or a non-entity, it cannot be accepted].

[The notion of 'substratum' 'receptacle' or 'container' is next taken up].

(47) Then again, if the *determinant* is different from the *determined*, how is it that it determines only that, and nothing else? "Well, that is due to the fact that that alone is its *ādhāra* or substratum." What do you mean by 'substratum'?—we ask. "The substratum of a thing is that wherein it is located (or situated)." This is not right; as it still remains to be explained what is the signification of the Locative in the word 'wherein.'

(48) "We may define the substratum as that with regard to which we have the notion of 'here', 'herein', 'in this'." This also cannot be accepted; as, by this definition, that with regard to which we have the notion of 'there', 'therein', 'in that' would cease to be a 'substratum'. And further, this definition will involve a clear case of objectionable interdependence: we can have the notion of 'herein' only after we know of the thing as the 'substra-

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tum' of another thing [without which knowledge we cannot have any notion of the thing being situated 'herein']; and (by your definition) we can know what is a 'substratum' only when we have the notion of 'herein'.

(49) "The Substratum is that in which something inheres—subsists *by inherence*". This also cannot be accepted; as it will not apply to such notions of substratum as we meet with in the following conceptions—'there is absence of horns *in the hare*', 'the jujube fruit is *in the vessel*' [in which cases the subsistence is not by inherence, but by conjunction, and yet it cannot be denied that the Hare and the Vessel are the 'substratum' of the *absence of horn* and the *jujube fruit* respectively]. "In such cases as you have cited, in which the subsistence is not by inherence, the name of 'substratum' can be applied only figuratively." This is not enough; what you should add is that the very idea of such things being regarded as 'substratum' is wrong! "Well, yes! What then!" Why should it not be the other way? [That is, we may as well regard as *correct*, the application of the name 'substratum' to cases where the subsistence is by relations other than inherence; and regard as *wrong* its application to cases of subsistence by inherence]. And further, if the notion that 'the hare is the substratum of the absence of horns' were wrong (as you hold), then the hare would be a real substratum of the horn! As of two contradictories, the *horn* and the *horn's absence*,—the denial of one must imply the affirmation of the other.

(50) "The Substratum, then, may be defined as that which prevents falling." This also cannot be accepted; as this definition will not apply to the case of the *composite whole* (of which the component parts are the substratum), or to that of Qualities (of which Substances are the substratum); as in either of these cases the substratum does not serve the purpose of preventing falling. [If the component

particles prevented the composite whole from falling, then there would be no falling at all for any composite whole].

(51) "The substratum of a thing may be defined as that which is situated immediately below that thing." This also is not tenable; as in the first place, there is nothing to prove that the substance to which certain qualities belong is situated *below* those qualities [and it cannot be denied that the substance is the substratum of the qualities];—*secondly*, (even admitting that the substance possessing the quality is below the quality),—inasmuch as the component particles of a composite substance would be as much below the qualities of the composite substance as the composite substance itself, the particles also will have to be regarded as the substratum of those qualities (which, in reality, belong to the substance as one composite whole, and not to its component particles);—*thirdly*, when of two objects in contact with one another, one is above the other, the upper object will be *above* (not *below*) the conjunction; and as such, could not by the present definition, be regarded as the substratum of that conjunction;—*fourthly*, the definition will not apply to many such cases as that of an object hanging by a thread [where even though the thread is *above* the object, it is regarded as its substratum, the thread being contained in the object].

(52) "If we do not find it possible to fix upon a single denotation of the word 'Locative' or 'Substratum', then we can attribute to it more than one denotation,—as we do in the case of such words as 'akṣa' and the like (which have more than one meaning)." This is not possible; as if the 'āshraya', 'substratum', had no one uniform character, then there would be no uniformity of character in the fallacy of 'āshrayāsiddhi' and such other conceptions as involve the idea of 'āshraya'. "We may accept the diversity of character in all these." That will not be

right; as in that case, the exact enumeration of the fallacies of 'asiḍḍhi' (as found in the standard Nyāya works), upon which all usage is based, would be wrong [as the number of 'āshrayāsiḍḍhi' itself would be very much more than the number attributed to all the 'asiḍḍhis' combined];—and further, it would be impossible to indicate any character that would afford the basis for a comprehensive idea of all those several kinds; for instance, in some cases the āshraya is that in which the thing inheres [e. g. when a substance is spoken of as the āshraya of a quality]; while this character can never belong either to that wherein a negation subsists [e. g. when we speak of a place as the āshraya of the jar's absence, in which case, the relation is not by *inherence*, but by the relation of simple qualification],—or to Inherence when it is put forward as a probans subsisting in the probandum [e. g. when we speak of the Earth as distinct from Water, &c., because it is the āshraya of the inherence of the community 'prithivīva', where, according to the Logician himself it will not be right to hold that the Inherence inheres in the Earth].

[PAGE 596] (53) In view of these indisputable facts, the Opponent says:—"We shall admit that the denotations of the word 'āshraya' are diverse,—diverse also are the several kinds of āshrayāsiḍḍhi and the rest, taken each singly by itself; and as regards the exact number of 'asiḍḍhi' laid down in our treatises, we must explain these enumerations differently, in view of the fact that the ordinarily accepted interpretation of these is found to be contrary to well-known facts (as you have shown above)." Even this admission will not help you very far; for even though all this may be possible, yet you have to explain what will be the exact sense of 'ādḥāra' ('āshraya', 'substratum') in the case of the expression 'the jujube fruit in the vessel'. (a) It could not be explained as *that which prevents falling*; as it is quite possible for the fruit to fall along with the vessel containing

it,—in which case the vessel, which is its *āshraya*, does not prevent its falling. (b) Nor will it be right to explain it as *that with which the thing contained is in contact*; as both the things being equally in contact with each other, one would be as justified, by the definition, in regarding the fruit as the ‘*ādḥāra*’ of the vessel, as *vice versa* ! (c) Nor, with a view to avoid this difficulty, will it be right to define the ‘*ādḥāra*’ as that with which the other thing is in contact, and which lies below this other thing; as even though this definition may be applicable to the case of the fruit in the vessel, it will fail in other cases: *e. g.* when the soles of the feet are smeared with particles of dust, where the dust-particles [even though having the foot-sole in contact with them, and lying below the foot-sole] are not regarded as the ‘*ādḥāra*’ of the foot; in fact, on the contrary, the foot-sole is regarded as containing the dust-particles, and as such, being their ‘*ādḥāra*’; and thus the definition being found failing in such other cases, cannot be accepted as correct, even with regard to the particular case that we have been considering (of the fruit contained in the vessel). “The last explanation of ‘*ādḥāra*’ is not intended to be applicable to all cases; it is meant to apply to only some cases (and this it does)—according to the view that the character of ‘*ādḥāra*’ is diverse (and not one only).” This does not help you at the present juncture: it may be possible for some other definition of ‘*ādḥāra*’ to apply to some other cases; but what you now put forward as the definition is not possible, for the simple reason that it is found applicable to things (*e. g.*, the dust-particles on the foot-sole) that are never known as ‘*ādḥāra*,’ as we have shown above. “With a view to avoid this difficulty, we shall add the further qualification that the *ādḥāra* has a size larger than that of what it contains.” This will not be right; as this qualification will not apply to the case of a large mass of cotton held on the palm of the hand

[when the *adhāra*, the hand, is smaller in size than the mass of cotton it holds]; nor can the '*adhāra*' in this case, be explained as something else. Then again, your definition contains the word '*adhah*,' 'below,' 'underneath,'—and you cannot determine the exact signification of this word.

(54.) "We regard that thing as 'below' which lies in the direction of falling." This will not be right; as 'falling' cannot be explained as anything other than 'going below or downwards'—which is only the idea of 'below' having the notion of 'going' added to it [and thus the definition of 'below' by 'falling' would involve a vicious circle]. It was for this reason that the Great Teacher of Advaita (R̥ibhu), knowing that it is impossible to define the exact meaning of the word 'below,' explained the refutation (of the use of such word as 'below' and 'above') to his pupil (Nidāgha),—a refutation that has been thus summed up by the revered Parāshara :—'what is it that is called by the name *below*, and what which is called *above* ?'

(55.) "We can explain the word 'below' as signifying the direction towards the Earth." This also cannot be accepted; as it is possible (in certain cases) for the word 'above' also to signify the direction towards the Earth (for instance, when the word 'above' is used by the inhabitants of Pātāla).

"Whenever we speak of the 'direction towards the Earth' it is also in relation to something (*e. g.*, the Sun); and with reference to this something the 'direction towards the Earth' will be 'below.'"^{*} This is not right. What do you mean by 'with reference to which'?

(a) Do you mean that which is regarded as the limit or point from which the direction is judged? Or (b) that towards

* All notion of Direction is relative. When we take the Sun as the standard, all the points between the Sun and the Earth will be in the direction *towards the Earth* and all points on the other side of the Earth will be in the direction *away from the Earth*. Thus with reference to the Sun as the standard what is the 'direction towards the earth' is what is meant by the word 'below.'

which or facing which the Earth lies? [That is to say, is the standard only the limit from which the direction is judged? or is it that towards which the Earth's face is turned?] If it mean the former, then, taking as your standard or limit something that is above the Earth, what you call 'above'—*i. e.*, the direction above that standard something—will also be 'towards the Earth' in relation to something else (that may be higher); and so that direction also will have to be regarded as 'below.' For instance, above the Earth's surface, we have the mountain in relation to which mountain the Sun is 'above'; now the points of space between the Sun and the mountain will also be 'towards the Earth,' just as much as those below the mountain; and in this case also a 'limit' will be present, in the shape of the mountain, which is as much a limit for the points of space below it as for those above it; and thus fulfilling all the conditions of the definition of 'below,' the point of space between Sun and the mountain will also come to regarded as 'below']. For similar reasons [*i. e.*, because the character of 'being towards the Earth' is equally attributable to what is higher and what is lower than the standard limit] the second alternative also cannot be maintained [*i. e.*, it will not mend matters if by 'with reference to which' you mean 'that facing which the Earth lies'; as the Earth will face the points above the mountain, just as well as those below it].

(56). "That direction is 'below' by action towards which the Earth approaches nearer [so that 'falling' comes to be defined as that action by which the Earth approaches nearer, and that is 'below' which lies in the direction of that falling, defined above, in para. 54; against which the only objection urged was that of its involving a circle; and this circle becomes avoided by the definition of 'falling' provided here]." We cannot accept this definition; by this definition, the action of an object hanging by a rope in a well

and swinging horizontally will have to be regarded as 'falling' [as each swing brings the object nearer to the 'Earth' in the form of the walls of the well]; and the space traversed by each swing will have to be regarded as 'below.'

(57). "Taking the Earth and some other object as the two limits, that space which, intervening between these two, is called the 'middle,'—when taken in relation to the limit other than the Earth,—is what is called 'below.' [For instance, the space between the Earth and the Sun is 'below' the Sun]". This also cannot be accepted; as in that case, the Earth itself could never be regarded as 'below' (the Sun); and further, without explaining what is meant by the word 'below,' you cannot provide any adequate explanation of what is meant by the 'middle' or 'intervening space' between the Earth and the other object;—the only explanation possible of the 'middle' or 'intervening space' between the Earth and the other object being that it is 'above' the earth and 'below' the other object [so that the explanation of 'middle' involves the notion of 'below', and that of 'below' you seek to explain with the help of the notion of 'middle'; thus there is a mutual interdependence]. If you seek to provide any other explanation of the 'middle', (free from the notions of 'above' and 'below'), you will find that it applies to lateral space: For instance, such an explanation of the 'middle' would be in the form of 'that which is to the East of the Earth and to the West of the other limit;' as the word 'middle' or 'interval' is applied in usage to that space with regard to which two men standing in opposite directions have the notion of two contradictory directions [*i.e.* when one man is standing on the East and the other on the West, the intervening space is conceived by the former as 'West', and by the latter as 'East'] [and this explanation of 'middle' will apply to lateral space, which also, by the proposed definition of 'below', should have be regarded as 'below'].

(58) “[If none of the above definitions of the ‘Substratum’ can be maintained] there must be something else that is signified by the word ‘āḍhāra’; as the notion (of ‘herein’) is a well-recognised one; and it cannot be explained except by means of an explanation of what is meant by ‘Substratum’.” Even this is not admissible. Whatever may be signified by the word ‘āḍhāra’—is it eternal or transient? It cannot be transient; as that would mean that the substratum ceases to exist, so that there may be times when the very notion of ‘substratum’ would be non-existent; and further, inasmuch as the case of the substratum is analogous to that of the Community ‘cow’ [which as signified by the word ‘cow’ is regarded as eternal, even though its constituent individuals are transient; from which analogy, even though the individual substratum may be transient, yet the genus ‘substratum’, as signified by the word ‘substratum’, should be eternal],—if, even so, it be regarded as transient, then (exactly on the same grounds) the Community ‘cow’ also will have to be regarded as transient. Nor will it be right to regard the signification of the word ‘substratum’ as eternal. As will this, that is signified by the word ‘substratum’, be either comprehensive (including all kinds of substratum) or not-comprehensive? If it be not-comprehensive, then there would be an impossibility of any comprehensive conception of the ‘substratum’; and (in the absence of such comprehensive conception) it will be impossible also to comprehend any conventional denotation of the word ‘substratum’ [as this would, *ex-hypothesi*, have to be taken as separate with regard to each individual substratum; and the number of individuals being endless, any such convention would be beyond the grasp of our minds]. If, on the other hand, what is signified by the word ‘substratum’ be something comprehensive, then, is it one which, like Community, never renounces the individuals in which it subsists (*i.e.* the individuals that it comprehends, like Community, which has no

existence apart from the individuals composing it) ? or is it one that does renounce these individuals ? In the former case, if one thing has been once recognised as the 'substratum' of another thing, then it will never again be possible for the latter to appear as the substratum of the former [and this is possible, as at one time a man may be seated on the bed, and at another time he may be carrying it on his head]. If then, it be held that it does renounce the individuals in which it subsists,—then, if there is no fixed law under which it renounces and embraces individuals, then, no restriction being possible, it will be possible for us to conceive of such renouncing and embracing as going on at all times (which would be absurd).

[Page 601] (59) "[In order to escape from this last absurdity, if you assert that] there is something that regulates the renouncing and embracing of the constituent individuals,—then you should point out what this regulating agency is [as a matter of fact, there is no such agency that you could point out].

"But we can certainly assume such an agency, seeing that, without some such agency, we cannot account for the well-known conception of 'substratum'."

No such agency can be rightly assumed, we reply. For if we were to assume such a regulating agency, then that agency itself, which regulates the embracing of the constituent individuals, might itself be regarded as the 'substratum,' and there would be no need for postulating any other 'substratum' [whose conception would be based upon the said regulating agency].*

"Yes ; be that so." But this will not be quite right ; as that regulating agency also [which would constitute the character of the 'substratum'] will stand in need of some agency that will regulate its own renouncing and embracing of its substrates ; and for this latter

* That property which regulates the said embracing will be what indicates the character of 'substratum' ; and that which prevents the manifestation of the character of the substratum will be the property that regulates the renouncing.

agency again, another regulating agency will have to be assumed ; and [this latter agency itself serving the required purpose] the former would become futile [just as the assumption of another ' substratum ' was found futile in the previous case] ;—and thus your position comes to this : If you do not assume an additional agency, there is nothing to regulate the renouncing and embracing of substrates ; if, on the other hand, you do assume the additional agency, the assumption of every such agency renders futile what has gone before it ;—truly a difficult position from which there is no escape!

“ But there could be an interchange of the work of regulating between the two, [so that the renouncing and embracing of what follows will be regulated by what precedes it, and *vice versa* ; so that nothing would be futile, and there would be no endless assumption of regulating agencies].”

In that case there will be mutual interdependence between the two ; and we should feel called upon to answer this argument only after you have proved the fact that it is possible for two things to be so interdependently related that each would drag the other to where it is itself dragged ; [as a matter of fact to prove this is impossible ; as in that case mutual interdependence would cease to be an objectionable feature altogether.]

(60) “ Well, the reasonings that you put forward against the comprehensive conception of ' substratum ' apply with equal force to the case of such comprehensive conceptions as those of ' community ' and the like ; so that these latter also become impossible ”. For heaven's sake, please do not utter these words too loud ! If an enemy were to hear them, it would be a veritable calamity sprung upon us ! *

* The author holds all things to be inexplicable ; hence to him if it is pointed out that the conception of ' community ' becomes inexplicable, it is only a contingency that he would desire ; and not anything to disconcert him. This is the sense of the jocular answer given.

(61) Then again, the character of 'substratum' that you postulate—has that itself a substratum of its own? or is it without a substratum? If it is without a substratum,—*i. e.* there is nothing that contains the character of the substratum—then with regard to what particular object could it bring about the cognition of being qualified by itself; as there being no objects that contains that character, all objects would be equally related to that character, [and there would be nothing that could be recognised as particularly endowed with that character, and hence as entitled to the name of 'substratum']. If, on the other hand, the character of the substratum has a substratum of its own (*i. e.* is contained in a particular object), then you have to point out this further substratum [and so on and on, you will have to postulate substratum after substratum *ad infinitum*].

“But the very nature of the character of 'substratum' is such that with regard to its own substratum (which contains that character) it forms the basis of the notion of 'substratum', without the intervention of any other substratum for itself;—just as 'saṁtā', the generic character of 'being' by itself forms the basis of the notion of 'being' (the existence of things) without the intervention of a further 'being' (that would establish the existence of this 'Being' itself).” This will not be right; as a notion, without an adequate substratum, would be wrong; just as the notion of silver, in the absence of the character of 'silver,' is wrong, so in the absence of the character of 'substratum', the notion of 'substratum' would be wrong.

We shall explain this in detail, in course of our refutation of Diversity (p. 1141 *et seq.* Chaukhambha, s. s. Edition).

(62) “Even in the absence of the relation of the container and the contained (as held to subsist between the substratum and what subsists in it), the requisite agency

for the regulating of what is to be renounced, and what embraced, would be available in the shape of the intrinsic relation of things ; just as the connection between the object and its cognition is regulated by the relation known as ' *Viṣayaviṣayibhāva* ' .” This also is not possible ; as in the first place, we have already refuted your ' intrinsic or ' natural relation ' (in para. 41) ; and secondly, because you cannot provide an adequate explanation of the relation of ' *Viṣayaviṣayibhāva* '—of ' subject ' and ' object '—which you have cited as an example in support of your contention.

[The refutation of ' substratum ' having turned on the exact nature of the ' *Viṣayaviṣayibhāva* ' or the ' subject-object relation ', the author proceeds to show the impossibility of explaining it.]

(63) What is the ' *viṣayaviṣayibhāva* ' of cognitions with the jar and other objects ? “ Cognition being an entity of the form of illumination (or manifestation), the *viṣayaviṣayibhāva*, or relation of ' subject and object ', with the jar is only that particular *svabhāva* (innate nature) of an entity of the form of illumination or manifestation which consists in its pertaining (or belonging) to that object.” This definition cannot be accepted ; as it does not apply to the Objects of Desire (Aversion Action) and the rest [Desire &c. also, according to the Logician bear, with objects, the ' subject-object ' relation ; and yet not being of the form of illumination, which can apply to cognitions only, their relation becomes excluded from the definition]. “ We shall then substitute the word ' *viṣayinī* ', ' subjective ' [in place of ' *prakāśhāsy* . ' ; so that the definition will include all such entities as Desire and the rest, which bear upon objects, and are, as such, capable of being regarded as ' subjective '].” This will not be right ; as it is precisely this (the exact nature of the ' subjective ') that you have got to determine.

(64) Then again, what do you mean by the ' *svabhāva* ' of the cognition ? Do you mean: the cognition's own *dharma*' character or property ? Or its own self ?

(65) If it is the property, is it the character ' *jñānaṭva* ', ' being a cognition ', which is common to all cognitions ? Or is it a particular character peculiar to each individual cognition of the jar &c. ? If it is the generic character of cognition ', then, inasmuch as this is common to all cognitions, it is not possible for it to pertain to any particular individual object. If it is the peculiar character of each individual cognition, then the character of the cognition of each individual object would have to be regarded as distinct ; and this would be only another way of asserting that the cognition is of the form of its object [a view which has been held by the Yogāchāra-Bauddha- and stubbornly rejected by the Logician]. Then again, this property, this character of ' *jñānaṭva* ', — [Is this an adventitious accessory of the cognition, like the *stick* of ' the man with the stick ' ?] Or is it a permanent attribute, in the form of ' Community ', like ' *puruṣatva* ' of the man ? If it is an adventitious accessory, (a) is what is imposed as such the object apprehended by the cognition ? (b) Or is it something else ?] — [A] it cannot be held to be dependent upon something else to be imposed upon ; as in that case, for the cognition of the adventitious accessory, we would stand in need of something entirely different from the objects actually cognised, like the jar and the rest [e. g. in the case of the cognition of the man with the stick, the *stick* is what is imposed as the adventitious accessory ; and this being something other than the real object of cognition, the man, for the cognition of the man, in this case, we are made dependent upon the stick ; in the same manner, if ' *ghatajñānaṭva* ' as an *upādhi* of the ' *ghatajñāna* ' were an *upādhi* in which what is imposed as such

is something different from the jar itself, then it would come to this that for the simple cognition of the jar, we would stand in need of something other than the jar, which is absurd]. (A) Nor again, can the jar itself be what is imposed as an adventitious accessory; as there is, so far, no connection between the jar and its cognition [the only relation possible is the *viṣayaviṣayibhāva*; and this is still undetermined]; and if even so, it were to be imposed, then great confusion would be the result [any object might be imposed upon any cognition, without any restriction] (B) Nor again can 'ghatajñānaṭva' be regarded as a *āṭi*, (a class-character permanently inherent in the cognition of the jar); as in those ordinary cases where we cognise the jar by itself, and also the cloth by itself, the two class-characters, 'ghataṭva' and 'pataṭva' having been recognised as distinct, if, at some time, we happen to have the composite cognition of the jar and the cloth,—so that we have a *ghatapatajñāna*,—if the property hereof, as 'ghatapatajñānaṭva', were regarded as a class-character, or *āṭi*, this would be an instance of an admixture of two class-characters (*ghataṭva* and *pataṭva*; and such an admixture is not regarded as desirable by the Logician). If, in order to avoid this, it be held that the cognition of each individual object is distinct, [so that no such composite cognition as 'ghatapatajñāna' would be possible], then it would never be possible to have the cognition of any qualified object [as this would involve the cognition of the object and also of its qualification, which, *ex hypothesi*, is not possible].

In order to meet these difficulties, it may be held that in the case of composite cognitions (*e. g.* *ghatapatajñāna*) there is a *composite* class-character (which is apart from the class-character of each individual cognition of individual objects; just as we have the class-character 'variegated colour' which is distinct from 'blue', 'red' &c.); but in that case, we would ultimately be unable to speak of any class-character

pertaining to the cognition of individual objects [as, according to the Logician, every cognition involves at least two cognitions, the *Savikalpiki* and the *Niroikalpaka*, the former having for its object the concrete form of the object along with its distinctive features &c., while the latter apprehends only the object in its vague abstract form;—so that every cognition being composite in character, all cognitions would fall under the composite class-character].

If (thus reduced to a desperate position) you even admit the admixture of class-characters [and posit such class-characters as ‘*ghatajñānaṭva*’, ‘*putajñānaṭva*’ and the like], then these class-characters themselves being enough to distinguish each cognition, there would be no ground left for the assuming of the ‘object’ of cognitions (the Logician’s position being that each cognition is distinguished from the other only through its object, in all other details, all cognitions having the same character).

“Yet, inasmuch as in every cognition the relation to an object is manifest, we admit the *object* also.”

This explanation cannot be accepted; as it is this relation whose exact nature is under consideration now.

“True, but this is its exact nature—that it is that relation which subsists between the cognition and its object.”

This is not right; as this ‘subject-object’ relation being one only, the cognition and the object would both be liable to be known as ‘object’; just as in the case of the relation of Conjunction. *

“But as a matter of fact, the cognition is the *viśayi*, the ‘subject’ and the object is the *viśaya*, which is different from the

* Conjunction is a relation subsisting between two objects in contact with one another; and of this relation both members are known as ‘*samyogi*’ ‘conjoint’, ‘in conjunction’; similarly if ‘*viśaya-viśayibhāva*’ is a relation it must be one subsisting over both members of the relation—the cognition and its object; and, hence as in the case of cognition, so here also, both would be known as either ‘*viśaya*’ or as ‘*viśayi*’ and there would be nothing to determine that one is to be called ‘*viśaya*’ and the other ‘*viśayi*’,—the analogy of the well-known relation of conjunction not providing any justification for this strict apportionment of the names

vişayi. [That it to say, the relation is properly speaking 'vişayitva', 'being the subject'; and this belongs to the Cognition only, and not to both Cognition and Object; hence the case is not analogous to that of 'conjunction']". We cannot accept this; as this 'vişayitva' would only be another name for the *Bhāttā* has called *jñātā*, 'the character of being known' (as belonging to objects of cognition); and this we are going to refute later on.

(65) Then again, the 'svabhāva' of a thing cannot be explained as the self of the object (the second alternative suggested in para. 64); as if the 'svabhāva' consisted of the self of the object, then,—just as the 'self' of the individual objects, jar, cloth &c., is each distinct from the other, so the 'self' of the individual cognitions of these objects also would each be distinct from the other; so that there would be an end to all such usage as is based upon the comprehensive conception of the cognitions of several objects [i. e. each cognition being entirely distinct from the other, no such comprehensive conception would be possible].

(67) Then again, your assertion, that "the *ṭadīyā*, belonging or pertaining to the object, is the *svabhāva* or nature of the cognition," has to be looked into more minutely: The word '*ṭadīya*' (belonging to that) is formed of the pronoun '*ṭat*' (that) and the affix 'chha', where '*ṭat*' refers to the object, and the affix denotes relationship; so that what your assertion means is that 'these two—the object and relationship—as qualified by each other, form the *svabhāva* of the cognition'; and what this means is that 'objects form the *svabhāva* of the cognition'; and this would be an excellent refutation of the view of the Idealist by you (who make it your business to refute the Idealist standpoint, and yet reduce all objects to the form of mere cognition)! "What our assertion means is that what forms the *svabhāva* of the cognition is the relation, and not the object." This will not be right; as unless you add some specification, mere

'relationship' in general would belong to all things (and not to cognitions only); as it cannot be held that Relation does not belong to any cognition; as in that case it would not be *relation* at all;—nor will it be right to hold that Relation belongs to a particular cognition only. As in that case, firstly, the relation would become identified with the cognition, as pointed out above; and, in the second place, there is nothing to show to what particular cognition it belongs. "The cause of the cognition will be the specifying factor [so that the fact of the relation of the jar pertaining to the cognition of the jar only is indicated by the contact of the jar with the perceiving organ, which contact is the cause of the cognition of jar]". That cannot be; for what does that specifying factor do? "It makes the relation pertain to the particular cognition". This will not be right; for is this 'ṭaḍiyatā', 'belonging to that,' a part of that relation which forms the 'svabhāva' of the cognition? or is it a distinct property, outside, or apart from, it? If the former, then what is signified by the word 'that' is also a part of that same relation; so that there is the same identification of the object and the cognition, as pointed out above. If it is the latter, then, that distinct property (signified by the affix 'chha' in 'ṭaḍiya') would be the same as the *object* (as signified by the word 'tāt' in 'ṭaḍiya'); as by your own explanation, the object (jar) that is signified by the word 'ṭat', which forms the qualifying factor in the composite conception denoted by 'ṭaḍiya', is nothing more than the same 'distinct property'. "That distinct property may be identical with the object [what is the harm in that?]" Then we ask—is this (distinct property—*i.e.* the object) related or not related, to the aforesaid 'svabhāva'-relation (*i.e.* the cognition)? If not, then the cognition would not be related to anything. If, on the other hand, it is related, then is it related to the relation in the shape of cognition by some other relation? or by the relation of *sva-*

bhāva only? If by some other relation, then that would need another relation for being related, and so on and on, there would be that same infinite regress for avoiding which you posited the 'svabhāva' relation! If, on the other hand, it is related by the relation of 'svabhāva' only, then in the composite conception 'related to the relation in the shape of cognition', the cognition also enters as a qualifying factor; hence in accordance with the reasoning put forward above [*i. e.* if the cognition has the *svabhāva* of being related to the jar, then the jar and the cognition become identical], and in accordance with the argument just put forward [*i. e.* if 'ṭadīyaṭā,' being a distinct property, is of the form of the object, and to that the relation that the Cognition bears is that of 'svabhāva'], both—ṭadīyaṭā and ṭaṭ—become the 'self' of the cognition;—and this would only be another way of accepting the identity between the Cognition and its object!

[Page 608] (68) The above reasoning serves to refute the 'svabhāva'-relation in other cases also.

[For the purpose of defining the relation of 'viṣayaviṣayibhāva', the Opponent proceeds to provide definitions of 'viṣaya' and 'viṣayi' and then base his conception of the said relation upon the correlation of these two definitions.]

(69) "The *viṣaya*, 'object of cognition', is that which is the receptacle of the result of the cognition; and the *viṣayi*, *Subject*, is that which has (*i. e.* produces) that result". This also is open to objection. For what is the 'result of cognition'? Does it consist in *being known*? or in *being used*? If the former, then the definition will not apply to past and future things, or to things that are wrongly cognised, (as the past and future things do not exist at the present time, when the cognition appears, and when one has the wrong cognition of a thing, this thing is non-existent; so that in all those cases, the thing cognised being non-existent, it cannot be the receptacle of that

character of *being known*, which constitutes, *ex hypothesi*, the distinctive feature of the 'object'; so that neither the future thing, nor the past thing, nor the misconceived thing could ever be the 'object' of cognition]. Nor again is it possible for you to indicate any basis for the assumption, that a certain cognition (that of the jar, for instance) produces its result in that same object (the jar, and not in any other object, the cloth or the horse).—If there were some such basis, that basis itself might be regarded to be the distinctive feature of the 'object' [and there would be no justification for propounding a definition on the strength of that basis] If, on the other hand, the result of cognition consists in *being used*,—i. e. in being carried by the hands and so forth,—then, in the first place, as a matter of fact we find that such *usage* is not present in every case of cognition [*e. g.* when we cognise a quality, colour or smell, or when we cognise the self or the *ākāśha*; there is no *carrying by the hands*];—and secondly, even in the case of objects where such carrying is possible, along with the object will be caused many other things also that are inseparable from it (*e. g.* the qualities inherent in the thing, as the weight of the jar for instance); and even though these other things are not cognised, yet, by the definition, these also will have to be regarded as the 'object' of that cognition [that is when we cognise the jar and carry it, even though we do not cognise the weight of the jar, this weight will, by the definition, be the 'object' of that cognition of the jar]; and thus the said definition of 'object' becomes too wide. If again by *being used* is meant desire (aversion and indifference) [i. e. the result of cognition consists in its being desired or abandoned &c.], inasmuch as the Self is the only receptacle of Desire &c., the definition of 'object' could not apply to any such thing as the jar and the like. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, 't be held that the 'object' is not the 'receptacle of desire',

but the 'object of desire' (i. e. the desired object);—then, for the purpose of ascertaining if a certain thing is an 'object of desire' you would need to know if it is object of cognition, [so that you will land yourself in a vicious circle]. Then again there are some philosophers who do not accept 'treating with indifference' as a form of 'using' an object; what would be there to prevent these philosophers from rejecting (as *object-less*) that cognition which leads to the cognised thing being treated with indifference? [As such treatment not being 'usage,' the definition of 'object' will not apply to the thing apprehended by this cognition]. And further, who can you avoid the contingency that the cognition of such usages as *accepting* and *rejecting* would itself become objectless? * If, in order to avoid this, you hold that in every case, also in the cognition of usage, there is usage in the shape of *acceptance* and *rejection*,—then there would be no end to such cognitions and usages!

(70) There is another definition suggested on the basis of the object being related to the cognition;—that is, "when a cognition is found to have its nature in keeping with such usage as is inseparable from a certain thing, this thing is called the 'object' of that cognition; and the cognition having such an object is called the 'subject.'" This definition also does not escape from the arguments urged above [on the basis of difficulties attaching to the exact meaning of the words 'nature' and 'usage,' which are found in this definition also].

(71) It has been asserted† that "the 'object' apprehended by a cognition is only that thing which appears in that cognition; and it is nothing apart from it;—and this provides us with an adequate definition of what is 'apprehended' and what is 'not apprehended' [that which appears as a part and parcel of the cognition is its object 'appre-

* The cognition of usage should itself, by the definition, be dependent on a usage; if not, then, the definition of object, not applying to the usage, the cognition of usage would be without an 'object'!

† By Shalikanātha—says the *Vidyāsāgarī*.

hended,' and that which is apart from it is 'not apprehended' by it]." But as regards this definition we do not quite know what is meant by the thing appearing 'in the cognition': Does it mean—(a) that the cognition is the receptacle (or substratum) of the thing? (b) or that the cognition is the 'object'? (c) or that the cognition is merely related to the thing?

(a) The first of these alternatives is not possible; as in the first place, such things as the jar and like (which are placed on the ground, and which have the ground for their substratum), when not resting upon a cognition, would be excluded from the definition [so that these things could not be regarded as 'object']! And secondly the definition would include the generic character of 'cognition'—*jñānatva*, which, even though its exact nature can be determined with difficulty will fall under the definition, as it has 'cognition' for its permanent substratum—the generic character of 'cognition', always residing in cognitions.

(b) As regards the second alternative, you have not yet been able to determine what 'object' is; how then could it help to determine any other definition? Then again, by this definition the relation of subject and object, as between the cognition and its object—would be reversed [if cognition be regarded as the 'object' of the cognition, as intended by the second alternative].

(c) The third alternative makes the definition too wide: the cause of the cognition is also 'related' to it (and would therefore, by the third alternative, have to be regarded as the 'object' of that cognition]; specially as this cause also is something that is manifested by (is apprehended by) another cognition.

"But we shall add the qualification that it must be manifested by that same cognition [so that the cause of the cognition not being manifested by that same cognition, could not be regarded as its 'object']."

This also will not be right; as what you are explaining is exactly this same character of 'being manifested' [and hence it is not right to put forward a definition of which this very conception

forms the principal factor]; as it is only after we know what is meant by 'being manifested' that we can know if a certain cognition is 'related' to what is *manifested* by it.

(72) "We shall define 'Object' of a cognition as that which always necessarily appears on the appearance of that cognition." This also will not be right, we reply; as it is this 'appearance', the exact nature of which is still to be determined. "We all know in a general way what an 'object' is; and the definition here propounded is only that of particular objects [and as the generic entity 'object' cannot be gain-said, and as no generic entity is possible without specified individuals, no objection can be taken to a definition on the sole ground of its not applying to all objects]." This is not right; as when it is shown that no specific individual is in any case possible, the generic entity itself becomes impossible; and hence even the right conception that people may have of this generic entity becomes doubtful [and hence such a conception cannot form the basis of any specific definitions].

(73) [Another definition of 'object' is put forward*]—"The 'object of cognition' is only that cause of it which imparts its shape to that cognition." This cannot be accepted; as it cannot be ascertained by what the shape is imparted to the cognition. As a matter of fact this 'shape' is nothing other than the form taken by the cognition; under the circumstances, inasmuch as everyone of the causes (that bring about the cognition) would be capable (of imparting its shape to the cognition), how could you single out that particular cause (which you would regard as the 'object' of that cognition)? "Even though every cognition—of the jar, for instance—is accompanied, or led up to, by all those causes which are capable (of imparting a shape to it), yet it is the presence of the jar which is more explicit than the

* By the Bauddha' say the *Chitsukh*; and the *Vidyāsāgari*; 'by those who hold that cognitions have shape'—says the *Shūnkari*.

rest; and on this ground it is the jar that is held to be what imparts its shape to the cognition." This is not right, we reply; for there is as much reason to believe in the presence of the jar as in that of all the other causes; what difference, then, could explicitness and non-explicitness make in the matter? "Why, we shall define the object on the basis of that whose presence is explicit." This will not be right; as rightly speaking, the presence of all causes is equally explicit. "[It is true that there is as much reason for believing in the presence of the jar as in that of the other causes] But the 'object', jar, is that whose presence is actually perceived." This we have already answered [i.e. if by 'perceived' you mean *known*, then it applies to all causes, everyone of which is known; if you mean *seen with the eye*, then it would be impossible for odour, taste, &c., to be the 'object' of any cognition; as the presence of these can never be seen with the Eye]; and further, until it has been explained what an 'object' is, it cannot be pointed out what is 'seen'.

(74) Nor can we accept the definition of the 'Object of Cognition' as "that which is the *karman*, or objective, of the Cognition. [i.e. on which the action of the cognition operates]." This cannot be accepted; as what you have got to explain is the relation of the cognition to this 'objective'; and the refutation of this explanation is to be found in my *Īshvarābhisandhi*, under the section dealing with '*jñātaṭā*', the character of *being known*.

(75) "There is a certain thing of which the cognition is a qualification by itself, and not through any other relationship (save that of *vishēṣaṇa* and *vishēṣya*; and it is this thing that is the 'object' of that cognition; so that we may define the 'object' of a cognition as that which is qualified by that cognition; and as a rule, of two things (*vishēṣya* and *vishēṣaṇa*) that is regarded as the '*vishēṣya*' or 'qualified'

whose qualification is, assumed (or taken up) by something else, which is called 'composite conception' (of the *qualified* and the *qualification* together).'* In regard to this definition we make the following observation:—When it is said that the composite conception assumes the qualifications or character of the object, does it mean simply that it assumes this character [*i.e.* it assumes only some such nature]? or that it must assume this character? [*i.e.* it assumes all such natures]? If the former, then (in the case of the jar-cognition) the stick (of the potter) will also be a '*vishēṣya*',—as the jar-cognition assumes the character of *being an entity* which is one of the features of the stick. Nor can the second alternative be maintained; for in the case of that smoke which is not concomitant with fire for instance, the smoke that is seen issuing from the heated pot of the cowherd), we find that it is possessed of the character of issuing in an unbroken line; and there is 'something else' [in the form of the smoke that is concomitant with fire] which is qualified by that character; and yet this latter does not assume the character of *being not concomitant with fire* which is one of the features of the former '*vishēṣya*' [so that if the assuming of *all* features be made a necessary condition of the definition, *smoke* can never be regarded as a '*vishēṣya*']. "But as a matter of fact, the character of issuing in an unbroken line belongs (not to the *smoke* merely, but) to that which is endowed with unceasing upward motion; and certainly the character of failing to be concomitant with fire does not belong to such smoke, (the issue of smoke from the cow-herd's pot not being unceasing) [so that if this character is not assumed by smoke, it does not cease to be '*vishēṣya*']. This cannot be; for that which is endowed with the first character (*i. e.*, the smoke in the

* The composite conception 'the man with the stick' takes up the character of the 'man'—the stickholder being a *man*; hence it is the *man* that is the *qualified*, and the stick the *qualification*; in the composite conception 'the cognised jar' takes up the character of the *jar*; which makes the jar the *qualified* and the cognition the *qualification*.

pot which issues in an unbroken line),—does, or does not, this possess the character of being not concomitant with fire? If it does, then the objection that we urged before remains in force [i. e. *non-concomitance*, a character of the pot-smoke, not belonging to, not being assumed by, the unceasing column of smoke, this latter cannot be a ‘*vishēṣya*’]. If it does not possess that character (of failing in its concomitance), then the addition of the further qualification (of *unceasing* &c.) is entirely superfluous; as it is only in *that which is qualified by the character of issuing in an unbroken line* that there is possibility of the discrepancy [of *failing in concomitance*, for the removal of which discrepancy further qualification would be needed; so that when such a qualification is not needed in connection with this, it cannot be required at all.]

“What is assumed is only that character qualified by which the thing takes that qualification; and all its characters are not assumed; nor do the qualifications belong to the smoke as qualified by the character of failing in concomitance [they belong to it only as qualified by the generic character of ‘smoke’; hence it is this last character only that would be assumed, and not the failure of concomitance].” This cannot be, we reply; does this mean that the smoke *per se* never fails in its concomitance? [This cannot be, as in that case the qualification would be superfluous]. Thus then, if the smoke *per se* does fail in its concomitance, then the qualifications in question (that of issuing in an unbroken line, and that of unceasingly rising column) must be taken to belong to it as qualified by that failure of concomitance.

“The failure of concomitance may be the qualification of smoke; but it does not form a factor of the smoke being regarded as the ‘*vishēṣya*’.” This is not right, we reply; as it is still unknown what the ‘*vishēṣya*’ is.

(76.) Then again, you speak of the cognition as ‘the qualification of the object’;—does this mean that it is merely related to it? Or that it is related to it as its *qualification*?

If it were the former, then much confusion would arise [even adventitious accessories falling under the category of 'qualification']. And if it is the latter, then there is the same 'mutual interdependence' and other absurdities (that we have pointed out above in connection with the definition of 'viṣayi')*

(77). [Thus then it has been shown that no adequate definition can be provided of the 'vishēṣya'; and as the definition of the 'object' has been made dependent, in the beginning of para 75, upon that of 'vishēṣya', it follows that no adequate definition of the 'object' is available. Now a further objection is urged against the very conception of 'vishēṣya']—Does, or does not, the *vishēṣya* assume that character which consists in its *vishēṣyaṭva*, being the *vishēṣya*? If it does, then the definition (of *vishēṣya*) becomes too wide (inasmuch as it includes the *vishiṣṭa* also). If it does not, then your universal law, that the *vishēṣya* must assume all the features or characteristics, becomes violated.

(78) [A further objection is urged against the definition of 'Object' put forward in the beginning of para. 75]. Whenever there is a cognition, of the jar for instance, there is, according to the Logician, a corresponding *anuvyavasāya*, in the form 'I have this jar-cognition', which, in formal language, means 'there is inherence of the jar-cognition in my Self'; and in this the cognition appears as the qualification of the inherence, without the intervention of any relationship [as no relationship is held to subsist between

* That a certain thing is related as qualification we can understand only if we know what 'qualification' is; and for knowing what 'qualification' is we have to know what is meant by being 'related as qualification'; this is the 'interdependence.' The other 'absurdity' is referred to in the text:—(1) the *regressus ad infinitum* involved in the fact that for knowing what is 'related as qualification', we have to know what a 'qualification' is; and for knowing this we have to know what is 'related as qualification' and so on and on *ad infinitum*;—and (2) the 'vicious circle' involved in the above, when by the knowledge of 'qualification' is made to depend upon itself.

inherence and its substrate, for fear of infinite regress]; and yet the inherence is not the object of that jar-cognition (and under the definition it should be this object).

“ The definition contains the qualifying phrase ‘ not through any other relation ’; and this phrase is meant to exclude exactly that relation which forms the basis of the relation of ‘ qualification and qualified ’ as subsisting between a substance and its quality (or between an action and its instruments); and as it is the relation of inherence that forms the basis of these latter, how can it escape being excluded from the definition ? [So that being thus excluded, inherence could never be regarded as the ‘ object ’ of the jar-cognition]”.

This cannot be right; as what the phrase excludes is only that relation which is other than the relation of ‘ qualification and qualified ’; and this exclusion cannot apply to the *inherence* in question [as in the particular instance the *inherence* is only of the nature of the relation of ‘ qualification and qualified ’]. Thus then, when it is declared that the object is ‘ that of which the cognition is a qualification without the intervention of any other relationship ’,—we find that just as the cognition by itself, without the intervention of any other relation, is the qualification of the object, exactly in the same manner is it the qualification of the inherence also; and there is not the slightest difference between the two cases. Thus it was well said that when it is asserted that ‘ there is cognition in myself ’, the inherence becomes the ‘ object ’ of the Cognition.

(79) Further, the said definition of ‘ object ’ (as that of which the cognition is the qualification, without the intervention of another relationship) applies to the ‘ absence of cognition ’ also, [as in the phrase ‘ absence of cognition ’ the cognition is the qualification of the absence]. “ But in this case there is the relation of inherence itself [which is other than the relation of ‘ qualification and qualified ’; whose

presence, therefore, 'precludes the possibility of the definition of 'object' applying to the *absence*].' This is not right; as the relation subsisting between the cognition and its absence is that of the qualification and the qualified (and not any other relation, so that the definition is quite applicable) [and thus, as in all cases the relation subsisting could be reduced to the relation of 'qualification and qualified', to speak of 'by some other relation' becomes an absurdity]. "But this relation of (qualification and qualified) is not something apart from the members related (the relation between the jar and its colour, for instance, is nothing apart from the coloured jar); and what is meant to be excluded by the phrase 'other relationship' is only such relation as is something apart from the members related [and thus there is no absurdity or impossibility involved in the definition]." This will not help you; as the same might be said, with equal cogency, with regard to the relation of inherence also [which also may be said to be nothing apart from the members related]. "The relations meant to be excluded by the phrase 'other relations' are those of inherence and conjunction [so that the definition could not apply to inherence]." This will not be right; as even so the definition will apply to the *absence of cognition* (even though it may not apply to inherence); as the relation between *absence* and *that which is absent* is not that of either conjunction or inherence. "But as a matter of fact, in the case of the *absence of cognition*, cognition is only an adventitious accessory of the absence, and not its permanent qualification [so that not having the cognition for its qualification, the *absence of a cognition* cannot be the object of that cognition]." Even so the definition cannot be accepted; as under the definition past and future objects would cease to be 'objects of cognition' [as the cognition that appears at the present time cannot be regarded as the qualification of the past and future things, which are not-existent at the

time ; and thus, not having the cognition for its qualification, neither the past nor the future thing will fulfill the conditions of the definition of the 'object of cognition'].

(80) [Finding it impossible to save the definition from applying to the *absence of cognition* the Opponent says]—"But we intend the definition only for positive objects". This will not be right; as in that case negations (or negative things) will never be 'objects of cognition' (which is absurd);—and secondly, the definition would apply to everything apart from the cognition; that is, to every one of those things that pertain to the cognition; such as its cause, and other things connected with it. We desist from further prolixity. It may be right to assert (with the Idealist) that the object being of the same character as the cognition, there can be no difference between the cognition and its objects [so that there would be nothing 'apart from the cognition', and the last argument therefore becomes baseless, and loses its point]—But this will be contrary to our actual experience (in which the cognition is always known as distinct from its object);—and further if the difference between the two is not admitted by you, then it is not possible for you to deny such difference [as such denial would involve the absurdity of denying the unknown].

[This last discussion having led on to Difference, the author proceeds to demolish the conception of 'difference'.]

(81) It further behoves you to explain what is 'difference': It could only be either—(a) the specific form of the thing itself, or (b) mutual negation, or (c) some distinctive property (such, for instance, as separateness).

[Page 617] (82) (a) It will not be right to regard *Difference* as consisting in the specific form of the thing; as if it consisted in this, then there would be no possibility of mistaking a different thing as non-different [*i. e.* we could never mistake the piece of shell as non-different

from silver]. For even the mistaken cognition apprehends the form of the thing [and *ex-hypothesi*, the cognition of the thing's form is the same as the cognition of its *difference*]; if, in order to escape from this difficulty, it be held that the mistaken cognition does not apprehend the form of the thing, then, we ask,—of what would it apprehend the non-difference [as according to you also, in the case of the mistaking of shell for silver, it is the shell that is apprehended, and apprehended as non-different from silver, which shows that there is apprehension of the form of the shell; and this, by the definition, means that its difference is apprehended; so that there is no chance for the apprehending of its non-difference, which is essential in the mistaken cognition].

“When a number of unconnected wooden slabs are heaped up, and we impose upon this heap, the character of—*i. e.* mistake it as—one composite whole inhering in (made up of) several component parts,—thus apprehending the non-difference of the slabs from the composite whole,—we find that in this conception of non-difference those (slabs) upon which the character is imposed do not appear at all; all that happens is that a number of disjointed things, which do not form a compact composite whole, are mistaken for a compact composite whole [so that in this case, the specific form of the thing miscognised, is not cognised at all; and this form not being cognised, its *difference* is not cognised; and if its *difference* is not cognised, it is not impossible to cognise its non-difference].”

This reasoning is not right; as when we urged our objection we did not have in view this particular instance of the disjointed wooden slabs; the instance (of mistaken cognition) that we had in view was the case of things that are recognised as being ‘that same thing’ which they are not [and certainly so far as this instance is concerned the explanations given by the opponent do not apply to it at all]. And if you were to assert that in this latter

case also there is only an imposition of a different character [*i. e.* the character of non-difference ; so that it is analogous to the case of the slabs being mistaken for a compact whole]—then, in that case, every case of negation of identity would fall under the category of ‘ordinary negation.’ [as in every case the negation would be only of a certain character imposed] ; and certainly this should not be acceptable to the Logician (who insists upon distinction between ‘negation of identity’ and ‘ordinary negation of relation’). As a matter of fact, however, even if you were to admit this, when the specific form of the thing has been cognised,—which, *ex-hypothesi*, means that its *difference* is cognised,—there can be no possibility of any such character as ‘non-difference’ being imposed upon it. [So that our objection remains as it was].

(83.) (b) Nor will it be right to regard *difference* as meaning *mutual negation* ; as in that case, the very conception of such difference would involve an objectionable interdependence [the cognition of mutual negation depending upon the cognition of the negated thing as negated, *i. e.* different,—and this latter cognition depending upon the cognition of mutual negation]* “ But as a matter of fact, we have the cognition of the *substratum of the negation* (e. g. of the jar) even without actually recognising it as the *object negated* ; and conversely, the cognition of the thing (jar) as the *object-negated* is brought about by the mere remembrance of the thing ; and it is not necessary to remember it actually as the *substratum of negation* ;—and thus, where is there any *interdependence* ? ” This is not right, we reply : In the case of such negation as ‘the jar is not the cloth,’ we find that what is

* We can cognise the jar as not-cloth—only when we know that it is different from the cloth ; and by the proposed definition of *difference* this will mean that for knowing the jar as not-cloth we must know that there is mutual negation between the two ; again for knowing that there is mutual between the two it will be necessary to know that the jar is not-cloth. Thus there is an interdependence involved in the conception of *difference*.

negated is the *cloth* as well as the *jar* ; and [the only difference being that it is only the *cloth* that forms the *object of negation* with reference to the *jar* ; so that if the recognition as the *object of negation* be not regarded as essential in the cognition of mutual negation] the mutual negation ‘the jar is not the cloth’ would imply the negation of the jar also (with reference to itself), just as it implies the negation of the cloth [because so far as mere negation is concerned, without any reference to being cognised as the *object of negation*, both the jar and cloth stand on the same footing].

(84) The Opponent offers the following explanation :—
 “It is true that the mutual negation [of the jar and cloth] involves the negation of the jar also ; but at the time that we deny the *cloth-character* with reference to the jar (by the words ‘the jar is not the cloth), what is meant by this denial is not that the jar is the object negated, but only that the jar is the substratum (of the negation of cloth) ; and so the said mutual negation does not necessarily imply the negating of the jar ;—as regards the cloth, on the other hand, what is required is that it is the negated object, and not that it is the substratum of the negation ; and so the said mutual negation does not involve (or imply) the inclusion, (*i.e.*, affirmation) of the cloth, as it does that of the jar. Though it is quite true that both the jar and the cloth are the objects of the mutual negation (involving as it does the denial of each with regard to the other), yet that which has the jar for its substratum is different from that which has the cloth for its substratum, and that which negatives the jar is different from that which negatives the cloth ; and so even though the mutual negation has both for its objective and both for its substratum, yet there is no possibility of any incongruity in the shape of either the denial of both, or the affirmation of both.* It will not be

* The denial and affirmation of one or the other being regulated by the principle that of the two—Jar and Cloth—that which is directly cognised at the time,

right to urge against this the argument that if the character of the '*prāṭiyogin*' (i.e., the negated object, e.g., the cloth) depends upon its being different from the '*anuyogin*' (i.e., the object with regard to which the other thing is negated, e.g., the jar), then there is interdependence; and if it is not dependent upon that difference—i.e., if it is not necessary that there should be difference between the two objects,—then it would be possible for the object (the Cloth) to be different from itself [just as it is different from, is the *prāṭiyogin* of, the negation with reference to, the other object, which, *ex hypothesi*, may be non-different from it]. It will not, we say, be right to argue thus, as the regulating principle being that 'that which is remembered is the *prāṭiyogin* of the negation and that which is perceived is the *substratum* of the negation',—there is no possibility of any object being cognised as different from itself. It may be argued that when we recognise a certain thing as 'this is the same thing that I had seen before' [when the same thing is *perceived* as well as *remembered*], we should be cognisant of the thing being different from itself, (in accordance with the said principle). But this will not be right; as the actual presence or absence of difference will always serve as the determining factor [so that one thing is cognised as different from another when, *while being different*, the latter is remembered as the *prāṭiyogin* of the negation]."

(85) The above explanation cannot be accepted. For what do you mean by 'the cognition of the substratum' which you hold to be the cause of the apprehension of difference? (a) Does it mean that that which is the substratum is actually cognised *as substratum*? or (b) only that

is the substratum of the negation; while that which is only remembered, is the object of the negation; hence when we see the jar and deny, with reference to it, the cloth—when we say 'this jar is not the cloth'—the former is the substratum and the latter the object of the mutual negation; and it is not possible for both to be both at one and the same time.

that which is the substratum is cognised in its real form (without any idea of its being the substratum)? — (a) If the former, then, what is that of which the jar would be the substratum, the cognition of which would be the cause of the apprehension of the difference of the jar? The cognition could not be of the jar as the substratum of the mutual negation; because until it is known what 'mutual negation' is, there can be no cognition of its substratum; just as unless we know what the stick is, we can have no idea of that which contains it; specially as it is a well-recognised principle that the cognition of the qualified (*अधि*, the *substratum of a thing*) necessarily implies the cognition of the *qualification* (e.g., that thing itself); and this for the simple reason that the *qualification* forms an essential factor in the composition of the *qualified*. Nor again can the cognition of the jar as the substratum of anything be the cause of the cognition of difference; because when between two objects which are really different, we have the mistaken notion of non-difference, [*i.e.*, when we mistake two different things as identical],—even though the thing is cognised as the substratum of *existence* and such other properties, yet this latter cognition does not, and cannot, bring about the cognition of the difference of the thing. “[But the non-production of the cognition of difference in this case is only due to the fact that] the cognition of difference cannot arise merely from the cognition of the thing as the substratum of one thing; but from this latter cognition as accompanied by the remembrance of that which is negated (or denied with reference to that thing); and as in the case cited (when no difference is cognised, this remembrance is not present, it is only natural that the cognition of difference does not appear.” This explanation is not satisfactory; for what is meant by 'the remembrance of the negated thing'? Does it mean that there is remembrance of the thing *as the*

negatived object? Or that there is remembrance of the thing itself (without any idea of its being the negatived object)? If the former, then, is the thing remembered as the *prāṭiyogin* of the object negatived by mutual negation? Or as the *prāṭiyogin* of anything? It cannot be the former, as until it is known what mutual negation is, there can be no remembrance of anything as the negatived object of that negation, as already pointed out above. Nor can it be the latter; as when an object, which is really different, is mistaken as non-different, and is cognised as non-existent, in a place other than its own,—even though this object is cognised as the *prāṭiyogin*, the negatived object, of its own negation, yet (even though all the conditions laid down by you are present) the conception of mutual negation does not arise. “But in this case the thing is directly cognised as the negatived object, and there is no remembrance of it [and it is the remembrance that we make a necessary condition].” This is not right; as it cannot be essential that there should be *remembrance* only [as you must admit the actual perception also of the *prāṭiyogin* to be the cause of the cognition of difference or mutual negation]; otherwise, if you insist upon its being *remembrance* only, then it would not be possible to have any conception of mutual negation between two things, both of which are directly perceived (and neither is remembered). The assumption of the agency of an intervening remembrance is further rendered absurd by the fact that in every conception of mutual negation,—which appears in the form ‘these two things are not identical with each other’—we have a direct apprehension (and no remembrance). Even if it were essential that the intervening agency should be of the nature of remembrance, we find that in the case of such conceptions as ‘this is that thing which did not exist there’,—even though the thing is negatived by a remembered negation, there does not appear any idea

of 'mutual negation'; because the thing, though really different (from that which did not exist at the previous time), is mistaken as non-different. "[In the cognition of difference or mutual negation] the absence of discrepancies also is a necessary factor in the cause; and in the instance cited of mistaken cognition, this condition is not present (a discrepancy being present in the form of the mistaken cognition). [And hence it is only natural that the cognition of difference does not appear]." This explanation is not right; for when one remembers the jar seen at some previous time, and sees, at the present time, another jar, even if he fails to apprehend the difference between the jars,—he would by your definition, cognise the 'mutual negation' of the two jars! [As the only two conditions that you lay down are—(1) absence of discrepancy in the shape of mistaken cognition, and (2) the remembrance of the negatived object; and both these conditions are present in the case cited]. "Even under the circumstances stated the mutual negation is actually cognised." It is not so; as we find that the perception of the jar is followed by a doubt (as to its being the same as, or different from, the previously perceived jar; and there could be no such doubt if the mutual negation were definitely cognised). "But the specific cognition (of the peculiar features of the thing concerned) is also an essential factor in the cause of the cognition of difference [so that there are three factors in this cause: (1) the specific cognition of the thing, (2) the absence of discrepancies, and (3) the remembrance of the negatived object; and so, in the case cited, the specific cognition of the jar being wanting, so long as there is an uncertainty as to its being or not being the same as the former jar, the cognition of mutual negation does not arise]." This is not right, we reply; as the peculiar features of a thing cannot be known until its mutual negation is duly determined [to know the peculiarities of a thing, it is necessary to know what things it resembles and

what it differs from; so that a recognition of its differences is essential for the due recognition of its peculiar features]. This same reasoning serves to set aside the view that the cognition of difference is aided by the remembrance of the actual form of the thing itself; * and also the view that it is aided by the cognition of the actual form of the substratum †; as (under both these views) it will be possible for us to cognise the mutual negation of a tree which, though actually different from the other tree, is mistaken as non-different from it.

(86) Nor is the third alternative (noted in para. 81) admissible—that is to say, Difference cannot be defined as presence of distinctive property. As, if Negation be held to be devoid of all properties, then it could not be 'different' from any thing; so that it would have to be regarded as non-different from the entire Universe; and thus being non-different from negation, the Universe itself would become a negation, and thereby, *ex-hypothesi*, devoid of all properties; and thus being devoid of all 'difference' which, *ex-hypothesi*, consists in the presence of distinctive properties, the entire Universe would have to be regarded as of one uniform form; for the simple reason that Negation has no properties. "In this case the 'difference' will consist of the actual form of the negation itself (and not in the presence of any distinctive properties)." That is not possible; as this 'actual form' of negation which you describe as its 'difference'—is this a 'difference' from something else? Or is it a difference without a counter-entity (*from* which the negation is different)?

(87) The difference cannot be without a counter-entity; as there being no proof for such a difference, it will have to be rejected as non-existing: As a matter of fact, whenever

* The second alternative put forward in the text, Pandit Edition, p. 620, fourth line from the bottom.

† The second alternative proposed in the opening lines of para. 85.

we talk of 'difference', it is always difference *from something*; and it is never without a counter-entity, as the use of the concept 'blue' is. Nor is it ever possible for the 'difference' to be without a counter-entity. Under the circumstances, if, even though without a counter-entity, it could form the basis of a usage referring to a counter-entity,—then there would be no restriction as to the exact counter-entity of a 'difference'; and it might be possible for the difference to be conceived and spoken of as different from itself. If it be asked—'how can there be any difference from itself?'—our answer is (if there is no difference from itself) is the difference from something different? *In that case* there would be an infinite regress of differences—each difference implying a 'different' thing!

(88) Nor can the first alternative be accepted—that is, we cannot accept the view that the 'difference' consisting in the form of the negation is a difference from something else, a counter-entity of that difference. As it should be explained, in that case, what is that counter-entity from which there is the 'difference'. The 'difference' cannot be from *all things*; as that would involve difference from itself. Nor can it be 'difference' from such things as the jar and the like; for when we talk of one thing as 'different' *from another*, the latter (taking the Ablative ending) is the *limit or boundary*, and the former the *limited or bounded*; now is this relation of the 'limit and limited' something different (from the things)? Or is it included in the things themselves? If the former, then as that also will be the limit of a 'difference', a similar question being raised with regard to a further relation of the 'limit and limited' that would be involved, if the same answer were given—*i. e.*, if this further relation were held to be something different again—then there would be an infinite regress of 'differences'. If, on the other hand, the relation be held to be included in the things themselves,

at the second stage, then why should there be an aversion to admitting this at the outset? In fact at the very first stage the difference should be admitted to be in the form of the things themselves. But as a matter of fact, even this will not be right; for if the 'limit and limited' relation of the difference of 'difference' with the jar &c. were to be included in the actual form of the 'difference', then the same form could not include the relation of 'negative and negated' that subsists between the negation and the object negated by it; as the 'form' of a thing is one only, while the two relations are entirely different from one another; as the difference (of the jar) from the counter-entity (the cloth) can never be the same as its negation; as 'difference from the jar' pertains also to things that are not meant to be negated [as the difference can be expressed as 'the cloth is other than the jar', in which no idea of negation or denial is involved]; whereas the relation of 'negative' and 'negated' pertains only to certain well-defined things [so that when 'the negation of the jar' is regarded as a mere negation or denial, it pertains to the jar only; while if it is regarded as difference it pertains to the cloth and all those things from which the jar differs].

(89) The same objections can, with equal force, be urged against all natural relationship '*svarūpasambandha*'—such as that between the cause and its effect and so on. And the same objection can also be applied to all cases where difference between things is held to consist in their own forms.

(90) Then again, when you assert that 'difference' consists in the presence of distinctive peculiarities, what is your meaning? Is it that the generic character '*ghatitva*' (which is the principal distinctive feature of the jar) constitutes the 'difference' (of the jar)? Or that it is some other distinctive property that constitutes the 'difference'?

(91) If it be the former—that is, if the ‘difference’ of the jar consists in the generic character ‘*ghataḥ*’,—then this would imply the absurdity of the generic character of ‘*ghataḥ*’ having for its *pratīyogin*, counter-entity, something negated by it; as every ‘Difference’ must have a counter-entity; as a matter of fact however the generic character of ‘*ghataḥ*’ has no counter-entity at all; as it is cognised without the corresponding cognition of any counter-entity in the shape of the cloth or any other thing. “But there are occasions when the said generic character is cognised with reference to, and along with, such other things as the cloth and the like; and it is only on such occasions that it forms the basis of the conception of ‘Difference’ [*i. e.*, it is only when the jar is cognised along with the cloth that it is recognised as possessed of the generic characters of *ghataḥ* which makes it ‘different’ from the cloth].” This is not right; as it behoves you to explain the cognition of what is with reference to, or dependent upon, the cloth; is it the cognition of the generic character of ‘*ghataḥ*’ that is so dependent? or the cognition of some property of it? If the former, then it would never be possible to have any cognition of ‘*ghataḥ*’ except with reference to the cloth! As if a certain thing appears without another thing, this latter cannot be regarded as its cause. In the case of fire, which is producible by various causes (such as dry grass, friction of two dry pieces of wood and the lens), it is possible to restrict the causal efficiency of one kind of cause to particular fires, and to reject it in the case of other fires,—this being made possible by reason of the possibility of dividing fire into several sub-classes in accordance with the particular kind of cause that produces it, so that in this case it does not matter if any particular cause is not found to produce some other kind of fire;—no such explanation or discrimination however is possible in the case in question [where

Kh. II. 129.

no sub-classes of the cognition of 'ghataṭva' being possible, it could not be held that the cloth is necessary for the production of the cognition of one kind of 'ghataṭva'; and so it does not matter if every cognition of ghataṭva is not produced by, and is dependent upon, the cloth]; specially as it is not possible to have larger and smaller (more and less extensive) classes (in connection with the 'cognition of ghataṭva') in the shape of 'direct apprehension' and the like.* Even though there may be people who (on the basis of the fact that there is no 'larger' and 'smaller' class among 'Qualities', and cognition is a quality) would be willing to accept the cross-divisions of classes (that such sub-divisions of 'cognition of ghataṭva' would give rise to), yet, even according to these people—what would the idea of *limit*, denoted by the ablative ending (in the word *patāṭ* as occurring in the sentence *ghataḥ patāṭ bhinnāḥ*, 'the jar is different from the cloth') be construed? If the idea of 'limit' were connected with 'ghataṭva' [as this connection could only be in the form of something inherent in the form of the 'ghataṭva' itself, *i. e.* its '*svarūpa-sambandha*'], the 'ghataṭva' would ever, subsequently, be cognised as that 'limit' [and there would be no conception of 'ghataṭva', except as a 'limit'] which is absurd. "What is related to the 'limit' is a certain pro-

* This anticipates the following objections:—"Why should sub-classes be impossible in regard to 'the cognition of ghataṭva', when there is such a class as 'right cognition', which is more extensive than, and includes, the class 'the cognition of ghataṭva'?" The sense of the reply is that as regards the case in question, the only such-class of 'cognition of ghataṭva' that can be postulated is some such as 'the cognition of ghataṭva as having a counter-entity'; and if this is not more extensive than the class of 'direct apprehension'—*i. e.*, if it does not include cognitions other than Direct apprehensions—then *remembrance of ghataṭva as having a counter-entity* would be an impossibility; as Remembrance is beyond the pale of 'direct apprehension'. On the other hand, if the class 'the cognition of ghataṭva as having a counter-entity' is more extensive than 'direct apprehension', then, when the ghataṭva would be cognised without any idea of its counter-entity, this cognition could not be regarded as 'Direct apprehension'; so that this gives rise to objectionable 'cross-divisions'.—Viḍyāsāgarī.

perty of the *ghataṭva* (and not the *ghataṭva* itself.) This however is not a fact; and this is precisely the second of the two alternatives propounded above [viz: it is the cognition of a property of the 'ghataṭva' that is with reference to, and dependent upon, the cloth];—and this is not admissible; as in that case, that property itself (cognised as 'limit', and hence) having its cognition dependent (upon something else, for instance, the cloth), would constitute the 'difference' (of the jar) [and not any such thing as '*ghataṭva*' which is what you really regard as constituting the 'difference' of the jar]; and further, as the property would be of the '*ghataṭva*', the 'difference' also would be of the same (and not of the *ghata*; and the mention of it in answer to the question regarding the 'difference' of *ghata* will, on that account, be wholly illogical. Lastly, if 'difference' consisted of '*ghataṭva*', '*paṭaṭva*', and the individual properties of each,—taken severally,—how could there be any such comprehensive notion of 'difference' at all? If you hold that even so the distinct individuals (properties in the present case) afford the requisite comprehensive notions, then, you may as well base all comprehensive notions upon the distinct individuals themselves [and there would, in that case, be no justification for the postulating of 'communities', which are assumed entirely for the purpose of affording the basis for comprehensive notion].

[Page 627] (92). Nor can we accept the second alternative (noted in para. 90);—that is, it will not be right to hold that the 'difference' of the jar consists in some distinctive property other than '*ghataṭva*'; for the Logician himself cannot consistently accept this view; as, in the first place, a 'difference' like this cannot be included in any of the seven categories accepted by him; and secondly it will not be logical to regard this difference either as present or as not present in itself [as if this 'difference' differs from its substrate by that same difference, then there is the absurdity of the

difference resting in itself; if, on the other hand, the difference between the 'difference' and its substrate is other than itself, there would be an endless assumption of differences].

If, then, the above difficulties be sought to be met by asserting that 'difference' is only a class or community (and hence nothing apart from the *seven* categories),—then our answer is that if such diverse individuals, differing from one another in regard to their distinct specific properties, were to constitute a 'Community', then all those diverse things that differ from one another in their distinctive properties might, with equal reasonableness, be regarded as forming a 'Community' [and there would no such thing as distinctive features at all].*

(93) "As a matter of fact 'difference' consists of *ghataṭva* and such generic characters; and even though in all cases of the difference of the jar, there would, *ex-hypothesi*, be the cognition of *ghataṭva*, yet it becomes possible for each case to be spoken of (and cognised) as distinct, by reason of the aid that is accorded (in each case) by the cognition of the counter-entity or negatived object."† This is not right; as in order to establish the real character of usage (as regards the 'difference' of the jar being diverse), it becomes necessary to admit that the conception (of diversity with regard to the 'difference') is a true one; so that the same objection that has been urged before becomes applicable [that is to say,—is the difference of the jar from the cloth different from that of the horse by that same difference or by some other difference? If the former, there is the absurdity of the difference subsisting in itself; and in the latter case, there is

* "And if 'difference' be a *Community*, a *Jāti*, then there could be no difference among *Communities*; as the *Logician* denies the possibility of one 'Community' residing in another.

† So that the difference of the jar from the cloth, and that from the horse, though cognised as '*ghataṭva*' in both cases, comes to be distinguished from each other by the cognition of the cloth in the former, and that of the horse, in the latter case.

an endless assumption of 'differences']. If an endless series of differences is postulated,—if each one of the series could be held to be known gradually, one after the other, then in connection with the cognition of any single difference, there could be no end to the cognitions of differences which could go on *ad infinitum*! If, on the other hand, the entire series is cognisable simultaneously, then as all these endless differences would be alike, there will always be a chance of the difference from one thing being mistaken for the difference from another thing; and thus with regard to the cognition of no difference could there be any confidence in our mind as to its being a true cognition of a real difference (and not a wrong cognition of some other difference). If, in order to escape from these difficulties it be held that it is not necessary that every one of the endless series of differences should be cognised [and that it is enough for the cognition of difference if three or four differences in the series are cognised], then there would be no proof for the existence of that difference which is not cognised [so that retracing our steps backwards from that point in the series, we would be forced to deny all the differences, even up to the very first of the series]. It may be that in the case of all things we cognise only that which we intend to cognise, so that even though a certain difference in the series of differences may not be cognised at any particular time, it will be cognised, whenever there is a desire on our part to cognise it, and the mere non-cognition of any difference at any one time need not lead us to deny it altogether;—but even so, as all these cognitions would be 'cognitions of difference,' it would be impossible to form a comprehensive conception of these cognitions unless we admitted of a community including all of them; and when once we admit of such a Community, the 'difference' of that Community also should have to be included in that Community; and thus between the 'Community' and

'difference' each would be the 'container' as well as the 'contained' of the other, each subsisting in the other (which is absurd)! This same objection is also applicable to the view under which anything—*e.g.*, 'Being'—is regarded as endless.

(94) Then again, if 'difference' consisted in such generic characters as '*ghataṭva*' and the rest,—and the due cognition of this depended upon such limits (counter-entities) as '*paṭaṭva*' and the like,—then, inasmuch as like '*ghataṭva*,' '*paṭaṭva*' also (being a generic character) would constitute 'difference,' the cognition of this also would depend upon certain 'limits;' and these limits would be in the form of '*ghataṭva*' and such other 'generic characters; and thus the cognition of '*paṭava*' (as 'difference') would be dependent upon that of '*ghataṭva*'; so that there is a most objectionable interdependence. "As a matter of fact, when we have to recognise the '*ghataṭva*' or the '*paṭaṭva*' only, in its own form as a genuine character, we do not need to have the idea of any 'limit' or 'counter-entity'; the idea of this latter being necessary only when we have to recognise the '*ghataṭva*' or the '*paṭaṭva*' as constituting the 'difference' (of the *ghata* or the *paṭa*); and when '*ghataṭva*' or '*paṭaṭva*' is recognised as a 'limit' or 'counter-entity', it is so recognised only in its own form; so that where is there any inter-dependence at all?" This reasoning is not right; as [when the '*ghataṭva*' is regarded as constituting 'difference', it can be so regarded either in its own form, or in the form of some other character or quality] if the form of the '*ghataṭva*' itself constituted the 'difference', then the assertion that 'when we recognise the *ghataṭva* in its own form we do not need to have the idea of any *limit* or *counter-entity*' can have no meaning. If, on the other hand the 'difference' consisted of *ghataṭva* in the form of some other character,—then, in that case, the same character

may be regarded as constituting the 'difference'; and there is no necessity for the assumption of the complicated dictum that the 'difference' consists of the '*ghataṭṭva*' as qualified by the said character! "All right, we may regard 'difference' as consisting of that same character." This will not be right for you; as this view is open to many objections [such, for instance, as that this would mean the postulating of an additional category over and above the six or seven postulated by you.]

(95) Then again, how can you justify the assertion that 'Difference' consists of all the three factors—the form of the thing, mutual negation and diversity of character (as held by the Logician)? The form in which difference is spoken of in ordinary usage is, as a matter of fact, of only one kind; and if, even though this is so, the basis of that one uniform difference be held to be threefold, then what proof could there be in support of the view that for the comprehensive notion that we have of the 'cow,' there should be a single basis (in the shape of the community 'cow')? As the said case of difference would falsify the idea that the comprehensive notion of a number of things must have its basis in a single entity, [as the comprehensive notion of 'difference' has, *ex-hypothesi*, a threefold basis.] And under the circumstances, as all usage with regard to the large community ('cow') could be explained on the basis of the manifold sub-classes (the 'hornless cow', the 'red cow' and so forth), there would be no ground for the assuming of the wider community at all.

(96) Then again, [as regards the view that 'difference' consists of *mutual negation* and *diversity of character*, we ask]—in the Difference itself, is there any further difference or not? If there is, then there is a *regressus ad infinitum*—an endless series of differences. On the other hand, if there is no difference in the difference itself, then that would mean

the entire negation of all difference ; as difference (according to you) consisting of the form of the 'different' thing itself, the assertion that there is no difference in this form, would mean that this thing itself is not existent. "Inasmuch as the form of the thing itself constitutes the 'difference,' it could quite reasonably form the basis of the ordinary conception of difference with regard to itself ; exactly in the same manner as *sattā*, *Being*, forms the basis of our conceptions of existence with regard to itself." This cannot be ; as this would mean that 'difference' of a certain thing is *non-different from itself* (consisting in its own form), and at the same time it is also *different from itself* ; so that in regard to difference *from itself* the thing is the '*araḍhi*' limit, and in regard to its difference from something else it would be the '*avaṭhēya*', *that to which the limit pertains* ; and this would mean that the *difference* has the same thing for its counter-entity as well as for its substratum ;—and if you do not feel any incongruity in this, then wherefore should you not accept the thing to be different from itself ? Certainly there could be no incongruity in this, if there is none in what you already admit ! "We could accept this only either if such a contingency were actually cognised, or if in our ordinary practice and usage we had such a conception (as that a thing is 'different' from itself)." This does not extricate you from the difficulty ; for if you have both these conditions fulfilled in the case in question,—for instance, when one makes the assertion 'the jar is different from itself',—even though this assertion is wrong and untrustworthy, yet the fact asserted is certainly cognised ; and as the speaker has made the assertion, we have the said conception (of the jar being different from itself) occurring in actual usage. "But it is only *right cognition* and *correct usage* that can afford sufficient ground for admitting a fact ; and certainly there can be no right cognition and correct usage with regard to

any thing being different from itself." Even so, your position is not improved ; for in the same manner, no right cognition and correct usage is possible with regard to the thing itself being its own substratum as well as its own limit ; and under the circumstances, how is it that you admit this latter fact ?

(97) " We do not hold that any thing is either its own substratum or its own limit ; all that we mean is that when we accept a distinct character or quality to be either the substratum or the counter-entity of the difference, on the basis of this acceptance a definite conception and usage are found to proceed ;—and in seeking for an explanation of these, if we postulate another distinct character, we find ourselves landed on a *regressus ad infinitum* ; and with a view to avoid this we hold that what gives rise to the said conception and usage is the nature of the 'difference' itself, without the intervention of a further distinct character." This also cannot be maintained ; as such a conception of distinct character, in the absence of any such character, would not in any way differ from any ordinary conception of such character appearing where the character is entirely absent ; and as this latter is universally regarded as wrong, the similar conception (on which you base your idea of 'difference') would also have to be regarded as wrong ; and that 'nature of the thing,' on the basis of which such a wrong conception would proceed, would have to be regarded as a *defect* [as it is only a defect in the cognitive agency that gives rise to wrong conceptions] ;—exactly as in the case of silver, when we have the conception of silver appearing in regard to what is really silver, it arises from '*rajaṭaṭva*,' the 'nature' of the silver,—and when there is no silver, if '*rajaṭaṭva*,' the conception of silver, appears, it is always, regarded as wrong,—and that on the basis of which such a conception proceeds is called 'defect.' " In the case of the silver cited, the silver cognised is not

there at all; while in the case in question what is cognised—and forms the basis of the cognition—is the *Difference*, which is actually present, even though only in the form of the thing concerned. [So that the two cases not being analogous, the conception of difference cannot be regarded as wrong].” This is not right; for in one case [*i.e.*, in the case of the conception ‘the jar is different from the cloth’] you have admitted the truth and validity of the composite cognition apprehending the difference as well as its substratum (jar); and now if with regard to another cognition, [of the conception ‘the Difference is different’] which does not, in the slightest degree, differ from the former cognition,—if you deny that it apprehends both things [the ‘difference’ as well as its difference], then the conception would be most decidedly a wrong one, and even Indra himself could not prevent it from being wrong! On the other hand, if you admit that it does apprehend both, then there is a *regressus ad infinitum* [the assumption of endless series of differences being necessary]. If, on the other hand, this latter conception not apprehending both things, were held to be true and valid,—then, in that case, all other conceptions that do apprehend the two things would have to be regarded as false and invalid. We desist from further straining of this point.

(98) Then again, the case of *Sattū, Being*, has been cited (in para 95) as a corroborative instance;—but this citation resembles the case of the proverbial ‘bull in the camp;’* as *Being* itself will be rejected by us by means of the arguments that we have just put forward.

[The author now reproduces those arguments in support of the notion of *Difference* which have been propounded by Uḍayanāchārya in his *Ātmatattvavivēka*. The expounding of this stand-point of the Logician continues up to para. 105, *i.e.* line 6, page 637 of the ‘Pandit’ edition, and up to page 1176 of the *Chaukhambha Series Edition*].

* There are three explanations given of this :—(1) ‘a wicked bull, wherever it goes, it is beaten’ (*Vidyā*.) (2) ‘In a camp when horses run about, the cow also breaks its tether and runs along with the horses; so when the notion of Difference

(99) The following explanation has been provided by the Logician.

“ What is really meant by those philosophers who reject *Difference*? (1) Do they mean that the idea or conception of Difference does not exist at all? (2) Or that even though existing, it is eternal? (3) Or that though non-eternal, it is without any cause (to bring it about)? (4) Or that though having a cause, it is objectless? (5) Or that though having an object, its object is discarded or sublated? (1) The first of these alternatives is opposed to the experience of all men and so does not need to be answered [even the Vēdāntin could not proceed with its refutation if he had no *idea of Difference*.] (2) As regards the second alternative, it has to be discarded, in view of deep sleep [during which, according to the Vēdāntin himself, all conceptions cease, so that having no existence at that time, the idea of Difference can not be eternal]. (3) The third alternative also has to be rejected, as it involves a self-contradiction [what is not eternal cannot be without a cause]. (4) We must reject the fourth also; for the simple reason that Difference is actually spoken of [by the Vēdāntin himself, which proves that the *idea of Difference* has an object in the shape of the *Difference* that is spoken of]. (5) The fifth alternative we are going to discuss in detail.

(100) “ [The fifth alternative is that the Idea of Difference, though with an object, has this object sublated; now with regard to this, we ask]—what is the object of the conception of difference? Is it one of the three already mentioned [the *form of the thing*, *mutual negation*, *diversity of character*] ? Or is it something other than these? If

is running away from our arguments, *Being* also will run away along with it;—or (3) ‘a bull even though beaten away, returns again and again to the camp, so even though often rejected, the case of *Being* is cited again and again by the Logician.’ These two explanations are given by the Shāṅkara.

it is the latter, then inasmuch as all the arguments that you have propounded in subversion of the idea of difference are only against the said three forms of difference, these arguments would not be applicable to that something else (apart from these three forms) which you assert to be the object of the conception of difference; and under the circumstances do the said arguments sublata or subvert the object of the conception of difference? If they do, then this would be analogous to the case where for the crime of the thief the punishment inflicted was upon Ṛṣi Māṇḍavya (an entirely different person)!

(101) "If, on the other hand, one of the three forms be held to be the object of the conception of difference,—then (A) firstly, if it be held that of the three, it is the *diversity of character* that Difference consists in,—then all that you will be justified in rejecting, for fear of the *regressus ad infinitum* (that you have urged against this view), would be those subsequent *diversities* that would be assumed in addition to the first *diversity*; and there would be no justification for the rejecting of the original Difference itself. [So that the *regressus ad infinitum* cannot lead us to reject the whole idea of Difference]; for a *regressus ad infinitum* never sets aside a thing that is actually perceived (*appears* to consciousness); it only serves to bar the way to the further stream of presumptions; *e. g.*, in the case of *odour*, the presumption of a further odour in the odour that we perceive is precluded by the infinite regress that such presumption leads to [and it does not tend to reject the perceived odour itself].

(102) "(B) Secondly, if the difference consists in mutual negation (the second of the three alternatives suggested),—and the *conception of Jiff rouer* has that negation for its basis or object,—then also, wherein could there be any 'ātmaśh-*raya*' or 'Vicious Circle'? If there were any such vicious

circle, there would be no idea of difference at all; *—so that if (as a matter of fact) there is the idea of difference, it must point to a cause different from itself (the postulating of which leads to the 'vicious circle'); and certainly the fact of a thing not being its own cause does not prove the non-existence of the thing itself! The Vedāntin may attribute the idea of the difference to *Avīdyā*, Nescience; but what difference would that make? The mere mention of 'nescience' cannot do away with the 'vicious circle'. And further (if mere Nescience could explain the idea of difference, independently of the causes, then) even such things as the jar and the like could come into existence by themselves, independently of the potter and other causes! 'As regards the idea of Difference, we find that if it is regarded as its own cause, then there is a vicious circle; so that its appearance must be due to something else; but we cannot determine what this something else is; hence it is that we attribute it to *Nescience*.' Well, if this is all that the Vedāntin means, then there is no quarrel between us! [As the statement of the Vedāntin is tantamount to the assertion that the idea of Difference has Difference for its object as well as for its cause]. As a matter of fact however, it is not difficult to determine the cause of the Idea of Difference; as it is easily determined that when (of the two things, the jar and the cloth, the mutual negation between which is cognised), we perceive the one as being the substratum (of the negation), without, at the same time, recognising the counter-entity, and also when we remember the counter-entity, without, at the same time, remembering the substratum,—it is then that we have the

* There is 'vicious circle' if the idea of difference is held to be due to the idea of its substratum as qualified by mutual negation; and it was on this basis that the Vedāntin had urged the 'vicious circle' against the Idea of Difference. As a matter of fact, however, the Logician argues, the Idea of Difference is not due to the said idea of the substratum, but to something else. If no such cause is postulated, no idea of difference is possible; and yet the presence of this idea is not disputed by the Vedāntin.

cognition of difference [so that the cause of the cognition of difference consists in the cognition of the substratum independently of the cognition of the counter-entity, and also the remembrance of the counter-entity, independently of any idea of the substratum].

(103) “[C] Lastly, if the truth be that Difference consists in the form of the thing itself,—and this form is the object of the Idea of Difference;—then what you would be justified in rejecting would be only the incongruous juxtaposition of the two words ‘Jar’ and ‘Different’ [in the assertion ‘the jar is different’, which would be purely tautological]; and what fault will have been committed by the *Difference* itself (that you should reject it)? It may be urged that the said juxtaposition is actually met with in usage (and so we do not reject it; but we reject the difference). It is quite true that we meet with the juxtaposition of synonymous words; but such use is always due to special causes (in the shape of a definite purpose to be served by such usage); as for instance, we meet with the expression ‘*ghataḥ kumbhaḥ*’ (where two synonymous words are in juxtaposition) only when what is intended by the speaker is the explanation to an ignorant person of what is meant by the word ‘*ghataḥ*’; and such usage cannot be regarded as inseparable from (in the very nature of) the words; for instance, when making use of the word ‘*ghata*’ and ‘*pata*’ in such expressions as ‘*ghatamānaya*’ (bring the jar), or ‘*patam avalokaya*’ (see the cloth), no intelligent man ever uses the word ‘*bhēda*’ (Difference) along with the words in question (which should be the case if the juxtaposition of synonymous words were essential in the very nature of the use of words);—hence the juxtaposition of synonymous words can be accepted as correct only in special cases, under special circumstances and for special reasons.

(104) "The Opponent might ask—'what is the real truth with regard to the meaning of Difference?' Our answer is that Difference means all the three (*the form of the thing, mutual negation and diversity of character*); and in each individual case it is taken as meaning the one or the other, in accordance with the peculiar conditions of each case. For instance, it is a well-known fact that the jar is known in three forms: (1) it is known in the form of the jar itself, (2) it is known as not-cloth, and (3) it is known as possessed of a character distinct from that of the cloth. Now as regards Negation or Non-existence, it is always known in the first form; a negation having no further negation, nor any other character [so that the second and third forms would not be possible in this case] [and thus the difference of negation would always consist in its own form]. As regards the categories of Community, Individuality and Inherence, as these have no other character, their difference would consist in the first two forms;—while as regards Substance, Quality and Action, inasmuch as they have their own form as well as their own distinctive characters, all the three forms of difference are possible. For instance, in regard to the Substance *cloth* we have all three notions as —(1) 'this is cloth' (when the form of the cloth is known), (2) 'it is not the jar' (where the mutual negation of the jar and the cloth is known), and 'it is made up of yarns' (when its distinctive character is noticed);—similarly with the Quality of *odour*, we have the three notions, '(1) 'this is odour', (2) 'it is not colour', and (3) 'it is sweet';—and with regard to the Action of *going* we have the three notions—(1) 'it is going', (2) 'it is not *throwing up*', and (2) 'it is horizontal'.

(105) "When we come to the actual definition of Difference, we find that—(1) in the case of the first kind of Difference, that consisting in the form of the thing, we recognise the thing as *different* in its form from another, when

we find that the other thing is actually cognised, though not cognised as having the same form as (being identical with) the former thing;—*b*) the second kind of Difference, Mutual Negation, consists of that negation which is cognised without subsequent denial, as co-substrate 'with its counter-entity);—(*c*) and in the case of the third kind of Difference, we know one thing as of diverse character from another, when we find that there is an incompatibility in the characters of the two things,—this incompatibility consisting in the fact that they are never found co-existing in any one substance. Such is the position."

[Against the above account of *Difference* as provided by Uḍayanāchārya the Author offers the following objections.]

(106) Against the above view we make the following observations:—You have put the question—'Does the object of the Idea of Difference consist of any one of the three (the form of the thing, mutual negation, and diverse character)? Or in something apart from these?'—Now this question would shine at its best (would be effective) when put against one who undertakes to explain things, and not against us (who do not profess to explain anything at all); as what we assert is that the difference that appears in usage is absolutely inexplicable, no adequate explanation of it is available; in view of the fact, that whether we consider the question as to its inclusion or non-inclusion in any of the three aforesaid forms,—or as to any other property with regard to it—whether we regard it as a positive entity (in the shape of an effect) with regard to which something can be affirmed, or as a negative entity (as not having the character of the effect etc.), with regard to which only denials could be made,—in every case we find it liable to rejection [every one of the possible alternative views with regard to it being found beset with objections]. In fact

this applies, not to Difference only, but to the entire world and what this *Anirvachanīyavāda*, Philosophy of the Inexplicable is, we have already explained before.

(107) What has been asserted (by Uḍayana) in para. 101 above—is not right; as that same reasoning which justifies the presumption of one will make unimpeachable the presumption of a series of such things also;* and if this reasoning be regarded as too weak to justify the presumption of the series of Differences, then it would be equally weak to justify the presumption of a single Difference also; as the one is precisely of the same character as the entire series. For similar reasons it will not be right to assert that the one Difference is accepted on the ground of its directly appearing to consciousness [and not on the strength of any reasonings];—as, in the first place, this argument from mere appearance to consciousness would apply to (and thereby justify the acceptance of) all that we may be conscious of (rightly and wrongly alike; so that we would have to accept as true the objects of wrong cognitions also); and secondly, there is no reasoning in support of the view that only that fact of consciousness is to be regarded as authoritative which appears directly through perception; and not that which appears through inference and the other means of cognition; nor does this form one of your tenets. Then again, the argument that propounds a *regressus ad infinitum* does not differ from the Inferential and other reasonings; as Hypothetical Reasoning (which is the form of reasoning in which the infinite regress is urged) also is based upon invariable concomitance; and, in fact, you have yourself declared that every objection that is urged (against any theory) partakes of the character of inferential reasoning.

* The first Difference is presumed on the ground of the common idea of difference that everyone of us has. As with regard to Difference also we have ideas of further difference; on the ground of these we shall be justified in presuming a series of differences also.

Thus then (the conditions for accepting the first Difference being exactly the same as those for the whole series) it becomes incumbent on you either to indicate some defect in the reasoning propounding the *regressus ad infinitum* (involved in the whole Idea of Difference),—or to renounce your doctrine (regarding the Idea of Difference).

(108) “But as a matter of fact, there is no infinite regress involved in the accepting of a single item of Difference, as there is in that of a series of Differences.” Do you then hold the view that what proves the first Difference is the reasoning that you propound (in support of it) *as qualified by the absence of infinite regressus* [so that while the reasoning proves the first Difference, which does not involve infinite regress, yet it does not prove the series of Differences, which latter involves infinite regress]? If you do, then, inasmuch as there would be no infinite regress involved in the *second* Difference [the regress being involved only when we come to the *series* of Differences], you will have to admit the *second* Difference also. “Well, yes [we shall admit the second Difference].” In that case, what would be there to prevent the acceptance of one difference after the other,—this series extending up to the highest conceivable number? “But you cannot rest content with this alone: You may go on still further and say why we do not accept a further series of Differences—first, second, third and so on—beyond the highest conceivable number;—and thus there will be that same infinite regress [which we regard as barring the acceptance of more than one Difference].” True; let us carefully ponder over the question as to what we shall really accept, in order to avoid the infinite regress. “Well, what we have got to do is to reject the second and all that comes after it (accepting only the first Difference).” But the first Difference is just as much included in the infinite series (of Differences) as the

second and the rest;—under the circumstances, why then this favouritism towards the *first*, whereby you accept that and discard all the rest? “But as a matter of fact, the infinite regress begins with the second only.” If you were disposed to extend to the *second* the same favour that you now extend towards the *first*, then you would be equally prepared to keep the *second* also, declaring that the infinite regress begins with the *third*. And we do not think that this arbitrary favour and disfavour of yours, besetting the mind of the man who is trying for his highest good, will conduce to his welfare! There remains one more reason that you put forward in support of your discarding of the series of Differences. That is, the series is to be rejected just as we reject a further odour to Odour (end of para 101). But as a matter of fact there is no reason for attributing a further odour to Odour (as there is in the presuming of the series of Differences); and if there were a reason for it, what harm would that do to us—who have got to refute (among other things) that reason also?

(109) What has been urged by Uḍayana (in para 102, above)—beginning with ‘*aṭhēṭara, etc.*’ and ending with ‘*nirūpaṇāt*’—is also not right; as nothing that is urged therein affects the position of one who (like us) asserts that —“the position of the person who regards the cognition of mutual negation to be the cause of all usage bearing upon Difference is untenable, as it involves a vicious circle.” Then as regards the answer given by Uḍayana beginning with word ‘*ṛaṭiyogirūpaṭvēna* [towards the end of para. 102, where it is urged that *it is not difficult to determine the cause of the idea of difference*],—this has been already refuted before.

(110) The arguments put forward by Uḍayana—beginning with the words ‘*aṭha svarūpam*’ and ending with ‘*na doṣaḥ*’ [para. 103]—of that we take no notice; as it seeks to answer an objection that has never been put forward by us.

(111) As regards what Uḍayana has urged [in para. 104]—beginning with ‘*ṭaṭhā pi kaḥ*’ and ending with ‘*ṭiryak cha*’—this smacks of resemblance to the case of partitioning the flesh of the iguana whilst it is still in its hole; *—as each of the three alternatives being already covered by the arguments shown before they cannot be shown out as tenable [and thus they resemble the iguana hidden in its hole]; so that any division or adjustment of these is to be rejected on the simple ground that it is absolutely inopportune (and impossible) to adjust things that are entirely invisible!

(112) Uḍayana has (in para. 105 above) put forward the definition of the first kind of difference—i. e., that difference which consists in the form of the thing—as ‘that in which one thing is actually cognised, though not cognised as having the same form as the other thing’. This definition also is defective: as it applies to the case where one and the same thing is mistaken for something different; [*e. g.*, when we mistake the single moon for two different moons] as in this case also the one thing is not recognised as having the same form as itself, and yet it is cognised; though as a matter of fact this is not a case of *difference*; so that as applying to this case, the definition becomes too wide; specially as the qualifying word ‘*ṭādrūpyēṇa*’, ‘in the same form’, has been added only with a view to show that the case in question does not fall within any other form of difference (in the form of Mutual Negation and Diversity of Character). [So that neither of these two forms being present in the case of the single moon being mistaken for two, if the qualification has to have any meaning it must include the case of the two moons; and thus the definition becomes too wide]. “But what is meant is that the cognition of the thing should be one that is not wrong or mistaken [so that the definition could not apply to the case cited].” That does not help you; as

* Jacob: *Handful of Popular Misconceptions*, II 21.

the cognition of the thing itself is not wrong. [E. g. Even when we mistake a single moon for two, one cognition of the moon itself is not wrong]. And further this definition of *Svarupa-Bhēda* also applies to that case where a certain thing, which is really one only, is cognised simply as itself, neither as 'of the same form' nor as 'of diverse form' [as in this case also, the thing, though *cognised*, is not cognised as of the same form] [and this is absurd; that whenever, anything is cognised by itself it is a case of difference!]. "In actual practice there is no such case as has been just cited; as in every case an object must be recognised as being either of the same form, or of a different form". "This is not right; as in a matter of common experience there is no room for quarrelling over facts: As a matter of fact it often happens that when a man is asked—'that which you saw, was it one or many?'—he answers—'as regards the particular fact no suspicions arose in my mind, nor did I feel any curiosity to seek for this information; I saw and cognised the thing by itself, and thereupon became indifferent to all other details in connection with it.' "Well this form of the thing by itself also—does constitute its difference from something else; so that how can the definition be stigmatised as 'too wide', by being found applicable to that case?" This is not right; as in case, the qualifying term 'not cognised as of the same form' would be entirely superfluous; and it would be sufficient to define difference as consisting in *mere cognition*; as whatever is *known* is certainly *different* from something. You will perhaps say that the qualification of 'being not cognised as of the same form' has been added with a view to preclude the possibility of a thing being recognised as *different* from itself. But this has been answered [by the citing of the case where the man who sees a thing not having any doubts as to its being one or many]. "What is meant by *tādrūpya* is not being of the same form, but being of another form [the pronoun 'tat' in the compound *tādrūpya* denoting

another, 'that'] [so that the definition cannot apply to the difference of a thing from itself]." This cannot be; as in the first place, the pronoun 'taḥ' would in that case, stand for something entirely different from the thing concerned [which would make the definition totally absurd];—and further if this *being another* consisted of *svarūpa-bhēḍa* of a thing, then there would be 'self-dependence', as what you want to define is all 'svarūpa' [*i. e.*, it is not yet known what Svarūpa is; so that for understanding what 'svarūpa' is you bring in the word *another*; and your explanation of this *another* again contains the word 'svarūpa', thus the explanation of *svarūpa* is made dependent upon itself];—if, on the other hand, the *being another* consisted of *mutual negation*, then there is mutual interdependence [*i. e.* we know what is *mutual negation* when we know what is *svarūpa-bhēḍa*; and for comprehending this latter, we need to understand the meaning of *being another*, which again is only mutual negation];—lastly if *being another* consist of *diversity of character*, then there arises a vicious circle [*i. e.* unless we know what *svarūpa-bhēḍa* is we cannot know what *mutual negation* is;—unless we know what *mutual negation* is we do not make out what is contradictory to what;—without knowing this latter, we cannot know what 'diversity of character' is;—and it is upon our knowing what this last is that our comprehension of *svarūpabhēḍa* depends].

(113) Uḍayana (as shown in para 105, above) has defined *Mutual Negation* as *abūdhikāḥsamānūhīkaraṇo niṣēdha-pratyayaḥ*; and this definition is not acceptable; as when we come to examine the real meaning of the expression 'samānūdhikaraṇo niṣēdhaḥ' 'cosubstrate negation, &c.,' we find that what the definition means is that *Mutual Negation is that negation which is cognised as co-substrate*. And with regard to this we ask—what is the meaning of the negation being *co-substrate*? (A) Does it mean

that it has a similar (*samāna*) substrate? (B) or that it has one substrate? (C) or that it has identity for its counter-entity (i. e., it denies identity)? (D) or that which is denoted by that word (i. e., the negative particle) which stands in the relation of the *qualification and qualified* to the word denoting the thing which is the substrate (*f. i.*, the 'jar' denoting the jar which is the substrate of the negation)? (E) or does it mean something different from all these?

(113) (A) It cannot mean the first of these—i. e., it cannot mean that the negation has a similar substrate; as we meet with such conceptions as 'in the face of my beloved, as in the moon, there is no possibility of the slightest blemish' [where the *negation of blemish* has similar substrates, and would thus become included in the definition]. "Mutual negation actually subsists between the Face and the Moon [so that it is only right that the said negation should fall under the definition]." This contention is not right; as even though it is true that there is *mutual negation* between the Face and the Moon, it is not true that the conception cited by us has that negation for its object. [The conception does not mean that the Face is different from the Moon]. "The conception may not have the negation for its object; but so long as the definition we have propounded applies to it (and serves to distinguish it from everything else), it does not matter if the conception cited by you does not have the negation for its object." This is not right; as in that case, what does the definition come to? (a) It could not mean that *mutual negation* is that which is the object of the conception or cognition of that denial which has similar substrates [as this definition would apply to the instance of the Face and Moon cited above];—(b) nor could it mean that 'mutual negation consists in the conception or cognition of the denial with similar substrates' [as this definition would be

an impossible one, not applying to what is sought to be defined, mutual negation not being a *conception*].* (c) nor lastly, could the definition mean that 'mutual negation is that which is present where there is cognition of such difference as has similar substrates (i. e., it is that negation which is co-substrate with the said cognition); because with this definition, all the properties that subsist in the things (between which the *mutual negation* subsists) would have to be regarded as so many *mutual negations*! And this would make the qualification '*samānāḍhikaraṇaḥ*' entirely superfluous [as *all* properties subsisting in the things being included, the qualification fails to exclude anything, and as such becomes superfluous.]

[Page 645] (115) (B) Similarly the second alternative—that '*samānāḍhikaraṇa*' is that which has one substrate—also becomes rejected, if we take for our example any one of the two things cited above (viz : Face and the Moon) [so that the ordinary negation, that appears in the conception, 'there is no blemish in the face of my beloved,' would have to be regarded as 'mutual negation,' as it has *one substrate*, and this is all that '*samānāḍhikaraṇa*' means].

(116)(C) Nor can the third alternative—that what is meant by the mutual negation being *samānāḍhikaraṇa* is that it has identity for its counter-entity—be maintained. For until we understand what *identity* is, we can have no idea of its being a *counter-entity*; hence it becomes necessary to define *identity*; and it is not possible to provide an adequate explanation of identity:—Identity could only be explained either as (a) *oneness*, (b) or as '*absence of difference*'. It is not possible to explain it as the '*svarūpa*,' or '*specific form*' of a thing; as

* The *Shāṅkari* suggests another explanation of (B); by this, the text would stand thus—"mutual negation cannot be defined as that which is *always* the object of the conception of a denial which has similar substrates"; the addition of *always* serving to exclude the ordinary negation, which has dissimilar and different substrates also. The objection to this argument would, according to the *Shāṅkari*, be that the phrase "similar substrates" has still to be explained.

in the first place, the Logician regards the 'specific form' of a thing as constituting its *difference* from all other things [and what constitutes *difference* cannot be regarded as *Identity*]; and secondly (if the specific form of the thing constituted its *Identity*), on seeing the thing, there could be no possibility of the arising of any doubt as to its being, or not being, identical [as the perception of its *form* would mean the perception of its *identity*]. (a) If then *identity* be explained as *one-ness*, is this *one-ness* a particular number? or an entirely different property? It cannot be the former; firstly because in that case, there could be no *identity* among Qualities (Actions, Communities, Individualities, Inherences) [as a quality can, according to the Logician, subsist in Substances only];—secondly, at the first moment of the existence of a product, even though it is one only, it would have to be regarded as non-identical with itself [as, according to the Logician, at the moment that an object is brought into existence, it is without any quality; and *Identity*, being a number, which is a quality, could not, therefore, subsist in that object at that moment];—and if you urge that you do not accept the Vaishēṣika tenet (of the product being without qualities at the moment of its production), even then, the same objection would lie against you, with referencē to *one-ness* itself, which could never have any *Identity* at all [as *Identity* being *one-ness*, if *Identity* belonged to it, that would mean that *One-ness* rests in itself, which is absurd];—if, with a view to escape from this, it be held that the *Identity* (that rests in *One-ness*) is that which is connected with certain concomitant circumstances or limitations (and not that which consists in pure *One-ness*,—so that there is no *resting in itself*),—then, we ask, how could this *Identity*, which is related to the circumstances, be ever regarded to be one and the same as *Identity* in its pure unalloyed form?—when, as a matter of fact, the ideas that we have of them are wholly divergent (our Conception of *pure Identity* being different

from that of Identity as limited by circumstances). Nor will it be right to regard *one-ness* as an entirely different property; as if so regarded, that other property would require another different property, and so on there would be an infinite regress;—and if there were no ‘different property’ after the first one, then a thing would cease to be identical with itself. (b) Nor again will it be right to explain *Identity* as *absence of difference*; as the *absence of difference* would only be absence of *mutual negation*; as *Mutual Negation* consists in the denial of Identity (and Identity is absence of difference); then again, for the same reason Identity also will consist in the denial of mutual negation; as it is a well-established fact that the *negative* and the *negatived* consist of the denial of each other;—under the circumstances, it will be impossible to comprehend *Identity* without knowing what *mutual negation* is; as the cognition of the *negative* is always dependent upon the cognition of the *negatived*;—and thus you are landed in a ‘vicious circle’ [for explaining *Mutual Negation* it is necessary to understand *Identity*, and *vice-versa*].

(117) [D] Nor is the fourth alternative—viz. what is meant by the negation being *co-substrate* is that it is denoted by that word which stands in the relation of the *qualification and the qualified* to the word denoting the thing which is the substrate—tenable; as in that case the definition of ‘*Mutual Negation*’ would apply to the ordinary negation expressed in such conceptions as ‘*nirghatam bhūṭalam*’, ‘this place is jar-less’. [As here also the words ‘*nirghatam*’ and ‘*bhūṭalam*’ stand to each other in the relation of the qualification and the qualified].

(118) [E] Nor lastly can we accept the fifth alternative—that what is meant by the Negation being *co-substrate* is something different from these. When you speak of the negation being *co-substrate*, it must mean *co-substrate* with

its counter-entity ; so that the negation that is so co-substrate with its counter-entity would (according to you) be the *Mutual Negation* ; and such being the case, it would not be right to define *mutual negation* as consisting in the ' *pratīyaya* ' or cognition of the co-substrate negation [as has been proposed above in para. 113]. And further, if *mutual negation* were held to be co-substrate with its counter-entity, then the negation that is involved in the conception 'the *Kumbha* is not *pataṭva*' would not be 'mutual negation' [as ' *pataṭva* ', which is the counter-entity of the negation does not subsist in the *Kumbha*, which is the substrate of the negation ; so that the negation is not 'co-substrate with its counter-entity'] It might be held that, even though in the particular case of mutual negation cited the desired 'co-substrateness with the counter-entity' is not present, yet it remains true that 'mutual negation' in general (as a generic entity) is so 'co-substrate'. But in that case you will admit a certain peculiarity of character as the basis for the generic conception of 'mutual negation',—the presence of which character (in the particular instance cited by us) will justify its inclusion under the generic entity 'mutual negation' ; and under the circumstances, this character itself would be perfectly capable of forming the definition (distinctive feature) of *mutual negation* ; and would, on that account, interdict the putting forward of any other definition (such as you propose), which after all, is (as you have admitted) dependent upon the said character. As a matter of fact however, even this will not be possible [that is, it will not be right to accept this other character as the definition of *mutual negation*] ; as this has already been refuted by us in connection with the refutation of the distinction that you draw between *Mutual Negation* and *Ordinary Negation* ; and it is not possible for you to discover any other method (of defining) than the one there refuted. "The *mutual negation* involved in the conception ' *ghataḥ pataṭsam na bhavaṭi* ' (which has been cited by you against

us, as not being 'co-substrate with its counter-entity') is the same as that which is involved in the conception '*pataḥ pataḥvam na bhavaṣi*'; and the negation being the same, its counter-entity can be one (i. e., *pataḥva*) only; and as the negation is actually found, in some cases, [as in the conception '*pataḥ pataḥvam na bhavaṣi*'], to be co-substrate with this counter-entity (*pataḥva* being actually present in the *pata*, as well as in the *negation*), we are not wrong in asserting that '*mutual negation is co-substrate with its counter-entity.*'" This reasoning is not right, we reply; as by the same reasoning the *mutual negation* of a thing would become the same as its *absolute negation*,—the same thing being the counter-entity of both! And further, just as *Identity* rests in two substrates, so also does *Conjunction*; so that even on this ground the definition would become applicable to the Ordinary Negation of Mutual Negation of Conjunction*. Lastly, if by 'co-substrateness with the counter-entity' be meant subsistence in the same substrate at different points of time, then the definition would apply to *Prior Negation* and *Destruction* also; as these also subsist in the same substrate in which their counter-entity may subsist at any other time [E.g. before the jar is produced out of the clay, there subsists in the Clay, the *Prior Negation* of the jar, and after its production the jar also subsists in the same clay, so that there is 'co-substrateness.'] If, with a view to avoid this, it be held that the subsistence (of the negation and its counter-entity) in the same substrate should be at one and the same time, then the definition would not apply to the *mutual negation* of time [as by the definition it would be necessary for the *negation of time* to subsist in its substratum *at the same time that Time* does; which would imply the subsistence of *Time*

* This anticipates the explanation that there can be no sameness between mutual and absolute negations as the counter-entity of the former rests in two things, while that of the latter rests on a single thing.

in and at a time; and this is impossible; as by the Logician's theory, Time cannot pertain to Time.]

(119) Lastly Uḍayaṇa has defined (as mentioned above, in para. 105) the third kind of *Difference*, 'Diversity of Properties', as consisting in *incompatibility*, which has been explained as the impossibility of the two properties co-existing in any one object. This also is an assertion made by one whose mind is confounded. For, we ask—Is there, or is there not, a difference between *Pramāṇa* (Instrument of Cognition) and *Pramēya* (Object of Cognition)? If there is not, then the two words, '*pramāṇa*' and '*prameyā*' would be, synonymous! and the result would be that, when asked to indicate the *pramāṇa* for a certain cognition, one would simply mention, in answer, the *object* (*pramēya*) of that cognition!

Nor can the former alternative be maintained—that, there is a difference between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*; as, in the first place, the *difference* between these cannot consist in their very nature; as one and the same thing is often found to partake of the character of both; as for instance in the case of the balance (which is a *pramāṇa* in regard to the weight of other things, and a *prameya* when it is itself perceived, says Vāṭṣyāyana in his *Bhāṣya* II 1-16) [and this would not be possible if there were something in the very nature of *pramāṇa* and *pramēya* that made them different].

Secondly, for the same reason the difference between the two could not be in the form of *mutual negation*.

The only form of *difference* that remains is of the third kind which consists in the *diversity of character*; this alone might be possible in the case of *pramāṇa* and *pramēya*, as one and the same thing is *Pramāṇa* when endowed with one character, and '*pramēya*' when endowed with another. But, in that case, the definition of this kind of *difference*—as consisting in the impossibility of the two characters consisting in any single object—would fail

to apply to this case [the character of both 'Pramāṇa' and 'Pramēya' subsisting in one and the same thing.] And thus it turns out that when Uḍayana propounded the said definition, he forgot the instructions of the great sage (Gautama) imparted in the sūtra 'pramēyā cha ṭulāprāmāṇyavat' (II. i. 16) [where it is mentioned that one and the same thing' e.g. the Balance, is both *Pramāṇa* and *Pramēya*]. We desist from further prolonging of the discussion.

(120) "It cannot be denied that our notion of Difference is obtained by means of Sense-perception; and hence the cause of this cognition must be held to be *contact of the sense-organ with the object* (which is the cause of all sense-perception); and in this contact, as bringing about the cognition of difference, there are two factors, one of which is the sense-organ, and the other that with which the sense-organ is in contact; and it is this second factor of the contact that we call 'difference' [so that Difference may be defined as the object of the *notion of difference*."] This cannot be accepted; as we have already rejected, by means of several arguments, the very notion of 'difference'; so that we cannot accept the assertion that the said notion is brought about by 'the contact of the sense-organ with the object.'

[The discussion on Difference leads on to the subject of 'Cause'; as the last argument of the Logician has been to the effect that the *Sense-obj-ct Contact* is the 'Cause' of the *notion of difference*. So the author next proceeds to discuss the nature of the *Cause*].

(121) What too do you understand by *Cause*? It cannot be defined as that which goes before—i.e. the antecedent. As in that case, things that have long been utterly destroyed (and ceased to exist) would have to be regarded as 'Cause'. "We shall define *Cause* as the *immediate* antecedent—that which goes immediately before the effect." This also will not be right; as in that case, what would be regarded as the

cause would be the *operation* (that brings about the effect, and not that to which the operation belongs). “But the *operation* of the thing cannot be regarded as intervening between that thing and its effect (on the law that what belongs to a thing cannot interrupt it). [So that if the effect is immediately preceded by the operation of a thing, it is to be taken as immediately preceded by this latter thing itself].” This is not right; as in that case the cause of the cause of an effect will have to be regarded as the ‘Cause’ of that effect [as the Cause also belongs to the Cause]. “But the Cause of the Cause is not the *operation* of the cause; so that it could not be regarded as the Cause of the Effect.” Unless you add some specification, it is not possible to determine what is ‘operation’ and what is not. “When, in the absence of something, a cause does not produce the effect, that something is to be regarded as its ‘operation’ towards that effect.” This is not right; as by this definition the auxiliaries of the cause will have to be regarded as its ‘operation.’ “But we shall add the qualification ‘that which is produced’ [so that the ‘operation’ of the cause is that which, being produced by that cause, leads to the production of the effect of that cause].” This cannot help you out of your difficulty; as in the first place, until it is ascertained what the ‘cause’ is, it cannot be determined what is ‘produced’ by what; and secondly, even if this be somehow determined, by the definition that you have provided, the *Ākāśa* and such other permanent entities would have to be regarded as the ‘cause’ of everything [as these things are the immediate antecedents of everything that is produced].

[Page 652] (122) “We can define the *Cause* as that antecedent which is not *anyaḥāsiddha*.” This definition cannot be accepted; as it behoves you to explain what is meant by ‘*anyaḥāsiddha*’—i.e., what is meant by the cause being ‘*siddha*’, and in comparison to what it should not be

anyaṭhā. If by the cause being not *anyaṭhāsiddha* it be meant that it is not produced by a method different from the effect, then the definition becomes an impossible one; as the cause is never produced by the effect. Nor can the meaning be that it is not known by a means different from the effect; as causes are very often known by such means as Sense-perception and the rest (which latter are not their effects); and all cognition of the Cause is not always derived from its effect. Nor will it be right to explain '*na anyaṭhāsiddha*' as that it is not produced, or known, as other than the Cause; as in the first place, in this manner the cognition (and also the production) of the Cause would be dependent upon itself which is an absurdity; and secondly, as a matter of fact, the Cause is often found to be cognised by other means also.

(123) "What we mean by '*anyaṭhā*', 'different', is that which is *not-cause* [so that when we speak of the Cause as not *anyaṭhāsiddha* what is meant is that it is *siddha* in a form other than that of the *not-cause*]." This also is not right; as it does not remove the objectionable feature that has been urged [*i. e.*, other than the *not-cause* is synonymous with *Cause*; hence if the conception of the cause depends upon that of what is other than the *not-cause*, you have the self-dependence as before]; and further, the philosopher who, like the Logician, does not accept the momentary character of all things, holds that the production and cognition of a thing is present even before it acquires the character of the '*Cause*' [as the causal character is acquired by a thing that already exists, and thus there are production and cognition of the thing, in a form other than that of the '*Cause*' *i. e.*, in a form of the *non-cause*; and thus the definition proposed becomes too narrow, being not applicable to the causes just mentioned]. "But even in such cases, (even though its production and cognition are present from before) the Cause does exist immediately before the effect; and having the char-

acter of the 'cause' at that time, it is possible that even before that time, its production and cognition may be regarded as being only in the form not different from that of the 'Cause' [so that the definition remains quite applicable to all these cases also]. It is true that there may be some particular cases, where the cause does not fulfil these conditions exactly [*e. g.*, when the cause is such that it is destroyed the very moment at which it is produced, and is not actually present immediately before the effect]; but even these cases belong to the same category as the regular 'Cause'; and as such these also being included in the generic conception of the 'Cause', no such individual case can be regarded as vitiating the correctness of the general principle involved in the definition". Even so, the definition cannot be accepted; as this causal character could not be denied to such eternal substances as the *Ākāśha* and the rest, even with regard to effects other than those produced by themselves [as all permanent substances exist immediately before all effects, and they exist in the forms of 'Cause', as they do produce their own 'Effects']. "But all these permanent substances are *ananyathāsiḍḍha*—existing in a manner different from the Cause; inasmuch they exist before the production of effects, (not *as causes*, but) only as omnipresent and eternal substances. [So that the definition cannot apply to such Substances]." This reasoning is not right; as by this *Ākāśha* (never being a *Cause*) would cease to be the cause of Sound also (which, according to the Logician, is the product of *Ākāśha*).

(124) The reasons just set forth (against the idea of '*ananyathāsiḍḍha*') also dispose of the definition of *Cause* as that which is not *ananyathāsiḍḍha*, and whose presence and absence are in keeping with the presence and absence of the effect;—and this definition is open to the further objection that, as no *absence* is possible in the case of *Ākāśha* and such other permanent substances, these could never be a *Cause*.

Kh. II. 161.

[Page 654] (125) "We shall define the *Cause* as that which is operative," This also is not tenable; as does *b-ing operative* mean that the operation inheres in it? Or that it is the producer of the operation? It cannot be the former; as in that case a sacrificial performance could never be a 'cause' [as the operation, in this case, inheres in the performer, and not in the performance]. Nor can it mean the latter; as it is the exact nature of the 'producer' (which is the same as 'cause') that you are seeking to explain [so that it is not right to introduce the same in the explanation].

(126) Another definition of Cause is proposed:—"The Cause of an effect is that which is the precluder of the possibility of the effect being either eternally existent or absolutely non-existent." This also cannot be accepted; as, in the first place, until you have explained what a 'cause' is, you cannot determine the exact signification of the verbal affix in the word '*niṅīraka*' ('precluder') [the affix in the word signifying *cause*, we cannot understand what is meant by 'precluder', unless we know what a 'Cause' is; so that the proposed definition is futile, as it does not help us to understand what the 'Cause' is]. Secondly, you cannot provide an adequate explanation of the conception of 'either this or that' (involved in your definition).*

(127) Another definition is put forward—"One thing is regarded as the *Cause* of another when it is found that in case the former is not admitted, there would arise the possibility of the latter coming into existence before it is actually found to do so; and this character constitutes the definition, or distinctive feature, of the Cause." We cannot accept this definition either; for as a matter of fact we find that in case we do not admit the *destruction* of an entity, there is a possibility of its existing before it actually comes into existence

* If the phrase 'either this or that' implies uncertainty, then the definition becomes doubtful and hence indefinite, vague. If it implies the notion of *mutual negation*, this has already been refuted.

[as that which has no destruction must be eternal, ever-existent]; so that, by your definition, the *destruction* will have to be regarded as the *cause* of the entity! If, with a view to avoid this difficulty, you add the qualification that it should exist before the effect (which will exclude *destruction*, which never exists before the thing is destroyed),—even then the definition would apply to the negation of co-existent things [for instance, according to the Logician, when the jar is baked, colour, taste and odour are produced in it simultaneously; and in this case, if the *prior negation* of the colour, which does exist before the colour comes into existence, be not admitted, there arises the possibility of the appearance, not only of colour, but also of taste and odour; so that, by the definition, the *prior negation* of colour will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of Taste and Odour, and *vice versa*!] If this be admitted [*i. e.* if the prior negation of Colour be admitted to be the *Cause* of Taste], then, by the same reasoning, the attendant accessories also (of Colour) will have to be regarded as the *cause* (of Taste). If this also be admitted, then this would mean an absolute identity between the two effects (Colour and Taste)! The definition is open to the further objection that it is non-comprehensive [applying to only specific causes; as the word 'yat' in the compound 'yadabhyupagamē' must refer to specific things only]. In answer to this it might be urged that it is true that the definition applies to specific causes only, but it applies to *all* specific causes (all which thus becoming included, the definition becomes quite comprehensive). But (if the definition applies to all individual causes), then in that case, the definition becomes too wide [the cause of the jar's colour having to be regarded as the cause of its Taste]: And if, in answer to this, it be urged that the definition does not refer to any individual causes in particular [but generally to those things whose non-acceptance makes possible the existence of the effect before its time], then, that makes room for

the objections that we are going to put forth later on, on the basis of the unacceptability of all possible alternatives with regard to the meaning of the word 'pūrva', 'before' [and in the absence of an adequate explanation of the word 'pūrva', no sense can attach to the definition now under review].

(128) "We can define *Cause* as the invariable antecedent." This also is not tenable; as if *invariability* means *necessity* [the meaning being that that is the *cause* which must always exist before the effect], then the objection remains that *Ākāśa* and such other eternal substances would, in that case, be the *Cause* of all Effects; and further, the component parts of a thing would have to be regarded as the cause of that thing, as also of the colour and other qualities of the thing. If, on the other hand, *invariability* means *unadventitiousness*, then the meaning of the definition would be that that which is the unconditional or natural precursor of the effect,—whose antecedence is not due to any adventitious circumstance,—is the *Cause*; and by this definition, the issuing (out of the hole) of ants (which is a precursor of rain) will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of rain! Then again, of two co-existent things (Colour and Taste of the jar being baked e. g.) the causal accessories of one will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of the other [e. g. the accessories producing Taste will be the *Cause* of Colour; as the antecedence of these two latter will not be due to any adventitious circumstances]. "In the case of the appearance of ants and rainfall, the invariability does not pertain to the former, [as there is rainfall even when ants do not appear]; it pertains only to the sequence of the latter [there is sure to be rain when ants appear] [so that our definition cannot make the appearance of ants the *cause* of rain]." This explanation does not help the definition; [even though this reasoning might apply to the case of the ants and rain, yet there

is another case which makes the definition too wide; *e. g.*] in the case of the premonitory symptoms of diseases, it is found that the said 'invariability' pertains to the antecedence of these symptoms [which, by the definition, will have to be regarded as the *Cause* of the disease]. "True; these are certainly the *Cause* of the disease." Not so, we reply; as, in that case, there would be no distinction between 'premonitory symptoms' and the '*niḍāna*' (Cause) of diseases [a distinction that has been insisted upon by all standard writers on Medicine].

(129) Further, you have to explain what you mean by 'antecedent' [when you say that the *Cause* in the 'antecedent' of the Effect]. "That is the 'antecedent' which is connected with previous time." This is not right; as with this definition, Time could never be the *Cause* of anything [as according to the Logician, Time cannot be connected with time]; and farther, we have to consider what is meant by the *previousness* of time [in the phrase 'previous time' that appears in your definition of *Antecedence*]. "*Previousness* is that which is determined by past circumstances [such as the movements of the sun, whereby Time is determined and measured]." This is not right; as you have still to explain what is meant by the past participial word '*aḥiṭa*', 'past,' which itself denotes *previous time* [and as such cannot rightly be introduced into a definition of 'previousness']. "There are two qualities, *Paraṭva* (Priority) and *Aparaṭva* (Posteriority); and of these it is the former that constitutes *previousness*". This cannot be maintained; as the Logician does not admit the presence of any such quality in Time and other immaterial substances, or in Quality, Action and other Categories [as according to the Logician, Priority and Posteriority are qualities belonging to material Substances only; and hence Time being an immaterial substance, and Quality &c., not being Substances, *previousness* could not

belong to any of these; so that they could never be the Cause of anything!]; nor could the said quality of *paraṭva* belong to *Paraṭva* itself; so that *Paraṭva* also could never be a Cause of its own direct apprehension [though as a matter of fact, in every direct apprehension the object apprehended is regarded as its Cause].

[Page 558] (130) Nor will it be right to define the Cause as a part of the *Sāmāgrī*, i. e. the circumstances or accessories attendant (upon the appearance of the effect). As, in the first place, it cannot be determined what 'a part' in this connection is; for it is not possible for the 'Circumstances' to have any *avayava* (component parts) or *praḍēsha* (particular place in the entire extent), or any other form of 'part;'—and secondly, the word '*Sāmāgrī*' is only a collective name applied to all the causes that operate in the producing of an effect; so that in defining the Cause by means of that word you are defining the Cause by itself (thus landing yourself in a circle). "But we give the name *Sāmāgrī* to that whereafter the effect necessarily appears [so that our definition does not involve the absurdity of defining the Cause by itself]." This is not right; as in the case of Disjunction we find that as soon as there is disjunction, the destruction of Conjunction necessarily follows; so that, by your definition, the Disjunction would have to be regarded as the *Sāmāgrī* of the destruction of Conjunction, [while, as a matter of fact it is the sole Cause of it];—similarly, the action or motion (that brings about Disjunction, and as such is its Cause) would have to be regarded as '*Sāmāgrī*';—and lastly, the final contact of the yarns (which is the Cause of the cloth) would have to be regarded as the '*Sāmāgrī*.'

(131) "There is a distinct relationship known under the name of '*Kāryakāraṇa-bhāve*', the Cause-Effect-Relation' [and that in which this relation subsists is the Cause]." In that case, so far as the said relation is concerned, there

being no difference between the Cause and the Effect (in both of which the Cause-Effect-Relation subsists), it would be impossible to determine which is the *Cause* and which the *Effect*. And, if you seek to avoid this confusion by making a distinction between the two by qualifying their relation by 'Cause' and 'Effect' respectively [so that the 'Cause' is *that which is related to the Effect*, and the 'Effect' is *that which is related to the Cause*],—then it becomes necessary for you to provide separate definitions of each of them.

(132) “*Kāraṇtva*, the causal character, is a definite property [and that which possesses this property is the *Cause*].” This cannot be accepted; as it behoves you to explain what proof you have for the existence of such a character. “The proof of it lies, in some cases [*e. g.* in the case of the stick as producing the jar], in direct Perception, and in others, [*e. g.* in the case of the atom being the cause of all composite substances] in Inference based upon Perception.” This is not right; what is that with regard to which (as the effect) the 'Causality' (of the *Cause*) would be indicated by Perception? [That is to say, when you *perceive* the stick as the *cause*, do you perceive it—as the *cause of the jar*? Or simply as a *cause in general*?] The *cause* cannot be held to be perceived merely as a *cause in general*, without any reference to a particular effect; for, as a matter of fact, no cause is ever perceived as such; and this for the simple reason that all positive and negative cognitions with regard to any cause—as also every property that is recognised as indicative of the causal character—can pertain only to particular effects. Nor will it be right to hold that when you recognise a cause (the stick for instance) you know it as the cause of *jar in general* (without reference to any particular individual jar). For in that case there could be no production of *individual jars* at all (the 'causes of the jar' being recognised as productive of the *jar in general*

only). If, in answer to this, it be held that the cause productive of the *jar in general* would naturally produce the individual jar also [as the *jar in general* is inseparable from the *individual jars*],—then there would be this difficulty that you could not ascertain which particular *cause* would produce which particular effect. On the other hand, if it be held that when the *cause* is perceived it is recognised as productive of each individual effect, then, inasmuch as before it is produced the effect is not in existence, it cannot come into contact with the sense-organs; and as such it will not be possible for the *cause*, in this case, to be cognised by Perception;—and as for the time during which the effect is actually in existence (*i.e.*, after it has been produced), at that time all the circumstances that constitute the ‘*sāmagrī*’ necessary for the production of that particular effect are not present,—so that that is not the time *at* which the effect is produced; and under the circumstances, how could there be at that time, any *perception* of the cause *as qualified by the production (i.e., as productive) of that effect?* [The production not being present at the time]. And as such a qualified cause would never have been perceived before (the production of the effect), there would be no possibility of the help of any *impression* [that could remind the perceiver of the cause previously perceived and thereby lead to his subsequent *recognition* of it]. Similarly, how could there be any Inference with regard to such a *cause*?—No such cause having ever been perceived, on the basis of what *probans* could there be any premiss (expressing invariable concomitance) from which such an Inference could proceed? As for the Retaliatory Argument that might be put forward by the Logician [to the effect that if no cognition of the cause is possible how does the Vedāntin proceed with arguments? Or how does he proceed to drink water when he feels thirsty?],—no such argument can be rightly urged against one who regards everything as inexplicable. “The cognition of

the *Cause* would proceed from Inference based upon the premiss that without a Cause the occasional character of the effect (*i.e.*, the fact that the effect is produced only at a particular time) cannot be accounted for". This inference, we reply, will not be sound; as the two characters (the character of 'cause' and the said 'occasional character') subsist in different substrates [the former in the *Cause* and the latter in the *effect*; thus affecting the 'fallacy of four terms']. Even if the two characters were, somehow, shown to be co-substrate, [by putting the inference in the form that the effect, which is *occasional*, must *have a cause*']—there will arise a further difficulty: the character of *having a cause*, which is put forward as accounting for the *occasional character*, would itself need something else to account for itself; and so on and on, there would be an *infinite regress*; nor will it be possible to justify this regress on the ground of the said series having no beginning in time [on the analogy of the regress involved in the case of the seed and the tree] [for if the series were regarded as beginningless, there would be an end to the very conception of *cause and effect*]. Then again, if the two characters belonged to different substrates, if there were no relation between the character that is accounted for (*i.e.*, the occasional character) and that which accounts for it (*i.e.*, the character of *having a cause*), then there would be no restriction (as to what proves what);—if, on the other hand, there be some relation between the two, then there arises an *infinite regress* [the relation belonging to the relatives by some sort of relation, etc., so on and on].

[Page 652] (133) The arguments just urged (in the preceding paragraph) also dispose of the definition of *Cause* (propounded by the *Mīmāṃsaka*) as that which has '*shukṭi*', power or efficiency.

(134) Then again, as regards the view that the nature of the *Cause* is something actually perceptible, it is a well-

known fact that in every Perceptual Cognition, the *object* also is a 'Cause' operating towards the cognition through the 'contact' (of the sense-organ with the object, which is the essential cause of every perception); and thus in the perception of *cause*, you will have the undesirable contingency of the *cause* [as the *object*, and also as such the *Cause* of that perception] operating upon itself. If, in order to avoid this contingency, you deny the causal character of the 'Object' (of Perception), then you will have to deny such character of the 'Sense-organ' also; which also operates only through the *contact*, in which the 'object' is as essential as the 'sense-organ'. Specially as, if the contact of the *sense-organ* only, independently of the *object*, were held to be the *cause* of Perception, then a great confusion would result [the presence of the Eye alone without any object before it, would in that case, bring about the perception of all objects]. Lastly [if the nature of the *cause* were directly perceptible] as regards the question as to whether a certain thing is the *cause* or not [no difference of opinion would be possible, just as no one quarrels as to whether or not fire is hot; and if a difference of opinion could ever arise, there would be no chance of ever settling the question one way or the other] as while one person will perceive the *cause*, the other will not perceive it [and this state of things could not be altered]; And if, in order to determine the question, you were to call in the aid of the definitions that have been propounded—such, *e.g.*, as 'that which is a necessary precursor' and the like,—you become open to *all* the several objections that have been urged against every one of those definitions. And yet without some such distinctive feature, by the perception of *what* could you set aside your misconception and doubt (with regard to a certain thing being the cause of another thing)? Then again, it may happen that though the thing, which is the *cause*, is itself perceived by the senses, its *causal character* is not perceived; and in this case you will have to postulate something by the

help of which the sense-organs would be enabled to apprehend the casual character; and such being the case, this latter something, which is a real entity, will provide the necessary basis for your notion of 'Cause'; and so, what would be there to justify the unnecessary complications involved in the assuming of another basis for the same notion? "[If the said 'something' which, being perceived, manifests the causal character to the sense-organs, be held to be the sole basis of the notion of 'Cause']—any such perceptible basis would be entirely absent in the case of such causes as *ākāsha* and the like whose casual character is always *inferred* (and never *perceived*); so that in view of such *causes*] we have to postulate a basis (for the notion of 'cause') different from that manifestive 'something'." This is not right, we reply; as this would involve an objectionable interdependence: If Perception had for its object a 'causal character' different from that which manifests that character, then alone could the analogy of this lead to the inference that in the case of *Ākāsha* and such other things, the causal character is different from the said manifestor;—and conversely, the fact of the causal character apprehended by Perception being different from that which makes that character apprehended is made to depend upon the facts of the causal character of *Ākāsha*, etc., being *inferred* (and not *perceived*).

(135) Further [is the *causal character* of such causes as the Stick and the like adventitious, something transient? or unadventitious, eternal?—if the causal character is eternal, then; even before the cause produced its effect, we would have the notion that *it produces*, just as we would have the notion that *it exists*; and both these notions would be equally valid [which is absurd!;—if, on the other hand, the casual character were transitory, then prior to the production and appearance of this *causal character* [which being an abstract generic entity, is only one], there would be no *casual character*

anywhere at all [and there being no *causal character*, there would be no *cause* to produce that character]; and if, even though transitory, it were never *produced*, then why could not the same be the case with all such transitory objects as the jar and the like?

(136) Lastly if, there be such a single entity as '*Kāraṇatva*,' *causal character*,—and it subsists in each and every one of the diverse things that are regarded as '*cause*,'—then everything would be the cause of every other thing! "But the '*casual character*' pertaining to each individual effect is distinct." This will not help you, we reply; as even so, there will be some character common to all *causes*; and this character being the basis of the simple comprehensive notion of '*cause*', if this generic entity of the '*cause*' were conceived of only as consisting of the causes of all such things as the jar and the like, you could not avoid the contingency of the '*cause of the jar*' being regarded as the '*cause of the pillar*.'! "But the comprehensive notion that we have is only in the generic form '*cause*' and not in the form '*cause of the jar*,' '*cause of the pillar*,' '*cause of the cloth*' and so forth." This is not right; as there is no proof for the existence of any such vague generic entity as '*cause*'; independently of all particularisation by reference to the jar and other particular effects,—a *cause*, that is, with regard [to which it cannot be determined *of what effect* it is the '*cause*.' On the other hand, if the generic character of one *unspecified* '*cause*' were to subsist in that which is the '*cause of a particular effect*', then—as that same particular cause would not be the *cause* of some other particular effect, the character of the '*non-cause*' also would subsist in it; so that one and the same object, being possessed of such mutually independent and contradictory characters as the '*cause*' and the '*non-cause*', would have to be regarded as '*different*'; and

thus your theory having led to the absurdity that every 'cause' is different from itself, you discard every chance of even a single 'cause' being established!

[Page 66b] (137) Further, we ask—Has a particular effect a *cause* or not? If it has not, then it would either never exist at all, or be ever existent. If, on the other hand, it has a *cause*, then what is that *cause*? If you say simply that it is a particular individual, [i. e., a particular individual stick is the *cause* of a particular individual jar],—this cannot be accepted; as if this particular individual be held to be simply that which exists before the effect—the jar—is produced, even such adventitious accessories as the ass (on which the clay has been brought, and which is there before the jar is moulded) and the like would also have to be regarded as the *cause*; hence it behoves you to provide a further explanation as to what is it in the particular individual—stick—that makes it the *cause* of the particular effect—jar? (A) "Well, it is the form of the particular individual that makes it the *cause*." This will not be right; as in the first place such form is distinct with each individual object; so that if the *cause* of the particular effect (jar) were to consist in [the specific form of any one particular individual (*stick*), then anything else not having that form could never be the cause of that particular effect! [i. e., if the *stick* is the cause of the jar, because it has the stick-form, then the potter's wheel and such other things, which do not have that form, could never be regarded as the *cause* of the jar;—and yet the name 'cause of the jar' is actually given (by the Logician, not to the stick only, but) to several particular individual things that produce the jar—viz: the constituent (clay), the non-constituent (stick, wheel, &c.,) and the active or efficient (potter); and if several distinct individuals (in the shape of the several kinds of *cause*) could form the basis of the use of the single comprehensive name ('cause of the jar'), then there

would be no ground for the postulating of such comprehensive entities as 'Gōva,' the class 'cow,' and the like [which are postulated only with a view to provide an adequate basis for the use of such comprehensive names as 'cow' &c., which could rest on the basis of the distinct individual cows], as we have already pointed out before. (B) "What makes the stick the *cause* of the jar is the fact that it is its necessary antecedent [which the ass and such other accessories are not]."⁸ This also cannot be accepted; as what constitutes the *necessary* character (of the *antecedence*) is the fact that the two are *invariably concomitant*;—and as a matter of fact, there can be no such invariable concomitance between any particular individual cause and all particular individual effects [e.g. all particular jars can never be concomitant with any particular stick]; and if the qualification 'necessary' be removed, and mere 'antecedence' were made the condition, then many other things become included under the category of 'Cause,' which are not a cause at all. (C) "[In order to escape from the difficulty just pointed out] we explain that what makes a particular thing (the stick) the *cause* of another (the jar) is the fact that the former belongs to that *class or category* of things which is concomitant with things belonging to another class [so that the particular stick belongs to that *class* 'Stick' which is always found concomitant with every individual thing that belongs to the class 'jar']." This also is untenable; as this definition will apply to other individuals of the class also [i.e. it will include every stick that belongs to the category of 'stick,' and not only to that which is productive of the jar]. (D) "We may state the definition in the form that that which is the *cause*, while belonging to the category which is concomitant with things of the other category, is the *antecedent* to the particular individual of the latter category." This also cannot be accepted; as it will apply to hundreds of

⁸ As a definition of 'Cause' this has already been refuted above in para. 128.

those particular things that may be productive of hundreds of particular effects appearing at the same time as the effect in question (so that if one hundred jars are produced at the same time, the cause of one would, under the definition, have to be regarded as the cause of all); and if you accept this as desirable, then the destruction of the cause of one of these particular effects would imply the destruction of all those effects [i.e., the destruction of the component particles of one jar will mean the destruction of all jars]! And further it may be held that all these particular things, belonging to the category concomitant with things of the other category, which are produced at any one time—are produced by all those causal accessories belonging to the category with which the other is concomitant, that exist at the time;—but in that case, as difference of the effects can be due to difference in the causal accessories only, if you regard all accessories as jointly producing the several effects, this would mean that all the effects are identical [every one of them being produced conjointly by the same set of causes]; and if each effect be held to be produced by a distinct set of causal accessories, then each particular effect would have to be regarded as diverse [being the product of the diverse accessories]!

(138) [We next proceed to demolish the Logician's conception of the '*Samavāyikāraṇa*,' 'Constituent or Material Cause']. As regards the Constituent Cause, if you make the *similarity of properties* the determining factor by which indicates what is the constituent of what, so that the yarn is the constituent of cloth because there is a certain similarity between the two], then the definition becomes too wide [all the yarns in the world having to be regarded as the constituent of any particular piece of cloth];—and if you take each yarn by itself, then it would be impossible for you to get at any idea of concomitance (between cloth and yarn). But we can define the *Constituent Cause* as that which, while belonging

to a category of things which are the invariable concomitants of the particular effect, is one that is co-situate (*saḍḍśha*.) with the effect [so that of any particular piece of cloth only those yarns would be the constituent cause which are co-situate with it, which occupy the space occupied by the piece of cloth].” This will not be right; for if by the two being ‘co-situate’ you mean that both are co-inherent, inhering in a common substratum, then this will not apply to the case in question at all; as you do not hold the view that the cause and its effect inhere in the same substratum;—if, on the other hand, by the two being ‘co-situate’ you mean that both are in conjunction or contact with the same points in space, then the definition will not apply to qualities and other such categories [which according to the Logician, cannot have any conjunction, which is possible for Substances only];—lastly if some indefinite sort of *co-situateness* be meant [so that even though in the case of Qualities and the Substances to which they belong, there is no conjunction, yet there is no doubt that there is some sort of *co-situateness* between them], then the definition becomes too wide [some sort of *co-situateness* being found in the case of many things that do not stand in the relation of cause and effect; for instance, when fire and water are contained *in the same room*]. Then again, inasmuch as you admit, as *Cause*, many such things as the unseen force and the like, which never occupy the same points in space as their effects, everything—whether co-situate or not—might be regarded as the *Cause* of everything else!—specially as mere antecedence remains the same in both cases [i. e. in the case of the co-situate *Cause* like the yarn, as also in the case of the non-co-situate *Cause* like the Unseen Force].* Further, whenever we conceive of invariable concomitance, it is always as between two communities (*e. f.* between ‘fire’ in general and ‘smoke’ in general, and never as between particular individuals); so that [*if invariable concomitance* be the

* So that the stick at Benares would be the cause of the jar at Pataliputra.

distinguishing feature of the *Cause*] the relation of *Cause and Effect* could subsist only between the two Communities to which the particular individuals belong [and never between any particular individuals]; for if the invariability of concomitance pertained to the Communities, and yet the relation of Cause and Effect pertained to the particular individuals,—then you would have the absurd contingency of the differential subsisting in a substratum totally different from the thing defined [*i.e.*, while the *concomitance* subsists in the *communities*, the *causal nature* subsists in the *individuals*]. If, in order to avoid this, it be held that the concomitance really pertains to the *individuals as composing the communities*,—then, in that case, no *individual*, as such, could ever be a *Cause* [the causal nature being restricted to the individual only *as composing the communities*, and not by itself];—and as all *communities* are ever-lasting, your hypothesis would mean that the Effect is something that has been in existence already [as the Effect is only an individual, *as a member of a Community*, and this Community being eternal, must have existed before the operation of the cause]! And further, [the causal character pertaining to *communities*] the causal accessory pertaining to the ‘substance,’ that pertaining to the ‘tree’ and that pertaining to the ‘*shimshapā*,’ would each produce distinct individual effects; as each of the three being a ‘community’ its causal character must be distinct, and its causal operation must be productive of individuals only; as all communities, ‘substance,’ and the like (being eternal), could never be products [so that the individual effects of each of the three causal accessories, ‘substance,’ ‘tree’ and ‘*shimshapā*’ being distinct, there would be no possibility of the co-ordination of the three; so that you could not have any such notion as that ‘this is the *shimshapā*, which is a tree, which is a substance’]! “But the causal accessory of the ‘*shimshapā*’ is an accessory only as along with the acces-

sory of the 'tree'; so that the individual *shimshapā* cannot be anything apart from the *tree*." Even this will not help you; as [even though the individual *shimshapā* may not be different from the 'tree'] the individual *trees* produced by the causal accessory of the tree are certainly different from the *shimshapā*; as even apart from the causal accessory of the '*shimshapā*,' the accessory of the 'tree' produces many such other trees as the *sāl*, the *palm* and the like [so the fact remains that there can be no co-ordination between the 'substance,' the 'tree' and the '*shimshapā*']. "But the causal accessory of the *shimshapā* is productive only as accompanied by the accessory of the *tree*; so that how can there be any absolute difference between the individual *shimshapā* and the individual *tree*?" This cannot be right as [if there were no difference between the individual effects produced by the accessory of the '*shimshapā*' and those produced by that of the 'tree'], there would be no possibility of the production of any tree other than the *shimshapā*; as, by your hypothesis, the accessories of the '*shimshapā*' and of the 'tree' being identical, there could be no difference in their effects! And further, your theory would mean that even in the producing of the individual *tree*, the causal accessory of the 'tree' [would not be enough; as it] would require, in some cases, the causal accessory of the '*shimshapā*,' and in other cases, that of the '*ṭamāla*,' and so forth [so that there would be no possibility of the *shimshapā* and the *ṭamāla* both being equally regarded as 'tree']; and the result of this would be that even though the effect produced, in the two cases, might be in the qualified form of the 'tree', yet inasmuch as the causal accessory in the two cases would be different (accompanied in one case by the accessory of the '*shimshapā*,' and in the other by that of the '*ṭamāla*'), it would be necessary to admit some difference in the generic form of the 'tree' itself! If (in order to avoid this) it be held that there is a comprehensive causal accessory as the

accessory of the 'tree' (which is common to all kinds of trees), —then it would be necessary to admit the production of an effect in the shape of the individual *tree* (produced by the "accessory of the tree"), as entirely distinct from the effect in the shape of the particular trees, *shimshapā* and the rest (produced by the 'accessory of the *shimshapā*' &c., &c.)! There would be many such other objectionable features in your theory, which you can yourself perceive.

[The *Cause* having been defined as the 'necessary antecedent,' it becomes necessary to determine what is meant by 'ante' 'before'; and as 'before' and 'after' are only manifestations of time, the Author proceeds to examine the explanation of Time provided by the Logician.]

(139) In the definition of *Cause* it has been stated that the invariable presence of the *cause* should be *previous* to the effect; and here the word 'previous' is meant to exclude the present and the future times; now we have to consider what is the 'previous time' which excludes the other two. As a matter of fact however, no consideration or examination of this is possible [as there is no proof for the existence of any such divisions of time.] "But with regard to Time we all meet with such notions as 'the present' and the like; and these notions supply the proof for the diversity in their subject (time) [i. e., the well-known ideas of 'present,' 'past' and 'future' prove that there are these three divisions of time]."

This is not right; for what, after all, is the *subject* of the notions of 'present' and the rest? "Different Times form the subject of these notions." This cannot be right; for is this 'difference' of the Time something natural or adventitious?

(140) It could not be natural; as you hold Time to be one only; so that that same Time which is cognised as 'present' could not, previous to the present, be regarded as 'future,' or, after the present, as 'past.' "But the single Time is actually endowed with the three-fold character (of

past, present and future)." This cannot be ; as, in the first place, the diversity of the character should cause a diversity in the object itself [so that if Time is endowed with the three-fold character, it must be regarded as three, and not one] and secondly, in that case, there would be no restriction at all : that is, at the very time that we have the idea that a certain thing 'exists,' we could also rightly have the idea that it 'existed,' or that 'it will exist.'

(141) If, on the other hand, the *Difference* of the Time be held to be *adventitious*, then please point out what is that condition or circumstance (to which the adventitious Difference is due). "What gives rise to difference or diversity in Time is the diversity of connections with the movements of the Sun and such other objects." This cannot be, we reply ; as you must say that even with regard to the *past* and *future* (just as with regard to the *present*) you have the same idea of the connection of the said movements ; as the same day, that, being connected with certain movements of the Sun, is cognised as 'present,' comes also to be cognised as 'past,' or 'to be,'—and in both these latter cases also, it is connected with certain movements of the Sun ; for the ideas of 'past' and 'future' pertain, not to the pure unqualified Time, but only to Time as conditioned by certain circumstances ; and that same circumstance, which, previously, marked the day as 'present,' as distinguished from another day, should serve again to mark that same day as 'past,' or as 'future,' as distinguished from that same day [so that the said circumstance, connection with the Sun's movements, being common to all divisions of Time, cannot be accepted as the circumstance that gives rise to the various divisions of Time].

(142) "What you say is quite true ; but, as a matter of fact, when the connection of the circumstance with the Time is actually here, we have the idea of 'present' ; when that connection is destroyed, we have the idea of 'past' ; and when the connection is not yet come (and is yet to come) we have

the idea of 'future'." This also cannot be right; as in your expression '*avatiṣṭhamānah*,' 'is there,' if the Present tense is meant to be significant, then it comes to this that you seek to explain the notion of the 'present' by means of the idea of the Present (involved in your explanation); so that you land yourself either on a 'vicious circle,' or on an 'infinite regress' (by seeking to explain every conception of the *present* by means of another idea of the *present*, and so on and on). Similarly the words 'destroyed' and 'not yet come' are only synonymous with 'past' and 'future' respectively; and thus what you have done in the explanation you have put forward is to pick out one out of a number of synonyms and to explain it by means of another; and truly praiseworthy as your *acumen* is, you are wonderfully lucky! [literally, 'you have your parents alive'].

(143) "The time characterised by action is the 'present'; that characterised by previous negation of action is the 'past'; and that characterised by the destruction or absolute absence of action is the 'future'." This also cannot be maintained; for as a matter of fact, even when we have the conception of 'past' and 'future,' we actually conceive of the time as 'characterised by action'; so that, by your definition, all these will have to be cognised as 'present'!* Specially as the Time that is not 'characterised by action,' cannot be characterised either by the 'previous negation' or by the 'destruction' of action. Further, until you have provided an adequate explanation of what is meant by 'previous,' how could one understand what is meant by 'previous negation'? How too could it be possible to point out the difference between 'previous negation' and 'destruction'? "Well, the difference between these two is this that, 'previous negation' is that negation which

* 'Time is *one* only; so that mere change in its characterisation cannot produce any diversity in it. Or, every point of time being characterised by some action or the other, the 'being characterised by action' will apply to all Time, and not to the *present* only.

has an end, while 'Destruction' is that negation which has a beginning." This is not tenable; for what is that 'end' of the Previous Negation, on account of which it is called 'having an end'? If the 'end' of Previous Negation be said to consist in the counter-entity of the negation—such as the jar and the like,—then, inasmuch as Destruction also, like the previous negation, has a counter-entity, that also 'has an end.' Then as regards Destruction, you define it as that negation 'which has a beginning';—now it has to be considered what is meant by 'beginning' here. If by 'beginning' is meant the '*saṭṭva*' or 'being' of that which has been *asaṭ* or non-existent,—and this '*saṭṭva*' is a Community,—then it is absolutely impossible that any such should belong to a Negation [as according to the Logician, Community is possible only in the case of Substance, Quality and Action]. If, on the other hand, by 'beginning' is meant merely '*svaṛūpasatṭva*' or 'the attaining of one's own individuality,'—then such a 'beginning' would be possible for the Previous Negation also; as this also is non-existent at some time or other. "What is meant by 'beginning' is the '*saṭṭva*, coming into existence, of what was previously non-existent." This is not right; as it has still to be determined what is meant by 'previously,' 'now' and 'subsequently.' For similar reasons we also reject the definition of 'beginning' as 'existence determined by the cause'; for unless the meaning of 'before' and 'after' has been ascertained, no adequate explanation is possible of what is meant by 'Cause.'

(144) "The 'past' and the 'future' might be explained in any manner (that does not concern us now); as regards the 'present,' when a certain time is qualified or characterised by a particular action, that time is called 'present' with reference to that action,—and not with reference to any other action." This definition also cannot be maintained; as what do you mean by the phrase 'with reference to that'? Does it mean

—(a) that the action is the determinant of the time? (b) or that it is its limit or standard of comparison? (c) or that it is its correlative? (d) or that it is its method or manner? (a) The first is not possible; as we have pointed out more than once that the time that is cognised as 'past' and 'future' is also the same that is 'determined by action' [so that this definition cannot apply to the 'present' alone]. (b) Nor is the second possible; because as a matter of fact, when we conceive of the 'present,' of something as 'existing,' our conception does not involve any idea of a standard of comparison; that is to say, our conception does not appear in the form '*asmā ayam var'atā*', 'this exists *as compared to that action*', as it does whenever the idea of standard of comparison is involved; as for instance, in the conception 'this is longer *as compared to that*;' and further, at all times, all the three notions of 'past,' 'present' and 'future, would be possible, in regard to three distinct 'standards;' and [as all these notions would appear in connection with the Time which is a single entity], no exact division into 'past,' 'present' and 'future' would be possible. (c) For the same reason the third alternative also cannot be maintained. (d) Nor lastly is the fourth alternative tenable; as even at the time that we conceive of the 'past' and 'future,' the conception may appear in the 'manner' determined by the action; so that these also will be liable to be cognised as '*present*.' "But as a matter of fact, the 'manner determined by the action' is not present in the 'past' and 'future' times." This statement of yours is not right; as you have still to determine what is meant by *being present*; so that it is not yet right for you to indicate the difference (between the 'present,' the 'past' and the 'future') by using the phrase 'is present' [as you do in your last statement].

(145) "We shall define the 'present' as that time which, at the time of a certain action, is determined or characterised by that action." This also we cannot accept; as this

definition (containing the phrase *kālē kālak*) implies the subsistence of Time in Time, which is impossible ; specially as you do not admit more than one Time (whereby one Time could subsist in another), your statement would mean that Time rests in itself ; which clearly involves the absurdity of 'self-subsistence.'

(146) [Finding that any such determining circumstance as the action of the Sun and the like cannot be reasonably maintained, the Logician puts forward another definition on the basis of other determining circumstances].—" That time is called ' present' which is the object as well as the substratum of the cognition that apprehends it [where we cognise the present time, this cognition apprehends the present time, and also appears at the present time];—that time is called previous ('past') which is characterised by the previous negation of the determining factor of present time (by the aforesaid definition the present time is determined by the *cognition of the present time*) so that the 'past' time would be that which is characterised by the previous negation of the cognition of present time ;—and that time is the 'future' which is characterised by the distinction or cessation of that determining factor. And as regards the distinction between these latter two, this is got at on the basis of the natural difference that there lies between 'previous negation' and 'destruction:'—Previous Negation being defined as the cause of the demarcation of previous time, on the basis of the particular (effect in the shape of the said demarcation) which proceeds from its very nature ; and similarly Destruction being defined as the cause of the demarcation of future time".

(147) The above definition cannot be accepted. According to the philosophical theory (of the Logician) that does not admit of the self-luminosity of Cognitions, it is not possible for a cognition to apprehend a thing upon which it itself rests [and in the proposed definition, the *present time* is the substratum as well as the object of its cognition] ; and under

the circumstances how could there be any apprehension of present time (such as your definition depicts it ? If it be held that that cognition of which the present time forms an integral factor is apprehended by means of another cognition; and it is in this manner that the 'present time' is cognised,—then the cognition 'this *was seen* by me then' should have to appear in the form 'then this *is seen* by me' [as your theory involves the admission of the fact that the 'present time is apprehended by means of a cognition that appears *after* that time has passed by, and this means that the *past* is apprehended as the *present*]. For this same reason there is no escape for you, even if you admit the self-luminosity of cognitions; for even in this case, what you declare to be apprehended as the 'present' is exactly what is apprehended by the other cognition (of the *past*) also,—thus your definition becoming vitiated by the fault of being too wide. Specially as, even if you were to add (to your definition) the qualification 'self-luminous' [so that the 'present' time is that which, while being the object of the self-luminous cognition, is the substratum of that cognition], that does not make any difference in the character of the *object* [and hence the definition remains applicable to the *past* as well as to the *present*]. "Certainly, there would be a difference consisting in its (Cognition's) own *specific form* of each [so that the cognition in which the 'present' enters as the objective factor, cannot be the same as that which apprehends the 'past']. "This is not right; as whether you take the phrase *its own form* as comprehensive or not comprehensive,—in either case undesirable contingencies result [i. e. if the pronoun 'its' includes all cognitions, then the 'form' of one cognition would be the same as that of another; so that there would be no difference among cognitions at all; if, on the other hand, the pronoun refers to any particular cognition, then the time of no other cognition could ever be regarded as 'present']'

(148) Then again, even though there may be some difference in the specific forms of 'previous negation' and 'destruction' [on which natural difference the opponent has, in para. 146, based the difference between 'past' and 'future'], we ask—which of the two determines the application of the name 'past' and which that of 'future'?—And if (instead of answering this question directly) you were to explain that the application of the different names is due to the difference in the effects produced,—then our reply to this is that you cannot find out what is productive of which product, until you have explained what is meant by 'before' and 'after'—the only explanation of which that you have offered having been refuted by us.

(149) Further, if you base your distinctions of time (into *past*, *present* and *future*) upon differences of determining circumstances, (such as the movements of the Sun and the like), then Time, which you have held to be *one* only, would become *many*, in view of the possible determining circumstances being innumerable, in the shape of the movements of the Sun, of the Moon, and so forth; specially as it is not possible for you to determine that (from among these innumerable circumstances) it is only this, and not that, which serves to determine Time.

(150) As for the theory that the nature of everything is undergoing momentary transformation; so [though Time is one, its nature being different at each moment] the distinction into 'past' 'present' and 'future' is due to these changes in the nature of Time—in this case also it will be necessary to base the distinction ultimately upon certain determining circumstances; and hence this theory also will fall within the grip of the objections that we have already urged against the distinction being based upon determining conditions.

[Finding it impossible to provide an adequate explanation of the distinctions of Time, the Opponent, instead of being represented as defeated, is made, with a view to introduce and demolish the Logician's conception of *Doubt*, t, say that--"no one can deny that the distinction of Present, Past and Future is real; under the circumstances, if we are unable to provide an adequate explanation, we may regard the explanation as *Doubtful*, accepting the fact as settled.' This provides the Vedāntin with an occasion for taking up the Logician's account of *Doubt*].

(151) "With all this, however, there must be some difference among the several points of time; as it cannot be denied that people have the different conceptions (with regard to the different points of time). And thus, the existence of some sort of difference in a general way being an established fact, if we are unable to determine what that exact difference is, all that this can justify us to do is to say that the exact nature of the difference is doubtful." This is not right, we reply; as you cannot explain the exact nature of *Doubt* either. For instance, to what is the difference of *Doubt* from *Certainty* due?—(A) Is it due to some adventitious condition? Or (B) to the very *jaṭi* or nature of the two?

(152) (A) If it be held to be due to some adventitious condition, we ask—(a) is it due to this adventitious condition in the form of some peculiarity in the objects (of the Cognition)? (b) or in the form of some peculiarity in the causes (of the cognition)? (c) or in the form of something else related to them? (a) It cannot be the first—i. e., the difference of *Doubt* from *Certainty* cannot be held to be due to the adventitious condition in the form of some peculiarity in the object; for no adequate explanation is possible as to what is the *object* of *Doubt*? "But (it is a well-known fact that) *Doubt* has for its object two things". This is not right; as under this definition of *Doubt*, the *Certainty* that people may have with regard to two things would also have to be regarded as 'Doubt'. "But as a matter of fact, no such *Certainty* is ever met with in experience (all *Certainty* bearing upon

only one of the two things). This is not true; as people do have such two-sided certainties; e. g., when they regard a thing as both different and non-different from another thing (as real as well as unreal, and so forth); secondly, when they have the verbal cognition on hearing the sentence 'this is different as well as non-different from that' [in which case also the cognition of the two alternatives is a certainty]; and lastly, in the case of dreams also (such certainty is often met with). "But when people have a certainty with regard to the two sides of a question, there does not appear, to their mind, any contradiction (or incompatibility) between the two alternatives; while in the case of Doubt, such contradiction is clearly manifest [so that the two cases are not analogous]." This also is not right; for even though one may be quite cognisant of the contradiction or incompatibility between the conchshell' and 'yellowness'—this 'incompatibility' consisting in the fact that the 'character of conch' and 'yellowness' are never found in the same substratum,—yet (under the influence of bile) he has the notion 'the conchshell is yellow' (and this notion is a certainty with regard to both concepts). "But in this notion itself the incompatibility does not appear at all." This is not true; as this certain notion often appears in a person who is all along thinking as to how the *conch* could be *yellow*, which clearly shows that the idea of *incompatibility* between the two as existing in the same substratum is present in his mind. "But the examples that you cite all belong to the category of *wrong cognitions* [while we make a distinction between Doubt and Wrong Cognition]." This does not help you; as you regard *Doubt* also as not apprehending the real nature of things [so that *Doubt* also, according to you, is only a form of 'Wrong Cognition']; and whether the cognitions are right or wrong [whether or not they apprehend the real nature of things], it does not make any difference in their having the thing for their object; for instance, the cognition of silver, even when wrong,

does not cease to be the 'cognition of silver' [so that even though the cognition 'the conch is yellow' is wrong, the fact remains that it has for its object the two incompatible things 'conch' and 'yellowness']. "We can define *Doubt* as that which has for its object two *avyavasāhita*, or undetermined, things." But what do you mean by the thing being '*avyavasāhita*'? "By the thing being '*avyavasāhita*' we mean that it is '*pūṅjika*'." But we do not ask you to give us a synonym for '*avyavasāhita*'; what we mean to ask is—does this '*avyavasāhita*' constitute the very nature of the two things? Or it is only a property of these? If it is the former, then my contention remains in force that with this definition *Doubt* does not differ from the *Certainty* that people have with regard to two things. And if it is the latter—*i. e.*, if it is a property of the two things,—then, if the *avyavasāhita* is a property established by a proof (recognised by a valid instrument of cognition) then this cognition of the '*avyavasāhita*' itself, having for its object this property as belonging to two things, would fall within your definition of *Doubt*; and thereby cease to be a *right cognition*;—while, on the other hand, if it is not cognised by any valid instrument of cognition, then [the *avyavasāhita* is a non-entity; so that the object of your *Doubt* being a nonentity] there is nothing in the object of *Doubt* that can distinguish it (from other cognitions). "Other points of difference in the 'Object' of *Doubt* may be stated in the form that it has for its object the *post* as well as the *non-post*, or the *man* as well as the *non-man* [while the *Certainty* cognises either the *post* only or the *man* only].—But this statement also is refuted by the same reasoning that we have just put forward [*i. e.*, this statement also cannot stand either of the alternatives of the object being validly cognised or not]. If then what appears in *Doubt* were held to be an absolute non-entity, then all victory to the Bauddhas who hold the *Asaṅkhyāṭi* view [that what is apprehended by Wrong Cognition is an

absolute non-entity]! (b) Nor can the second alternative (mentioned in the opening of the paragraph) be maintained—that is, the Difference between Doubt and Certainty cannot be due to an adventitious circumstance, in the shape of Difference in the causes of the two cognitions; for does this Difference lie in the entire causal apparatus (leading to the cognition)? Or in only a portion of that apparatus? It cannot be the former; as the entire apparatus (consisting as it does of many seen and unseen agencies) being imperceptible; the Doubt that would be determined or conditioned by it would never be amenable to Perception;—nor again could the causal apparatus be amenable to Inference; as there is no characteristic mark which (as the probans) could lead to its inference. “Why; the peculiar character of the Effect would be the requisite probans leading to the inference of the Cause.” This will not be possible; as it is the peculiar character of the Effect (Doubt) that we are still considering, and which we have not yet got at; specially as we are going to refute the view that the peculiarity rests upon the particular *jāti* or genus (to which Doubt belongs). Nor can the second alternative be accepted—that the difference of Cause lies in only a portion of the causal apparatus; for if this portion be something perceptible, then,—inasmuch as the cognition of the common property (subsisting in the two things figuring in Doubt) and the remembrance of the distinctive peculiarities of both are perceptible (by the mind), and [when alone Doubt appears],—these two (cognition and remembrance), being the (objects, and hence) *causes* of the mental perception of the said cognition and remembrance, would also fall within your definition (of the ‘portion of causal apparatus’ that forms the distinguishing feature of Doubt) [so that the said mental perception of the cognition and the remembrance would have to be regarded as *Doubt*]! On the other hand, if the portion of the causal apparatus be held to be something not perceptible, then there arises this difficulty, that there is no

characteristic mark available (which, as the probans, could lead to the inference of that portion), so that no cognition of the 'portion' would be possible; and as for the view that a peculiar genus (or nature) is imposed upon the Effect [*i. e.* the Doubt,—this peculiar nature bringing about the inference of the imperceptible 'portion of cause'], this we are going to refute later on; and then again, inasmuch as the *sud nature* (imposed or determined as it is, by an imperceptible cause) would be imperceptible, it could never form an integral factor in that cognition which is borne out by the (doubtful) representative cognition (in the form 'I have had a Doubt') (as there would be no possibility of the 'nature' appearing in the direct perception of the object of that doubtful cognition; while if such a nature were really imposed, it would be certainly perceived). (c) Nor, lastly, is the third alternative tenable,—that the difference between Doubt and Certainty is due to the adventitious circumstance in the form of something else related to them;—as it is absolutely impossible for you to indicate what this 'something' is.

(153) (B) Nor again can we accept the second alternative (mentioned at the close of para. 151)—that the difference between Doubt and Certainty is due to the very *jāti* or nature of the two. As in that case [inasmuch as Doubt would be the cognition which is the substratum of the *entire genus of 'Doubt'*], every factor that constitutes this genus,—even the mere unspecified form of the thing—would have to be regarded as 'doubtful' [*e. g.* in the doubt 'is this a man or a post?' there are three factors, *this, man* and *post*; and under the definition now offered, every one of these would have to be regarded as *doubtful*; so that the *Doubt* would pertain, not only to the 'man' and the 'post', but to 'this' also]; while as a matter of fact, such is not the case; for in the Doubt—'is this a man or a post?'—the idea that appears in the mind of the observer and guides his action is never in the form—'is this the form of the thing or not?'—

pertaining to the existence of the *form of the thing itself*, in the shape of a *thing characterised by tallness* [*i. e.* as something tall'], which is what is referred to by the word 'this' (in the expression 'is this a man or a post?'); in fact, so far as the idea of 'something tall' is concerned, the man is quite *certain* about it. If you ask in what way this affects your position,—our reply is that one and the same cognition (*i. e.* the cognition 'is this a man or a post?') consisting of both 'doubt' and 'certainty', this gives rise to a commixture or overlapping of your two *jāṭis* of 'Doubt' and 'Certainty' [which, as *jāṭis*, should be always distinct]. "But there need be nothing incongruous in this; in the cognition—'is this a man or post?'—we regard the idea of 'this' as *valid*, 'pramā,' and the idea of 'man or post' as *invalid*, 'apramā'; and in the same manner, the idea of 'this' is *certain*, and that 'man or post' is doubtful." This analogy does not help you, we reply; as it is exactly in view of this commixture of 'pramā' and 'apramā' that '*pramāṭṭva*' and '*apramāṭṭva*' have been regarded, not as distinct *jāṭis*, but only as two *upādhis*, 'adventitious adjuncts,' consisting respectively of the characters of *being in consonance with the real nature of the thing* and *not being in consonance with the real nature of the thing*. Further, if you hold that the cognition—'is this a man or a post?'—is a commixture of the two classes of 'Doubt' and 'Certainty', then, the same cognition, in regard to one object ('this) belongs to one *jāṭi*—'Certainty',—while, with regard to another object ('man or post'), it belongs to another *jāṭi*—'Doubt'; and this would mean that the conception of *jāṭis* is not something absolutely determined and fixed, but relative and variable; and this would certainly represent an untrodden path of philosophic speculation!

(154) But even traversing the course of philosophic speculation, if you betake yourself to this novel path, what determinant would you put forward, whereby it could be

determined that in regard to the thing as such, (as *something tall*, for instance), the same cognition is a *certainty*, while in regard to its particular forms 'man' or 'post' it is a *doubt*? "What will determine this will be the perception and non-perception of the specific characters [that whose specific character is perceived is the object of 'Certainty' and that whose character is not perceived is the object of 'Doubt'].¹" This will not help you, we reply; for the specific character of the *post* consists in its *being post*, and that of *man* in *being man*; and as both these characters appear in the cognition ['is this a man or a post?'], this cognition (even with regard to the man and the post) will have to be regarded as *Certainty*. "But before the Doubt appears there is no perception of the specific characters; so that it is only right to say that there is *Doubt* (and not *Certainty*).²" In that case, with regard to the thing itself, also, before its cognition appears, how could there be any perception of its specific character (whereby its cognition would be regarded as a *Certainty*)? And there is yet another objection that can be rightly urged against your theory: *viz.*, that at the time that the Doubt appears, the perception of the specific character of the things is present; so that from that moment the Doubt would become a *Certainty*, and there would be no chance for the continuity of the doubtful cognition [a continuity which, in the form of a 'stream of consciousness', should be present in the case of every cognition]. "What is held to be the determinant of the *certainty* with regard to the 'something' (the idea of 'this') is a specific character which is entirely different from that specific character which is apprehended in the *Doubt* appearing after the appearance of the aforesaid *Certainty* [so that the continuity of the Doubtful Cognition, 'is this a man or a post?', is quite possible].³" This also is not right; as in that case (the perception of another specific character being the determinant of *Certainty*, and hence the obstacle to *Doubt*) after the observer has had one Doubt—

in the form 'is this a man or a post?'—he could not (with regard to the same tall object) have another doubt—in the form 'does this consist of wood, or of flesh and blood?'; for the simple reason that the former Doubt will have apprehended the specific characters of 'man' and 'post', which are different from the two characters of 'wooden' and of flesh and blood '[and should therefore bring about *certainty* and bar the way to any further *Doubt*]'. "What bars the way to further Doubt is the previous perception of the specific character of *one* of the two things concerned; and in the case of Doubt ['is this a man or a post?']—what is perceived is the specific character of *both things*; so that the objection urged by you [that no further doubt could appear with regard to the two things, after the first Doubt] does not affect our theory." In that case [the perception of *both* specific characters not being a bar to the appearance of further Doubt], if, by some means or other, the observer mistakes the thing to be both *man* and *post* [so that he has the perception of the specific character of *both*], this should not bar the way to the further doubt, in the form 'does this consist of wood or of flesh and blood?'; as the previous cognition has apprehended the specific characters of *both*! [Though as a matter of fact, when the man cognizes for *certain* that the object he sees is both man and post, he cannot, under any circumstances, have any such doubt as to whether it is of wood or of flesh and blood]. "When we speak of the 'perception of the specific character,' what we mean is that the observer should have a *certainty* with regard to it, and not merely that he should have any sort of cognition of it (certain or doubtful); and only if this latter were the case, then alone could even the *doubtful cognition* of specific character bar the way to further Doubt." This also is not right, we reply; as your theory comes to this: what is the determinant of *certainty* can be ascertained only when it has been ascertained, in a case where the doubt apprehends two specific characters, that the Doubt cannot

be regarded as a *certainty* with regard to these characters;—and conversely, that ‘the Doubt cannot be regarded as a *certainty* with regard to two specific characters’ can be ascertained only after the determinant of *certainty* has been ascertained: and who could escape from the most undesirable ‘mutual interdependence’ involved in this theory?

(155) “If it were held that the Doubtful Cognition has the thing (the ‘tall something’) for its object, then there would certainly be a half-and-half commixture of ‘Doubt’ and ‘Certainty’ [in the cognition ‘is this a man or a post?’]; and therefore this ‘commixture’ disappears simply on account of its *not* being held that the Doubtful Cognition has the *thing* for its object; and our theory is that the cognition of the *thing itself* (as ‘this’)—which is a *certainty*—is totally distinct from the cognition ‘is Man or post’; this latter is what we call a ‘Doubt.’” This also is not tenable; for there is no incompatibility between the idea of ‘man’ and that of ‘post,’ except when both are related to one and the same thing; so that (apart from the cognition of the *thing*, ‘this’) there could be no possibility for the appearance of the idea of its being *either* a man *or* a post; for if the idea of ‘post’ appeared with regard to one thing and that of ‘man’ with regard to another thing,—there would be no incongruity in this [hence there would be no justification for the idea that the thing must be either *man* or *post*, which implies that it cannot be both, which could be true only in case of incompatibility between the two]. If there were an incompatibility between the two (‘man’ and ‘post’), *apart from their connection with a single object*, then in the whole world, they would be constantly contending against each other, and both would become non-existent! And further, [if the incompatibility were independent of the connection of the one object], the certain cognition of ‘man’ that one has with reference to a certain thing (the tall object before him) either puts an end all his *doubt*

with regard to that thing, or does not allow any doubt to arise at all;—exactly in the same manner would all doubt with regard to that same thing be either put an end to, or not allowed to appear at all, also by the certain cognition of ‘man’ that the observer may have with regard to himself! For there would be no difference in the two cases (as regards the incompatibility): Specially because just as the Doubt is not with reference to the observer’s body, so also is it not with reference to the *thing* before his eyes (which, *ex hypothesi*, is cognised for certain). Further (irrespective of the connection of a single common object) how could there be any such idea of co-existence, or co-ordination, with the thing recognised as ‘this’, which is involved in the *doubt*—‘*is this tall thing a man or a pillar?*’ How also (in the absence of such co-ordination) could *Recognition*, “This is that same thing”, and such other Cognitions (as ‘this is a jar’ and the like, which involve the idea of co-ordination) be regarded as *one* cognition? Thus (by the denial of the said co-ordination) the whole fabric of *qualified or concrete cognition* crumbles to the ground! And the entire world of ‘Cognition’ becomes reduced to such disjointed ideas as those of the ‘cow’, the ‘horse’, the ‘man,’ and so forth! Let us desist from pressing this point further!

(155) “Notwithstanding all this, it cannot be denied that there is such a conception as ‘is this a man or a pillar?’, which touches, or refers to, two mutually incompatible things; and this (well-known) conception will indicate (and establish) its object, such as it is [and we have no business to quarrel with this fact of common experience].” This will not help you; as the objections urged above having rejected all possible ways in which the *object* of Doubt could be established, there can no be way left in which it could be proved.

[It has been held that there is 'Virodha', 'Contradiction', between the two objects that appear in a Doubtful Cognition. This leads the Author to take up the criticism of the idea of 'Contradiction' or 'incompatibility']

(157) With regard to *Doubt* it has been held that it has for its object things that are, by their very nature, contradictory or incompatible, *Virodha*;—now (apart from the objections we have urged above) no adequate explanation can be provided of what is meant by this '*Virodha*,' 'contradiction', or 'incompatibility.' For instance, what is the '*Virodha*' between *Bhāvi*, Existence, and *Abhāva*, 'Non-existence' [which form the most general and most pronounced pair of contradictories]? "The 'contradiction' between *existence* and *non-existence* consists in this that they do not exist together." This is not right; [does this mean that they do not exist at the same time? or at the same place?—The latter would be impossible, as the *existence* and *non-existence* of the jar is found to be present at the same place at different times;—the former also will not be right] as the *existence* and *non-existence* (of the jar) is actually found to be present at the same time at different places. "What is meant is that they are not present at the same place (at the same time)." This also is not right; if you hold the view that conjunction and such other qualities occupy only a part of their substrates, then the definition becomes impossible; as you yourself admit that in the same substance there is (at the same time) both *existence* (presence) and *non-existence* (absence) [of conjunction], even though the manner (or method) of the two (presence and absence) may be different [*e.g.*, when in the same tree you have the presence of the monkey at the top, and its absence at the bottom]. "In accordance with the view of those who accept the theory that Conjunction occupies only a part of its substrate, 'Contradiction' should be defined as consisting in the fact that the two cannot be present together *in the same manner*, at one and the same (time and place); while in accordance with the view

of those who do not accept the said theory, we can define it simply as consisting in the fact that the two cannot be present together at the same (time and) place." This also will not be right; [as in either case no correct explanation of *not being present together*, '*Sahānavasthāna*', can be provided]. For what does the phrase 'cannot be present together' mean? (a) Does it mean that 'there can be no concomitance of the presence of both'? (b) Or, that 'there should be concomitance of the negation of the presence of both'? (a) If the former is the meaning, then your statement involves the denial of an impossible thing; 'the concomitance of the presence of two contradictory things' being something that has never been known [and hence its denial is an absurdity]; as for the denial of such impossible things (or non-entities) as the *hare's horn* and the like, we explain them as being the denial of the *horn* in the *hare*; so that what is denied is the horn, which is a well-known thing. One of your own philosophers (Uḍayana, in his *Kusumāñjali*) has declared that 'it is only a real object that can be denied'; and also another (Vāchaspaṭi Mishra, in his *Tātparyatikā*)—'it is only an object that has had its form known somewhere that can be denied.' (b) If, on the other hand, you accept the second meaning of the phrase, then, you admit the possibility of the *concomitance of the presence of the two*; as the *denial of two contradictory things* ultimately resolves itself into the *two things* themselves [your definition means that there is 'concomitance of the denial or negation of the two things'; now of the two contradictory things, *existence* and *non-existence*, the denial of the one means the affirmation of the other; and thus the denial of both means the affirmation of both; so that the 'concomitance of the denial of both' means the *concomitance of both*; which makes your definition absurd].

(158) [Another definition of 'Contradiction' is put forward]—"Two things are said to be *contradictory* when they are each other's overthrow." This also cannot be maintain-

ed; for what do you mean by their being 'each other's overthrow'? (a) Do you mean that they are the *cause* of each other's overthrow? (b) Or, that they consist in (are identical with) each other's overthrow? (a) The former meaning is not possible; as there is nothing to prove that anything in the world is the cause of any such effect (as its own negation). (b) Nor is the latter meaning possible; for in that case, it would be impossible for you to provide any explanation of the word 'overthrow' which could apply in common to both

(153) "The 'Contradiction' between two things consists in this that where there is existence (presence) of the one, there is invariably the non-existence (absence) of the other." This definition also cannot be accepted; because as a matter of fact, 'existence' and 'non-existence' (being mutual negations) must belong to two different substances [*literally*, 'while *existence* belongs to one, *non-existence* must belong to another substance']; whence the two can never subsist in the same substratum; so that the co-substrateness (of the two) implied by your definition is impossible. And further, the relation between the two things concerned consisting in one of them being the negation of another, what this leads to is the view that the *existence* of one constitutes the *non-existence* of the other; so that your assertion—'where there is existence of the one there is non-existence of the other'—comes to mean that 'where there is existence of the one, there is existence of the one' [as the 'non-existence of the other' is identical with, and consists in, the 'existence of the one']; and thus your definition becomes open to the charges of being tautological [meaningless] and so forth: For instance, the meaning of the phrase 'where there is non-existence of the jar' is that 'that to which the *non-existence of the jar* is related as the *contained*.' [i.e., that wherein 'the non-existence of the jar is contained'];—and the meaning of the phrase 'there the jar does not exist' is that 'the non-existence of the jar

is related to it as the *contained*' ;—similarly the meaning of the phrase 'where the jar exists' is 'that to which the jar is related as the *contained*' ;—and the meaning of the phrase 'there the non-existence of the jar is not' is that 'the negation of the relation of the non-existence of the jar is related to it as the *contained*' ; and *the relation of the non-existence of the jar* being the same as the *non-existence of the jar*, the *negation of the non-existence of the jar* is the same as the *jar* itself ; so that the meaning [of the phrase 'there the non-existence of the jar is not'] ultimately comes to be that 'the jar is related to it as the *contained*.' Nor will you be justified in taking exception to this on the ground of your belief that the 'jar' and the 'negation of the jar' are two distinct things [just like the 'jar' and the 'cloth' ; so that the denial of the 'jar' need not mean the affirmation of the 'negation of the jar'] [this will not be right, as it cannot be denied that the 'jar' is identical with the 'denial of the relation of the negation of the jar'].

(160) "What our definition means is that—'where there is presence of the one, *there is presence of that one only*' ; so that it is this restriction that is implied [by the phrase 'there is non-existence of the other' ; which removes the charge of 'tautology', against our definition.]" This is not right ; we reply ; for this *restriction* might mean the exclusion of anything else (besides the one that is present) at random [and not necessarily] of that particular thing which may be 'contradictory' to that thing ; so that the definition does not establish any 'contradiction' at all [which you intend to be a certain relation between two particular things]. If you hold that the restriction serves to exclude only that which is the *virodhi*, the *contradictum*, of the thing present, then our answer is that, until you have provided an adequate explanation of what *virodhi*, 'contradiction,' is, you cannot explain what is *virodhi*, 'contradictory'. "When the thing present is positive, what is excluded by the *restriction* is the

negative thing ; and when the thing present is negative, the *restriction* excludes the positive thing. [Thus there need be no indefiniteness in our definition]". This also will not be right ; unless you point out something of a comprehensive character (that is excluded by the *restriction*), you will not have provided us with the basis for a comprehensive conception of 'contradiction.' Then again, according to your theory, 'the exclusion of the positive and negative, is nothing other than 'the affirmation of the negative and the positive', respectively ; and thus what we have said above,—with regard to the impossibility of any syntactical connection in the sentence 'where there is existence there is non-existence, and where there is non-existence there is existence,'—remains in force ; as there is practically no difference [between 'existence' and 'negative of non-existence,' or between 'non-existence' and 'negation of existence'] ; so that your amended definition does not carry you any further (than the previous definition).

(161) [Being baffled in his attempt to provide an adequate explanation of 'Contradiction' as a quality subsisting in two contradictory things, *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*, the Logician now puts forward a somewhat different explanation]—" 'Contradiction' is nothing more than the very form of *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*. Nor will this make it impossible for these two to be spoken of as 'Contradictory'. Just as 'Being,' though itself in the form of a positive entity, still forms the basis of itself being spoken of as 'existence,' as the nominative agent of the verb 'to exist', in the same manner *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*, though consisting of *contradiction*, will form the basis of themselves being spoken of as 'contradictory' ;—i, e., as the nominative agents of the verb 'to contradict.' If the question is put—'of what do *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* constitute the Contradiction ?'—our answer is that they form the 'contradiction' of their substratum. And to the further question—'what is the effect of this Contradiction,?' the answer would be that the effect consists in this that the two must ever be distinct from each other. This

is exactly what has been declared in the following sentence—‘The diversity, or the ground of diversity, between two things lies in this that they are the substratum of contradictory properties, or in that they are produced by different causes.’”

(162) This is not right, we reply ; for do *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* constitute ‘Contradiction’ (A) each by itself, individually, or (B) both together, collectively ?

(163)-(A) It cannot be the former—i.e. *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* cannot be regarded as constituting ‘Contradiction,’ each singly by itself ; as if each of these, independently of the other, constituted ‘Contradiction,’ then this would mean that each (as possessed of contradictory properties) is (by your hypothesis) ‘diverse’ ; and as such there is no ‘single substratum’ (for the Contradiction). “What we mean by ‘diversity’ in this connection is, not that the thing ceases to be *single*, but that there is diversity in the substratum of two contradictory properties.” This also cannot be right ; as no such diversity is possible either [as the *red colour* is found to appear in the same jar wherein there subsisted the *absence of red colour*, and yet there is no *diversity* in the jar, which remains the same]. “But there is sameness—absence of diversity—in such cases, because the same thing is the substratum of the two contradictory properties of *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* at *different points of time* [and not at the same time].” This is not right ; as what do you mean by this *sameness* of the time ? Do you mean the *sameness* (or non-difference) of the time in its natural form ? or of time as determined by an adventitious adjunct ? If the former, then, your qualification becomes redundant [as by its nature Time, according to the Logician, is one only ; so that every thing that happens is *at the same time*]. If, on the other hand, you mean the sameness of Time as determined or limited by a limiting adjunct, then also you have the same possibility of one and the same thing being the

substratum of both *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*, 'at the same time,' even though you may be under the impression that it is so at *different points of time*.*

If, in order to avoid this difficulty you explain that what is meant by 'at the same time' is a *time not determined by different limiting adjuncts* [so that things occurring at different hours could not be regarded as occurring *at the same time*]—then, the very conception of 'the same time' becomes an impossibility [as every moment of time is determined by such adjuncts as the position of the Sun, the position of the Moon, and so forth]. Lastly, if with a view to escape from this it be held that 'at the same time' means 'at a time that is not determined by several such limiting adjuncts as do not exist together,—then as the idea of *existing together* would involve the idea of the *same time*, it will be open to all the difficulties that have been pointed out with regard to this conception of the 'same time'.

(164) (B) If the view be held that *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* both together, collectively constitute *Contradiction* [the second alternative mentioned in para 162], then the question arises—what is meant by the two being together? (a) Does it mean that the two exist at the same place? or (b) at the same time?, (c) or that both exist in the same manner? (d) or that both are characterised by an adjunct which is different from the manner of their existence? (a) The first of these cannot be accepted, as it is never possible for the (*Bhāva*, Presence) and the *Atyanta-Abhāva*, absolute absence [of a thing] to exist at the same place. (b) Nor can the second alternative be accepted; as it is never possible for the *Bhāva* (Presence) and the *Prāg-Abhāva* (Prior Negation) and *Dhūśma-Abhāva* (Des-

* 'You explain' at the same time' as 'at a point of time determined by a limiting adjunct'; now when we take the adjunct to be a period of 24 hours, things occurring during 24 hours will have to be regarded as occurring *at the same time*; so that even though the *redness* appears in the jar fully one hour after the *absence of redness* has disappeared, yet we should be justified in regarding both *redness* and *absence of redness* as appearing in the jar *at the same time*.

truction), to exist at the same time. (c) Nor can the third alternative be accepted; as according to the theory of those who hold that Conjunction and such other qualities subsist only partially in (*i. e.*, only over parts of) their substratum, the *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* of Conjunction do not subsist in *Ākāśha* in the same manner. (The presence of *bhāva* of the Conjunction subsisting by the relation of *inherence*, while its absence or *Abhāva* subsists by the relation of *qualification*; which is the relation by which *negation* is held to subsist in its substratum]; and according to the theory of those who do not admit the partial subsistence of any quality, there can be no *other manner* for the *existing together* of both *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* [as such co-existence is possible only when the *Bhāva* occupies one and the *Abhāva* another part of their common substratum]. [so that in this case the definition provided becomes impossible]. (d) Nor lastly can the fourth alternative be accepted; as it is never held to be possible for *Bhāva* and *Prāg-Abhāva* and for *Bhāva* and *Dhvamsa-Abhāva* to exist at the same time, it follows as a necessary corollary that things qualified by these also can never exist at the same time; so that it would be impossible to explain at what time the Contradiction could rest upon these; even if it were possible to find and indicate such a characterising adjunct as you propose.

(165) And further, if (with a view to escape from the above predicament) it be held that *Bhāva* and *Prāg-Abhāva* and *Bhāva* and *Dhvamsa-Abhāva* of a certain object can be present at the same time, so that the same object would be the substratum of the Contradiction—then, the diversification of the substrata would be inevitable; [as ‘contradiction’ consisting in *mutual rejection*, the *Bhāva* and *Prāg-Abhāva* would reject each other; so that if they exist at the same time, they must subsist in different substrates; and thus the theory that the two subsist at the same time in the same thing involves the absurdity that the thing is different from itself]. Further (between the *Bhāva* and the *Prāg-Abhāva* of a thing or between its *Bhāva* and

Dhvaṃsa-abhāva) even *mutual rejection* (and consequent contradiction) cannot be accepted as necessary ; as room for such rejection (by the *Bhāva*) is available in the other kinds of *Abhāva* also [that is to say, when the *Bhāva* of a thing appears, it does not follow as a necessary consequence that it must be regarded as rejecting *only* the *Prāg-abhāva* of that thing or only its *Dhvaṃsa*] ; for as a matter of fact what we actually necessarily recognise as being rejected by the *Bhāva* is only the *Ajanta-abhāva* and not necessarily the *Prāg-abhāva* or the *Dhvaṃsa* ; so that if there is mutual rejection it is between *Bhāva* and *Ajanta-abhāva* only. If then (in view of what has been urged) it be held that there is no mutual rejection between *Bhāva* and *Prāg-abhāva*, or between *Bhāva* and *Dhvaṃsa*,—then this would mean that there is no ‘Contradiction’ between these [so that it would be possible for them to be present at the same time,—which is absurd]. “What we mean is that there is *contradiction* between the *object*, (*its bhāva*) and its *absence* (*abhāva*) in general only, and not that it is between the object and the particular forms of its absence (like *Prāg-abhāva*, *Dhvaṃsa* and so forth); so that what you have urged does not militate against our position”. This will not mend matters ; this would mean that there is no ‘contradiction’ between the object and the particular forms of its absence ;—so that it might be possible for the two (the object, jar, and the particular forms of its absence, its *dhvaṃsa*, destruction, for instance) to exist together (at the same time and place) ! And if they were to subsist ‘together (like this) always, then that would strike at the very root of the ‘contradiction’ between these.* Then again, you have held that there is contradiction between the object and its *absence in general only* ; now if by this ‘only’ you mean that the *absence*

*The translation differs from the interpretation of the Commentaries. Both the *Shūnkari* and *Vidyāsāgarī* take the phrase ‘*nyamāna tathātvā*’ to mean,—‘if it be held that even though there is no contradiction between the two, yet such is their very nature that they cannot subsist together.’

has no particular forms at all, then your statement turns out to mean that you do not admit the 'absence' at all; as there would be no proof for it absolutely; it being absolutely impossible to put forward any proofs for the existence of mere *absence in general*, without any specification [as to the object that is absent, or the form in which it is absent and so forth]; — if on the other hand, the word 'only' has been introduced with a view to indicate the idea that 'even though there are particular forms of *absence*, yet the *contradiction* of the object lies only in the general unspecified form of its Absence,—then the objection remains that in that case there would be no contradiction between the object and its *Prāg-abhāva* or its *Dhvamsa* [as both of these are only *particular forms* of its absence]; and yet it cannot be denied that the contradiction does lie in particular forms also; as after all it must be admitted that the *general character* of Absence is present in the particular forms of absence also; so that, through this general character, the contradiction must be in the particular forms also. [Thus your statement becomes self-nugatory].

[The Logician depends for his refutation of other systems upon *Tarka*, Hypothetical Reasoning, which consists in bringing home to the Opponent the incongruities involved in his statement. So the Author takes up the refutation of this Hypothetical Reasoning and introduces it through the subject of 'Contradiction', representing the Logician as putting forward, in support of his view of 'Contradiction,' the reasoning that certain undesirable contingencies arise if *Bhāva* and *Abhāva* are not regarded as 'contradictory.']

(166) "If you do not admit that there is 'contradiction' between *Bhāva* and *Abhāva*, you put yourself in *Āpatṭi*, a sorry predicament". What, we ask, is this *āpatṭi*, 'predicament' ? "Well, if it is a form of *Tarka*, Confutation, Hypothetical Reasoning". What is this 'Hypothetical Reasoning' ? we ask.

"Hypothetical Reasoning", the Logician explains "consists in the urging or fastening of the '*vyāpaka*' (the more extensive of two invariable concomitants) upon one

who admits the 'vyāpya' (the 'less extensive'); this 'thrusting' or 'fastening' consisting in its being brought home to him that if he admits the smaller circle he must admit the larger circle in which the former is contained [e.g. when on seeing smoke there arises the question as to whether there is fire or not, a man who, while acknowledging the concomitance between 'fire' and 'smoke', were to say 'there is no fire', thereby admitting the *absence of fire*, it will be urged against him that in 'that case there would be no smoke',—i.e., there would be *absence of smoke*; as 'the absence of smoke' includes all cases of 'absence of fire']*.

This definition is not right; as in the first place, it is too narrow; there is (according to you) a form of 'Hypothetical Reasoning,' 'Supposition' ('or Surmise'), in which there is no 'fastening or urging of an undesirable contingency'; for instance, the hypothetical reasoning—'if water could be brought about by favourable conditions conducive to its appearance, it would allay my thirst'; [in which case the *supposition* is put forth for one's own benefit and there is no urging or 'fastening'] †.

* The 'Tarka' to which the Vēdāntin renders himself liable by the denial of the 'contradiction' between *bhāva* and *abhāva* is as follows:—The Vēdāntin regards *mokṣa*, Release, as the 'abhāva' of Bondage; so that if there is no contradiction, between *bhāva* and *abhāva* in general, then there is no contradiction between Bondage and Abhāva of Bondage; thence Bondage would not be put an end to by Release. So what is fastened upon the Vēdāntin is the undesirable contingency of having to admit the *absence of the particular contradiction* (between Bondage and its *abhāva*) as he admits the *absence of all contradiction*.

† 'Tarka' has been held to be of two kinds—(1) that called 'Prasaṅga' or the negative Hypothetical Reasoning, 'Confutation,' which is addressed to another party, with a view to set aside his objections against the argument set forth; e.g. when the first party has propounded the argument 'there must be fire here because I see smoke issuing from it', if the other party demurs to the conclusion, it is pointed out to him that 'if there were no fire there would be no smoke';—which is an undesirable contingency, as that would be against a perceived fact. (2) That called 'Sam-*bhāvānā*,' 'Supposition,' the affirmative Hypothetical Reasoning, which is put forward not with a view to set aside objections, but with a view to produce conviction; therefore, while the former always consists in the urging of an undesirable contingency,

[And if it be urged that the definition put forward is meant to apply to only Confutation, the first, the Negative, kind of Hypothetical Reasoning, which is urged for the purpose of the bringing home of an undesirable contingency, —then] the definition also becomes too wide; as it applies to the Hypothetical Reasoning that brings home a desirable contingency [for it includes the case where the man, though denying the presence of smoke, and also that of fire, has the reasoning urged upon him in the form ‘if there were no fire, there would be no smoke’; where also the less extensive ‘absence of fire’ is admitted, and what is urged is the more extensive ‘absence of smoke’; so that the conditions of the definition are fulfilled; and yet what is urged, the *absence of smoke*, is a contingency not *undesirable* for the man to whom the reasoning is urged.] “With a view to escape from this we shall add the further qualification that the person to whom the reasoning is addressed should be one who does not admit the ‘more extensive’ (absence of smoke).” This also will not be right; as even so the definition will include the reasoning where the acceptance of the ‘*vyāpaka*’, ‘more extensive’, is urged on the basis of the acceptance of something which is not really the corresponding ‘*vyāpya*’, ‘less extensive’—if this is addressed to a person who does not admit the ‘more extensive’; e. g., [when the man does not admit the *absence of human character*, if the reasoning is addressed to him in the form ‘if this person is not dark, he is not a man’, where there is no invariable concomitance between ‘darkness’ and ‘humanity’, or between ‘absence of darkness’ and ‘absence of humanity’, and yet the reasoning is urged by a person who does regard them as invariably concomitant; so that even though this would be an *invalid* Hypothetical Reasoning, it would fulfil

and is always put forward for the removing of contrary convictions, the latter consists in the setting forth of reasonings for confirming a conviction; so that if *Ṭarka* be defined as consisting in the urging of an undesirable contingency, the latter kind would be excluded entirely.

the conditions of your definition]. "We shall add the further qualification that the reasoning should be urged on the basis of the '*vyāpya*.'" This also will not be right; as neither of the alternatives arising out of this can be maintained. For instance, (A) do you mean that the man to whom the reasoning is addressed is one who admits the presence of the *vyāpya* thing e. g., the 'absence of fire [not necessarily recognising it as '*vyāpya*, but only] in its own form,—and does not admit the presence of the *vyāpaka* thing [e. g., the 'absence of smoke'] also in its own form [without any 'idea of its being the '*vyāpaka*'] [i. e. without any idea of the one being invariably concomitant with the other]? (B) Or that the man admits them to be the '*vyāpya*' [actually recognising it as such], and does not admit the other to be the '*vyāpaka*' [actually recognising the one to be invariably concomitant with the other] ?

(167) [Page 695] (A) The former of these two alternatives cannot be maintained. As in that case you will have to accept as true 'Hypothetical Reasoning' that which may be addressed to a person who does not know that what he admits and what he does not admit are invariable concomitants;—[which would be absurd, as the force of the reasoning only lies in showing the incongruity involved in admitting the presence of one thing and not admitting that of another, when the two are actually known to be invariable concomitants];—and further, that also will have to be accepted as a true 'Hypothetical Reasoning' which may be addressed to one who admits the one and does not admit the other, recognising the two as invariable concomitants in a manner contrary to facts [i. e., recognising that to be the '*vyāpya*', the less extensive, which is actually the '*vyāpaka*']. [And this also would be absurd; as the incongruity sought to be brought home lies only in the man admitting the less extensive, 'absence of fire', and not admitting the more extensive, 'absence of smoke'; so that if he himself regards the former as the 'more extensive' and the latter as the 'less extensive',

then there is absolutely no incongruity in his position]. *And if this be regarded as true 'Hypothetical Reasoning', then, in a case where one of the disputants puts forth a reasoning, urging the undesirable contingency (of having to admit the *vyāpaka*) on the basis of the acceptance of what, though actually the '*vyāpaka*' of that *vyāpaka*, is not recognised as such by the other party, and the fact of whose being the '*vyāpya*' cannot be proved to him by the former disputant,—even in this case [the reasoning will have to be regarded as a true 'Hypothetical Reasoning' and accordingly] the victory will have to be adjusted in favour of the disputant putting forward such a reasoning!

(168) (B) Nor can the second alternative be maintained, [*i.e.*, we cannot accept the definition of *Hypothetical Reasoning* as the urging of the admission of the '*vyāpaka*' upon one who admits the thing and does not admit the other, even though he actually recognises them as invariable concomitants, knowing the one to be the '*vyāpya*' and another to be the '*vyāpaka*'.] For if the disputant putting forward the reasoning also recognises the two as '*vyāpya*' and '*vyāpaka*' and admits the presence of the one and the absence of the other as such, then his opponent will urge against him that same reasoning as a counter-argument;—and this counter-reasoning will (under the definition) have to be regarded as a valid 'Hypothetical Reasoning,' even though as a matter of fact such counter-reasonings are never accepted as valid, according to the principle that 'when an argument applies with equal force against both parties, and where the means of meeting that argument are equally available for both parties—such an argument should not be put forward by either party';—and thus the definition suggested proves to be too wide. "In order to avoid this we shall add the further qualification

* The *Shāṅkarī* reads '*anyathā*,' and the *Viśvāsāgarī* '*ṣaṭhā satī*' The sense of the expression as explained by both is the same. So the latter reading is more appropriate.

that the reasoning should be urged on this basis of what, though recognised by the Opponent as the '*vyāpya*,' and admitted to be present as such, *is not admitted and recognised as such by the disputant putting forward the reasoning*. [So that there could be no chance of the same reasoning being urged back as a counter-argument]. This will not be right; as in that case the definition will fail to include all those cases where the disputant urges the acceptance of what he himself recognises as the '*vyāpaka*,' and whose presence he alone admits [the Opponent not admitting it, by the definition],—on the basis of what is recognised as the '*vyāpaka*,' and whose presence as such happens to be admitted by the disputant himself. [E. g., in the ordinary case of Fire and Smoke, the disputant knows the two to be invariable concomitants; and admits the presence of both in the mountain; and then urges, against the Opponent, who admits the presence of the smoke, but not of the fire, the admission of the presence of fire, on the basis of the presence of smoke;—and this case does not fall under the definition].

(169). With a view to avoid the difficulties just urged, the Logician re-states his definition of *Hypothetical Reasoning* in another form:—"Hypothetical Reasoning consists in the urging, to the Opponent who does not admit the *vyāpaka*, the acceptance of that *vyāpaka* on the basis of the *vyāpya* which he admits,—this urging not referring to a *vyāpaka* which the propounder of the reasoning himself does not admit, and not being on the basis of what he himself admits as *vyāpya*. In this manner, we avoid both the difficulties that have been urged against our former definition; *viz.*, (1) that it is too wide, in that it includes the urging of the *vyāpaka* not admitted by the propounder of the reasoning on the basis of the *vyāpya* admitted by him [this difficulty being set aside by the qualifying clause 'this urging not referring &c.']; and (2) that it is too narrow, in that it does not include the urging of the *vyāpaka* admitted by the propounder only, on the basis of the

vyāpya admitted by himself; [this being avoided by the phrase 'not being on the basis &c.']. This definition also cannot be accepted; as it does not apply to the reasoning urged in the form,—'If the jar had been present here, would have been seen'; as the '*vyāpaka*' that is urged in this is the 'seeing' of the jar; and this 'the propounder himself does not admit;' and the '*vyāpya*' on whose basis it is urged is 'the presence of the jar which is capable of being perceived'; and this is what is admitted by the propounder [so that this is quite contrary to what you have laid down in the qualifying clause of your definition]. "The negative qualifying clause that we have added—'which is not on the basis of what he admits as *vyāpya*'—means that it should not be on the basis of that *vyāpya* which he admits as existing [so that in the case in question *the presence of the jar* not being admitted as actually existing at the place, it fulfils the conditions of the definition]." This also is not right; as even so the definition becomes too wide, as it includes even those reasonings that do not prove a conclusion to the contrary (of what the reasoning is intended to demolish) [*e.g.*, if the Logician were to urge against the Vedāntin the reasoning 'if Brahman were something that could be known by means of the Veda alone, then like the Agnihoṭra, it would not be self-luminous,'—though the '*vyāpya*,' in this case, *the character of being known by means of the Veda alone*, is not one that actually proves the contrary conclusion that 'Brahman is not self-luminous,' on account of the parties not admitting any such premiss as 'that which is self-luminous is never known by means of the Veda alone,'—and as such it should not be a true 'Hypothetical Reasoning'—yet it falls within the proposed definition, as *the character of being known by means of the Veda alone*, which is the '*vyāpya*,' is not admitted by the Logician to be present in *Brahman*]. "We shall add the further qualification that the *vyāpya* should be one that points to the contrary conclusion."

This also will

not be right; as the definition thus qualified would not apply to the case where the propounder urges the 'vyāpaka' solely with a view to find fault with the theory of the Opponent, on the basis of a 'vyāpya' that is admitted by the Opponent alone,—this being sufficient for the said purpose; as in this case the reasoning cannot point to a contrary conclusion, the invariable concomitance (of the 'vyāpya' and the 'vyāpaka,' that would lead to such a conclusion) not being admitted by the propounder himself.*

"As a matter of fact such a reasoning would not be a true 'Hypothetical Reasoning,' as it does not propound an undesirable contingency [which could be done only by the indication of a contrary conclusion]; and all that it does is to indicate a 'contradiction' (incongruity, in the Opponent's theory)." This is not right; the actual purpose served in both cases (in the pointing of an 'incongruity' and in the propounding of an 'undesirable contingency') is the same: In both cases, on the strength of his acceptance of the invariable concomitance of the 'vyāpya' and 'vyāpaka,' something that the Opponent does not admit is brought home to him. Under the circumstances, the purpose served in both cases being the same, if, merely by reason of your inability to provide a suitable definition, you insist upon regarding that alone as true 'Hypothetical Reasoning' which proves a contrary conclusion,—then with equal reason we shall insist upon calling that alone true 'Hypothetical Reasoning' which demolishes the Opponent's position, regarding that as propounding a mere 'contradiction' or 'incongruity' which proves a contrary conclusion! Otherwise (if you do not accept my usage) both

* E. g. the Logician urges against the Vēdāntin the reasoning—'If Braḥman were the material cause of the world, then, like Clay and such other material causes it would be modifiable'; here the *Brahman being the material cause of the world* is what is admitted by Vēdāntin alone, and not by the Logician himself; and though this is sufficient to demolish the Vēdāntin's position, it does not prove any contrary conclusion; because not admitting it himself, the Logician could not deduce any conclusion from it.

could be regarded as cases of the propounding of mere 'contradiction' or 'incongruity': [as we shall with equal reason not accept your usage]. If you urge that the mode of urging is different in the two cases, the mode of showing an 'incongruity' being different from that of showing an 'undesirable contingency'—then we reply that the same mode is equally applicable to both cases.

(170) [Page 699] This same reasoning also serves to set aside the contention that 'Supposition' (*Sambhāvanā*) is not a true 'Hypothetical Reasoning'.* Specially as the necessity of admitting the 'vyāpaka' by reason of the acceptance of the 'vyāpya' can be urged with equal force on the strength of a *supposition* also.

(171) Similarly also is set aside the view that—"the addition of the qualification that the urging of the reasoning should be *on the basis of the 'vyāpya' admitted by the Opponent* serves to exclude, from the category of true *Hypothetical Reasoning*, that reasoning which merely shows up an undesirable contingency to the Opponent, and does not prove a contrary conclusion", [as in this reasoning also what is urged is the admission of the 'vyāpaka' on the basis of the admission of the 'vyāpya', and this is all that is done by *Hypothetical Reasoning*]. As even though in the case of the Reasoning in question, there may be invariable concomitance between the particular 'vyāpya' and 'vyāpaka', the urging of the Reasoning on the basis of what the Opponent admits is just as present as in the case of your true *Hypothetical Reasoning*. For when the Opponent admits the 'vyāpya', how could he avoid admitting the 'vyāpaka'? The Reasoning that urges the admission of the 'vyāpaka' does not depend upon the actual reality of the invari-

* It has just been shewn that the position that 'the reasoning that does not prove a contrary conclusion is not a true Hypothetical Reasoning' is untenable. On the same grounds it can be shown that the position that *Sambhāvanā* is not *Tarka*—the position taken up by the Opponent in Para. 166 can not be maintained.

able concomitance between the 'vyāpya' the 'vyāyaka'—but only upon its admission or acceptance [so that, even though the concomitance may not be present, if the Opponent only accepts it, he becomes liable to the Reasoning being urged against him]. As a matter of fact, even when the concomitance is actually present, if it is not admitted by the man, no Reasoning can be urged against him on the basis of that concomitance. It is for this reason that before the Reasoning is urged, its propounder secures, by means of proofs, the Opponent's admission of the 'vyāpya'. "What we hold to be the necessary conditions for the urging of the Hypothetical Reasoning are both—that the 'vyāpya' should be a real 'vyāpya', and also that it should be admitted as such." This cannot be right; as when the mere admission of the 'vyāpya', which you accept as a necessary condition for the urging of the Reasoning, is by itself, independently of everything else, quite sufficient (to provide the necessary basis for the Reasoning), there can be no reason for introducing an additional condition that the 'vyāpya' should be a real 'vyāpya'.

(172) All this leads to the conclusion that when *Hypothetical Reasoning* is urged with a view to establish one's own position, if it fails to prove a conclusion contrary to that maintained by the Opponent, it cannot but be regarded as defective; for as a matter of fact, the *Hypothetical Reasoning* is urged with the sole purpose of proving a conclusion contrary to that held by the Opponent,—which proof is intended to close the door against all the theories not compatible with the propounder's own view; for instance, when the Buddha proceeds to prove the invariable concomitance between 'existence' and 'momentary character', he puts forward, in support of this, a Hypothetical Reasoning which sets aside all ideas not compatible with that concomi-

tance.*] [Specially as unless the *Reasoning* proves the conclusion contrary to the Opponent's view, it cannot be regarded a confirming the propounder's own view. Thus then, it follows that the Hypothetical Reasoning proves a conclusion contrary to the opponent's view;—and in this case the invariable concomitance also, on whose basis the Reasoning is urged, should be a real one; as otherwise, if the concomitance, in respect to the contrary conclusion, were not real, it could not be held to establish the view of the propounder either. When, on the other hand, the Reasoning is urged with a view to demolish the Opponent's position, all that is necessary is, that he should admit the 'concomitance'; this being sufficient to demolish his position, there is no necessity for the further conditions that the concomitance should be real, or that it should prove a contrary conclusion. Such being the facts of the case the definition of Hypothetical Reasoning that has been put forward remains as untenable as it ever was. [That is, with the qualification that it should prove a contrary conclusion the definition fails to include those reasonings that are urged merely for the demolishing of the Opponent's position].

(173) [With a view to avoid the difficulties pointed out, the Logician re-states his definition in a simpler form, dropping the qualifications he had introduced].—"Hypothetical Reasoning consists in the cognizance of the '*vyāpaka*' which is not desired, on the basis of the acceptance of the '*vyāpya*'." This also cannot be accepted; as it fails to include that Reasoning in which there is a 'surmise' or 'supposition', of what is actually desired; [e. g. the reasoning in the form—'if there were water here my thirst would have been allayed']. "Then we shall simply define it as the cognizance of the '*vyāpaka*' on the basis of the accept-

* The Reasoning urged by the Bauddhas is in the form—'if the thing were not momentary it could not be an active agent', which sets aside all such views as 'thing may be existent; but they need not be momentary'.

ance of the 'vyāpya'." This also cannot be maintained; as this will include the Reasoning that urges something which is quite desirable (for the Opponent) [and which therefore is not a true 'Tarka']. "We shall add the qualification that the 'vyāpaka' should be one that is *not known* [by the Opponent; and what is *not known* can never be *desired*]." This will not be right; as it will include the first inference (of a thing not known before; such an inference consisting of the cognizance of an unknown 'vyāpaka' on the basis of the acceptance of the 'vyāpya'). "But in the case of inference, the cognizance of the 'vyāpaka' proceeds on the basis of the *right cognition* of the 'vyāpaka', and not on that of its mere *acceptance* (as in the case of Hypothetical Reasoning)." This will not help you; as even though the 'vyāpya' be a real 'vyāpya', and it be rightly cognised,—if it happens to be one that is not accepted by the Opponent—it cannot lead to the inference of the 'vyāpaka'; so that in the case of inference also it is essential to proceed as far as *acceptance* [and not rest with the *right cognition* only, of the 'vyāpya'].

(174) "If in an Inference it be considered necessary to prove the 'vyāpya' (i. e. the inferential probans) and make it accepted by both parties—if it happens to be not accepted by either—then that would strike at the whole fabric of inference: for, in the first place, if such a 'vyāpya' were not duly proved and established, then the inference would be open to the fallacy of having its *probans* 'unknown' by one or the other party;—secondly, if it were to be duly proved and established, then the Opponent who, thereupon, comes to accept it, becomes open to the charge of 'apsidḍhānta' (ground-shifting); as he accepts what he did not accept before;—and thirdly, if the first party were to omit the urging of this 'Appasidḍhānta' and to proceed to prove the 'vyāpaka' on the basis of the said established 'vyāpya',—then he himself would be open to the

charge of 'having neglected to urge what should have been urged'; [and thus in the *first* case, the Inference becomes fallacious; and in the last two cases there is no occasion for the inference, as in both cases one of the parties, in the *second* the second party, and in the *third*, the first party, having been silenced by the charge to which he has been shown to be liable, all further discussion would cease]."

(175) What if such should really be the case? This (impossibility of Inference) has got nothing to do with the subject under consideration (*viz*: the definition of Hypothetical Reasoning); and as such, why should you bring it up at all in the present connection?*

(176) "It is the wrong cognition of the '*vyāpaka*' (on the basis of the accepted '*vyāpya*') that constitutes 'Hypothetical Reasoning', [so that the Inference becomes excluded, as it is *not* Wrong Cognition]." This also cannot be accepted; as it makes the definition applicable to all those reasonings that, while involving the incongruities of 'self-contradiction' and the like, bear the semblance of 'Hypothetical Reasoning' [though they are not true 'Hypothetical Reasoning,' involving as they do the said incongruities]. "We shall, for this purpose, add the qualification that the 'wrong cognition of the *vyāpaka*' should be free from the said incongruities of '*āshrayasiddha*' (*Baselessness, Self-contradiction, and the like*)". Even so the definition will be untenable; for it will fail to include the following case of true 'Hypothetical Reasoning': One sees real smoke issuing from a place,—but he is in doubt as to what he sees being smoke or vapour,—then there comes the 'supposition' or 'surmise', 'if it is smoke rising from the place, there must be fire';—as the cognition of the '*vyāpaka*' (Fire) in this case is quite in accordance with the real state of things, the 'surmise' cannot forego the character of 'right cognition',

*Specially as if the inferential process becomes impossible, it is a contingency not undesirable for the Refuter of all conceptions.

[while the definition lays it down as an essential condition that the cognition should be wrong]. “We shall add the further qualification that the cognition of the ‘*vyāpaka*’ should be one that is *not actually recognised at the time as being right* [so that it includes the case cited, in which, owing to the doubt, the cognition of fire is not recognised at the time as being valid or right].” This is not right; as we have more than once shown the objectionable character of such definitions [which involve the idea of a particular time and place, and as such cannot form the basis of that comprehensive conception which ought to be the aim of all definitions]. And further, every one of the definitions that you have put forward is too wide,—being applicable to the cases cited above, where, though the ‘*vyāpaka*’ is not accepted by both parties, the ‘*vyāpya*’ is accepted by both [so that both are equally liable to be affected by the Reasoning, which on that account, cannot be a true ‘*Tarka*’]. And if, for escaping from this difficulty, you add the condition that the ‘*vyāpaka*’ should be urged on the basis of the acceptance of the *supposed* ‘*vyāpya*’,—then the definition fails to apply to those cases where the urging is on the basis of a ‘*vyāpya*’ that is admitted and real;—for instance, if the Mīmāṃsaka were to argue that ‘plants and such other things are all created by the Unseen Force, because they are products’,—he would be met by the Logician with the reasoning that for exactly the same reason the things in question may be regarded as the creation of a personal Creator [and this reasoning would be a true Hypothetical Reasoning; but would not be included in the definition, as the ‘*vyāpya*’, ‘being products,’ is admitted by both parties and is real.]

(177) Then again, on the basis of the difference in the character of what is urged, ‘Hypothetical Reasoning’ has been divided into six forms—(a) ‘*Ātmāshraya*,’ *Self-dependence*, (b) ‘*Anyonyāshraya*,’ *Mutual Interdependence*, (c) ‘*Chakraka*,’ *Vicious Circle*, (d) ‘*Vyūghāṭa*,’ *Self-contradiction*, (e) ‘*Anavaśṭhā*,’

Vicious Regress, and (f) '*Pratibandhi*', *Retaliatory Argument*;—and these have been defined as follows—“(a) When a thing rests upon itself directly, without the intervention of a second thing, there is *Self-dependence*;—(b) when of two things each rests upon the other directly, without the intervention of a third thing, there is *Mutual Interdependence*;—(c) when these two—*Self-dependence* and *Mutual Interdependence*—are through the intervention of a second or third thing, there is *Vicious Circle*;—(d) the combination of contradictories constitutes *Self-contradiction*;—(e) when there is an unceasing flow of proofs and the proved, there is *Vicious Regress*;—and (f) when one's position is liable to the same charge that he has urged against the other party, he becomes open to what has been called *Retaliatory Argument*.’

(178) [The author proceeds to show that the definition of Hypothetical Reasoning as put forward by the Logician is found to be applicable to the *wrong forms* of every one of these six kinds of Hypothetical Reasoning].—(a) As regards ‘Self-dependence,’ it is regarded as wrongly urged when it is found that there is some difference in the connecting relationship; for instance, when ‘Self-dependence’ is urged against the view that ‘*cognisability* subsists in itself’ (that is, ‘*cognisability* is *cognisable*’).^{*} In some cases, ‘Self-dependence’ is not objectionable; as for instance, when it is urged against the view (held by the upholder of the theory that everything has only momentary existence) that

^{*} When we regard the jar as cognisable, ‘Cognisability’ is a property; and as such, it must be cognised; this means that, ‘cognisability is cognisable,’ i.e. ‘cognisability subsists in itself’; against this it may be urged that this involves ‘Self-dependence.’ Against this it is pointed out that there is a difference in the connecting relationship; inasmuch as the cognisability of the jar is dependent upon *the cognition of the jar*,—and this has this *cognition of the jar* for its connecting relationship; while the *cognisability* of cognisability is dependent upon the cognition of cognisability; and this has this latter for its connecting relationship. If the cognisability of the jar were apprehended by the *cognition of the jar*, then alone could there be a ‘Self-dependence,’ the cognition resting in itself; as it is however, the cognisability is apprehended by an entirely different cognition.

the jar as existing at the previous moment is the cause of the same jar as appearing at the present moment. (b) As regards *Mutual Interdependence* it is regarded as wrongly urged when the particular things concerned are different from one another; as when it is urged against the view that [in the case of remembrance] 'the cognition is produced by impressions, which have themselves been produced by cognition' [the *Mutual Interdependence* in this case would be wrongly urged, because the cognition that produces the impression is not the same that is produced by the impression]. (c) *Vicious Circle* is regarded as wrongly urged when the particular things concerned are not the same;—*E.g.* when it is urged against the assertion that 'the seed produces the sprout, from which arises the body of the tree, from which again the seed' [where the seed produced is not the same as that which has been sown]. (d) 'Self-contradiction,' is regarded as wrongly urged when there is a difference in the attendant circumstances; *E.g.* when it is urged against an assertion as to the same thing being productive as well as unproductive, such assertion being made in view of the different times and places [it being quite possible for a certain thing to be productive at one time and place, and not productive at another]. (e) *Vicious Regress* is held to be wrongly urged when, as a matter of fact, the particular action under consideration is found to be such as does not, for being effective, stand in need of an endless series of causes; that is to say, for the producing of a certain effect what is actually needed is only a particular set of causal agencies; and if it is found that, as a matter of fact, this particular set of causes, in the producing of its particular effect, does not stand in need of a further endless series of causal agencies [it cannot be right to urge against this the charge of its involving a 'vicious regress']; as if this explanation of the causal operation tending to the production of the effect were rejected, this production, which is a fact, could not be accounted for];—the 'vicious regress' urged in such cases has been called the

'*descending vicious regress*'. In some cases however the 'vicious circle' is not wrongly urged; as for instance, when a 'difference' is postulated as the basis for the idea that people have with regard to certain things (the jar and the cloth for instance) being 'different,'—and it is further held that the difference of the 'Difference' also from the objects concerned is not due to that same difference (but to another difference), then this means the postulating of an endless series of 'Differences', and as such involves a real Vicious Regress; as in this case, the postulating of every succeeding 'difference' does away with the preceding 'difference' (as no longer necessary); and there are similar other incongruities also;—such a *Vicious Regress*, is called the '*Ascending Vicious Regress*'. (f) The *Retaliatory Argument* is held to be wrongly urged when there is a distinct difference between the two sets of reasoning; as for instance, when a certain reasoning is stigmatised as vitiated by certain adventitious adjuncts, if the propounder of this reasoning turns round on his opponent with the *Retaliatory Argument* that the reasoning of the latter by which he infers (the presence of fire) from the presence of smoke is also vitiated by adventitious conditions;—this *Retaliatory Argument* is regarded as wrong, as the two reasonings do not stand on the same footing; inasmuch as the latter reasoning has the support of Hypothetical Reasoning (in the form 'if there was no fire there would be no smoke') [while there is no such Hypothetical Reasoning available in support of the former reasoning]. Now all these six 'reasonings' are found to be wrong 'Hypothetical Reasonings;' and yet how can you avoid their inclusion in your definition? [Nor can it be denied that the instances of wrong reasoning cited are really wrong; for] even though it be true that there is nothing wrong in the Reasonings themselves, yet it cannot be denied that they become wrong by being urged under the particular circumstances. *

* The reasoning would be in the form—'the presence of adventitious conditions vitiates an inference, therefore the inference of fire from smoke is vitiated.' There is

(179) "In order to escape from the said difficulties, we shall add, to our definition, a further qualification, that on the particular occasion that the Confutation (through Hypothetical Reasoning) is urged it should be free from the peculiarity of being urged under the particular circumstances noted." This also will not be right; as the definition in this case would be too narrow, not being able to include all Confutations; inasmuch as the absence of the circumstances that make 'Mutual Interdependence' wrong—*viz.* difference in the particular individuals concerned—will not be found in the case of 'Vicious Regress' [so that this latter will be excluded from the definition]; and similarly the absence of the circumstances that make 'Self-dependence' wrong—*viz.* difference of connecting relationships—will not be found in the case of other cases of 'Self-dependence'; and so on, the definition would fail to include many cases of true Confutation.

(180) Further, how can you prevent your definition of 'Hypothetical Reasoning' from applying to cases of '*Apasiddhānta*' (Shifting of Ground), and '*Virodha*' (Contradiction)? And under the circumstances, it must be held to be wrong (on the part of the Logician) to regard these two (*Apasiddhānta* and *Virodha*) as distinct '*Nigrahasāhānas*' ('Clinchers')—when they could be included in the category of that same 'Clincher' in which all other cases of 'Hypothetical Reasoning' are included!

[The subject of 'Self-dependence' and the rest has been dealt with hitherto with a view to expose the defect in the definition of 'Hypothetical Reasoning'; and it has been taken for granted that all these are real instances of 'Hypothetical Reasoning.' The Author next proceeds to show that even this is not possible. 'Self-dependence,' 'Mutual Interdependence' and the rest cannot be rightly regarded as 'Hypothetical Reasoning.']

(181) Then again, as regards 'Self-dependence' &c.,—if it be held that the premiss (expressing invariable concomitance

no doubt that the '*vyāpka*' in this case is true, as no one can object to the premiss that the presence of adventitious conditions vitiates an Inference; but when the presence of this '*vyāpka*' is urged in a case where it is not actually present the reasoning cannot but be rejected as wrong.

between the *probans* and the *probandum*), upon which is based the reasoning against which the Confutation (through *Self-dependence* &c.) are urged, is a true one, then the whole process being perfectly valid, how could the 'Self-dependence' be regarded as an invalidating confutation? If, on the other hand, it be held that the premiss is not a true one, then the reasoning is wrong at its very base [so that at the very outset being invalid, it is not necessary to urge any Confutation against it]. How can you extricate yourself from this dilemma? "But this objection cannot apply to the urging of the Confutation—of 'Self-dependence' for instance,—when it is urged in the following form:—'The notions of *container* and *contained* pre-suppose a diversity (in things with regard to whom, the notions are entertained);—if you accept this principle in the case under dispute [*e.g.* in the case of the jar depending on itself], then this should certainly imply a difference in the thing itself (which is absurd).'" This is not right; for as a matter of fact we often find the same thing being both *container* and *contained* [*e.g.* the jar is the *container* of its own colour, but is *contained* in the lump of clay out of which it is made]. "But what is meant is that it is only when two things are different from each other that one can be the *container* and another the *contained* [*i. e.* a thing can not be the *container* and the *contained* of one and the same thing; while in the case you have cited, the jar is the 'container' of one thing and the 'contained' of an entirely different thing]." This cannot be accepted; as the premiss, in that case, is made untenable by the introduction of the words 'that thing' and 'each other' [as these words restrict the premiss to definite particular individuals, and as such could not have that universal application which is meant to be carried home to the Opponent against whom the principle is urged]. "Well, we shall put forward the premiss in this form—'because this (the jar) is the *container* and this the *contained* also, it cannot

be one and the same' [so that the general principle being stated, in this particular form, with reference to each particular case, could not fail to be effective." Even this form will not be right; as the sense of the premiss in that case would be—'if this thing were the *container* &c. &c. then *it would not be itself*'; and this certainly would be a most improper assertion; as it would mean that there is an incompatibility between the thing and the undesirable contingency that is urged against it. "But the fact that the undesirable contingency is something not right is a circumstance that only strengthens the Confutation; and it is only this fact that is proved by the incompatibility that you have urged." This is not right; for if you once discard the idea that there should be a co-ordination (a connection) between what is urged and that against which it is urged, this would give rise to very undesirable consequences; so that, in that case (your premiss becoming untenable) the Confutation would fail to prove the contrary conclusion; as the contrary conclusion could only be asserted in the form—' [if this thing were the container &c., it would not be itself;] while as a matter of fact *this is this* (thing itself), *therefore it is not the container* &c.';—and this assertion is an impossible one to make; for when you speak of the thing as 'this', the subject, you cannot predicate with regard to it the same 'this', [and this is what is actually done in the assertion 'this is this']; as in this case there would be no difference in the character of the 'subject' and the 'predicate' (which is essential). Nor will it be right for you to argue that—"the Confutation itself would suffice to reject the Opponent's position, and there would be no necessity for pushing it on to the contrary conclusion." As you yourself regard the premiss as the essential basis of the Confutation; so that for the sake of the denial that is urged, you must regard it absolutely necessary that the contrary of what is sought to be denied should be fully established by proof [and this is what

would be the 'contrary conclusion,' whose validity must be brought home, for the sake of the success of the Confutation itself].

(182) For similar reasons the Confutation could not be urged in the form 'this would be something other than this (instead of 'this would not be this'). Specially as the conception of 'something other than this' being the same as the conception of difference from the specific character of the thing, the confutation urged in the said form would involve a contradiction in terms (the thing being spoken of as different from itself). And further, the contrary conclusion also would be in the form 'this is not a thing different from this,' which predicates a difference qualified by 'this' [i. e. it asserts that 'the thing is different from what is different from *this*']; so that in regard to the difference there is a predication of itself as the qualification of a qualification; a contingency which cannot be suffered by it! For 'that which is different from what is different from *this*', which is equivalent to 'what is not different from *this*,' is the same as 'this.' If the *thing itself* were regarded as the adventitious adjunct of the *Difference* (and not its essential attribute), then as it is mere unqualified *Difference* that would be characterised by that adjunct, the 'difference of this' might mean the *difference* from something else also; as it is not possible that the *thing* characterises a difference which, by itself, is of a definitely particular character; because when you speak of the difference of a certain thing, all that such an assertion need imply is that mere unqualified 'difference' in general is characterised by certain particular things; and it can not rightly be extended further, to imply that the difference thus characterised is a particular individual *difference*. Even granting that the particular *difference* is implied,—we find that the premiss upon which the Confutation is based, must be stated in a general form (in the form of a universal proposition), comprehending all the particular *Differences* that are characterised by the

adjunct in question ; and as such this premiss would present the difference in this same comprehensive form, both in the confutation and the contrary conclusion (that would be urged on the basis of that premiss); and thus it could not escape from the incongruities that we have urged above. And these same incongruities, that have been pointed out as applying to the particular case of the relation of 'container and contained', would be found in all those cases that could be cited as instances of *Self-dependence*.

(183) As regards *Mutual Interdependence*, which is urged against one who accepts the existence of difference between two things on the strength of actually finding the two things to be different,—in what form could you urge this confutation also? You could not urge it in the form—"If the cognition of difference were dependent upon a cognition which is itself dependent upon the cognition of that same difference, then there could be no cognition of the difference at all"—;—for the premiss, upon which this confutation would be based, would be an impossible one (*i. e.* not accepted by both parties); as 'that whose cognition is dependent upon the cognition of that' is a term signifying something which has been never seen [and of which no right conception could be formed; so that the premiss containing that term is incomprehensible and inconceivable]. Even if it were possible, by assuming some peculiar kind of invariable concomitance, to avoid the said discrepancy in the premiss and its inconceivability,—would be nothing to repress the objector who would simply deny the said concomitance [and even so the premiss would be an impossible one, being not accepted by one of the parties]. Similarly in all cases, of *Mutual Interdependence*.

(184) As regards *Vicious Circle*, this is only that form of 'Self-dependence' and 'Mutual Interdependence' in which the intervention of a third factor is necessary ; and as such it cannot escape from the difficulties besetting these two forms of Confutation.

(185) Then as regards *Self-contradiction, or Incompatibility*—which is held to be present in such assertions as this is non-existent' [*i. e.* being non-existent, it exists,']—in what form again would you urge this confutation? If it were urged in the form—'if it did exist, it would not be non-existent,'—then as the sentence 'it would not be non-existent' would mean that 'it would exist', the two parts of your confutation would be identical; so that one could not be regarded as the '*vyāpya*' of the other; and as such, between them there could be no such relation as that between the '*vyāpya*' and '*vyāpaka*' [which is essential for the Confutation]. And as for the other two kinds of 'Contradiction,' which depend upon the incompatibility of the natures of the things concerned, these become rejected by the rejection of '*Vyāghāṭā*' or Self-contradiction; the bull cannot be the buffalo, because the 'nature of the buffalo' is not compatible with the 'nature of the bull'; and herein alone lies the 'contradiction' of the two.

(186) As regards *Vicious Regress*, which is urged against the view that in Being, '*saṁtā*', there subsists another *Saṁtā* or *being* (by virtue of which it is regarded as *existent*), and in that another *Saṁtā*; and so on and on without end,—in what form would this confutation be urged? It could not be urged in the form—'if a *Saṁtā* subsisted in *Saṁtā*, then there would be no resting at all.' As when you accept, or you do not accept, the invariable concomitance between *the postulating of Saṁtā in Saṁtā* and *the absence of rest*,—in either case, your position would be open to objection.

(187) Lastly as regards the *Retaliatory Argument*, this has already been refuted (in para. 10, *et s. q.*).

(188) Further, every one of such (universal) characters as '*pramēyaṭva*' (cognisability), '*abhiḍhēyaṭva*' (denotability), '*vyavahāryaṭva*' (capability of being employed or made use of), '*Sannikarṣaṭva*' (being in contact), '*abhāvapraṭi-*

yogikaṭva ' (capability of being denied), and so forth,—are found to subsist in themselves [*pramāṇyatva* also is *pramāṇya*, *abhidhāṇyatva* is *abhidhāṇya*, and so on]; and under the circumstances, how can you escape from the predicament that every one of these vitiates the premiss upon which you base your rejection of such *self-dependence*? And the diversity of the connecting relationship [on whose basis 'self-dependence' is urged] also constitutes a premiss that should be free from discrepancies (in order to be rightly effective). Similarly, there are many cases where such *self-dependence* is admitted (as right);—for instance, (a) according to the theory of those who hold cognition to be self-illuminated, the cognition is cognised by itself,—(b) one who does not admit another *abhāva* is an *abhāva*, holds *abhāva* to be its own *abhāva*,—(c) in the cognition of the Self, the same Self is the cognition as well as the cognised, and the Self cognises itself,—(d) when you make the assertion 'words are expressive', in this assertion, *words* are the *objects* cognised as well as the *means* of cognition,—(e) Destruction is held to be its own destroyer,—(f) when you accept the *svarūpasambandha*, the natural relationship of things, this relation is held to be *related* by itself;—and so forth; and when many such cases of *self-dependence*, are admitted, what can be the criterion by which it could be ascertained which is a case of true (objectionable) 'Self-dependence', and which is not so?

(189) Similarly as regards *Mutual Interdependence*,—there are many cases in which you admit it (as right): For instance—(a) you hold that when sound is produced, there is a regular series of sounds produced one after the other, every one of the series having a momentary existence, being destroyed by the sound next to it; this goes on till the last sound of the series; and this last sound, as in other cases, destroys the sound immediately preceding it, and is itself also destroyed by that same previous sound, [so that there is

mutual interdependence between the last and the last but one sound, in the matter of their destruction];—(b) in a case where two concepts are of equal extent, both equally being the invariable concomitants of each other, you admit that each is the 'vyāpya' as well as the 'vyāpaka' of the other [e.g. in the case of 'cognisability' and 'nameability', we can rightly deduce the one from the other, regarding either of the two as the 'vyāpya' or the 'vyāpaka'];—(c) when two causes are productive of the same effect, they are accepted as the auxiliary of each other;—and so on in many other cases. And under the circumstances, how can you escape from the predicament of having your definition (whereby *Mutual Interdependence* is an undesirable contingency to be avoided) vitiated by these cases?

(190) Then again, we ask—what is that distinctive feature [the presence of which makes the one case of *Self-dependence* right and acceptable, and the absence of which makes, the other cases wrong and undesirable, and on this account] the absence of which feature you would introduce into your definition of the *Self-dependence* &c., as 'undesirable contingencies'? "The distinction lies in this that in certain cases the *Self-dependence* is actually found to be not incompatible or incongruous, so that we do not regard it as wrong or undesirable." But this will not be right; as the only ground for any contingency being regarded as 'incompatible' or 'incongruous' consists in its being one that is never found to be present, and this ground is as present in the one case (of *Self-dependence*) as in the other. "But there is this distinctive feature in the contingencies accepted as right, that there are special reasons (or proofs) for accepting the contingencies as right." True, but then in the case of all those contingencies that you do not accept, let your non-acceptance be based upon this *absence of proof*, which does actually lie at the basis of all non-acceptance; and do away with such reasons as 'mutual

interdependence' (Self-dependence) and the like, which are not always regarded as undesirable!

(191) As regards the *Vicious Circle*,—Gauṭama's Sūtra itself—1. 1. 2—involves such a 'circle'; so that its undesirability cannot be regarded as universal*; specially as it is impossible to prove the absence of those peculiarities that make the 'vicious circle' undesirable; for the causal relation is held to subsist between whole *classes* (between the entire genus 'jar' and the entire genus 'clay' for instance); so that the idea of *individuals* does not enter into the conception of *causal relation*, or into that of 'Vicious Circle' †.

(192) Similarly as regards 'Self-contradiction' or 'Incompatibility,' you admit it when you regard the same thing as both *productive* and *unproductive*. You cannot urge in answer to this that there is real 'Self-contradiction' only when the *two things* refer to the same point of time (so that the *productiveness* and *unproductiveness* referring to different points of time there can be no 'contradiction' in this case). This reasoning will not be right; as you would certainly admit 'Self-contradiction' in the case of a person regarding the Jar and its *destruction* to be identical, though the two appear at different times.

Then again, the Prābhākaras also urge the following objection (against your view of 'Self-contradiction'):—Wherein lies the difference in the incompatibility or contradiction involved in the 'Neutralised Probans' and that involved in the 'Futile Rejoinder,'—by reason of which difference it should be held

* According to the Sūtra, Defects give rise to Activity, Activity to Birth, and Birth again to Defects. This involves a clear 'circle'.

† It might be urged on behalf of the Logician that there is real 'Vicious Circle' only when the matter turns upon the same *individuals* again and again; while in the case of Defect, Birth &c., the second birth is not the same as the first birth; so that the Sūtra cannot be held to involve a 'Vicious Circle.' Against this the Author points out that that what the Sūtra lays down is that *Defect is the cause of Birth*; and this statement, being analogous to the statement *clay is the cause of the jar*, must mean that the *entire genus* 'Defect' is the cause of the *entire genus* 'Birth;' so that there can be no reference to individualities at all.

that while in the former both the reasonings are rendered fallacious, in the latter it is the subsequent Rejoinder that is rendered fallacious, by the preceding reasoning? It is true that the 'Neutralised Probans' differs from the 'Futile Rejoinder' in this that it proves a different conclusion (while the Futile Rejoinder does not prove any thing at all). But you will have to admit that the *Neutralised Probans* does not really prove any thing at all, having its proving efficiency set aside by another reason of equal efficiency; or else it would not be 'fallacious' at all. So that there is 'contradiction,' 'incompatibility,' present in this case also. And thus, whether the 'contradiction' of the Reason be by itself (as in the case of the Futile Rejoinder), or by another Reason, which must follow in its wake, (as in the case of the Neutralised Probans),—the 'self-contradiction,' or 'incompatibility,' is there all the same; and there is no effective difference between the two cases. "But if there is 'self-contradiction' in that case—let there be so; that does not affect its 'neutralised' character." It will not be right for you to argue thus; for [if there be real contradiction in this, then as both reasonings will have proceeded on the basis of correct premisses, the conclusions of both would have to be regarded as true; so that] how could you avoid the contingency that from one of the reasonings it would follow that Sound is eternal, and from the other that Sound is non-eternal? "Such a contingency would be precluded by the force of that valid proof which establishes the contradiction between the two (eternality and non-eternality) [that the two are contradictory to one another being an established fact, it is impossible for them to be attributed to the same object]." This is not right; just as we make the assertion—'both eternality and non-eternality would belong to the same thing,'—in the same manner we could also make the assertion— both contradictory and non-contradictory attributes could belong to the same thing'; and how could you prevent me from making this assertion? "All this

would be possible if the reasonings were not subject to the fallacy of being *neutralised*." In that case, you will have to admit that one of the two reasonings, having its efficiency destroyed by the other, cannot be regarded as proving anything at all; a fact to which we have already drawn your attention on a previous occasion!

(193) As regards *Vicious Regress*, it is not regarded as objectionable in cases where it is supported or vouched for by valid proof; as for instance, in the case of ' *saṁtā* ' or ' Being,' an endless series of ' *saṁtā* ' or *existence* has to be postulated [on the valid ground that, as each and every Being is an entity, it must be possessed of *Samtā* or *existence*];—and in cases where it is not supported by proof (it would be something that is not known at all; so that) the reasoning that would urge such an ' unknown ' *regress* would be open to the charge of involving the fallacy of being ' *āshrayāsiddha* .'

(194) Similarly, if in regard to all those cases of *Self-dependence* &c., (which you yourself accept) it be held that they are admitted because they are supported by proof,—then, it comes to this that those cases where they are urged in confutation, are not supported by any proof; so that in these cases what should be urged against the upholder of the reasoning is the want of proof, and not an undesirable contingency (as Confutation).

[Having refuted *Tarka* proper, in its five forms, accepted by all Logicians, the Author takes up the other five kinds of *Tarka* which have been postulated by the 'older Logicians' according to the *Sarva-darshanasaṅgraha*.]

(195) There are some other divisions of *Tarka* also, based upon the character of its subject-matter; and every one of these should be dealt with in the same manner as *Self-dependence* and the rest. The five additional forms of *Tarka* are—(a) *Avinigama*, ' Suspense ' (Dilemma), (b) *Utsarga*, ' Wrong Induction,' (c) *Kalpanāgamava*, ' Com-

plexity,' (d) *Kalpanālāghava*, 'Simplicity (of the Opposite view),' and (e) *Anauchitya*, 'Impropriety.'

(196) [Page 718] Of these (a) 'Suspense' has been thus defined:—"When there are two things, with regard to which it is found that a certain character can be predicated of only one of them,—and there is nothing to determine of which one it should be predicated;—there is what has been called 'Suspense'; and like the two contrary reasons, in the case of 'Neutralised Probans,' the two factors of the Suspense tend to overthrow each other, whereby it is found impossible to determine of whom the particular character is to be predicated. An objection is raised,—Inasmuch as the predication required by the reasoning can be accomplished and accepted with reference to either one of the two things concerned, 'Suspense' cannot be regarded as a defect of reasoning [which can proceed on the basis of that predication, without detriment to its effectiveness]; all that is possible is that there might be a doubt in the mind of the person (as to the predication being possible with reference to the other thing also); but if such a doubt should appear, let it appear [it should not vitiate the reasoning]. This contention is not right; you evidently have not grasped our meaning. In the absence of any definite proof one way or the other, how could any peculiarity be found in either one of the two things, on whose strength the character could be predicated of that one (and not of the other)? But in that case what would vitiate the reasoning would be the *absence of proof*, and not *Suspense*. Not so; as the 'absence of proof' is only indicated by the 'Suspense'; so that 'Suspense' being the first to appear, it is only right that this (and not the 'absence of proof') should be urged against the reasoning. Well, if such *Suspense* (as you describe) were a defect of reasoning, then such a defect would be found in many inferences; as in most of these the conclusion (being in the form of a universal proposition) pertains to entire

classes [e. g. in the proposition, *there is fire in this place*, the class *fire* is predicated with regard to the particular place]; so that there must always be a *Suspense* as to the *specific individuals* concerned. This would not be possible; for in the case of Inference, there is nothing in the conclusion to justify the predication being referred to a number of specific individuals; the affirmation in the general form (*there is fire*) indicating the predication to be with reference to a *single individual* only; while in the case of 'Suspense,' the predication is indicated and found possible with reference to more than one individual."

(147) (b) *Utsarga*, 'Wrong Induction,' has been thus described:—"When a thing has been found to be possessed of a certain character in a large number of cases,—and to be possessed of the contrary character in comparatively fewer cases,—if, even in the face of this fact, the latter character is ascribed to it (as its usual character),—we have what has been called 'Wrong Induction.' For instance, with regard to a certain cognition of a healthy wideawake person, when there is no evidence, either one way or the other, to show whether it is valid or invalid,—and yet, without any reason, in the form of subsequent sublation and the like, that cognition is regarded as invalid,—the confutation of 'Wrong Induction' would be urged against the person thus asserting its *invalidity*; it could not be urged against the person asserting its *validity* [as cognitions are oftener valid than invalid]. It is with reference to this that we have the following declaration (in the *Shlokavārtika*)—'Thus every cognition, as cognition, being by its nature, valid,—this validity is rejected only by the recognition of defects in the agency bringing about that cognition, such recognition arising from actually finding the thing concerned to be otherwise than what is apprehended by the cognition.' Examples of this will be found in the *Īshvarābhisaṅgī* in connection with the authority of the Veda;—these examples

are such that even the Bauddha (who holds all cognitions to be inherently invalid) cannot take exception to them.

From the account that you give of *Wrong Induction*, it appears that it is only a particular form of *Doubt*, in which one of the two alternatives concerned is stronger (more reasonable) than the other; why then should this be regarded as *Confutation*? This is not right; as in the case of *Wrong Induction*, as in the case of *Supposition* (both of which are forms of *Confutation*), there is always a predilection for, and stress laid upon, only one of the two alternatives concerned (the other alternative being absolutely rejected); whereas in the case of *Doubt*, it is not so, (as in *Doubt* there is no leaning either one way or the other); so that while *Wrong Induction* pertains to only one side of the question, *Doubt* pertains equally to both sides. • This also sets aside the view that *Wrong Induction* is nothing more than the stronger of the two factors in *Doubt*; specially as (if this were true, then) *Definite Cognition* also could be regarded as that factor of *Doubt* which is stronger by reason of being brought about by causes operating upon the thing as it really exists.

But *Definitive Cognition* could be regarded as *Doubt* only if *Doubt* did actually appear in its wake, as it does appear in the wake of *Wrong Induction*. [That is, as a matter of fact, at the time of *Wrong Induction*, the *Doubt* is actually present in the Mind, the two sides of the question being still there, which is not the case with *Definitive Cognition*].

This is not right; as in every case that can be cited as an example of ' *Wrong Induction*, ' the man—who puts forward, as correct, the reasoning against which the confutation of ' *Wrong Induction* ' is urged,—believes that his reasoning sets aside all *Doubts* in the matter—[so *Doubt* cannot be said to be concomitant with *Wrong Induction*]; specially as, on the strength of the fact that there is no sublating cognition to the contrary, the reasoning in question—stigmatised as ' *Wrong Induction* '—is intended to be a perfectly valid proof of only one side

of the question (which thus leaves no room for Doubt). Thus it is found that just as *Vicious Regress* and the other aforesaid Confutations lose their vitiating efficiency only when there are sublating cognitions to the contrary, but continue to retain that efficiency so long as there is no such cognition,—so also does *Wrong Induction* [which shows that this latter is as much entitled to be regarded as a Confutation as those others].”

(198) [Page 721] (c) “ When of two reasonings—one of which is simpler and more lucid than the other—that which is less simple and less lucid is put forward, the comparative weakness of this latter leads it to be stigmatised as ‘complex;’ and thus in this case the confutation that is urged against the reasoning is called ‘Complexity.’ It is a fact of common experience that the perceptible is more easily known than the imperceptible, and also that the few is more easily known than the many. And after full discussion we have shown in our *Īshcarābhīṣanḍhi* how this ‘Complexity’ is urged against one who would have the Logician admit a distinct creator of each product, in the shape of the Earth and the rest,—and also against one who would have the Bandha admit the production of many *blu* individuals at the same time and place from each of the several efficient causes. In both these cases the ‘complexity’ helps the person urging it to be demolish (the undesirable theory).

(d) And conversely ‘simplicity’ is urged by one in favour of one’s own view, in which case, it helps to establish the desirable theory.”

(192) (e) “ When one puts a question not dealing with things that can be known by the recognised means of knowledge, and which does not admit of an answer,—we have a case of ‘Impropriety,’ also called ‘*Vaijātya*.’ There are several varieties of this, in the form of *Prashnavaijātya* ‘Impropriety of Question,’ and the rest. When a person puts

a question to one who has absolutely no knowledge of the subject of the question, he is said to commit an 'Impropropriety of Question', *Prashnavaijālyā*. For example, when the Baud̥dha puts to persons who take their stand on Pramāṇas (i. e. the Logicians) the question—' Everything being a non-entity, do you wish to affirm or to deny it?' It is with reference to this 'Impropropriety,' also called '*Vaijālyā*,' as a defect in the Opponent, that some people have declared that the best way for an intelligent man to urge this 'Impropropriety' or '*Vaijālyā*,' against the Opponent is to keep silent over the question; but others have held that when a question like the one mentioned above is put, the best way to urge the 'Impropropriety' is to say as follows—' If Devadātta is an absolutely unknown person, any question as to his being dark or fair cannot be put without impropriety.' If this 'Impropropriety' were not accepted as a defect, then in a case where a disputant having refuted an argument by urging 'irrelevancy' against it, if that 'irrelevancy' is sought to be set aside by a further charge of 'irrelevancy,' and so on and on,—how could this latter disputant be silenced, by the declaration that ' when the other disputant does not regard an answer based on irrelevancy as adequate, it is *not proper* to address to him an argument based upon irrelevancy?' How also could a disputant, who does not accept 'irrelevancy' as a 'Clincher,' gain victory over an opponent who, for fear of defeat, does not wish the disputation to come to an end, and so goes on putting a series of questions? It will not be right to hold that in a case like this what would lead to the Opponent's defeat would be the 'vicious regress' involved in such unceasing questioning. As even if this 'vicious regress' were urged, it would be met by a further question ('what is vicious regress?') and so on *ad infinitum*; and if every one of these questions were sought to be answered by being rejected as 'irrelevant,' there would be an unending series of these answers also; so that both parties

would be equally liable to the charge of 'vicious regress.

'And this defect of *Impropriety* is one that has been accepted by the rhetorician Mahima in his *Vyakṣivivēka*,—which is a work opening the eyes of poets,—as one that is extremely effective in all discussions relating to poetry."

(200) [An objection is raised against the definition of 'Impropriety' propounded by the Logician in the beginning of the preceding paragraph]—"How can it be known that a certain question—that of the Bauddha, for instance, with regard to the *non-entity*—is one that 'does not deal with things known' by the recognised means of knowledge? If, when such a question is put to a person, he keeps silent over it, and does not point out to the questioner the fact that his question is one that does not deal with things known &c.,—then the person questioned becomes open to the charge of *Apraśibhā*, 'Embarrassment;' if, on the other hand, he points it out to his opponent, in doing so, he naturally speaks of the thing concerned; so that he admits it being *known* by a means of knowledge; and thereby he admits the possibility of speaking of an absolute non-entity (with regard to which the question had been put by the Bauddha)."

To this objection, the Logicians make the following answer:—In such a case Silence is the only means of silencing the questioner. Nor would this silence make the person liable to the charge of 'Embarrassment;' as 'Embarrassment' has been defined as that condition (of a disputant) in which he cannot find an answer to a question *that is capable of being answered*. There is also another answer to the above objection: If the disputant is a strict observer of the rule that 'whatever he asserts must be right—that he will never say what is not right—except when recapitulating what his Opponent might have said,'—then we can take this defect of 'Impropriety' as one to be urged by the Umpire. [The Umpire is not tied down by the same hard and fast rules of procedure that bind the two disputants; so that] just as he

can explain things to the disputants in the vernacular also (and need not confine himself to the use of Sanskrit only), so also if he found it necessary to speak of things not exactly amenable to the recognised means of knowledge, how could it be taken objection to in his case?—Specially as that particular matter can be explained to the disputant in that manner only. So when an improper question has been put by his Opponent, what the disputant should do, in order to defend his case against the charges made against it, is to point out *to the Umpire*, the ‘Impropriety’ involved in his Opponent’s question; there being no harm in his speaking to the Umpire of things not quite vouched for by the recognised means knowledge.

“But whether the ‘impropriety’ be urged by the disputants (between themselves), or by the Umpire to the first disputant (the questioner), or to the Umpire by the second disputant, — the fact remains that there is an admission of the possibility of an absolute non-entity being spoken of; and will not this imply the admission of the ‘*asatkhyāti*’ cognition of an absolute non-entity?” Certainly it will, answers the Logician; all upholders of the ‘*Anyatḥākhyāti*’ theory do admit that there is such ‘cognition of non-entity’ in special cases—for instance, when a non-entity is put forward in a qualified form, or when a certain non-existent relation (is spoken of as subsisting between two things).

“But there are cases where the ‘cognition of non-entity’ will have to be admitted even apart from the special cases just mentioned;—*e. g.* when one speaks of ‘the child of a barren woman as something different from the horns of the hare,’ this involves the admission of the ‘cognition of non-entity’ in both the qualifying factor (the hare’s horn) and the qualified factor (the barren woman’s son).”

This is not right; for all that our ‘admitting of the cognition of a non-entity’ means is that we do not insist upon the fact that there can be cognition of a *real entity only*. What the upholders of the ‘*Anyatḥākhyāti*’ view hold is that even when a non-entity is cognised (as it is

in the case of the cognition of the barren woman's son as different from the hare's horn) it is cognised only along with an entity [in the case in question, the child and the horn being cognised along with *difference*, which is a real entity], and in no case is a non-entity ever cognised *by itself* alone. Even for one who makes the assertion that 'the child of the barren woman is different from hare's horns,' the factor of 'difference,' appearing in this conception, is one that has, in a general way, been cognised by him in connection with other things; what happens then is that while in the case of these other things the Difference has been cognised as subsisting in an entity, and as having an entity for its counter-entity, in the assertion in question it appears *otherwise*—i. e. as subsisting in a non-entity, and also as having a non-entity for its counter-entity; so that this is a clear case of 'Asatḥkhyāṣi' [the Difference appearing as *otherwise* from what it has been known before]. [Nor is there any absurdity in the two non-entities appearing as the substratum and the counter-entity of the Difference;] when the qualified non-entity can appear in consciousness, why cannot non-entities similarly appear as the substratum and the counter-entity of the Difference? "The same line of argument may be adopted by the upholder of the 'Asatḥkhyāṣi' theory also: He might for instance with equal reasonableness, argue as follows:— That an entity by itself can appear in consciousness is against our view; what happens then is that in certain cases (even though an entity might appear in consciousness, yet) it might be that either the *qualified* or the *relation*, or qualification, or such other things, though an absolute non-entity, is yet, by mistake, pointed out by the cognition, so that *Asatḥkhyāṣi* becomes admitted. And when an entity appears in consciousness, why cannot a non-entity also appear?" This argument of the *Asatḥkhyāṣivādin* would not be sound; as what the Bauḥha holds is that the qualified cognition that appears is always one that, not at all

pertaining to any real entity, points only to what is absolutely unreal, and which, on that account is called 'Asaṅkhyāṭi,' 'cognition of an absolute non-entity.' If, however, he accepts the view that has been just put forward* (wherein the appearing in consciousness of both entity and non-entity is admitted), then on this point also, as on the subject of Inference being a means of right cognition, there is no difference between the Bauddha and the Logician. "But," the Bauddha urges, "you have to admit the cognition of the absolute non-entity also (apart from the mixed cognition of entity and non-entity); for when you make such an assertion as that 'the barren woman's child and the hare's horn are like the hairs of the tortoise,' and intend to convey a definite meaning by means of these words, is there even the slightest entity that could be pointed out by the cognition arising from these words?" This is not right, the Logician will reply; as what is expressed by the words is only *identity*—a thing that has, in a general way, been cognised elsewhere,—as pertaining to a number of non-entities; 'identity' is only the unity or sameness of objects that otherwise appear, to be different; and such an identity certainly subsists in many other things also (apart from such entities as the hair's horns and the like).

(202) Even though Hypothetical Reasoning and Doubt are both invalid cognitions, and the cognition of 'Impropriety' is brought about by these, yet, as in the case of many other right cognitions (that, though brought about by a mistaken cognition, are themselves right, *e. g.* when on seeing vapour we infer the presence of fire, which is actually present)—so here also there need be nothing incongruous in a right cognition of 'impropriety of the question' being produced (in the mind of the questioning disputant) by the cognition of it in the mind of the Umpire, even though this latter cognition may be not quite valid (being hypothetical and doubtful); just as in the case of a wrong cognition, which

is sublated by another cognition, even though the real object is not as it is apprehended by that wrong cognition, and the wrong cognition itself has been sublated, yet there is nothing incongruous in the question,—‘is this cognition really wrong or right?’—; in the same manner, even though the subject of the question may not be real, yet there can be nothing incongruous in the ‘impropriety of the question’ being quite real. This same reasoning also sets aside the view that ‘we never find a cognition produced by a wrong cognition to be right.’ The same explanation may be given in all similar cases. Nor can any person take exception to the explanation or proof that we have provided for the ‘*Anyathākhyāṭi*’ theory. Specially, as if one does not accept it, in what way could we know the ‘*Aśiṣṭyāṭi*’ theory also? And not knowing the the differences between his own view and that of his Opponent, how could he take part in the discussion?

[In para. 195—202, we have a full presentation of the Logician’s account of the five kinds of ‘*Tarka*’ or ‘Hypothetical Reasoning’—*Suspense, Wrong Induction, Complexity, Simplicity and Impropriety*. The Author now proceeds to show that none of these can be maintained.]

(203) All these ‘*Tarkas*,’ if pressed, enter into—*i.e.*, become included in—either ‘*Pramāṇavirodha*,’ ‘Contrariety to Proof,’ or ‘*Prasajyābhāva*,’ ‘Absence of Proof;’ and as such they do not differ from the fallacies of ‘*Bāṭha*’ (Annulment) and ‘*Aśiṣṭi*’ (Unknown) respectively. In fact even ancient writers have treated of them as such. It is we ourselves who have raised them to the position of ‘*Tarka*.’ And it is for this reason that we are not putting forth any arguments to demolish these; for—‘even though it be a poisonous tree, if it happens to be one that has been reared by itself, it is not right that it should be cut off by him’ (*Kumārasambhava* II).

* *Tava Śre—Suspense &c.*—have not been regarded as ‘*Tarka*,’ by either *Gaṅgūla* or *Vaiśyāyana*, the oldest writers on *Nyāya*, who regarded them only as *locus* of ‘*Fallacy*.’ It is only some later writer who has put them forward as forms

(204) The Logicians also postulate six 'defects of *Tarka*'—in the form; (a) *Āshrayāsiḍḍhi*, 'Unknown Subject' [when the subject spoken of is altogether unknown], (b) *Anukūlaṭvam*, 'Favourable Character' [when the reasoning urged is favourable, and not unfavourable, to the conclusion against which it is urged], (c) *Mūlashaithilya*, 'Weakness of the basic premisses' [when the premisses upon the basis of which the reasoning is urged are not true], (d) *Iṣṭāpādana*, 'Urging of a contingency that is desirable (and not undesirable), (e) *Viparyayaṅparyavasāna*, 'Not leading to a contrary conclusion,' and (f) *Mithovirodha*, 'Mutual Contradiction.' As a matter of fact however, this account of the *Defects of Tarka* is not quite reasonable. Just as an Inference proceeds on the basis of the cognition of 'invariable concomitance' (between the *probans* and the *probandum*) and of 'presence in the Subject (of the *probans*) [the cognition of these two being expressed in the two premisses],—so also does the *Tarka* or Hypothetical Reasoning; the only difference between the two is this, that while the Inference proceeds on the basis of the *right cognition* of the premisses, the Hypothetical Reasoning may proceed even on the basis of such premisses as the reasoner himself does not recognise to be right, and which he puts forward entirely on the basis of their acceptance by the person against whom he urges the reasoning. Thus then, when we come to examine the exact character of 'Hypothetical Reasoning', we find that it is based entirely upon what is actually accepted by the person to whom it is addressed; and it can never be open to the charge of being vitiated by the defect of *Āshrayāsiḍḍhi*, 'Unknown Subject.' In fact, the only difference that there is between Inference and Hypothetical Reasoning is that while the former is based upon well-

of '*Tarka*.' And on the strength of the latter alone, the Author has introduced these in the present connexion. The refutation of these is really implied by the refutation of the fallacies; and the unnecessary, under the circumstances, of putting forward a fresh refutation, is explained in a humorous fashion.

established premisses, the latter is based upon premisses that are only accepted (as true, by one of the parties); and hence what is most logical is that, with the sole exception of the defects that may be due to this, the defects of 'Hypothetical Reasoning' must be the same as Fallacies of Reason (affecting Inferences). Hence the conclusion is that of the 'defects of Hypothetical Reasoning' postulated by the Logician, (a) the 'Unknown Subject,' (c) 'Weakness of the Basic Premisses,' and (d) 'Urging of the desirable contingency' are all included in the fallacy of the 'unknown'; just as in the case of Inference; the only difference being that, in the case of Inference 'Unknown' means 'not cognised by any valid means of knowledge,' while in the case of *Hypothetical Reasoning*, it means 'accepted or admitted';—(f) as for the defect of 'Mutual Contradiction,' it is nothing more than what is implied in the fallacy of 'Neutralised Reason';—(e) as for the defect of 'not leading to a contrary conclusion,' it cannot be regarded as a defect of *Hypothetical Reasoning*; for the fact that the reasoning that does not lead to a contrary conclusion fails to establish itself is a circumstance that is entirely different (having nothing to do with regard to the vitiating of the Reasoning itself). Then again, just as in the case of Inference, we have the fallacies of 'Annulment,' 'Contradiction' and 'Inconclusiveness,' so must they be in the case of Hypothetical Reasoning also [and yet these have been mentioned among the Defects of the latter]. 'Annulment' may be regarded as a favourable circumstance in the case of Hypothetical Reasonings other than 'Wrong Induction' and 'Supposition' [but in these two, it must be a defect]. Lastly, there is yet a seventh defect possible in the case of Hypothetical Reasoning,—in the shape of '*Āpaṭṭisāmya*,' 'Liability to similar Confutation'; it is not that we admit this; the fact is that we have already shown above (see para 163 *et seq.*) under those definitions of 'Tarka' which lay down the conditions that it should proceed on the basis

of a 'vyāpya' admitted by both parties, and of a 'vyapaka' not admitted by both parties, and so forth.

We desist from further details.

[*Concluding Remarks.*]

(205) The methods of refutation shown can be similarly employed against other definitions also. Whenever a disputant may proceed to deal with subjects other than those that we have dealt with above, the intelligent Refuter should choose any one of the several methods of refutation that we have described and bring it to bear upon the subject, either exactly in the way in which we have shown it, or with such modifications as may appear necessary. Similarly if the disputant should put forward such arguments as we have not already anticipated (and demolished),—or if he should with his keen intelligence, offer an unexpected answer to the reasonings we have propounded,—and if it so happen that the exact method of refuting these does not come to the mind of the Refuter,—what he should do is to fix upon any one word out of the several that the disputant may have used, and then to proceed to examine the meaning of that word; and in so doing he should bring to bear upon it fresh methods of refutation. And if the disputant should (by answering these arguments) press hard the intelligence of the Refuter, then the latter should fix upon another word; and so on and on, he should move from one to the other and carefully entangle the Opponent in the labyrinth of refutations. Nor would the moving from one point to the other involve an 'irrelevancy;' as the points taken up would not be foreign to the subject under discussion. Nor again would the taking up of the second point before a definite conclusion has been arrived at on the first point involve an 'impropriety,' for if such a process of discussion were 'improper,' then it would be improper also to raise any objections against Sound being a 'product,' when someone urges the argument that

'Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product' [as this would mean the raising of a question different from the question of *Sound being non-eternal*]; and this would do away with all such fallacies as '*anyaṭarāsiddha*' and the like (in which the fallacy lies in the *premiss* not being known or admitted by one of the parties). Lastly, even when the further continuation of the arguments for Refutation be found impossible, if the Refuter can prove that the arguments themselves are 'inexplicable,' '*avirvachanīya*,' this also would tend to strengthen the view that 'all things are inexplicable' (which is the view with which the Refuter has started).

Thus then—

'The procedure adopted by us is threefold : (a) the applying of the arguments described to the refutation of other subjects with necessary modifications ; (b) the applying of the same arguments to other subjects; and (c) as the last resource, to have recourse to a series of arguments.'

'In this work of mine I have purposely introduced certain hard knots; my purpose in so doing being that the wicked and ignorant, thinking themselves to be clever, may not, through sheer audacity, read the book and dabble in its reasonings;—and that, on the other hand, the gentle reader, who has with due devotion, attended upon his Preceptor, and has (through his help) got the knots made easy for himself, may obtain the experience of joy arising from swimming among the waves of the essence of Reasoning and Argumentations.'

'Here ends the work composed, for the delectation of the learned, by the blessed Shri Harṣa,—who obtains a pair of betel-leaves and a seat of honour from the King of Kānyakubja,—who in his meditation, enjoys the direct vision of Supreme Brahman, the Ocean of Bliss,—whose poetry showers sweet honey,—and whose reasonings have frightened all opponents!'

FINIS.